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, rý Abstract 
In  the  early  17th  century  Christian  IV  of  Denmark  created  a  highly  im- 
pressive  navy.  This  thesis  investigates  the  uses  to  which  the  navy  was 
put,  and  assesses  the  ships  that  were  built  to  meet  these  needs.  It  shows 
that  the  Danish  navy  was  for  a  time  the  largest  state-owned  navy  in 
Europe  and  that  the  dockyard  used  to  build  and  maintain  these  ships  was 
one  of  the  finest  in  Europe. 
The  administration  of  the  navy  is  analysed  in  detail.  It  is  shown 
that  the  lower  administration  of  the  dockyards  and  the  seagoing  navy 
was  highly  organised,  but  Christian  IV's  failure  to  reform  the  higher 
levels  of  administration  seriously  hampered  the  effectiveness  of  the  navy. 
The  navy  grew  beyond  the  bounds  of  what  the  state  of  Denmark-Norway 
could  afford  and  naval  finance  became  a  highly  contentious  issue  in  the 
modernisation  of  the  state. 
To  build  the  navy's  ships  Christian  IV  brought  in  master 
shipwrights  from  England  and  Scotland.  The  organisation  of  naval  ship- 
building  is  examined  in  detail  and  the  design  of  Danish  warships  is 
analysed.  The  Scot  David  Balfour  is  shown  to  be  one  of  the  most  innova- 
tive  and  successful  shipwrights  of  the  early  modern  period. 
The  figure  of  Christian  IV  dominates  the  Danish  navy  in  the  early 
17th  century.  He  was  involved  in  all  aspects  of  its  organisation  from  its 
use  as  a  political  force  to  the  design  of  specific  vessels.  He  created  a 
highly  impressive  navy  in  terms  of  ships  and  dockyards  but  failed  to  see 
that  it  also  needed  an  efficient  administration  to  operate  effectively. 
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1 Introduction 
This  thesis  has  developed  from  an  initial  interest  in  the  Scottish 
shipwrights  who  worked  for  the  Danish  navy.  Its  scope  was  widened 
significantly  after  an  attempt  to  find  out  more  about  how  the  navy 
operated  in  the  reign  of  Christian  IV  (1596-1648)  showed  that,  although  it 
is  highly  symbolic  in  terms  of  Danish  national  identity,  very  little  serious 
scholarly  work  has  been  carried  out  on  it. 
Christian  IV  is  Denmark's  equivalent  of  Henry  VIII,  a  grand, 
domineering  king  who  is  remembered  for  his  drinking,  his  womanising  and 
his  navy.  Like  Henry  VIII,  a  great  deal  of  mythology  has  grown  around 
this  larger  than  life  monarch.  Perhaps  the  most  famous  image  of  Christian 
IV  is  as  the  warrior  'king  on  the  deck  of  his  flagship  leading  his  navy  to 
victory  after  being  blinded  in  one  eye.  Successive  generations  of  Danes, 
in  the  face  of  military  defeat  and  a  steady  contraction  of  national  bound- 
aries,  have  looked  back  in  admiration  at  the  great  age  of  Denmark  and  at 
the  king  who  valiantly  fought  to  save  his  country.  Christian  IV  and  his 
navy  were  romanticised  in  this  climate  of  -  nationalism  to  such  a  degree 
that  it  became  difficult  to  tell  myth  from  reality. 
The  first  historians  of  the  Danish  navy  were  naval  officers  and 
their  work  is  coloured  by  overt  patriotism  and  professional  pride.  The 
first  dedicated  history  of  the  navy  came  in  1818  from  W.  Graah1,  a  naval 
lieutenant,  who  openly  admitted  that  he  was  aiming  to  put  the  Danish  ad- 
mirals  on  a  par  with  those  from  England,  France  and  Holland.  A  more 
thorough  history  came  from  a  naval  captain,  Hans  Georg  Garde,  in  18322, 
but  although  he  consulted  a  large  amount  of  source  material  he  did  not 
-- 
1. 
--- 
W. 
----- 
Graah, 
---------- 
Udkast  til  Danmarks  s`ekrigshistoriß  (Kobenhavn,  1818). 
2.  H.  G.  Garde,  Efteretninger  om  den  danke  og  norske  S*magt  (K$benhavn,  1832).  I-IV. 
2 fully  understand  the  state  administration  of  the  period  or  the  sources 
that  it  produced.  His  interpretation  was  therefore  often  inaccurate  and 
his  figures  frequently  meaningless.  His  revised  version  of  18613  was  much 
better  although  it  was  still  imbued  with  a  romantic  notion  of  the  navy 
and  perpetuated  many  of  his  mistakes  and  misapprehensions.  Another  his- 
tory  was  published  in  1875  by  J.  C.  Tuxen4,  a  teacher  at  the  naval 
academy,  who  sought  to  provide  a  popular  account  of  the  navy's  history. 
He  reiterated  the  patriotism  evident  in  the  earlier  works  and  provided 
little  new  in  the  way  of  interpretation. 
These  works  were  all  general  surveys  of  the  Danish  navy  from  ear- 
liest  times  to  their  date  of  publication.  The  first  work  to  look  specifically 
at  Christian  IV's  navy  came  from  the  pen  of  a  remarkable  priest  by  the 
name  of  H.  D.  Lind,  who  between  1882  and  1924  published  over  30  books 
and  articles  on  the  17th  century  Danish  navy.  His  book  on  Christian  IV 
and  his  dockyards  was  his  first  and,  although  very  impressive  in  the 
amount  of  information  that  it  contains,  has  some  major  flaws.  Lind's  grasp 
of  the  source  material  was  much  better  than  Garde's  but  he  still  made 
some  mistakes  in  interpreting  the  political  and  administrative  background 
to  the  navy.  His  approach  was  essentially  genealogical  and  the  majority  of 
the  book  consists  of  biographical  details  of  naval  officers  and  master 
craftsmen.  Where  he  does  attempt  to  give  some  historical  perspective  he 
is  clearly  influenced  by  the  aura  of  Christian  IV  as  a  great  monarch  and 
his  analysis  is  uncritical  and  frequently  naive.  His  genealogical  approach 
-------------------- 
3.  H.  G.  Garde,  Den  dansk-norske  SSmagts  Historie  1535-1709  (K4benhavn,  1861).  This  was  a  com- 
panion  volume  his  Den  dansk-norske  Smmagts  Historie  1700-1814,  (K$benhavn,  1852). 
4.  J.  C.  Tuxen,  Den  danke  og  norske  S  wagt  fra  de  aldste  Tider  indtil  yore  Rage,  (Kibenhavn, 
1875). 
5.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  den  Fierde  09  hans  Aland  paa  Bremerholnp,  (K$benhavn,  1889). 
3 also  means  that  he  concentrated  on  the  higher  echelons  of  the  navy  and 
more  or  less  ignored  the  common  seamen  and  craftsmen. 
The  only  professional  historian  in  the  19th  century  to  investigate 
Christian  IV's  navy  in  any  depth  was  Christian  Bruun.  His  major  work 
was  a  biography  of  the  Dutch  admiral  Cort  Adeler6  and,  although  his  sub- 
ject  did  not  join  the  Danish  navy  until  the  1660s,  Bruun  provides  some 
interesting  background  from  the  reign  of  Christian  IV.  He  also  published 
accounts  of  two  of  the  major  sea  battles  of  Christian  IV's  reign?  which, 
for  the  first  time,  began  to  strip  down  some  of  the  myths  of  Christian  IV 
as  a  great  admiral  and  shed  light  on  the  real  history  of  his  navy. 
In  the  20th  century  many  articles  have  been  published  on  various 
aspects  of  Christian  IV's  navy,  such  as  the  development  of  the 
dockyards8,  naval  strength  at  particular  times9,  and  various  aspects  of 
naval  administrationlo.  The  most  comprehensive  work  has  been  carried  out 
by  Niels  Probst,  whose  interest  in  the  technical  details  of  shipbuilding 
and  in  the  pictorial  evidence  of  ship  paintings  has  provided  the  most 
detailed  analysis  of  the  navy's  ships  to  date».  However,  although  these 
articles  have  helped  to  build  up  a  more  accurate  picture  of  Christian  IV's 
6.  Christian  Bruun,  Curt  Sivertsen  Adelaer.  (Kobenhavn.  1871). 
7.  Bruun,  Slaget  paa  Kolberger  Heide  den  1.  julf  1644  og  de  efterfelgende  Begfvenheder, 
(Kobenhavn,  1879);  'Christian  IV  i  Listerdyb'.  Danske  Samlfnger,  VI  (1871),  263-86. 
8.  Knud  Klem,  'Christian  IV  og  Bremerholm',  Handels-  og  Sofarts  Museets  Arbog,  1977,96-6;  Ole 
Eisberg  Jensen,  'Bremerholm  eher  Gammelholm',  Marinehistorisk  Tidskrift  1988/3;  P.  Wessel-Tolvig, 
Holmen  og  K#benhavn.  En  beskrivelse  of  flAdestationens  betydning  for  byens  udvikling, 
besksftigelse  og  handel',  Historiallinen  Arkistq  92  (1988),  89-107. 
9.  Preben  Holck.  'Flaadelister  omkring  Krigsaarene  1644-45'.  Tidskrift  for  S#vasen.  114,1943. 
483-504  &  545-65;  J#rgen  H.  Barfod,  'Norske  defensionskibe  og  deres  udrustning  under 
Torstenssonfejden'.  Handels-  og  SOfartsmuseets  Arbog,  (1948),  99-129. 
10.  Steffen  Heiberg.  'S$etatens  "konomiske  forvaltning  under  Christian  IV'.  Marinehistorisk 
tidsskrift.  (1/1980).  8-18;  F.  S.  Grove-Stephensen,  'Marinens  jurisdiktionsforhold  f"r  1660', 
Marinehistorisk  tfdsskrift  (2/1984).  19-31. 
11.  See  the  bibliography  for  a  full  list  of  articles. 
4 navy,  its  political  and  administrative  importance  has  still  not  yet  been 
addressed  in  any  detail.  Probst's  general  history  of  Christian  IV's  navy 
was  due  for  publication  in  199612  and  may  address  these  issues,  but  at 
the  time  of  writing  has  yet  to  appear  and  its  contents  are  unknown. 
The  fact  that  Christian  IV's  navy  plays  such  an  important  role  in 
popular  Danish  history  and  national  identity  makes  it  strange  that  so 
little  has  been  written  on  its  wider  significance.  It  is  even  more  surpris- 
ing  given  that  there  has  been  a  major  debate  and  reappraisal  of  Christian 
IV's  kingship  over  recent  years  and  that  the  navy  played  such  an  impor- 
tant  role  in  shaping  his  foreign  and  domestic  policies13. 
This  lack  of  any  comprehensive  survey  of  the  political  and  ad- 
ministrative  background  to  Christian  IV's  navy  can  be  seen  in  the  work 
of  contemporary  historians  of  early  modern  Denmark,  who  still  tend  to 
rely  heavily  on  the  flawed  and  outdated  works  of  Garde  and  Lind14, 
thereby  perpetuating  their  mistaken  premises  and  meaningless  figures. 
This  thesis  aims  to  remedy  this  situation  and  provide  a  thorough  inves- 
tigation  of  the  political  aims  and  the  administrative  workings  of  the 
Danish  navy  in  the  reign  of  Christian  IV.  It  also  remains  true  to  its 
original  aim  of  assessing  the  careers  and  methods  of  the  master 
shipwrights  employed  by  Christian  IV. 
The  thesis  is  divided  into  three  separate  sections.  Part  A  deals 
with  the  politics  of  the  navy  and  the  way  in  which  the  navy  and  the 
state  administration  affected  each  other.  The  first  issue  to  be  addressed 
in  Chapter  1  therefore  is  why  Christian  IV  actually  needed  a  navy.  The 
role  of  the  government  officials  concerned  with  the  navy  is  investigated 
-- 
12. 
----- 
Niels 
---  --- 
Probst, 
--- 
Christfan  4.  s  tiMe,  1588-1664  (K`benhavn,  1996). 
13.  See  Chapter  2  for  a  fuller  discussion  of  this  debate. 
14.  For  example  Askgaard,  Jespersen  and  Tandrup  all  use  figures  and  assumptions  based  on 
their  work:  Finn  Askgaard,  Christian  IV:  Rigets  vabnede  Arm,  (K$benhavn,  1988);  Leon  Jespersen, 
'The  Machtstaat  in  Seventeenth-century  Denmark'.  Scandinavian  .  Journal  of  History,  10  (1995), 
271-304;  Leo  Tandrup,  Mod  triumf  eller  tragediß  (Aarhus,  1979),  I-II. 
5 in  Chapter  2,  and  the  contentious  nature  of  the  navy's  political  control  is 
also  discussed.  Christian  IV  essentially  sought  to  maintain  sole  political 
control  in  order  to  influence  both  his  foreign  and  domestic  politics,  but 
the  fact  that  he  needed  his  council  to  grant  funding  meant  that  a  certain 
degree  of  co-operation  was  required.  The  complex  nature  of  naval  finance 
is  discussed  in  Chapter  3  and  the  part  played  by  the  navy  in  Denmark's 
growing  financial  insolvency  is  analysed. 
Part  B  analyses  in  detail  the  navy  and  its  administration.  The 
strength  of  the  navy  is  analysed  in  Chapter  4,  where  it  is  shown  that 
not  only  did  Christian  IV  own  some  of  the  largest  ships  of  the  time  but 
that  the  Danish  state  navy  was  the  largest  in  Europe  during  the  1620s 
and  1630s.  To  service  this  growing  fleet  extensive  naval  dockyards  were 
needed  and  in  Chapter  5  the  development  of  Copenhagen  as  one  of  the 
finest  naval  dockyards  in  northern  Europe  is  discussed.  In  chapter  6  the 
administration  of  the  naval  dockyard  at  Copenhagen  is  discussed  in  detail 
and  Chapter  7  looks  at  the  civil  and  military  organisation  of  the  sea- 
going  navy.  What  comes  out  of  this  analysis  is  that,  although  the  higher 
command  of  the  navy  was  muddled  and  politically  contentious,  the  or- 
ganisation  at  the  lower  levels  of  naval  administration  was  much  more  ad- 
vanced  than  in  many  other  countries. 
Part  C  looks  in  detail  at  the  men  who  built  Christian  IV's  navy  and 
at  the  ships  they  built.  In  Chapters  8  and  9  the  careers  of  the  state 
shipwrights  and  their  role  within  the  state  system  are  discussed,  while 
Chapter  10  looks  at  ships  built  for  the  navy  under  contract  by  private 
shipwrights.  The  section  concludes  in  Chapter  11  with  an  analysis  of  the 
different  ship  design  methods  employed  by  the  various  shipwrights  which 
shows  that  one  shipwright  in  particular,  David  Balfour,  was  highly  in- 
novative  and  ought  to  be  recognised  as  one  of  the  major  master 
shipwrights  of  early  modern  Europe. 
6 The  role  of  Denmark  has  frequently  been  overlooked  or  dismissed 
as  relatively  unimportant  in  discussions  of  early  modern  European  his- 
tory.  In  recent  years  this  situation  has  improved  to  some  extent  through 
the  endeavours  of  Munck15,  Oakley1°,  Kirby'7  and  Lockhartte.  It  is 
hoped  that  this  thesis  will  build  on  their  efforts  and  establish  the  Danish 
navy  as  an  important  European  navy,  influential  in  shaping  the  politics  of 
northern  Europe,  forward  looking  in  terms  of  its  administration,  and 
highly  innovative  in  terms  of  dockyard  development  and  ship  design. 
15.  Thomas  Munck,  Seventeenth  Century  Europe:  State  Conflict  and  the  Social  Order  in  Europe 
1598-1700,  (Basingstoke,  1990). 
16.  Stewart  P.  Oakley,  War  and  Peace  in  the  Baltic  1561)-1794  (London,  1902). 
17.  David  Kirby,  Northern  Europe  in  the  Early  Modern  Period:  The  Baltic  World  1492-1772, 
(London,  1990). 
18.  Paul  Douglas  Lockhart,  Danmark  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  1618-1648:  King  Christian  IV  and 
the  Decline  of  the  Oldenburg  State,  (London.  1996). 
7 Stylistic  Conventions 
Throughout  the  thesis  various  conventions  have  been  used.  To  limit  any 
confusion  the  Danish  titles  of  officials  and  institutions  have  been  used. 
The  Danish  form  of  proper  and  place  names  has  also  been  used,  apart 
from  Copenhagen  which  has  been  preferred  to  K(pbenhavn,  except  when 
citing  Danish  language  publications.  Some  Danish  terms  are  also  more  elo- 
quent  than  their  English  counterparts  and  have  been  used  to  simplify  the 
text,  for  example  Kejserkrig  is  used  instead  of  'the  Danish  involvement  in 
the  Thirty  Years  War'.  A  glossary  of  the  more  commonly  used  terms  is 
provided. 
The  translation  of  early  17th  century  texts  is  never  easy  and  the 
original  of  all  foreign  texts  is  therefore  given  first,  with  a  literal,  and 
sometimes  approximate,  translation  following.  This  may  interrupt  the  flow 
of  the  text  to  some  extent  but  it  was  felt  important  to  cite  the  original 
text  to  minimise  the  risk  of  any  errors  or  misinterpretations  in  transla- 
tion  being  perpetuated. 
The  original  units  of  measurement  have  been  used  throughout  but 
where  possible  the  S.  I.  equivalent  is  also  given.  The  Danish  monetary 
system  saw  many  changes  throughout  Christian  IV's  reign  and  they  are 
discussed  at  length  in  Chapter  3.  Although  the  rigsdaler  is  generally 
taken  as  £0.25  during  this  period  it  was  felt  that  the  conversion  of 
figures  would  only  serve  to  further  complicate  matters. 
8 Glossary 
Alen  Ell 
B3dsmmnd  Seamen 
Danske  kancelli  Danish  Chancellery 
HJndfmstning  Accession  charter 
Kejserkrig  The  Danish  involvement  in  the 
Thirty  Years  War  (1625-29) 
Kongens  eget  kammer  The  King's  own  Chamber 
LBP  Length  between  stem  and  stern  posts 
LK  Keel  length 
Len  A  local  administrative  region 
Lensm,  vnd  The  local  administrative  official 
Mestersvend  Senior  craftsman 
Ren  tekammer  Treasury 
Rentemester  Official  in  charge  of  the  rentekammer 
Rigsadmiral  Lord  High  Admiral 
Rigshofinester  The  highest  state  official 
Rigsrad  Council  of  the  realm 
Skriver  Clerk 
Sttndermode  Meeting  of  the  Estates  General 
Svend  Craftsman 
Torstenssonkrig  The  Danish-Swedish  War  (1643-45) 
Tyske  kancelli  German  Chancellery 
9 PART  A 
THE  DANISH  STATE 
AND  ITS  NAVY 
10 1.  The  Function  of  Christian  IV's  Navy 
1.1.  The  Danish  Navy  in  Europe 
The  age  of  Christian  IV  (1596-1648)  was  a  period  of  great  change 
throughout  Europe  with  religious  strife  and  dynastic  disputes  resulting 
in  a  state  of  recurrent  and  protracted  warfare.  It  was  also  a  period 
which  saw  many  countries  going  through  crucial  phases  in  their  evolution 
from  medieval  feudal  states  into  modern  nation  states  with  central 
governments  and  state  controlled  armies  and  navies.  These  changes  sig- 
nificantly  altered  the  political  geography  of  Europe  as  the  power  of  dif- 
ferent  states  grew  or  declined,  both  through  the  fortunes  of  war,  and 
through  states  developing  more  modern  systems  of  government  at  dif- 
ferent  rates. 
Nowhere  was  this  change  more  evident  than  in  the  maritime  powers. 
In  the  early  16th  century  Spain,  Portugal  and  the  Mediterranean  powers 
were  the  main  political  and  economic  forces  on  the  seas  of  Europe. 
However,  the  rise  of  the  Dutch  republic  and  the  expansion  of  English 
shipping  in  the  late  16th  century  saw  a  significant  shift  in  power  from 
Southern  to  Northern  Europe.  The  northern  powers  had  developed  the 
new  technology  of  the  heavily  armed  sailing  ship  which  could  easily 
defeat  the  galleys  of  their  southern  adversaries.  The  impact  of  this  tech- 
nology  saw  the  decline  of  the  Mediterranean  powers  and  the  rise  of  the 
Atlantic  powers.  Spain  and  France  held  a  foot  in  both  camps  and  the 
early  17th  century  saw  them  trying  to  adapt  to  the  changing  balance  of 
power  with  very  different  results.  France  made  a  conscious  decision  to 
become  an  Atlantic  power  in  the  1620s  and  succeeded  remarkably  well, 
while  Spain  remained  torn  between  the  two  seas  and  by  the  mid  17th 
century  her  naval  influence  had  seriously  begun  to  decline'. 
-------------------- 
1-  Jan  Glete.  Navies  and  Nations:  Warships,  Navies  and  State  Building  in  Europe  and  America, 
1500-18  (Stockholm.  1993).  I.  102-72. 
11 In  the  Baltic  Sweden  and  Denmark  had  eclipsed  the  power  of  the 
Hanse  in  the  early  16th  century  to  become  the  most  powerful  maritime 
states,  but  the  Baltic  itself  remained  largely  on  the  periphery  of 
European  affairs  until  the  rise  of  England  and  the  Netherlands  as 
maritime  powers  in  the  late  16th  century.  England's  forest  resources  were 
becoming  depleted  and  the  Dutch  had  little  to  start  with,  therefore  the 
trade  in  shipbuilding  timber  and  other  naval  stores  from  the  Baltic  be- 
came  essential  to  their  survival  as  maritime  powers.  Control  of  the  Baltic 
trade  therefore  took  on  massive  significance  and,  with  Denmark  controlling 
entry  to  the  Baltic,  she  acquired  increasing  economic  and  political  weight 
in  European  affairs.  To  safe-guard  this  position  of  power  the  Danish  navy 
expanded  well  beyond  its  previous  level. 
However,  changing  political  geography  was  not  the  sole  reason  for 
the  expansion  of  the  Danish  navy.  The  early  17th  century  was  also  the 
age  of  mercantilism  and  expanding  commercial  empires,  with  for  example 
the  Dutch  and  English  governments  fostering  the  development  of  East  In- 
dia  companies.  Christian  IV  was  not  one  to  let  a  good  idea  pass  and 
firmly  embraced  the  idea  of  mercantilism,  establishing  the  Danish  East  In- 
dia  Company  and  many  other  state  controlled  shipping,  trading  and 
manufacturing  companies.  Denmark  also  had  a  potentially  major  advantage 
over  her  commercial  rivals  in  that  she  claimed  sovereignty  in  the  north- 
ern  seas.  This  provided  certain  benefits  such  as  fishing  and  whaling 
rights,  but  it  also  meant  that  if  the  North  East  and  North  West  passages, 
which  were  being  so  eagerly  sought  in  the  early  17th  century,  were  found 
then  she  would  be  able  to  exploit  any  trade  passing  through  them  to  the 
full.  With  this  expansion  of  maritime  trade  and  exploration  the  Danish 
navy  needed  to  expand,  both  to  safeguard  Denmark's  own  trading  inter- 
ests  and  to  fully  exploit  her  right  to  levy  tolls  on  foreign  shipping  in 
Danish  sovereign  waters. The  late  16th  and  early  17th  centuries  were  also  the  time  of  the 
'military  revolution'  in  Europe  which  saw  the  size  of  armies  and  navies 
expand  rapidly  as  the  scale  of  warfare  grew2.  The  navies  of  England, 
France,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden  all  grew  significantly,  both  in  terms 
of  the  number  of  ships  in  the  fleet  and  the  size  of  individual  ships. 
Christian  IV  recognised  that  if  Denmark  was  to  survive  as  a  European 
maritime  power  then  she  too  must  keep  up  with  these  developments. 
However,  Denmark  did  not  simply  respond  to  changes  elsewhere  and 
in  many  ways  Denmark  was  one  of  the  leading  nations  in  the  naval  side 
of  the  military  revolution.  In  terms  of  the  size  of  the  navy,  the  size  and 
design  of  its  ships,  and  in  the  development  of  dockyard  facilities  Denmark 
was  certainly  at  the  forefront  of  developments.  However,  mere  possession 
of  a  large  fleet  was  no  guarantee  of  success  and  when  it  came  to  naval 
tactics  Denmark  proved  not  to  be  so  well  advanced. 
Another  important  aspect  of  the  military  revolution  was  the  growing 
centralisation  of  government  and  the  development  of  bureaucracies  to  ad- 
minister  the  growing  burdens  of  the  state.  In  this  process  navies  became 
much  more  a  part  of  government  and  therefore  took  on  far  greater  politi- 
cal  importance  than  ever  before.  The  obvious  effect  was  on  foreign  policy, 
where  political  decisions  regarding  the  navy  could  significantly  alter  a 
country's  position,  such  as  the  decline  of  Spain  as  a  maritime  power  un- 
der  Olivares,  who  unsuccessfully  attempted  to  maintain  a  diverse  range  of 
naval  interests,  and  the  rise  of  France  as  a  result  of  Richelieu's  policy  of 
establishing  France  principally  as  an  Atlantic  naval  power.  However, 
navies  could  also  play  an  extremely  important  role  in  internal  state 
2.  There  is  a  growing  literature  on  the  theory  of  the  military  revolution.  The  more  significant 
works  are:  Geoffrey  Parker,  The  Military  Revolution:  Military  Innovation  and  the  rise  of  the  West, 
1500-1804  (Cambridge,  1988,2nd.  edition  1996);  Jeremy  Black,  A  Military  Revolution?:  Military 
Change  and  European  Society  1550.180Q  (Basingstoke,  1991);  Clifford  J.  Rogers  (ed.  ),  The  Military 
Revolution  Debate:  readings  on  the  military  transformation  of  early  modern  Europe,  (Oxford, 
1995). 
13 politics,  largely  as  a  result  of  their  massive  expense,  which  can  be  seen 
to  dramatic  effect  in  the  consequences  of  Charles  I's  'ship  money' 
policies. 
Both  foreign  and  internal  politics  played  a  major  part  in  the 
development  of  Christian  IV's  navy.  Apart  from  the  obvious  power 
struggle  with  Sweden  in  the  Baltic  the  navy  played  an  important  role  in 
Christian  IV's  policy  of  bringing  Denmark  much  more  into  the  mainstream 
of  European  affairs.  His  desire  to  see  Denmark  as  a  major  European 
power,  rather  than  simply  a  Baltic  power,  can  be  seen  in  his  attempts  to 
improve  the  status  of  his  court  by  bringing  in  artists,  architects  and 
musicians  from  all  over  Europe  to  try  and  transcend  its  previous  image 
as  crude  and  uncultured.  The  navy,  as  an  adjunct  to  the  court,  received 
similar  attention  and  craftsmen  were  specially  imported  to  build  a  more 
European  style  navy.  Christian  IV's  visit  to  England  1606  was  the  most 
blatant  use  of  the  navy  as  a  diplomatic  tool  to  display  to  the  rest  of 
Europe  the  growing  stature  of  Denmark,  but  there  were  numerous  other 
occasions  where  the  splendour  of  his  new  navy  was  used  simply  to  im- 
press  foreign  powers,  such  as  at  the  royal  wedding  celebrations  in  1635. 
Paradoxically  the  navy  was  only  ever  used  in  anger  in  the  Baltic  and  the 
event  that  brought  Christian  IV  really  onto  the  European  stage,  his  entry 
into  the  Thirty  Years  War,  had  little  to  do  with  the  navy. 
The  Danish  navy  also  played  an  equally  important  role  in  internal 
politics  and  become  an  important  element  in  the  process  of  Denmark's 
transition  from  a  feudal  society  to  a  modern  state.  As  we  shall  see  in 
Chapter  2,  the  question  of  who  controlled  and  financed  the  navy  was  one 
of  the  key  issues  that  dominated  the  constitutional  power  struggle  be- 
tween  the  king  and  his  council.  Christian  IV  deliberately  built  up  his 
navy  to  increase  his  own  power  and  prestige  in  the  face  of  direct  op- 
position  from  his  council.  This  constitutional  crisis  lead  ultimately  to  the 
14 abolition  of  the  council  and  the  establishment  of  an  absolute  monarchy  in 
1660.  The  difficulties  in  financing  the  navy  also  had  an  important  effect 
on  the  modernisation  of  the  Danish  economy  into  a  tax  state3.  Admittedly 
neither  of  these  changes  were  completed  under  Christian  IV,  but  he  was 
undoubtedly  responsible  for  precipitating  the  crisis  in  the  first  place  by 
his  extravagant  spending  on  the  court  and  navy. 
Christian  IV's  navy  therefore  became  very  much  a  symbol,  both  of 
Denmark's  growing  aspirations  in  Europe  and  of  the  growing  power  of  the 
king  in  his  own  country.  However  the  role  of  the  navy  in  protecting 
Denmark's  sovereignty  in  the  Baltic  remained  its  main  function  and  it  is 
to  this  role  that  we  must  first  turn  our  attention. 
1.2.  Dominium  Maris  Baltci 
The  primary  aim  of  Christian  IV's  navy  was  without  question  to  maintain 
the  Danish  claim  to  the  dominium  marls  Baltici,  the  dominion  of  the  Baltic 
Sea.  The  foundations  of  this  claim  lay  in  the  Kalmar  Union  of  1397  when 
Denmark  achieved  dominance  over  all  the  Scandinavian  lands  stretching 
from  the  River  Elbe  in  Holstein  right  round  to  Finnish  Karelia.  However, 
despite  possessing  all  these  coastal  territories  Denmark  could  not  become 
a  significant  maritime  power  while  the  Hanse,  the  league  of  north  German 
towns,  controlled  virtually'  all  maritime  trade  in  the  Baltic. 
A  significant  change  came  in  the  late  fifteenth  century  when  the 
arrival  of  Dutch  and  English  traders  in  the  Baltic  saw  the  influence  of 
the  Hanse  wane.  This  fragmentation  of  commercial  power  enabled  Denmark 
to  impose  heavy  tolls  on  shipping  passing  through  the  Sound,  and  her 
naval  strength  began  to  be  steadily  increased  to  enforce  these  tolls. 
3.  The  most  important  works  on  the  transformation  of  the  Danish  economy  are:  E.  Ladewig  Peter- 
sen,  'From  Domain  State  to  Tax  State'.  Scandinavian  Economic  History  Review,  23  (1975).  116-48; 
Steffen  Heiberg,  'Do  ti  tinder  guld:  RigsrAd,  kongemagt  og  statsfinanser  i  1630'erne',  Historisk 
Tidsskrift  76,  (1976),  25-58;  Jens  Engberg,  Danske  finanshistorie  i  1640'ernt%  (Aarhus  1972); 
and  Leon  Jespersen,  'The  Machtstaat  in  Seventeenth-century  Denmark',  Scandinavian  Journal  of 
History,  10  (1985),  271-304. 
15 Ironically  at  the  very  time  when  the  Hanse  domination  was  coming 
to  an  end  the  Kalmar  Union  was  also  fragmenting.  Sweden  under  Gustav 
Vasa  once  more  become  an  independent  power  and  began  to  assert  her 
influence  on  Baltic  trade.  As  a  result  of  the  so-called  'Count's  War' 
(1534-35)  the  power  of  the  Hanse  was  finally  broken,  but  the  threat  to 
the  Danish  claim  of  dominion  had,  in  the  space  of  just  a  few  years,  been 
substituted  by  that  of  Sweden4. 
Whilst  Danish  claims  to  the  dominium  maris  Baltici  were  more  or  less 
justified  by  her  geography,  her  claim  to  dominion  over  the  southern  Bal- 
tic  coastal  waters  was  less  justifiable.  Admittedly  Denmark  had  owned 
possessions  in  Estonia  and  Finland  but  these  had  been  ceded  as  far  back 
as  the  14th  century.  The  impending  collapse  of  Livonia  in  the  1550's, 
however,  brought  to  a  head  the  struggle  for  naval  dominion  in  the  East- 
ern  Baltic.  Denmark  bought  back  the  island  of  osel  and  a  small  foothold 
on  the  Livonian  mainland,  while  Sweden,  Poland  and  Muscovy  fought  over 
the  remaining  lands.  Sweden's  eastern  expansion  and  growing  claims  for 
the  dominium  marls  Baltici  for  herself  angered  Denmark,  and  the  accession 
in  close  succession  of  two  highly  ambitious  and  warlike  monarchs, 
Frederik  II  in  Denmark,  and  Erik  XIV  in  Sweden,  made  war  inevitable5. 
Although  the  cause  of  the  Northern  Seven  Years  War  (1563-70)  was 
nominally  about  the  use  of  the  symbol  of  the  three  crowns  in  the  regalia 
of  the  two  countries,  the  primary  aim  for  Denmark  was  undoubtedly  to 
once  more  subject  Sweden  under  a  restored  Kalmar  Union,  and  to  gain 
undisputed  dominion  over  the  Baltic.  The  war  at  sea  proved  disastrous 
for  Denmark,  and  Sweden  was  able  to  defeat  the  combined  fleets  of  Den- 
4.  David  Kirby,  Northern  Europe  in  the  Early  Modern  Period:  The  Baltic  World  1492-1772, 
(London,  1990),  61-2. 
5.  Stewart  P.  Oakley,  War  and  Peace  in  the  Baltic  1580-1794  (London,  1992),  29-31. 
16 mark  and  Lübeck  time  after  times.  The  almost  complete  destruction  of  the 
Danish  fleet  in  a  storm  in  1566  effectively  rendered  Sweden  the  master  of 
the  Baltic7.  However  the  dramatic  gains  by  Sweden  at  sea  were  more  than 
matched  by  Danish  gains  in  the  land  campaign,  and  the  resultant  peace 
treaty  proved  much  more  favourable  to  Denmark. 
The  Treaty  of  Stettin  was  an  unsatisfactory  affair  and  was  more  of 
a  formal  cease-fire  than  a  true  peace  treaty.  The  principal  area  of  dis- 
pute  was  not  resolved  but  merely  postponed,  and  the  unworkable  com- 
promise  over  the  Livonian  lands  allowed  Sweden  to  continue  her  expan- 
sionist  ambitions  in  this  area.  The  only  decisive  result  was  the  agreed 
ransom  for  the  return  of  älvsborg  to  Sweden.  The  war  had  sown  the 
seeds  of  bitter  hatred  between  the  two  nations  and  the  inconclusive 
peace  treaty  made  a  further  outbreak  of  hostilities  inevitable  at  some 
stages. 
The  uneasy  peace  allowed  Sweden  to  continue  her  campaign  for  ter- 
ritorial  gains  in  the  eastern  Baltic,  while  in  Denmark  the  war-weary 
Frederik  II  licked  the-  wounds  of  his  navy  and  set  about  reforming  the 
state  administration.  It  is  a  mystery  why  Sweden  after  having  fought  so 
hard  to  achieve  dominance  in  the  Baltic  then  allowed  her  navy  to 
deteriorate  after  Erik  XIV's  death,  but  the  financial  strictures  of  the 
Stettin  peace  and  the  growing  commitment  of  land  forces  in  Livonia  no 
doubt  played  their  part.  So  while  the  Swedish  navy  gradually 
deteriorated  to  virtually  nothing  but  small  inshore  craft  in  a  poor  state 
of  repair  by  the  end  of  the  century9,  Frederik  II  set  about  strengthening 
his  navy,  its  dockyard  and  administration. 
--  --  -------  --- 
8.  R.  C.  Anderson,  Naval  Wars  in  the  Baltic  1522-1854  (London,  1910),  4-16. 
7.  R.  Nisbet  Bain,  Scandinavia.  A  Political  History  of  Denmark,  Norway  and  Sweden  from  1513  to 
1904  (Cambridge,  1905),  79-81. 
8.  Leo  Tandrup.  Mod  triumf  eller  tragedie  (Aarhus,  1979).  I,  62. 
9.  Michael  Roberts,  Gustavus  Adolphus:  A  History  of  Sweden  1611-16  H.  (London,  1958),  285-6. 
17 The  quest  for  domination  of  the  Baltic  was  no  vain  geopolitical  pur- 
suit.  The  levy  of  tolls  on  the  vast  volume  of  shipping  passing  through  the 
Sound  provided  the  Danish  monarchy  with  massive  financial  resources 
which  could  be  used  without  any  authorisation  from  the  rigsrad.  The 
basis  for  the  right  to  levy  these  tolls  was  that  the  Sound  was  regarded 
as  a  'stream'  passing  through  Danish  territory.  Although  this  was  a 
rather  dubious  claim  even  Grotius,  the  champion  of  the  Mare  Liberum,  ac- 
knowledged  that  enclosed  seas  and  straits  occupied  on  both  shores  could 
be  regarded  as  sovereign  territory,  and  tolls  charged  accordingly10. 
The  Sound  tolls  were  first  imposed  in  the  1420s  to  compensate  for 
the  fishing  revenues  lost  when  the  herring  migrated  from  the  Baltic", 
and  as  Dutch  and  British  trade  grew  through  the  sixteenth  century  their 
value  steadily  increased.  Then  in  1567  Frederik  II  altered  the  assessment 
of  levies  from  the  ships  themselves  to  their  cargoes,  which  virtually 
trebled  the  revenue  within  the  space  of  a  year12. 
Although  Denmark's  naval  strength  had  diminished  slightly  during 
the  minority  government  (1588-1596),  this  was  the  situation  inherited  by 
Christian  IV.  The  Hanse  had  been  ousted  from  their  dominant  position, 
Sweden's  once  victorious  navy  had  all  but  vanished,  and  Denmark  was 
reaping  the  benefits  of  the  Sound  tolls.  However,  Swedish  gains  in  Livonia 
and  the  prospect  of  a  united  Polish-Swedish  state  under  Sigismund, 
pointed  to  the  storm  clouds  gathering  over  Denmark's  Baltic  domination. 
But,  for  the  moment,  with  the  possession  of  the  strategic  line  of  islands 
of  Bornholm,  Gotland,  and  Osel  stretching  between  Sweden  and  the  con- 
tinent,  Denmark  could  be  considered  the  undisputed  master  of  the  Baltic 
Sea. 
-  ----------- 
10.  T.  W.  Fulton,  The  Sovereignty  of  the  Sea,  (Edinburgh.  1911),  347-50. 
11.  Charles  E.  Hill,  The  Danish  Sound  Dues  and  the  Command  of  the  Baltic  (Durham,  N.  C.,  1926), 
11-12. 
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18 This  situation  did  not  last  long,  however.  Sweden  had  gained  per- 
manent  control  of  Estonia  and  Narva  in  1595,  and  then  joined  the  war  of 
succession  in  Muscovy  in  search  of  further  territorial  advantage  in  the 
area.  The  election  of  Sigismund  III,  rather  than  uniting  Sweden  and 
Poland,  occasioned  a  bitter  war  between  the  two  countries,  and  the  sub- 
sequent  privateering  and  blockading  by  the  two  countries  significantly 
affected  Denmark's  toll  revenues. 
Also  affecting  Sound  toll  revenues  was  the  free  trade  agreement 
between  Denmark  and  Sweden,  dating  from  the  time  of  Hanse  domination. 
Initially  this  exemption  from  paying  Sound  tolls  made  little  impact  since 
most  of  Sweden's  comparatively  negligible  trade  went  via  the  southern 
Baltic  ports.  However  from  around  1600  her  exports  of  iron,  copper  and 
forest  products  steadily  increased  and  foreign  goods  were  now  also 
beginning  to  be  carried  in  Swedish  owned  ships13.  This  double  blow  to 
Sound  toll  revenues,  and  therefore  royal  power,  was  not  taken  lightly  by 
Christian  IV. 
From  the  very  start  of  his  reign  Christian  IV  was  clearly  bursting 
to  re-open  the  unfinished  business  of  the  Northern  Seven  Years  War,  and 
finally  give  to  Sweden  the  blow  which  would  enable  the  restitution  of  the 
Kalmar  Union.  The  territorial  gains  of  Sweden  in  the  eastern  Baltic  and 
the  subsequent  disruption  of  trade  there,  as  well  as  the  issue  of  Sound 
toll  exemption,  provided  only  some  of  many  excuses  for  Christian  IV  to 
declare  war  and  after  many  years  of  wrangling  with  the  pacific  rigsrid 
he  finally  manipulated  their  consent  in  1611. 
The  much  strengthened  navy  proved  a  valuable  tool  in  the  ensuing 
Kalmar  War  (1611-1613).  The  poor  Swedish  fleet  dared  not  risk  a  full  scale 
naval  encounter  and  resorted  solely  to  opportunistic  harrying  of  the 
Danes.  Such  was  the  Danish  superiority  that  on  more  than  one  occasion 
-  ----------- 
13.  Tandrup.  Mod  triumf  eller  tragedie`  I,  67-70. 
19 the  Swedes  scuttled  their  ships  rather  than  risk  defeat  and  see  their 
ships  incorporated  into  the  Danish  navy.  This  naval  superiority  left  the 
Danes  free  to  bombard  coastal  defences  almost  at  will  and  enabled  the 
capture  of  both  Kalmar  and  Mlvsborg.  It  was  also  able  to  enforce  a  suc- 
cessful  blockade  of  Sweden,  preventing  goods  and  mercenaries  coming  in 
from  either  the  west  or  the  south.  However,  it  was  unable  to  strike  the 
final  blow  and  completely  eradicate  the  Swedish  navy,  as  at  one  stage 
seemed  possible14. 
Despite  the  overwhelming  Danish  success  at  sea  the  land  campaign 
reached  a  stalemate,  with  Denmark  having  achieved  the  greater  success. 
The  young  Gustav  Adolf  inherited  a  kingdom  at  war  on  three  fronts  and 
with  the  advice  of  Oxenstierna  sued  for  peace  with  Denmark  to  con- 
centrate  on  Sweden's  campaigns  in  the  eastt5. 
The  resultant  Knaergd  peace  treaty  on  the  surface  reflected  the 
Danish  victory,  with  Sweden  capitulating  to  almost  all  of  the  Danish 
demands.  However,  Christian  IV  had  been  unable  to  deliver  the  crushing 
victory  he  had  hoped  for  and  Danish  territorial  gains  were  minimal. 
Sweden  gave  up  her  claims  on  Finmark  and  the  fort  of  Sonnenburg  on 
Osel,  and  Alvsborg  was  ransomed  at  a  price  of  one  million  rigsdaler,  which 
Christian  IV  confidently  hoped  would  prove  impossible  and  therefore 
default  to  Denmark.  However,  this  was  hardly  adequate  territorial  compen- 
sation  for  Swedish'  advances  in  the  east  if  Denmark  was  to  preserve  its 
balance  of  power  in  the  Baltic.  The  free  trade  agreement  was  also  rein- 
forced  and  Sweden  was  granted  permission  to  levy  tolls  on  shipping  at 
Riga. 
------------------- 
14.  Anderson,  Naval  Wars  in  the  Baltic,  29-35. 
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20 The  harsh  terms  of  the  treaty  with  respect  to  the  Alvsborg  ransom 
in  fact  proved  much  more  to  Sweden's  benefit  in  the  long  run.  Britain 
and  the  United  Provinces  feared  for  the  consequences  of  Danish  aggran- 
disement  on  their  trade.  The  Sound  tolls  had  been  increased  for  the 
duration  of  the  war  and  official  Dutch  protests  were  met  with  an  arrogant 
dismissal  by  Christian  IV.  Alarmed  at  this  disrespect  and  the  prospect  of 
a  Danish  monopoly  in  the  Baltic  they  allied  themselves  with  Sweden  as  a 
safeguard  -against  any  further  machinations  by  Denmark.  This  fifteen  year 
defensive  alliance  proved  invaluable  to  Sweden,  who  had  previously  been 
without  any  western'  allies  at  all,  and  to  a  large  extent  made  possible  the 
payment  of  the  Alvsborg  ransom16.  Ominously  the  Dutch  also  promised  to 
respect  Sweden's  dominium  maxis  Balticf'r. 
The  Knaer4pd  treaty  has  been  likened  to  the  Versailles  peace  treaty18 
and  was  regarded  by  all  the  players  as  unsatisfactory.,  There  is  no 
doubt  that  Gustav  Adolf  concluded  peace  to  play  for  time  whilst  he  dealt 
with  Sweden's  conflicts  in  'the  east,  and  that  he  would  later  come  back  to 
the  conflict  with  Denmark  at  a  more  advantageous  time.  Christian  IV  had 
failed  in  his  primary  objectives  and  the  harsh  terms  back-fired  in  his 
standing  in  international  diplomacy.  Further  conflict  would  prove  in- 
evitable  between  the  two  nations  in  their  fight  for  Baltic  supremacy.  As 
Leo  Tandrup  put  it:  it  was  a  bad  war  and  it  resulted  in  a  bad  peacelo. 
Peace  with  Denmark  enabled  Sweden  to  push  her  advantage  in  her 
fight  with  Muscovy  and  the  territorial  gains  from  the  resultant  Stolbova 
peace  treaty  of  1617  gave  her  an  unbroken  coastline  from  Kalmar  through 
---  -  --------  --- 
16.  Roberts,  Gustavus  Adolphus,  I,  71-2. 
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19.  Tandrup,  Mod  triumf  eher  tragedie,  I,  219-223. 
21 to  Estonia.  In  its  turn  the  Stolbova  peace  enabled  the  Swedish  fight  to  be 
concentrated  against  Poland  and  after  faltering  gains  in  Livonia,  Riga  was 
captured  in  1621,  and  Danzig  subjected  to  an  enforced  neutrality  in  1623. 
Whilst  these  Swedish  gains  were  being  added  to  her  growing  empire 
the  issue  of  free  trade  with  Denmark  was  being  stretched  to  breaking 
point.  Sweden  had-imposed  an  indirect  sales  tax  which  was  seen  by 
Danish  merchants  as  a  toll  in  contravention  of  the  Stettin  agreement.  In 
addition  Sweden  was  now  levying  tolls  on  the  southern  Baltic  and  was  at- 
tempting  to  gain  exemption  from  the  Sound  tolls  for  trade  with  her  newly 
gained  territories. 
This  was  clearly  a  threat  to  Danish  sovereignty  in  the  Baltic  and  in 
1622  Christian  IV  gained  the  rigsrJds  sanction  to  resist  this  threat  by 
banning  the  transport  of  Swedish  war  goods  through  Danish  sovereign 
waters-20  >  Christian  IV  also  banned  all  warships  and  war  materiel  from 
passing  the  Sound  and  sanctioned  high  handed  and  malicious  customs  in- 
spections  on  all  Swedish  shipping.  Finally  in  1623  tolls  were  imposed  on 
Swedish  shipping  as  a  direct  retaliation  over  the  sales  tax  issue21. 
Christian  IV  was  keen  to  deliver  a  decisive  show  of  force  to 
preserve  his  supremacy  against  Sweden.  However,  in  the  meantime  Gustav 
Adolf  and  the  Swedish  riksrid  had  concluded  a  truce  with  Poland  and 
were  well  prepared  to  meet  any  Danish  aggression.  Only  the  Danish 
rigsräd  sought  to  preserve  the  peace  and  forced  a  border  meeting  at 
Knaerpd  in  1624.  Despite  blustering  threats  from  Christian  IV  he  knew  that 
his  army  and  navy  had  been  starved  of  funds  by  the  rigsracR2,  and 
were  in  no  fit  state  to  engage  a  battle-ready  Swedish  force.  The  Swedes 
-------------------- 
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ninger  til  rigsraad  og  standermfdernes  historie  f  Kristian  IV's  tid  (KKbenhavn,  1883-90),  I,  336-7. 
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22.  Erslev,  rigsraad  og  stwnderm*dernes  historiq  I,  401-2. 
22 also  knew  they  held  the  upper  hand  and  tried  to  use  their  superiority  to 
wrest  control  of  the  Sound  from  Denmark.  In  this  they  failed,  but  on  all 
other  points  Christian  IV  was  forced  to  agree  to  a  humiliating  capitulation 
which  re-imposed  the  former  free  trade  agreement  and  ensured  free  pas- 
sage  of  Swedish  war  materiel  through  the  Sound23. 
The  1624  Knaer(Od  incident  marks  the  decisive  moment  when  the 
dominium  maris  Baltici  slipped  permanently  from  Denmark's  grasp.  The 
relative  power  of  the  two  Baltic  nations  was  now  finely  balanced,  but  with 
the  scale  inexorably  tipping  in  Sweden's  favour24.  Before  the  treaty  Den- 
mark  was  recognised  as  the  superior  Baltic  power  but  a  humiliating  climb 
down  at  once  strengthened  Sweden's  and  diminished  Denmark's  standing 
in  international  circles. 
Meanwhile  Christian  IV's  expansionist  policy  in  northern  Germany 
had  not  been  as  successful  as  he  might  have  hoped.  In  an  effort  to 
retain  his  standing,  in  international  affairs  after  the  KnaerOd  treaty  he 
hastily  concluded  an  agreement  with  England  which  allowed  him  to  lead 
the  fight  in  Germany  as  head  of  the  Evangelical  League.  A  quick  success 
here  he  hoped  would  also  strengthen  his  position  in  relation  to  Sweden25. 
Denmark's  involvement  in  the  Thirty  Years  War  (1625-29),  known  as 
the  Kejserkrig,  made  little  demands  on  the  navy  in  the  Baltic,  apart  from 
coastal  blockades,  until  the  latter  stages  of  the  war.  This  dramatically 
changed  in  1627  when  Imperial  troops  overran  Jutland,  and  threatened  to 
push  on  to  take  the  Danish  islands.  Superior  Danish  naval  strength  was 
instrumental  in  thwarting  this  threat,  and  the  rigsrad  noted  that  the 
------  -  ----  --  --- 
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23 navy  was  'al  Danmarkis  (nest  Gud)  den  stOrste  defens  udi  done 
besvaerlige  tid'  (all  Denmark's  greatest  defence,  next  to  God,  in  these 
troubled  times)°.  However,  Denmark's  disastrous  land  campaign  had  led 
the  Habsburgs  to  contemplate  the  possibility  of  taking  control  of  the  Bal- 
tic  for  themselves  and  a  grand  plan  was  conceived  which  would  unite  the 
Spanish  and  Polish  fleets  in  the  Baltic.  Preparations  were  also  begun  in 
Wismar  for  the  building  of  an  Imperial  fleet  and  in  1628  Wallenstein  as- 
sumed  the  grandiose  title  of  General  of  the  Baltic  and  Oceanic  Seas27. 
To  combat  this  threat  Sweden  agreed  to  support  Denmark  in  her 
fight  and  a  three  year  alliance  was  concluded  in  April  1628.  This  was  no 
great  pact  of  friendship  but  a  tactical  manoeuvre  which  both  sides  hoped 
would  preserve  their  national  security.  After  Jutland  had  been  overrun 
Denmark  was  wary  of  a  threatened  sea-borne  invasion  of  her  islands  and 
was  keen  to  sue  for  peace  on  favourable  terms.  An  alliance  with  Sweden 
greatly  strengthened  her  bargaining  position.  Sweden,  on  her  part,  knew 
that  if  Denmark  capitulated  there  would  be  little  to  stop  the  Imperial 
forces  from  launching  an  attack  against  her.  Gustav  Adolf  had  also  made 
the  decision  to  involve  himself  in  the  German  war  but  needed  Denmark  to 
maintain  the  fight  until  his  war  with  Poland  was  ended  and  Sweden  was 
in  a  more  able  position  to  launch  an  attack  in  Germany.  By  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  Sweden  was  to  provide  eight  warships  to  strengthen  the 
Danish  navy  and  in  return  Denmark  was  to  stop  the  passage  of  any  ships 
sailing  to  Danzig.  Although  the  treaty  was  limited  it  was  significant  in  that 
the  two  Scandinavian  powers  suspended  their  contest  for'  the  dominium 
marls  Baltici  to  see  off  the  threat  from  a  third  party2s. 
------------------- 
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24 The  test  of  the  alliance  was  not  long  in  coming.  Wallenstein  had 
found  Wismar  an  unsuitable  naval  base  and  had  therefore  also  decided  to 
take  Stralsund,  and  laid  siege  to  the  town  in  May  1628.  An  Imperial  vic- 
tory  here  would  give  them  control  of  virtually  the  whole  north  German 
coast,  the  consequences  of  which  would  have  been  grave  for  both  Den- 
mark  and  Sweden.  The  relief  of  the  siege  by  the  combined  Scandinavian 
forces  gave  each  party  what  they  wanted.  Denmark  had  gained  an  impor- 
tant  bargaining  counter  for  her  peace  negotiations,  and  Sweden  had 
gained  a  foothold  in  north  Germany  and  a  valid  excuse  for  entry  into  the 
conflict. 
In  1629  the  Danish  navy  was  able  to  further  strengthen  Denmark's 
hand  in  the  peace  negotiations.  One  squadron  mounted  a  successful 
blockade  of  Wismar,  whilst  a  force  of  150  warships  and  transports  enabled 
the  landing  of  ten  thousand  troops  in  Slesvig  to  cut  off  the  Imperial 
forces  in  northern  Jutland29. 
Despite  these  successes  the  terms  demanded  for  peace  were  still 
unacceptable  to  Christian  IV.  In  a  last  throw  of  the  dice  he  invited  Gus- 
tav  Adolf  to  a  border  meeting  at  Ulvsbäck.  Ostensibly  this  was  to  discuss 
how  the  two  countries  might  defeat  the  Habsburgs  maritime  pretensions 
once  and  for  all.  However  Christian  refused  to  co-operate  on  any  matter 
and  the  meeting  ended  in  acrimony.  The  meeting  had,  however,  served  its 
true  purpose  for  Christian  IV  in  displaying  a  facade  of  Scandinavian 
unity.  Wallenstein  hurriedly  settled  the  peace  negotiations  which  proved 
more  than  generous  to  Denmark  in  the  circumstances.  The  treaty  of 
Lübeck  has  been  described  as  'the  greatest  diplomatic  coup  in  Danish 
history'30,  and  although  Christian  IV  was  excluded  from  the  Lower  Saxon 
Circle,  no  Danish  territory  was  lost,  nor  did  Denmark  have  to  pay  any 
------------------- 
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25 form  of  reparation. 
Christian  IV  may  have  succeeded  in  his  short  term  aims  with  his 
pretence  at  Ulvsbäck  but  the  long  term  consequences  were  bleak.  If  Gus- 
tav  Adolf  were  to  fail  to  keep  the  Imperial  forces  at  bay  the  Baltic  would 
then  be  open  to  Habsburg  domination.  However,  if  he  were  to  succeed 
then  Sweden  would  be  the  undisputed  master  of  the  Baltic.  Either  way 
Denmark  had  irrevocably  lost  her  control.  Coupled  with  this  Christian  IV 
had  also  lost  the  respect  of  her  western  allies  and  Denmark  could  no 
longer  to  be  regarded  as  a  European  state  of  the  first  rank.  The  original 
aims  of  the  war  had  been  reversed  completely  and  Christian  IV's  personal 
humiliation  was  total31. 
Sweden's  truce  of  Altmark  with  Poland,  and  the  subsequent  suc- 
cesses  of  Gustav  Adolf  in  Germany  left  no-one  in  doubt  as  to  who  was 
the  new  master  of  the  Baltic.  Sweden  controlled,  and  levied  tolls  on,  vir- 
tually  the  entire  southern  Baltic  coastline.  Christian  IV  recognised  the 
danger  of  Sweden  enlarging  its  area  of  lus  Dominij  Maris  BalticP2  and 
warned  the  rigsrid  in  1630  that  a  fleet  still  needed  to,  be  maintained  to 
prevent  any  further  encroachment  on  Denmark's  sovereignty,  but  Danish 
policy  in  the  Baltic  remained  somewhat  hesitant  in  the  years  immediately 
after  the  peace  of  Lübeck. 
However,  the  death  of  Gustav  Adolf  in  1632  and  the  subsequent 
reverses  experienced  by  the  Swedes  on  the  continent  emboldened  Chris- 
tian  IV  to  once  again  re-assert  his  claims  on  the  Baltic33.  He  asked  the 
rigsrAd  in  December  1632  how  'Rigets  Rettighed  over  Ostersipen  kunde 
--------  -  ---  ---- 
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26 haevdes  og  en  flaade  holdes  udrustet'  (the  state's  sovereignty  over  the 
Baltic  could  be  reinforced  and  a  navy  kept  mobilised),  to  which  they 
responded  with  the  granting  of  a  corn  tax34.  A  naval  rebuilding 
programme  was  also  begun  and  the  navy  was  put  in  a  state  of  readiness 
in  what  amounted  to  a  state  of  armed  neutrality. 
By  the  mid  1630s  Christian  IV  was  in  a  position  to  resume  his  ag- 
gressive  attitude  to  Baltic  politics.  Prompted  by  the  impending  end  of  the 
truce  between  Sweden  and  Poland,  the  fleet  was  ordered  to  be  as  strong 
as  possible  in  1635  and  1400  new  seamen  were  to  be  recruited36.  This 
mobilisation  may  simply  have  been  a  precautionary  measure  but  the  fact 
that  excuses  were  ready  prepared  for  the  Emperor  in  case  he  questioned 
the  'Starcke  ausrustung  zur  Sehe'36  (strong  mobilisation  at  sea)  would 
suggest  that  Christian  IV  saw  the  impending  outbreak  of  hostilities  as  an 
opportunity  to  regain  power  over  the  Southern  Baltic.  The  negotiations 
leading  to  the  Peace  of  Prague  in  May  1635,  which  would,  have,  sig- 
nificantly  strengthened  the  Imperial  position  in  northern  Germany,  could 
also  have  also  been  a  factor  in  Christian  IV's  thinking.  In  any  case  the 
Swedish-Polish  truce  was  renewed  and  the  peace  of  Prague  proved  to  be 
elusive.  The  new  recruits  were  stood  down37  and  the  main  Danish  fleet 
went  after  pirates  off  Norway  instead. 
Poland  had  now  begun  to  be  seen  as  a  major  threat  to  Danish 
pretensions  in  the  Baltic  with  its  small  but  growing  fleet.  It  had  also 
begun  to  levy  tolls  on  shipping  entering  Danzig,  clearly  violating 
Denmark's  claims  of  sovereignty.  Christian  IV  met  this  threat  with  force 
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27 and  two  Polish  warships  were  seized  off  Danzig  in  163738.  He  also  had  a 
pamphlet  published  in  1638  entitled  Mare  Balticum  which  laid  out 
Denmark's  claims  to  dominion,  aimed  at  the  Polish  infringements39,  and 
wrote  directly  to  the  king  of  Poland  threatening  action  unless  the  Danish 
dominium  was  recognised40. 
Christian  IV's  renewed  aggressive  Baltic  stance  soon  made  itself  felt 
on  his  Sound  toll  politics  and  he  began  to  regulate  once  more  the  passage 
of  war  goods  through  the  Sound41.  In  1639  the  Sound  tolls  were  raised 
by  1%  while  at  the  same  time  the  units  of  measure  were  reduced,  result- 
ing  in  a  virtual  doubling  of  revenue42.  This  naturally  infuriated  the 
Dutch  who  sent  a  delegation  to  negotiate  a  reduction.  This  was  met  with 
belligerence  by  Christian  IV  and  the  Dutch  attempted  an  unsuccessful 
boycott  of  the  Sound.  There  then  came  rumours  of  a  fleet  of  300  Dutch 
sail  which  was  to  attempt  to  force  the  Sound  without  paying  dues.  This 
threat  was  met  by  an  immediate  mobilisation  of  the  Danish  navy  and  35 
warships  assembled  in  readiness  in  the  Sound43.  Nothing  actually  came  of 
the  threat  but  Christian  IV  did  relent  to  Dutch  pressure  and  agreed  to 
certain  concessions,  including  the  publication  of  the  first  table  of 
tariffs". 
Dutch  annoyance  with  Denmark  was  further  compounded  with  the 
sending  of  a  Danish  ambassador  to  Spain  and  the  apparent  possibility  of 
an  alliance  between  the  two  countries.  Sweden  was  also  becoming  incensed 
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39.  Hill,  Danish  Sound  Dues,  108-9. 
40.  Lette  r  to  Frederik  Günther,  January  1638,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV.  172-4. 
41.  Füll,  Danish  Sound  Dues,  109-114. 
42.  Hill,  Danish  Sound  Dues,  115. 
43.  Navy  list  7  May  1640.  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  333-6. 
44.  Hill,  Danish  Sound  Dues,  118-121. 
28 with  Denmark's  increasingly  aggressive  and  insensitive  attitude.  This 
reached  a  climax  when  Danish  ships  were  used  in  the  escape  of  the 
Swedish  queen  mother  and  her  subsequent  residence  in  Denmark.  The 
natural  conclusion  was  a  renewed  defensive  alliance  between  Sweden  and 
the  Netherlands  against  Danish  aggression,  which  was  signed  in  164045. 
During  the  1640s  Denmark  continued  her  aggressive  stance  in  the 
Baltic  and  there  were  numerous  petty  disputes  over  salutes  and  the  like. 
Despite  the  raising  of  tolls  in  1639  revenues  began  to  decline  once  more 
in  1642,  and  to  compensate  ever  more  vigorous  and  thorough  visitations 
were  made  on  shipping  passing  through  the  Sound.  Then  in  1643  Denmark 
blockaded  Hamburg  and  started  to  levy  tolls  on  shipping  off  Rügen,  which 
directly  affected  Swedish  war  supplies46.  At  the  same  time  Christian  IV 
was  presenting  himself  as  a  mediator  in  the  Thirty  Years  War,  and  al- 
though  he  was  claiming  impartiality,  the  Swedes  naturally  feared  for  the 
consequences  of  a  peace  brokered  by  her  avowed  enemy4r. 
The  situation  had  now  become  intolerable  to  Sweden  and  in  1643  the 
riksdag  resolved  to  proceed  with  a  pre-emptive  attack  on  Denmark  with 
the  intentions  of  removing  Christian  IV  from  the  negotiating  table  and  of 
gaining  control  of  the  Sound.  Christian  IV  completely  failed  to  see  the 
impending  danger,  and  the  Swedes  were  able  to  capture  Jutland  almost 
unopposed.  This  was  the  start  of  the  so-called  Torstenssonkrig  (1643-45). 
The  Swedish  land  forces  were  undeniably  far  superior  to  Denmark's 
but  at  sea  the  story  was  different.  The  Danish  navy  had  been  steadily 
built  up  during  the  1630s  while  the  Swedes  had  let  theirs  diminish  while 
their  war  effort  was  concentrated  in  Germany.  Although  the  Danish  fleet 
was  not  in  a  state  of  readiness  the  timing  of  the  Swedish  attack  in 
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29 December  allowed  a  full  mobilisation  to  be  completed  for  the  summer  sail- 
ing  season.  To  meet  this  threat  Louis  de  Geer  was  charged  with  raising  a 
fleet  in  the  Netherlands  to  join  the  Swedes  in  the  Baltic.  Although  official 
reaction  by  the  States  General  was  cool  since  Sweden  had  violated  their 
treaty  by  declaring  war  without  prior  consultation,  there  were  enough 
disgruntled  merchants  who  jumped  at  the  possibility  of  seeing  the  Danish 
control  of  the  Sound  broken  to  see  a  fleet  of  thirty  sail  assembled.  They 
sailed  initially  to  aid  the  Swedish  forces  in  Holstein  and  before  they 
could  head  for  the  Baltic  they  were  met  by  two  separate  small  Danish 
squadrons.  These  squadrons  failed  to  link  up*  but  were  able  to  inflict 
successive  defeats  on  the  Dutch  who  only  just  managed  to  escape  before 
their  complete  destruction. 
Meanwhile  the  Swedish  navy  was  preparing  to  launch  an  attack  in 
the  Baltic  and  the  Danish  squadrons  hastily  made  their  way  back.  They 
returned  to  find  that  the  Swedes  had  already  captured  the  island  of 
Femern  and  were  about  to  launch  an  attack  on  Copenhagen.  The  two 
fleets  met  off  Kolberger  Heide  'and  an  all  out  battle  between  the  two 
countries'  navies  was  fought  out.  The  result  was  hotly  disputed  with  both 
sides  claiming  victory,  but  in  the  aftermath  the  Danes  were  able  to  com- 
mand  a  position  of  strength  by  blockading  the  Swedes  in  Kiel  fjord. 
However,  despite  continual  Danish  manoeuvring  and  abortive  strikes  the 
Swedes  after  three  weeks  were  able  to  slip  through  the  blockade  at 
night,  unnoticed  by  the  Danes. 
From  a  seemingly  overwhelming  position  of  strength  Denmark  now 
found  herself  hopelessly  divided.  The  Swedes  had  escaped  and  at  the 
same  time  a  second  Dutch  fleet  was  entering  the  Baltic  to  join  them. 
Christian  IV  made  a  decisive  tactical  error  by  dividing  his  fleet  into 
three  to  search  out  both  enemies  at  once.  This  policy  met  with  disaster. 
The  Swedes  and  Dutch  managed  to  meet  up  unhindered  and  pounced  on 
one  of  the  smaller  Danish  squadrons.  Of  the  seventeen  Danish  ships  ten 
30 were  taken  as  prizes  and  only  two  made  it  back  safely  to  Copenhagen. 
The  balance  of  sea  power  had  altered  decisively  in  Sweden's  favour  and 
only  the  lateness  of  the  season  prevented  an  all  out  assault  on 
Copenhagen.  By  the  end  of  the  campaign  the  Danish  navy  had  lost  around 
a  quarter  of  its  ships  and  over  a  third  of  its  potential  firepower.  But 
despite  this  crushing  defeat  the  Danish  navy  had  succeeded  in  deterring 
a  Swedish  assault  on  the  islands  which,  had  it  been  successful,  would 
have  had  disastrous  consequences. 
While  these  events  were  taking  place  an  official  Dutch  navy  under 
the  command  of  de  Witt  had  convoyed  a  fleet  of  merchantmen  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Sound  to  ensure  their  free  passage.  The  following  year  he 
returned  with  forty  eight  warships  and  convoyed  the  merchantmen 
through  the  Sound  without  paying  any  dues.  The  weakened  Danish  navy 
was  unable  to  do  anything  but  watch. 
The  peace  negotiations  were  begun  in  1644.  and,  with  both  the 
Swedish  and  Dutch  navies  free  to  sail  the  Baltic  at  will,  Denmark  had 
little  option  but  to  capitulate48.  The  Dutch  fearing  Swedish  domination  of 
the  Sound  were  able  to  moderate  some  of  the  demands  but  the  result  was 
still  a  compete  humiliation  for  Denmark. 
Two  separate  treaties  were  signed  with  the  Swedes  and  the  Dutch 
reflecting  their  own  interests.  The  treaty  of  Brpmsebro  gave  Sweden  and 
her  newly  conquered  territories  complete  freedom  from  tolls,  including 
war  goods,  and  the  hostile  visitations  were  abolished;  warships  were  al- 
lowed  free  passage  through  the  Sound;  the  Danish  Rügen  tolls  were 
abolished;  Gotland,  Osel  and  Arendsborg  were  ceded  to  Sweden;  and  Hal- 
land  was  given  over  as  surety  for  thirty  years.  All  claims  regarding  the 
dominium  marls  baltici  were  also  to  be  rescinded.  The  treaty  of  Chris- 
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31 tianopel  signed  with  the  Netherlands  limited  the  Sound  dues  to  1%  ad 
valorum  and  all  other  ancillary  charges  were  abolished.  France,  Britain 
and  the  Hanse  towns  also  obtained  similar  treaties4g. 
Christian  IV  began  his  reign  as  undisputed  master  of  the  Baltic, 
with  great  hopes  of  extending  his  power  base  into  Sweden  and  the  con- 
tinent.  He  ended  it  in  humiliation,  having  lost  control  of  the  Baltic,  and 
forced  to  accept  a  diminution  of  his  powers  in  the  Sound.  After  the  Peace 
of  Westphalia  'ended  the  Thirty  Years  War  in  1648  Denmark  found  herself 
virtually  encircled  by  Sweden  and  with  her  strength  and  reputation  in 
Europe  in  tatters,  which  were  the  very  results  that  Christian  IV  had 
striven  so  hard  to  avoid. 
1.3.  Dominium  Marls  Septentrionalis 
Like  the  Baltic,  the  northern  seas  from  Norway  to  Greenland  were  con- 
sidered  as  sovereign  possessions  by  the  Danish-Norwegian  monarchy.  The 
basis  for  these  claims  were  the  two  definitions  recognised  by  interna- 
tional  law  for  the  right  of  sovereignty  over  open  seas50.  The  first  was 
that  the  seas  in  gulfs  and  bays  of  a  country  were  held  by  that  country. 
This  justified  earlier  claims  when  it  was  believed  that  Norway  was  con- 
nected  to  Greenland  and  that  the  northern  seas  constituted  one  vast  bay. 
Although  this  had  long  been  proved  to  be  erroneous  the  second  defini- 
tion,  that  if  a  country  held  the  territory  on  both  sides  of  a  sea  it  could 
be  considered  sovereign,  came  into  force.  Norsemen  had  begun  to  settle 
Greenland  in  the  10th  century  and  although  no  contact  had  been  made 
since  the  15th  century  Greenland  was  still  considered  to  be  a  Norwegian 
possession.  Possession  of  Iceland  and  the  Faroes,  as  well  as  the  continued 
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32 belief  that  the  Orkneys  and  Shetland  remained  only  in  pawn  to  Scotland, 
further  strengthened  the  claims  to  the  so-called  dominium  maris 
septentrionalis¢'.  Despite  the  tenuous  nature  of  Danish  claims  they  were 
strongly  believed  in  and  were  driven  by  the  same  principles  of  mare 
clausum  which  governed  her  Baltic  policies.  If  other  nations  were  to  use 
these  seas  then  they  must  be  prepared  to  pay  for  that  privilege. 
From  the  time  of  the  Kalmar  union  the  Danish  monarch  had  lain 
claim  to  all  the  coastal  waters  of  Norway  and  from  1523  an  administrative 
centre  was  established  at  Vardmhus  on  the  northern  tip  of  Finmark. 
However  it  was  not  until  1586  that  Frederik  II  formally  claimed  the  whole 
of  Finmark  and  Samiland  for  Denmark-Norway.  The  value  of  these  north- 
ern  waters  had  been  increased  dramatically  in  1553  when  Richard  Chan- 
cellor  succeeded  in  rounding  the  North  Cape  and  reached  the  Dvina52. 
The  resultant  exploitation  of  the  Russian  trade  by  the  English  Muscovy 
Company  provided  a  welcome  source  of  revenue.  The  English  at  first  hotly 
disputed  the  Danish  right  to  levy  tolls  but  in  1583  an  agreement  was 
reached  whereby  England  paid  an  annual  fee  of  100  Rosenobler  to  Den- 
mark  for  the  right  to  sail  these  waters,  thereby  explicitly  acknowledging 
Danish  sovereignty.  Similar  agreements  were  also  reached  with  France  and 
Hamburg  a  few  years  later. 
Much  as  this  modest  income  was  welcomed  the  potential  of  a  North 
East  Passage  to  the  'Indies'  promised  riches  that  would  rival  the  Sound 
tolls  and  explains  Denmark's  determination  to  maintain  control  of  these 
waters.  Although  the  North  East  Passage  proved  impractical,  unlicensed 
Russian  trade  did  increase  at  a  pace  which  eventually  forced  Christian  IV 
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33 to  establish  a  fort  in  1642  to  'thuiinge  alle  dem,  som  sager  Archangelo  at 
giiffue  sammestedtz  en  anseendtlig  toll'  (enforce  all  those  seeking  Archan- 
gel  to  give  there  a  considerable  toll)53. 
English  attempts  to  find  the  North  West  Passage  also  excited  the  in- 
terests  of  the  Danish  monarchy.  Danish  claims  over  Greenland  were  at  the 
moment  undisputed,  but  if  Denmark  wanted  to  exploit  this  position  and 
control  all  northern  access  to  the  Indies,  and  levy  tolls  accordingly,  her 
sovereignty  had  to  be  reinforced.  The  tenuous  geographical  claim  was 
strengthened  by  the  equally  tenuous  belief  that  the  Inuit  were  descen- 
dants  of  old  Norse  settlers  from  the  10th  century.  If  Denmark-Norway 
could  re-establish  contact  with  its  old  'colony'  then  her  position  would, 
she  believed,  be  unassailable. 
Frederik  II  sent  two  unsuccessful  expeditions  to  Greenland  in  1579 
and  1581  but  Christian  IV  greatly  increased  these  efforts.  Expeditions 
were  sent  out  in  1605,1606  and  1607  with  the  purpose  of  exploring  the 
Greenland  coast  and  formally  claiming,  the  land  as  Danish-Norwegian 
sovereign  territory.  There  were  also  strong  hopes  of  finding  great  mineral 
wealth54.  These  early  expeditions  were  not  entirely  successful  but  at 
least  they  did  reach  their  destination  and  returned  with  some  promise. 
The  final  arctic  expedition  of  Christian  IV's  reign  was  little  more  than  a 
complete  disaster.  Jens  Munk's  well  documented  attempt  to  find  the  North 
West  Passage  in  1619  ended  with  the  loss  of  all  but  two  of  the  crew.  A 
further  expedition  was  planned  in  162155  but  the  understandable  lack  of 
volunteers  ended  Danish  hopes  for  Greenland  for  the  time  being56. 
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34 Although  the  promise  of  great  riches  from  tolls  on  the  North  East 
and  North  West  Passages  was  to  remain  nothing  more  than  a  dream  there 
were  very  real  riches  to  be  had  from  the  fishing  and  whaling  industries. 
Both  England  and  the  Netherlands  were  very  active  in  the  northern 
waters  and  both  contested  Denmark's  right  to  claim  sovereignty  and 
espoused  the  right  of  freedom  to  fish  in  open  waters.  The  English  case 
was  weakened  by  intermittently  agreeing  to  pay  for  fishing  licences  but 
the  Dutch  steadfastly  refused  to  acknowledge  any  claims  to  sovereignty  of 
the  seas  and  championed  the  concept  of  Mare  LiberunL  The  discovery  of 
Spitzbergen  and  its  rich  whaling  grounds  further  complicated  matters.  Al- 
though  the  Dutch  claimed  discovery  in  1596  the  English  were  the  first  to 
exploit  the  whaling  and  claimed  the  islands  as  sovereign  territory  in  1613. 
The  Dutch  retaliated  in  force  in  following  years  and  attempted  to  nego- 
tiate  the  division  of  sovereignty  of  the  island  with  England.  The  result 
was  that  English,  Dutch  and  French  whaling  stations  were  established, 
and  English  and  Dutch  warships  sailed,  in  an  area  which  Christian  IV 
regarded  as  unquestionable  Norwegian  sovereign  territory57. 
This  situation  led  to  numerous  violations  of  Denmark's  supposed 
sovereignty,  and  the  diplomatic  correspondence  with  Denmark  is  littered 
with  disputes  over  fishing  and  trading  rights.  The  Hanse  monopoly  in  the 
Icelandic  trade  with  Denmark  was  rescinded  in  1602  and  transferred  to 
Danish  merchants58  and  Christian  IV's  instructions  to  a  policing  expedi- 
tion  in  1618  clearly  outline  his  policy  on  Norwegian  waters: 
paa  ueien  allestedtz  Erfhaare,  om  nogen,  Ihuad  Nation  hand  uerre 
kan,  paa  Norriess  reffuerer  eller  strQmme  y  nogen  maade  wlofflig 
fiiskeri  eller  handel  vden  Pass  bruger 
57.  Fulton,  Sovereignty  of  the  Sea  181-4. 
58.  Ole  Feldbak,  'The  Danish  Trading  Companies  of  the  Seventeenth  and  Eighteenth  Centuries', 
Scandinavian  Economic  History  Review,  34  (1986),  211. 
35 on  the  way  always  ensure  that  no-one,  whatever  their  nationality, 
in  any  way  carries  out  any  illegal  fishing  or  trade  on  Norway's 
coast  and  rivers  without  a  pass. 
He  also  attempted  to  forbid  all  foreign  whaling  off  the  coasts  of  northern 
Norway,  Iceland,  the  Faroes  and  Greenland.  Clearly  he  was  determined 
that  only  Denmark  would  gain  from  exploiting  these  seas. 
Several  private  merchant  companies  were  encouraged  to  do  just 
this,  and  Christian  IV  even  involved  himself  with  a  whaling  enterprise 
from  1619-22  when  Danish  warships  were  used,  rather  unsuccessfully,  to 
catch  whalesOO.  The  Greenland  Company  of  1635  was  intended  to  exploit 
the  Greenland  whaling  but  also  raised  hopes  of  re-colonisation  of  that 
country  for  a  time.  By  far  the  most  important  of  these  companies  though 
was  the  Icelandic  Company.  This  received  the  grant  of  a  monopoly  in  1619 
for  trading  and  fishing  in  the  area  and  became  the  principal  importer  of 
fish  into  Denmark.  The  company  had  bases  in  Copenhagen  and  Glückstadt 
and  operated  a  very  considerable  fleet  of  cargo  ships  and  large  armed 
merchantmen,  which  -were  occasionally  requisitioned  by  the  navy. 
However,  Danish  hopes  of  monopolising  the  northern  seas  were 
clearly  forlorn.  Danish  capital  and  expertise  were  far  too  limited,  relying 
largely  on  imported  Dutch  and  Biscayan  technology  and  business  methods, 
to  fully  establish  any  Danish  supremacy.  The  area  was  also  far  too  vast 
to  police  effectively  and  the  riches  too  great  a  temptation  to  be  over- 
looked  by  other  nations.  A  change  in  whaling  methods  during  the  1630s 
further  reduced  the  Danish  hold  on  the  trade.  Instead  of  requiring  a 
coastal  base  to  render  the  oil  this  was  increasingly  done  aboard  ship  and 
59.22  April  1618,  egenhandige  Brevet  I.  138-9. 
60.  Sune  Dalg&rd.  Dansk-Norsk  hvalfangst  1615-1664  (Kobenhavn,  1962),  413-429. 
36 despite  Danish  claims  to  sovereignty  over  all  northern  coastal  areas  there 
was  little  that  could  be  done  to  prevent  ships  sailing  freely  in  the  open 
seas.  This  was  recognised  in  1641  when  Denmark  was  forced  to  concede  to 
Dutch  pressure  for  rights  to  uncharted  whaling  at  sea,  ending  all  hopes 
of  a  Danish  monopoly61. 
The  problems  of  effectively  policing  the  northern  seas  are  well  il- 
lustrated  by  a  voyage  undertaken  in  1616  by  Jan  Olafssone2.  He  sailed 
from  Copenhagen  with  six  ships  up  the  Norwegian  coast  to  VardQhus  and 
the  Kola  peninsula,  then  on  to  Iceland,  the  Faroes,  and  back  to  Norway 
before  returning  to  Copenhagen.  During  the  22  week  voyage  they  encoun- 
tered  only  one  small  convoy  of  Hamburg  merchants  sailing  to  Archangel, 
whose  papers  were  in  order.  On  the  way  the  ships  nearly  ran  aground, 
two  of  them  were  separated  in  a  storm,  and  there  was  an  outbreak  of 
scurvy.  Although  this  was  probably  a  much  more  extensive  tour  than 
usual  it  clearly  shows  the  impossibility  of  one  squadron  of  just  a  few 
ships  patrolling  the  entire  northern  seas,  especially  given  the  heavy 
weather  frequently  encountered  and  the  shortness  of  the  season.  In  fact 
these  difficulties  meant  that  for  all  practical  purposes  the  strictly  regu- 
lated  sovereignty  was  limited  only  to  around  20  miles  off  the  coast  Nor- 
way  and  around  the  Atlantic  islands63. 
Fishing  and  the  levying  of  tolls  were  not  the  only  considerations  to 
be  taken  account  of  in  this  area.  The  coast  of  Norway  also  had  the  added 
advantage  to  Denmark  that  it  kept  Sweden  securely  locked  into  the  Baltic 
and  therefore  the  politics  of  Baltic  domination  also  encroach  onto  Nor- 
wegian  waters.  The  only  free  access  to  the  west  that  Sweden  had  outside 
the  Baltic  was  the  small  strip  of  land  between  Danish  Halland  and  Norway 
61.  DalgArd,  Dansk-norsk  hvalfangst;  418. 
62.  Memorier  og  Brevq  I,  Islanderen  Jon  Olafssons  oplevelser  som  b*ssekytte  under  Christian  IV, 
(K$benhavn,  1966),  132-150. 
63.  Fulton.  Sovereignty  of  the  Sea,  527-8. 
37 fighting  was  confined  very  much  to  the  Baltic  arena.  The  successful  out- 
come  of  the  war  for  Denmark  further  reinforced  Danish  sovereignty  over 
all  Norwegian  waters  up  to  Vard4phus,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  over  the  Kola 
peninsula  as  well.  Christian  IV  also  confidently  believed  that  the  seem- 
ingly  impossible  )  lvsborg  ransom  would  mean  that  this  territory  would 
also  finally  become  Danish. 
From  the  time  of  Christian  IV's  involvement  in  the  Thirty  Years  War 
Danish  interest  in  the  northern  seas  waned  significantly.  The  increasingly 
difficult  political  situation  in  the  Baltic  and  northern  Germany  took  first 
priority  and  the  worsening  financial  situation  made  effective  policing  of 
the  northern  seas  impossible.  The  area  could  not  be  completely  neglected 
however,  and  the  solution  arrived  at  were  the  so  called  defensionskibe. 
Norwegian  complaints  over  increasing  piracy  at  the  Oslo 
stsndermode  in  1628  resulted  in  an  ordinance  of  1630  whereby  each  Nor- 
wegian  len  was  to  build  from  one  to  four  specially  designed  ships, 
providing  a  dedicated  Norwegian  fleet  of  21  ships85.  These  ships,  in  con- 
trast  to  the  small  galleys  and  skerry-boats  formerly  used  for  coastal 
defence,  were  designed  as  ocean-warships.  They  were  also  able  to  be 
used  as  merchantmen,  trading  with  special  privileges,  and  were  operated 
by  private  individuals.  As  their  name  suggests  they  were  primarily  in- 
tended  for  coastal  protection  but  they  could  also  be  enlisted  into  the 
main  fleet  in  times  of  emergency.  The  result  was  that  the  Norwegian 
coasts  were  patrolled  by  locally  maintained  ships,  theoretically  leaving  the 
main  Danish  fleet  free  for  other  purposes. 
------------  ------ 
65.  Yngvar  Nielsen,  Jens  Bielke  til  Ostrlt  (Kobenhavn,  1872),  158-60. 
39 The  Danish  navy  did  not,  however,  abandon  the  northern  seas  al- 
together.  Periodic  shows  of  strength  were  undertaken  to  maintain  Danish 
claims  of  sovereignty,  especially  with  respect  to  Spitzbergen.  Warships 
were  sent  there  in  1637  and  1638  to  attack  the  French  and  Dutch  whaling 
stations66  and  it  was  finally  established  as  Norwegian  sovereign  territory 
in  1643,  although  by  this  time  its  significance  to  the  whaling  industry  was 
minimal.  Christian  IV  also  continued  to  make  a  point  of  sailing  the  Nor- 
wegian  waters  himself  right  up  to  164667  and  Danish  warships  continued 
to  be  used  to  protect  the  Icelandic  fishing  grounds  and  trade  routes. 
1.4.  The  Exploitation  and  Protection  of  Trade 
Another  important-  role  for  the  Danish  navy  was  to  support  Christian  IV's 
ambitious  mercantilist  politics.  They  did  this  by  three  different  methods. 
The  first  was  for  warships  to  take  part  in  trade  themselves,  the  second 
was  to  protect  merchant  shipping  by  keeping  the  seas  clear  of  pirates 
and  convoying  merchant  fleets  in  times  of  danger,  and  thirdly,  and  by 
far  the  most  important  economically,  to  enforce  the  collection  of  tolls  in 
Danish  territorial  waters. 
The  first  trading  company,  and  the  most  important  as  far  as  naval 
participation  was  concerned,  was  the  Danish  East  India  Company.  This 
received  its  charter  in  1616  and  was  originally  a  private  venture  based 
largely  on  the  Dutch  East  India  Company,  with  Christian  IV  as  one  of  the 
principal  shareholders.  The  vessels  involved  in  the  trade  were  a  mixture 
of  small  naval  warships  and  merchant  ships,  but  the  distinction  was 
blurred  greatly  by  the  king's  active  involvement  in  the  company.  This 
involvement  increased  from  1630  when  the  company  essentially  became  a 
royal  concern,  trading  insolvently,  but  maintained  simply  to  bolster  the 
--  ---------------- 
66.  Dalg3rd,  'Osters0,  Vesters4,  Nords#',  311. 
67.  N.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  den  Fjerde  og  hans  Mand  paa  Dremerholn%  (Kiobenhavn,  1889),  10. 
40 king's  prestige  at  home  and  abroad.  Vessels  such  as  the  Christi'anshavn 
were  company  owned  ships,  but  were  manned  to  a  large  extent  by  naval 
personnel  and  received  spares  and  victuals  from  the  naval  dockyard. 
The  number  of  purely  naval  vessels  involved  was  not  great,  around 
eight  ships  over  a  twenty  year  period,  but  the  method  of  Danish  trade 
meant  that  they  could  be  away  from  home  for  several  yearseB.  In  contrast 
to  the  Dutch  and  English  companies  the  Danes  principally  traded  amongst 
merchants  in  the  east,  rather  than  sending  regular  cargoes  back  and 
forth  to  Europe.  The  dangers  from  the  weather,  and  from  Dutch  and  Por- 
tuguese  competitors  also  took  their  toll  on  the  ships  with  several  being 
badly  damaged  and  some  lost  altogether. 
Another  short  lived  trading  company  sought  to  exploit  the  supplies 
of  ebony  in  Mauritius.  The  company  had  the  backing  of  the  king  and  the 
warship  Flensborg  was  used  on  the  one  and  only  voyage  between 
1622-2409. 
The  trading  companies  in  the  northern  seas  did  not  use  warships 
directly,  although,  as  already  mentioned,  Christian  IV  was  not  above  ex- 
perimenting  with  warships  in  whaling  expeditions.  The  navy's  principal 
role  in  this  area  was  to  keep  competitors  at  bay  and  to  keep  the  seas 
clear  of  pirates.  The  Spanish  Company  was  the  only  other  trading  com- 
pany  of  any  great  significance  to  the  navy.  The  involvement  of  naval  ves- 
sels  in  this  trade  was  minimal,  involving  only  the  occasional  convoy  duty 
when  piracy  was  interfering  with  trade,  but  from  time  to  time  small  war- 
ships  were  sent  to  trade  Norwegian  timber  for  Spanish  salt70.  Warships 
were  also  used  fairly  frequently  to  transport  naval  supplies  to  the  dock- 
-------  -  -------  -- 
66.  Sanjay  Subrahmanyam,  'The  Coromandel  Trade  of  the  Danish  East  India  Company,  1618-1619', 
Scandinavian  Economic  History  Review,  37  (1989),  41-56. 
69.  Sune  Dalgärd,  'Danish  Enterprise  and  Mauritius  Ebony  1621-24'.  Scandinavian  Economic  His- 
tory  Review,  4  (1956).  3-16.  - 
70.  Letter  to  rentemostrene,  6  August  1640,  egenhandigo  Brevq,  IV,  376-7. 
41 yard  in  tandem  with  the  royal  cargo  fleet. 
Piracy  was  evident  on  the  Baltic  to  some  extent,  mainly  by  Swedish 
and  Polish  privateers,  but  the  area  known  as  the  Vestersq,,  encompassing 
all  waters  from  Spain  to  Norway,  was  notoriously  infested  with  Pirates 
from  England,  Spain,  Dunkirk  and  even  Algiers.  Action  against  pirates  was 
sporadic  and  appears  to  have  been  driven  'to  a  large  extent  by  public 
opinion.  This  was  particularly  the  case  with  the  hunt  for  Mendoza  and  his 
supposed  brothers  in  1615  and  1616.  The  mid  1630s  proved  particularly 
bad  for  Dunkirkers  and  in  1635  nine  ships  were  used  to  convoy  vessels 
from  Norway  and  a  total  of  13  ships  were  sent  after  pirates  in  the  north- 
ern  seas71.  The  employment  of  warships  against  pirates  was  limited  by 
the  use  of  privateers,  but  unfortunately  very  little  research  has  been 
carried  out  on  Danish  privateers  in  the  early  modern  period72  and  it  is 
impossible  at  this  stage  to  quantify  the  number  of  ships  involved,  their 
impact  on  combating  piracy  or  their  economic  significance.  The  issue  also 
becomes  confused  with  the  Norwegian  defensionskibe,  which  were  also 
primarily  intended  to  meet  the  increasing  threat  of  piracy  in  the  1630x. 
A  much  more  important  role,  both  politically  and  economically,  for 
the  navy  was  to  enforce  the  collection  of  tolls  from  foreign  shipping 
using  Danish  sovereign  waters.  This  was  closely  linked  with  claims  to 
sovereignty  over  the  Baltic  and  the  northern  seas  and  little  more  needs 
be  said  about  the  importance  of  the  Sound  dues  or  of  Danish  aspirations 
for  the  control  of  the  North  East  and  North  West  Passages.  The  other 
principal  area  where  the  question  of  sovereignty  and  tolls  occurs  is  in 
northern  Germany. 
------------------ 
71.  Letter  to  rigsr1d  1  December  1635,  egenhandige  Breve,  III,  445-6. 
72.  H.  C.  Berg,  Dansk  Marinehistorisk  Bibliografi  150D-1975  (K*benhavn.  1975).  73. 
42 Christian  IV's  position  as  Duke  of  Holstein  dominated  the  claim  to 
sovereignty  in  northern  Germany.  The  Danish  monarchy  had  long  envied 
the  trading  superiority  of  Hamburg  which,  although  located  in  Holstein, 
maintained  a  strongly  guarded  independence73.  His  establishment  of  the 
fortified  port  town  of  Glückstadt  on  the  Elbe  in  1616  was  designed  to 
divert  trade  away  from  Hamburg  and  to  reinforce  Christian  IV's  ambitions 
to  command  the  estuaries  of  the  Elbe  and  Weser74.  He  made  his  intentions 
perfectly  clear  when  he  stated  that  'med  Gudtz  hiielp  ...  bliiffuer  Glycks- 
tadt  En  Bye  och  Hamborg  En  landsbye'75  (with  God's  help  Glückstadt  will 
become  a  town  and  Hamburg  a  village).  It  would  also  thwart  any  Dutch 
plans  to  evade  the  Sound  dues  by  the  construction  of  a  canal  to  the  Bal- 
tic. 
Christian  IV's  interest  in  the  area  was  also  closely  linked  with  the 
struggle  for  Baltic  supremacy.  While  Sweden  increased  her  possessions  in 
the  eastern  Baltic  Christian  IV  recognised  the  need  to  counterbalance  this 
with  increased  Danish  control  over  the  north  German  states.  His  position 
in  the  area  was  greatly.  strengthened  by  the  appointment  of  his  family 
members  in  the  bishoprics  of  Bremen,  Verden,  Schwerin  and  Halberstadt, 
and  resulted  in  his  own  election  as  Captain-General  of  the  Lower  Saxon 
Circle  in  162576. 
The  humiliation  suffered  in  the  Thirty  Years  War  stripped  Christian 
IV  of  his  authority  in  the  Lower  Saxon  Circle  but  strengthened  his 
resolve  to  increase  his  powers  as  Duke  of  Holstein.  This  is  seen  in  his 
decision  to  impose  tolls  on  the  Elbe.  He  obtained  a  grant  from  the  Em- 
73.  Johan  Jorgensen.  'Denmark's  Relations  with  Lübeck  and  Hamburg  in  the  Seventeenth  Century'. 
Scandinavian  Economic  History  Review,  11  (1963),  73-79. 
74.  Although  sovereignty  was  claimed  on  the  Weser  and  all  ships  had  to  strike  their  colours  in 
recognition  of  this,  no  attempt  was  made  to  levy  tolls  there  (Kancelliets  Orevboper,  a  July  1625). 
75.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  17  June  1640,  egenhandige  Brevq  IV,  35% 
76.  Roberts,  Gustavus  Adolphus,  I,  197-99,  &  242. 
43 peror  after  signing  the  Peace  of  Lübeck  in  1629  for  the  levying  of  tolls  on 
the  river.  This  incensed  the  town  of  Hamburg  as,  although  it  had  actually 
acceded  its  sovereignty  to  Holstein  in  1621,  it  still  disputed  the 
sovereignty  of  the  river  and  claimed  'antient  priuelidges  and  the  freedom 
of  Commerce  upon  the  River  Elue  for  all  people  and  all  nations  that  use 
the  same'77.  To  make  matters  worse  they  had  been  granted,  just  the  pre- 
vious  year,  a  confirmation  by  the  Emperor,  of  their  exemption  of  all  tolls 
on  the  river78. 
When  tolls  were  imposed  in  1630  it  immediately  came  to  open  hos- 
tilities.  Hamburg  succeeded  in  capturing  a  small  Danish  naval  squadron  at 
Gliickstadt  and  blockaded  the  town.  The  entire  Danish  fleet  was  then  sent 
round  from  Copenhagen  and  after  a  fight  of  several  weeks  the  blockade 
was  broken  and  the  Hamburgers  forced  to  accept  defeat7g.  The  Danish 
naval  presence  on  the  Elbe  was  thereafter  greatly  strengthened  to  avoid 
any  repeat  of  Hamburg's  resistance. 
Although  the  right  to  levy  tolls  on  the  Elbe  was  rescinded  by  the 
Emperor  in  1637  Christian  IV  still  maintained  his  claims  over  the  river 
and  forbade  all  trade  with  Hamburg.  The  dispute  dragged  on,  with  Ham- 
burg  trying  to  extricate  itself  from  Holstein's  sovereignty80,  but  by  1643 
Christian  IV  decided  to  blockade  Hamburg81,  and  succeeded  in  extracting 
a  sizeable  ransom  and  the  recognition  of  his  sovereignty  not  just  of  the 
town  but  also  of  the  Elbe.  This  situation  did  not  last  long,  however,  as 
77.  Outline  of  the  History  of  DDenmark,  Bodleian  Library,  MS  Rawl.  C737,3,  f.  77-8. 
78.  Outline  of  the  History  of  Austrl4  Bodleian  Library,  MS  Rawl.  C737,3,  f.  160. 
79.  Battle  instructions  to  Klavs  Daa,  24  August  -6  September  1630  egenhandige  Breve,  It.  280- 
291. 
80.  Justification  for  attack  against  Hamburg.  22  February  1643,  egenhandige  Brevet'  V.  303-4. 
81.  Letter  to  rigsrAd  22  February  1643.  egenhandige  or-eve,  V.  304-7. 
44 after  the  Torstenssonkrig  in  1645  Sweden  gained  control  of  the  Bremen 
side  of  the  Elbe  and  all  Danish  claims  to  sovereignty  had  to  be  aban- 
doned. 
The  tolls  collected  on  the  river  went  some  way  to  alleviate  Christian 
IV's  penury  after  the  Thirty  Years  War  but  his  dream  of  Glückstadt 
eclipsing  Hamburg  proved  unrealistic,  with  even  Danish  merchants  still 
preferring  to  use  the  well  established  facilities  and  trading  links  of 
Hamburg82. 
1.5.  Royal  Prestige 
The  question  of  royal  prestige  played  a  great  part  in  the  navy  of  Chris- 
tian  IV.  It  is  evident  that  he  was  a  highly  ambitious  monarch  with  great 
pretensions  of  taking  a  leading  role  in  European  politics  and  the  concept 
of  'royal  reputation'  in  the  formation  of  the  king's  diplomatic  philosophy 
has  been  strongly  stressed83.  The  navy,  as  the  most  visible  instrument  of 
foreign  policy,  was  therefore  greatly  influenced  by  these  considerations, 
especially  in  the  early  years  of  his  reign.  The  navy  also  played  an  impor- 
tant  role  in  internal  politics,  becoming  a  pawn  in  the  power  struggle  be- 
tween  the  king  and  the  rigsrAd34  . 
A  writer  on  20th  century  naval  policy  gives  an  interesting  analysis 
of  the  question  of  prestige  which  could  easily  be  applied  to  the  time  of 
Christian  IV: 
------------------- 
82.  Jorgensen,  'Denmark's  Relations  with  Lübeck  and  Hamburg',  73-79. 
83.  Paul  Douglas  Lockhart,  'Denmark  and  the  Empire,  A  Reassessment  of  Danish  Foreign  Policy 
under  King  Christian  IV'.  Scandinavian  Studies,  64  (1992).  390-416. 
84.  See  Chapter  2  for  a  discussion  of  this  power  struggle. 
45 prestige  is  sought  not  merely  or  mainly  to  serve  the  national  inter- 
est  (although  actions  are  justified  in  these  terms),  but  as  a  politi- 
cal  end  in  itself.  Prestige  is  sought  not  so  much  to  promote  other 
ends,  but  for  the  glory  and  satisfaction  which  come  from  having  a 
recognised  reputation.  ° 
The  ships  built  directly  after  Christian  IV's  accession  demonstrate 
his  attitude  towards  his  own  status  and  how  this  was  reflected  in  his 
navy.  Great  ships  such  as  Victor,  Argo  and,  above  all  Tre  kroner,  were 
far  larger  and  much  more  extravagantly  decorated  than  was  practicable 
for  real  warships.  They  were  designed  not  so  much  for  operational  duties 
but  to  impress  foreign  powers  and  to  signal  to  the  rest  of  Europe  that 
Denmark  was  a  maritime  power  to  be  reckoned  with.  The  great  importance 
attached  to  his  status  as  a  maritime  monarch  is  further  emphasised  by 
the  fact  that  Christian  IV  was  regularly  portrayed  in  pageants  and  al- 
legories  as  Neptune,  the  divine  ruler  of  the  seas86. 
The  first  exposure  of  the  new  Danish  fleet  to  the  western  world  oc- 
curred  in  1606  when  Christian  IV  took  a  squadron  of  eight  ships  on  a 
state  visit  to  James  I/VI  in  London.  The  impact  was  immediate. 
Pamphleteers  and  commentators  all  praised  the  ships,  their  ordnance  and 
men,  and  news  of  the  visit  rapidly  spread  across  Europe.  The  visit  had 
no  overt  diplomatic  purpose  and  it  seems  that  the  visit,  apart  from  the 
obvious  family  reasons,  was  arranged  purely  as  a  show  of  naval 
strength87. 
------------ 
85.  Ken  Booth,  Navies  and  Foreign  Policy,  (New  York,  1979),  52. 
86.  Mara  R.  Wade,  'Festival  Books  as  Historical  Literature:  the  Reign  of  Christian  IV  of  Denmark 
(1596-1648)'.  The  Seventeenth  Century.  VII  (1992),  1-14. 
87.  Martin  Bellamy,  'Naval  Aspects  of  Christian  IV's  Visit  to  England  in  1606',  forthcoming  in 
Mariner's  Mirror. 
46 The  Kalmar  War  gave  the  navy  its  first  chance  to  impress  the  world 
with  its  fighting  abilities.  Although  no  great  naval  battle  was  fought  the 
navy  did  impress  foreign  observers  by  its  size  and  for  its  part  in  taking 
the  forts  of  Kalmar  and  Alvsborg.  The  Frenchman  Julien  Peleus  was  par- 
ticularly  effusive  in  his  praise,  although  his  description  must  be  tempered 
by  the  fact  that  he  also  compared  Christian  IV  and  his  generals  to 
Alexander,  Caesar  and  Hannibal8s: 
...  vne  flotte  de  beaux  &  grands  Nauires,  que  l'on  pouuoit  appeller 
les  merueilles  de  l'Ocean:  car  ce  n'estoient  pas  tant  des  Nauires  que 
des  Chasteaux  &  puissantes  forteresses  flottates  sur  la  mer,  en 
aucunes  desquelles  etoiet  des  quatre-vingts  pieces  de  mötail,  belles 
par  excellence.  L'equippage  estoit  somptueux  &  magnifique,  &  si 
1'0cean  eust  eu  des  yeux,  il  l'eut  admire  auec  estonnement,  aussi 
estoit-il  digne  d'vn  tel  Prince. 
...  a  fleet  of  large  and  beautiful  ships  which  might  be  called  mar- 
vels  of  the  ocean  as  they  were  not  just  ships  but  castles  and 
powerful  fortresses  floating  on  the  sea,  in  any  of  which  there  were 
eighty  first-rate  bronze  cannon.  Their  fittings  were  sumptuous  and 
magnificent  and  if  the  ocean  had  had  eyes  it  would  have  admired  it 
with  astonishment  as  it  was  worthy  of  such  a  prince. 
Impressive  squadrons  were  sent  abroad  in  succeeding  years  on 
diplomatic  missions,  and  a  very  favourable  impression  of  Christian  IV  and 
his  navy  persisted  among  foreign  powers  until  his  setbacks  in  the  Thirty 
Years  War.  A  typical  view  is  reflected  by  Robert  Munro,  who  was  cer- 
tainly  impressed  by  what  he  saw  at  the  start  of  that  campaign8g: 
----------------- 
Be.  Julien  Peleus,  L'Histoire  de  la  derniere  guerre  do  Suede...  centre  los  Danois,  (Paris.  1622), 
274-5. 
47 The  King  is  powerfull  by  Sea,  and  is  mightily  well  furnished  of  all 
things  necessary  for  warres,  of  Armes,  Artillery,  "  Ammunition,  vict- 
ualls,  money,  and  what  else  is  requisite  to  set  forwards  a  warre; 
and,  which  is  more,  a  noble,  and  a  liberal]  Master,  as  ever  I  did 
serve. 
His  humiliation  removed  any  chances  of  recovering  his  previous 
promise  as  a  European  leader.  His  defeat  on  land  did  however  strengthen 
his  resolve  to  remain  powerful  at  sea,  as  demonstrated  by  his  naval  re- 
building  programme  of  the  1630s.  The  greatest  show  of  royal  prestige  of 
his  reign  was  the  great  double  wedding  of  1634  and  significantly  among 
the  delights  arranged  for  the  assembled  foreign  dignitaries  was  a  parade 
of  the  fleet  and  a  mock  naval  battlegO.  To  some  extent  he  did  regain  the 
respect  of  the  maritime  powers  during  the  1630s,  but  despite  his  postur- 
ing  the  memory  of  military  humiliation  still  hampered  his  standing  in 
Europe.  This  standing  was  completely  destroyed  after  the  naval  defeat  of 
1644. 
The  navy's  role  in  internal  politics  was  equally  troublesome  and 
was  closely  linked  with  the  king's  foreign  policy  ambitions.  The  rigsräd 
held  a  political  strangle-hold  over  the  country's  foreign  policy  by  having 
an  absolute  veto  on  the  declaration  of  war  and  the  granting  of  extraordi- 
nary  taxes.  However,  the  confused  nature  of  state  finance  and  Christian 
IV's  personal  fortune  allowed  him  to  build  up  the  naval  hardware  needed 
for  his  own  ambitions  independently  of  any  government  control. 
--  --------  --- 
89.  Robert  Munro,  Monro  His  Expedition  with  the  worthy  Scots  Regiment  (called  Mac-Keyes  Regi- 
ment)  levied  in  August  1624  (London,  1637),  I,  20. 
90.  Charles  Ogier,  Ephemerides,  Sive  Iter  Danicum,...,  (Paris.  1656),  59-61. 
48 This  was  in  contrast  to  the  army  which  required  less  in  the  way  of 
capital  expenditure  and  much  more  co-operation  with  the  nobility.  Land 
forces  were  still  based  on  the  outmoded  principle  of  knights'  service,  and 
therefore  mercenary  troops  were  heavily  relied  upon.  The  lensmwnd 
resisted  any  move  to  expend  their  local  revenues  on  the  improvement  of  a 
force  whose  deployment  may  have  endangered  their  own  financial  and 
political  interests,  and  attempts  to  institute  a  peasant  militia  in  1614 
resulted  in  a  force  that  was  famously  'worse  than  beasts'.  Only  when 
Christian  IV's  fortune  had  been  exhausted  by  two  expensive  campaigns 
conducted  mainly  by  mercenary  troops,  and  significant  political  conces- 
sions  were  able  to  be  extracted  by  the  rigsrJd,  was  a  standing  army  es- 
tablished  in  1637.  The  navy  therefore  provided  a  much  easier  tool  to 
manipulate  in  the  king's  struggle  with  the  rigsrAd  over  foreign  policy 
ambitions  than  the  army  ever  could. 
The  pacific  rigsrjd  saw  the  navy  first  and  foremost  as  a  defensive 
safeguard.  However,  Christian  IV's  refusal  to  appoint  a  rigsadmiral  until 
1610  ensured  that  its  political  leadership  lay  with  himself  and  not  with 
the  rigsräd.  The  more  powerful  the  navy  became,  the  stronger  Christian 
IV's  prestige  became  and  his  position  in  the  power  struggle  was 
strengthened,  enabling  him  to  follow  policies  at  variance  with  the 
rigsrAds  wishes9l. 
This  policy  was  fine  during  Christian  IV's  financially  secure  early 
years,  when  he  was  effectively  able  to  pay  for  the  naval  expansion  from 
his  own  purse,  but  it  became  increasingly  hard  to  maintain  this  position 
as  his  financial  state  deteriorated.  The  main  problem  was  that  although 
the  king  paid  for  capital  expenditure  the  state  was  expected  to  meet  the 
running  costs  of  men  and  victuals.  This  gave  the  rigsrid  an  equally 
powerful  hand  against  the  king  when  he  wished  to  mobilise  the  fleet.  The 
91.  See  Chapter  2  for  a  fuller  discussion  of  this. 
49 most  dramatic  aspect  of  this  internal  power  struggle  came  in  the  1624 
confrontation  with  Sweden.  Whilst  the  king  was  pursuing  an  aggressive 
policy  dependent  on  a  strong  navy,  the  rigsrAd  steadfastly  refused  to 
grant  funds  to  mobilise  the  fleet. 
The  defeat  in  the  Thirty  Years  War  saw  political  and  monetary  con- 
cessions  granted  to  the  rigsrAd  and  the  worsening  condition  of  the 
state's  finances  saw  the  navy  becoming  an  ever  more  contentious  pawn  in 
the  power  struggle  to  control  state  expenditure  and  disputes  over  the 
role  and  financing  of  the  navy  continued  until  the  end  of  the  reign92. 
The  king's  mercantile  projects  were  also  based  to  a  large  extent  on 
royal  prestige.  The  East  India  Company  was  established  largely  as  a 
result  of  envy  and  jealousy  of  the  English  and  Dutch  companies.  Even 
when  the  company  proved  unprofitable  he  refused  to  let  it  be  liquidated 
fearing  that  this  would  reflect  badly  on  his  own  prestige  at  home  and 
abroad.  He  also  planned  a  West  Indian  Company  for  similar  reasons,  al- 
though  this  plan  came  to  naught.  The  imposition  of  tolls  on  the  Elbe  can 
also  be  regarded  in  the  light  of  royal  prestige.  Christian  IV  wanted  to 
eclipse  the  republican  city  with  his  own  town  of  Glückstadt,  and  to  en- 
force  his  ducal  sovereignty  over  Hamburg. 
1.6.  Conclusion 
The  numerous  roles  that  Christian  IV's  navy  was  expected  to  take  on 
clearly  involved  a  number  of  commitments  which  were  far  larger  than  any 
one  navy  could  hope  to  meet  adequately.  This  compelled  the  navy  to  be 
used  largely  as  a  defensive  force,  with  the  size  and  number  of  ships 
being  designed  very  much  as  a  deterrent.  Several  minor  acts  of  aggres- 
sion  were  witnessed  by  small  squadrons  of  the  navy  during  the  reign  but 
only  during  the  Kalmar  war  was  the  navy  as  a  whole  used  aggressively. 
-  --------  --- 
92.  See  Chapter  3  for  a  full  analysis  of  naval  finance. 
50 The  importance  of  the  navy  in  national  defence  was  clearly  demonstrated 
at  the  end  of  the  Kejserkrig.  It  should  also  have  been  used  to  similar  ef- 
fect  in  the  Torstenssonkrig,  but  lack  of  experience  or  ingenuity  in  using 
the  whole  fleet  in  a  battle  situation  proved  decisive  in  its  defeat. 
The  geography  of  the  kingdom  drove  the  requirements  for  the 
navy.  It  was  necessary  to  maintain  a  number  of  different  types  of  vessel 
and  to  operate  a  number  of  separate  fleets  at  the  same  time,  to  patrol  all 
the  vast  areas  of  claimed  sovereign  seas.  Effectively  three  navies  were 
needed  to  cover  all  the  areas  involved,  reflecting  Christian  IV's  triple 
embodiment  as  King  of  Denmark,  King  of  Norway,  and  Duke  of  Holstein. 
Geography  provided  Denmark-Norway  with  a  great  many  advantages,  such 
as  being  able  to  control  the  Sound,  but  it  also  proved  one  of  the 
kingdoms  major  disadvantages.  If  the  entire  fleet  ever  needed  to  be 
mobilised  in  any  one  area  it  left  the  other  areas  vulnerable  to  attack  or 
unlicensed  commercial  exploitation. 
Connections  to  Sweden  and  the  continent  made  Denmark  vulnerable 
to  attack  by  land,  demonstrated  so  ruthlessly  in  the  case  of  Jutland  in 
1627  and  1643.  Although  border  defences  were  greatly  strengthened  un- 
der  Christian  IV,  the  army  remained  under  strength,  poorly  trained  and 
inefficient.  The  navy  could  only  be  one  part  of  the  country's  defence  but 
personal  ambition  and  difficult  political  circumstances  meant  that  Christian 
IV  paid  far  more  attention  to  it  than  perhaps  he  ought  to  have  done.  Any 
improvement  in  the  army  required  the  political  co-operation  of  the 
rigsräd  and  the  landowning  nobility.  Christian  IV's  aggressive  foreign 
policies  meant  that  this  co-operation  was  limited  and  the  result  of  the 
army  reforms  after  the  kejserkrig  was  that  Christian  IV  steadily  lost  his 
influence  over  the  army  at  the  expense  of  the  nobility93.  In  comparison 
to  the  army,  Christian  IV  enjoyed  relative  autonomy  in  the  development 
------------------ 
93.  Gunnar  Lind.  Herren  og  nagten  f  Danmark  1614-1&TZ  (Odense,  1994). 
51 and  deployment  of  the  navy  and  this  helps  to  explain  why  so  much  of  his 
resources  went  into  building  up  such  a  large  navy  while  the  army 
remained  relatively  small. 
The  result  of  this  strategy  was  that  during  the  Thirty  Years  War 
the  failure  of  the  army  twice  resulted  in  the  imposing  navy  being  used 
only  to  provide  the  last  line  of  defence  in  defeat.  Petersen9+  comes  to 
the  conclusion  that  Denmark  was  not  in  fact  a  true  maritime  power,  but 
was  torn  between  wanting  to  be  both  a  great  maritime  power  and  a  great 
continental  power,  and  succeeded  ultimately  in  being  neither. 
Having  said  that  it  must  be  admitted  that,  given  the  limitations,  the 
navy  was  relatively  successful  in  its  endeavours.  Its  role  as  a  deterrent 
at  sea  was  unquestioned,  and  when  called  upon  to  fight  it  was  on  the 
whole  competent,  although  by  no  means  spectacular.  Where  setbacks  were 
encountered  they  were  largely  as  a  result  of  diplomatic  or  tactical  incom- 
petence  on  the  part  of  the  king  himself.  Christian  IV  failed  to  appreciate 
that  impressive  military  hardware  was  no  substitute  for  guile  and  tact  in 
international  negotiations  or  astute  military  tactics.  His  clumsy  attempts  at 
diplomacy  outdid  any  advantage  he  hoped  to  gain  by  the  admiration  of 
his  powerful  navy,  and  more  or  less  negated  its  role  in  international 
power  politics.  Royal  prestige  depended  first  and  foremost  on  the 
monarch,  if  he  himself  was  perceived  as  conceited  and  inept  then  no 
amount  of  military  hardware  could  alter  that  impression. 
He  also  overlooked  the  fact  that  a  large  powerful  navy  was  useless 
unless  it  was  effectively  commanded  by  a  tactician  and  strategist  of  some 
skill.  The  philosophy  of  royal  prestige  built  up  the  navy  to  what  it  was 
in  1644,  but  the  same  philosophy  also  caused  its  defeat.  Christian  IV's 
belligerent  attitude  precipitated  the  Swedish  attack  in  the  first  place  and 
his  insistence  on  dictating  naval  strategy  at  the  expense  of  a  better 
-------------------- 
94.  Charles  William  Petersen,  'England  and  Danish  Naval  Strategy  in  the  Seventeenth  Century'. 
(unpublished  PhD  thesis,  University  of  Maine  at  0rno,  1975),  308-16. 
52 qualified  or  skilled  commander  resulted  in  the  tactical  error  that  ended 
with  the  navy  being  all  but  annihilated.  As  one  expert  states,  in  words 
which  could  easily  have  been  written  to  describe  Christian  IV's  policy, 
,  used  without  care,  a  policy  of  prestige  can  contribute  to  overcommitment, 
exposure,  lack  of  vigilance,  arrogance  and  ultimately  failure'95. 
-----  -  ------------ 
95.  Booth,  Navies  and  Foreign  Policy,  55 
53 2.  Political  Control  of  the  State  and  the  Navy 
Having  seen  why  Denmark,  and  in  particular  Christian  IV,  needed  a  navy 
we  should  now  look  at  how  the  navy  was  controlled  and  the  ways  in 
which  this  affected  the  development  of  both  the  state  and  the  navy.  To 
do  this  it  is  first  necessary  to  outline  the  way  in  which  Denmark  was 
governed  and  how  the  central  administration  of  the  state  worked  before 
turning  to  the  question  of  who  held  overall  political  control  of  both  the 
state  and  the  navy.  This  is  a  very  complex  issue  and  before  attempting 
any  analysis  we  must  look  at  what  actually  constituted  the  'Danish  state'. 
When  the  Kalmar  union  of  the  three  Scandinavian  kingdoms  of  Den- 
mark,  Norway  and  Sweden'  was  established  under  Queen  Margrethe  the 
0  constitutions  of  the  separate  member  states  were  maintained.  It  was  a 
union  of  crowns  rather  than  a  union  of  governments.  When  the  union  dis- 
integrated  in  the  early  16th  century  Denmark  and  Norway  retained  their 
union  of  crowns,  since  by  now  Norway  had  effectively  become  just  a 
Danish  province.  It  no  longer  had  its  own  government  or  administration 
and  was  governed  directly  from  Denmark.  The  term  Denmark-Norway  is 
therefore  used  to  describe  this  joint  kingdom. 
Denmark  itself  consisted  of  a  number  of  different  provinces.  The 
island  of  Sjaelland,  which  included  Copenhagen  and  Kronborg  Castle,  was 
the  most  important  politically.  Jutland,  Funen,  and  the  Scanian  provinces 
of  SkAne,  Halland  and  Blekinge  provided  the  best  agricultural  land.  The 
smaller  islands  were  of  lesser  importance  and  were  administratively 
grouped  under  the  title  of  SmAlande.  In  addition  Iceland  and,  at  various 
times,  the  Baltic  islands  of  Bornholm,  Gotland  and  Osel  also  came  under 
Danish  jurisdiction. 
-------------------- 
1.  Finland  was  not  yet  considered  a  separate  kingdom. 
54 Of  all  these  areas  the  Danish-Norwegian  monarchy  owned  nearly 
half  of  the  lande.  These  crown  lands  were  divided  into  administrative 
units  called  len,  which  were  administered  by  noble  officials  called 
lensmmnd.  The  distribution  of  len  was  at  the  discretion  of  the  king  and 
as  noblemen  progressed  in  their  careers  they  were  steadily  awarded 
larger  and  more  important  len.  This  created  the  paradox  that  as  officials 
were  promoted  to  greater  responsibility  within  the  central  government 
they  were  at  the  same  time  also  expected  to  take  on  greater  local  ad- 
ministrative  responsibilities. 
In  addition  to  being  king  of  Denmark-Norway  the  Danish  monarch 
also  held  the  title  of  Duke  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein.  Schleswig  had  long 
been  assimilated  into  Denmark,  but  Holstein  remained  an  independent 
duchy  and  an  integral  part  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire.  There  was  there- 
fore  a  separate  administration  for  Holstein,  with  its  own  council  and  min- 
isters. 
Various  other  ancient  peoples  and  lands  were  traditionally  claimed 
by  the  king.  This  is  reflected  in  the  formal  diplomatic  title  accorded  to 
Christian  IV,  which  stated  that  he  was  'King  of  Denmark  and  Norway  and 
of  the  Goths  and  Vandals,  Duke  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  Stormarn  and  the 
Dithmarshes,  Count  of  Oldenborg  and  Delmenhorst'3.  Although  the  lesser 
titles  had  by  now  no  real  political  weight  they  were  a  significant  factor 
behind  Christian's  expansionist  policy  in  northern  Germany. 
------------------- 
2.  E.  Ladewig  Petersen,  'From  Domain  State  to  Tax  State',  Scandinavian  Economic  History  Review, 
23  (1975),  126. 
3.  Ronald  L;  Meldrum,  The  letters  of  King  James  I  to  King  Christian  IV  1603-1624  (Surrey,  1976), 
letter  dated  30  September  1615. 
55 2.1.  The  System  of  Government 
Since  the  13th  century  Denmark  had  been  a  constitutional  monarchy.  The 
king  was  elected  by  the  rigsräd  (Council  of  the  Realm)  and  representa- 
tives  of  the  three  higher  estates  of  the  realm.  Before  taking  up  his  posi- 
tion  as  elected  head  of  state  the  king  was  obliged  to  sign  a  h1indfmstning 
(accession  charter)  in  which  he  agreed  to  abide  by  the  decisions  of  the 
rigsrad,  to  ensure  that  the  number  of  members  within  it  were  maintained 
at  a  required  level,  and  that  certain  positions  in  the  central  administra- 
tion  were  filled. 
This  situation,  that  the  king  was  both  the  servant  and  the  master 
of  the  rigsrhd,  having  to  accept  their  rulings,  but  at  the  same  time  being 
able  to  choose  its  members,  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  problem  in  analysing 
the  precise  boundaries  of  control  within  the  Danish  central  administration 
in  the  reign  of  Christian  IV. 
Policy  making  was  basically  a  dual  responsibility  between  the  king 
and  the  rigsrad  linked  in  a  dyarchic  administrative  system.  This  system 
was  explained  when  Arild  Huitfeldt  wrote  his  history  of  Denmark  for  the 
instruction  of  the  young  Christian  when  he  detailed  his  views  on  the 
constitution  with  a  suitable  nautical  analogy: 
Da  skall  en  Fmrste  oc  Herre  samle  til  sig  forstandige  vise  oc  for- 
neme  Folck,  deris  Raad  skal  hand  bruge,  Saa  at  huad  vdi  hannom 
fattis,  kand  ved  dens  gode  Raad  bliffue  erstadit  oc  opret,  oc  for- 
miske  Regimentit  met  flere.  Oc  ligeruijs  som  paa  it  Skib  foruden 
Styremand,  huilcken  dog  er  den  Fornemste,  ere  andre  flere,  som 
tilhielpe,  Skibit  eller  Menigheden  oc  Seylaßen,  det  er,  Regieringen 
oc  rette  Kaas  at  driffue,  En  sidder  ved  Styrit,  andre  hotte  Acker 
op,  andre  fire  oc  hale  Sk4id:  Saa  skal  oc  en  forstandig  Herre  giore, 
at  hand  bruger  fleris  Raad  oc  Hielp,  end  sin  egen,  heldst  de 
56 forstandigis,  Thi  fiere  Oyen  see  mere  end  it,  oc  mangen  aff  egn 
Forstand  bedrager  sig  selff,  oc  kommer  baade  sig  oc  flere  paa 
Wly  k  ke.  4 
Then  shall  a  prince  and  master  gather  unto  him  intelligent,  wise 
and  distinguished  people,  their  counsel  shall  he  use,  so  that  what 
he  in  himself  lacks  can  be  substituted  and  created  with  their  good 
advice,  and  appropriately  organised,  and  so  forth.  And  likewise,  as 
on  a  ship  in  addition  to  a  steersman5,  who,  after  all  is  the  top 
ranking,  has  others  there  who  help  the  ship,  its  crew  and  its  sail- 
ing,  and  determine  the  right  course  to  steer.  One  sits  by  the  rud- 
der,  others  draw  up  the  anchor  and  others  slacken  and  haul  the 
sheets:  So  shall  an  intelligent  master  do,  that  he  uses  others  advice 
and  help  than  his  own,  preferably  the  most  knowledgeable6,  since 
more  eyes  see  better  than  one,  and  many  a  man  relying  on  his  own 
intelligence  deceives  himself,  and  puts  both  himself  and  others  in 
danger. 
Although  the  decision  making  process  was  therefore  complex,  a 
powerful  rigsrad  could  provide  a  safety  net,  looking  after  the  interests 
of  the  realm,  in  the  teeth  of  an  over-ambitious  or  aggressive  king.  This 
system  broke  down  though,  as  Christian  IV  was  able  to  dictate  foreign 
policy  from  his  independent  and  unchallengable  position  as  Duke  of 
Holstein,  and  the  rigsräd  also  tended  to  look  after  the  personal  interests 
of  its  own  members  rather  more  than  those  of  the  state  as  a  whole. 
------------------ 
4.  Arild  Huitfeldt,  En  kaart  Historlske  Beskriffuelse  ...  Christian  den  Tredie1  (K$benhavn,  1596). 
f.  ):  iij.  (Danske  Krnicke  9  Bd.  ) 
5.  In  fact  the  skipper  was  the  senior  seafaring  officer.  See  Chapter  7. 
6.  i.  e.  the  high  nobility. 
57 In  theory  the  rigsrad  was  to  represent  the  views  of  the  three 
higher  estates  of  the  realm,  the  nobility,  the  clergy  and  the  burghers. 
However,  in  practice  it  represented  only  the  interests  of  the  ruling  clique 
of  higher  nobility  who  maintained  a  self-perpetuating  hold  on  the  rigsrad. 
The  händffstning,  which  was  drawn  up  by  the  rigsrad,  was  in  many 
respects  a  guarantee  for  the  ruling  nobility  that  their  status  and 
privileges  would  be  safeguarded.  Certain  names  crop  up  time  and  again, 
such  as  Ulfeldt,  Sehested,  Rantzau  and  Urne,  and  it  was  not  unusual  for 
both  father  and  son,  brothers  or  cousins  to  serve  at  the  same  time. 
Indeed,  of  the  48  members  elected  during  Christian  IV's  reign  only  two 
had  no  family  connection  with  other  rigsräd  members7. 
The  opinions  of  the  estates  were  sought  at  standermOder  (meetings 
of  the  estates  general),  which  were  held  infrequently  in  different  parts 
of  the  country.  Theoretically  members  of  all  four  estates  were  to  attend, 
but  in  practice  the  burghers  and  peasantry  were  only  occasionally  in- 
vited,  -and 
from  1631  the  peasantry  were  excluded  altogether8.  These 
st&nderm.  pder  were  initially  only  a  formal  protocol  with  little  real  in- 
fluence,  but  they  began  to  take  on  increasing  importance  through  the 
reign.  At  the  meeting  in  Odense  in  1638  the  estates  forced  the  rigsrad  to 
recognise  their  right  to  better  representation  and  forced  the  more 
regular  calling  of  sttndermuder.  The  estates'  interest  and  influence, 
however,  was  largely  restricted  to  taxation  and  their  own  privileges 
rather  more  than  wider  political  issues.  Their  opposition  to  increased 
taxes  in  order  to  pay  for  the  army,  though,  did  have  its  impact  on  Chris- 
tian  IV's  foreign  policy. 
------------------ 
7.  Leon  Jespersen,  'Rekrutteringen  til  rigsrddet  i  Christian  IV's  tid',  in  K.  J.  V.  Jespersen,  (ed.  ), 
RigsrAd,  adel  og  opposition  1570-1644  (Odense,  1980),  108-9. 
8.  Kr.  Erslev,  Aktstykker  og  oplysninger  til  rigsraad  og  standermddernes  historie  i  Kristian  IV's 
tic(  (K#benhavn,  1883-90),  III.  595. 
58 At  the  meeting  in  Copenhagen  after  the  Swedish  war  in  1645  the 
estates  strengthened  their  political  position  when  it  was  agreed  that  a 
noble  landkommissmr  was  to  be  appointed  in  every  province  who  was  to 
consult  members  of  the  other  estates  and  then  present  their  combined 
grievances  to  the  rigsräd.  The  burgers  also  established  their  own  yearly 
meeting  to  which  a  royal  representative  was  expected  to  attend. 
2.2.  The  Rigsrid  and  the  State  Officials 
The  rigsrad  was  not  simply  a  compliant  body  that  rubber  stamped  the 
king's  policies  but  was  an  institution  with  real  political  power,  able  to 
force  the  king  to  alter  policy  with  which  it  disagreed.  Their  approval 
was  needed  for  the  raising  of  any  extraordinary  taxes  and  they  had  an 
absolute  veto  on  the  declaration  of  war.  The  choice  of  members  was 
therefore  of  vital  importance  if  Christian  IV  was  to  succeed  in  carrying 
out  his  own  political  agenda. 
Although  he  had  a  relatively  free  rein  in  choosing  its  members  he 
did  tend  to  abide  by  the  recommendations  of  the  sitting  members, 
presumably  so  as  not  to  unduly  antagonise  those  whose  approval  he 
needed.  In  later  years  he  attempted  to  gain  influence  within  the  rigsrhd 
by  marrying  off  his  daughters  to  members  of  the  ruling  noble  families 
and  electing  them  to  serve  in  the  rigsrad.  This  svigerspnpolitik  (son-in- 
law  politics)  eventually  backfired  when  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  and  Hannibal 
Sehested  manipulated  their  position  within  the  rigsrad  to  increase  their 
own  power  at  the  expense  of  the  king's. 
The  number  of  members  within  the  rigsrad  varied  widely  but 
averaged  around  fifteen.  Although  Christian  IV's  händffstning  required 
him  to  maintain  a  suitable,  though  unspecified,  number  of  members,  his 
appointment  of  new  members  was  highly  erratic.  They  were  elected  for 
life,  but  instead  of  electing  new  members  as  old  ones  died  Christian  IV 
tended  to  wait  until  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  replace  members  and 
59 then  appoint  a  number  of  them  at  the  same  time.  In  1596,  after  the  long 
minority  had  taken  its  toll,  it  was  necessary  to  appoint  nine  new  mem- 
bers,  in  1616  he  appoi  nted  six  new  members  at  one  go,  in  1627  another 
four,  and  in  1640  six  again.  He  did  appoint  some  individually  but  only 
when  he  was  forced  to,  or  when  he  felt  it  was  convenient  or  expedient  to 
do  so. 
In  1645  Christian  IV  agreed  that  the  number  of  members  should  be 
permanently  maintained  at  229,  although  typically  he  made  no  attempt  to 
comply  with  this.  At  the  same  time  he  agreed  that  the  estates  could  select 
their  own  list  of  suitable  candidates  for  new  rigsräd  members,  from  which 
the  rigsrAd  could  make  a  further  choice  and  present  their  recommenda- 
tions  to  him.  He  did,  however,  retain  the  right  to  have  the  final  say  in 
the  choice.  Figure  2.1.  shows  the  variation  in  the  number  of  rigsrid  mem- 
bers  during  Christian  IV's  reign'O. 
9.  Letter  to  rigsrA4  17  August  1645,  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den 
Fjerdes  egenhandige  Breve,  VI,  56-7.  This  concession  was  offered  in  return  for  the  rigsrAd 
granting  sufficient  funds  to  keep  the  navy  mobilised. 
10.  The  figures  shown  are  as  of  31st  December.  which  obscures  to  some  extent  the  wide  fluctua- 
tion  in  numbers.  The  number  dropped  to  as  low  as  nine  in  the  summer  of  1616v  and  the  highest 
number  was  21  at  the  very  start  of  the  reign. 
60 Source:  Kr.  Erslev,  Aktstykker  og  oplysninger  hi  rigsraad  og  standerm4dernes  historie  i  Kristian  IV's  64  (K$benhavn,  1883-90). 
The  range  of  ages  within  the  rigsrad  varied  greatly,  from  those  in 
their  twenties  to  those  who  made  it  into  their  seventies.  Some  retired  of- 
ficially  from  the  rigsrid  in  their  old  age  such,  as  Peder  Munk  and  Holger 
Rosenkrantz,  but  others  nominally  remained  members  although  they  had 
become  'gamle  och  wformugsom'1'  (old  and  incapable)  and  took  no  further 
part  in  its  proceedings. 
New  rigsrAd  members  had  to  swear  an  oath  which  outlined  their 
formal  obligations12.  This  essentially  committed  them  to  swear  allegiance 
to,  and  uphold  the  reputation  of  the  king  and  the  realm,  to  uphold  the 
protestant  religion,  to  be  impartial  in  their  judgements  and  to  treat  the 
rich  and  poor  as  equals.  Their  vote  was  to  be  strictly  confidential  and 
-------------------- 
11.  Letter  to  rigsrao  1  Dec  1616,  egenhandige  Brew  I,  106. 
12.  Erslev,  Aktstykker,  III,  576. 
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Figure  2.1.  Number  of  Rigsräd  Members they  were  not  to  countermand  any  resolution  which  had  been  agreed. 
Christian  IV  drew  up  a  revised  oath  in  1644  which  further  bound  the 
rigsräd  members  to  abide  by  all  mandates  and  orders  issued  by  the 
king13. 
Within  the  rigsrad  there  were  a  number  of  high  state  officials  who 
were  responsible  for  various  aspects  of  the  running  of  the  country.  Un- 
der  Christian  IV's  handfmstning  he  was  obliged  to  have  at  all  times  a 
rigshofinester,  a  kongens  kansler  and  a  rigsmarsk14.  The  king  had  a  free 
choice  in  the  selection  of  rigshofinester  and  kongens  kansler  but  the 
rigsrAd  could  exercise  their  power  in  the  choice  of  the  other  posts  of 
rigsadmiral,  rigskansler  and  Norwegian  stadtholder. 
As  in  all  aspects  of  Christian  IV's  government  the  practice  did  not 
quite  match  the  theory.  Many  of  the  posts  were  filled  only  intermittently 
and,  in  direct  contradiction  of  his  hJndffstning,  the  highest  post  of  rig- 
shofinester  was  the  one  least  likely  to  be  filled.  When  there  was  no  rig- 
shofinester  the  administrative  duties  of  the  post  were  split  between  the 
proxy  post  of  stadtholder  i  Kobenhavn  and  the  kongens  kansler,  but  it  is 
not  always  clear  who  assumed  the  duties  of  the  other  offices  it  they 
stood  vacant.  Figure  2.2.  shows  the  times  at  which  the  various  state 
posts  were  occupied  or  vacant. 
------------  --- 
13.8  Dec  1644,  egenhandige  Breve,  V,  541. 
14.  Jespersen,  'Rekruttering  til  rigsr&det',  39. 
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Figure  2.2.  High  Officials  of  State  in  Office 
Source:  Kr.  Ersiev,  Aktstykker  og  oplysninger  h1  rigsraad  og  standermornes  historie  i  Kristian  IV's  64  (Kobenhavn,  1883-90). 
There  was  certainly  no  career  structure  with  regard  to  the  ap- 
pointment  of  officials,  or  their  subsequent  promotion  to  other  posts.  The 
offices  were  generally,  filled  for  life  by  the  appointees.  Of  the  27  officials 
during  the  reign  of  Christian  IV  only  one  was  forced  to  leave  office15, 
and  just  five  were  promoted  between  offices.  Of  these,  three  were  sons- 
in-law  and  another  appears  to  have  been  moved  to  make  way  for  a  son- 
in-law.  The  only  clear  cut  move  was  from  stadtholder  to  rigshofinester. 
The  duties  assumed  by  the  different  officials  and  the  political 
power  they  wielded  was  very  much  dependent  on  the  individual  who  held 
office.  Occasionally  Christian  IV  would  formulate  a  written  'contract'  out- 
lining  their  terms  of  reference  but  these  were  ambiguously  worded  and 
referred  only  to  the  duties  of  a  particular  individual  who  was  taking  up 
office,  and  did  not  constitute  a  formal  outline  of  the  responsibilities  of 
the  office  itself. 
-------------------- 
15.  Rigsadmiral  Albert  Skeel,  see  later. 
63 2.2.1.  Christian  IV's  Letters 
In  order  to  get  a  clearer  picture  of  the  role  of  these  officials  the  letters 
of  Christian  IV  have  been  analysed  to  determine  which  officials  dealt  with 
which  issues  in  the  running  of  the  state. 
Christian  IV's  collected  letters  were  published  between  1887  and 
1928  in  eight  volumes  and  provide  a  remarkable  source.  In  all  there  are 
more  than  3000  letters  ranging  from  simple  one  line  notes  to  extensive 
diplomatic  correspondence.  The  range  of  interests  discussed  in  these  let- 
ters  is  phenomenal  and  the  king's  obsession  with  trivial  matters  shines 
through.  The  majority  of  letters  demonstrate  a  rapid  flow  of  ideas  that 
were  put  to  paper  without  any  structure  so  that  domestic  household 
issues  are  frequently  discussed  alongside  international  diplomacy.  To 
demonstrate  the  style  of  these  letters  it  is  worth  giving  one  example. 
Many  letters  consist  simply  of  a  list  of  instructions,  such  as  the  one  to 
kongens  kansler  Christian  Friis  in  1618,  given  here  in'  summaryte: 
1.  The  plasterer  shall  send  one  of  his  swains  here  with  some 
plaster  to  repair  some  plasterwork  which  has  fallen  off  two  beams. 
2.  A  hole  shall  be  dug  between  the  altar  and  the  pulpit  to  see  if  a 
stair  can  go  into  the  church. 
3.  The  burgers  militia  shall  be  ready  to  be  mustered  when  required. 
4.  The  kansler  shall  write  to  Jacob  Ulfeldt  to  prepare  a  room  at 
Nyborg  for  a  noble  guest. 
5.  The  prisoners  in  the  tower  at  Copenhagen  should  follow  Spes 
and  those  at  Helsing4pr,  should  follow  Markatten.  On  each  of  the  gal- 
leys  should  be  a  ship's  drummer. 
-----------  ------ 
16.  Letter  to  Christian  Friis,  April-May  1618,  egenhandige  8rev4  VII,  17-8. 
64 6.  The  vice-kapelmester  should  exercise  his  musicians  and  Hendrik 
Trumpeter  should  join  the  company  to  learn  the  new  piece  by 
Mogens. 
7.  The  wine  cellarer  shall  follow  the  two  captains  who  are  going  to 
the  Belt,  each  is  to  have  some  wine. 
8.  Sten  Villumsen  shall  have  the  two  ships  with  the  two  galleys 
ready  to  sail  this  week. 
9.  Since  Waldkirch  has  arrived  and  has  my  wares  with  him  he  Auld 
immediately  be  sent  a  message. 
10.  Clauss  Soll  has  a  cauldron  which  belongs  to  Hendrik  Frisch  and 
he  should  immediately  return  it. 
The  use  of  these  letters  to  unravel  the  function  of  the  state  offi- 
cials  is  therefore  somewhat  flawed  as  the  king  may  have  instructed  an 
addressee  to  do  certain  things  simply  because  he  happened  to  be  writing 
to  him  at  the  time  the  thought  occurred  to  him.  The  letters  are  also  very 
much  skewed  towards  the  latter  period  of  Christian's  reign,  with  very 
few  existing  for  the  period  up  to  around  1620.  The  vast  majority  of  them 
date  from  the  1630s  and  1640s.  Whether  this  is  because  Christian  IV  wrote 
so  many  more  letters  in  this  period  or  whether  earlier  letters  have  simply 
been  lost  is  not  known.  Most  likely  there  is  an  element  of  both. 
These  facts  naturally  distort  the  results  of  the  analysis  to  some  ex- 
tent.  The'  distinction  between  officials  is  blurred  by  the  nature  of  the 
letters  and  the  date  skew  will  weight  the  changing  concerns  of  later 
years  at  the  expense  of  the  earlier  period.  This  is  evident  in  the  greater 
importance  seemingly  attached  to  finance  and  foreign  affairs  over  com- 
merce  and  building  works,  which  would  have  been  more  significant  in  the 
earlier  years.  However,  in  the  absence  of  more  comprehensive  materiall7, 
17.  The  directives  issued  from  the  Danske  Kancell;  published  in  Kancelliets  Drevbbger,  deal  more 
with  the  officials'  roles  as  lensm-end  than  as  state  officials. 
65 the  use  of  Christian  IV's  letters  for  this  study  is  felt  to  be  justified. 
Ten  broad  categories  were  chosen  as  the  basis  of  the  analysis  and 
all  correspondence  on  these  subjects  to  each  individual  member  of  the 
r-igsrad  was  catalogued  under  the  following  headings:  The  Royal  Court; 
Foreign  Affairs;  Finance;  Government  Administration;  The  Navy;  Law  and 
Order;  Building  Work;  Army  and  Land  Defence;  Commerce;  and  The  German 
Duchies. 
By  restricting  it  to  these  categories  there  will  of  course  be  a  cer- 
tain  amount  of  simplification.  Within  each  category  no  degree  of  impor- 
tance  has  been  attached  to  what  was  being  discussed.  If  we  look  at  how 
the  letter  the  Christian  Friis  above  was  categorised  we  see  that  it  comes 
under  the  royal  household  (for  paragraphs  4,6  &  10),  the  navy  (paras  5, 
7&  8),  building  works  (paras  1&  2),  the  army  and  land  defences  (para 
3),  and  commerce  (pars  9).  Paragraph  9  hardly  has  the  same  weight  as, 
for  example,  a  discussion  of  investments  in  the  Danish  East  India  Com- 
pany,  but  it  is  still  concerned  with  commerce.  Similarly  the  finance 
category  contains  all  orders  for  petty  cash  payments  as  well  as  discus- 
sions  relating  to  tolls,  taxes  and  state  finance. 
Most  of  the  letters  cover  more  than  one  subject,  and  of  the  1093 
letters  addressed  to  rigsrAd  members  50  are  jointly  addressed  to  two, 
three,  or  four  individuals.  All  letters  which  were  jointly  addressed  and 
those  which  deal  with  a  number  of  different  subjects  are  therefore 
counted  more  than  once.  The  total  number  of  letters  addressed  to  the 
rigsrad  members  are  shown  in  Table  2.1. 
66 Addressee  No.  96 
Rigshofinester  342  31.3 
Kongens  Kansler  457  41.8 
Stadtholder  224  20.5 
Rigsmarsk  13  1.2 
Rigsadmiral  36  3.3 
Rigskansler  8  0.7 
Stadtholder  i  Norge  8  0.7 
RigsrAd  members  without  office  55  5.0 
Table  2.1.  Total  Number  of  Letters  to  Rigsräd  Members 
Sources  C.  F.  Bricka  I  JA  Frede  icäa  (eds.  ),  Kong  Chrisäan  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve,  (4benhavn,  1818-86),  1-  V11 
J.  Skovgaard,  Kong  Christian  den  Fj&*  egenhandige  brevM  (4benhavn,  1928),  VIII. 
The  role  of  the  individual  office  holders  will  be  discussed 
separately,  but  as  a  basis  for  comparison  the  results  of  the  analysis  for 
rigsrad  members  without  office  are  given  first,  in  Table  2.2. 
Subiect  No.  96 
1.  The  Royal  Court  7  12.7 
2.  Foreign  Affairs  24  43.6 
3.  Finance  16  29.1 
4.  Government  Administration  -13  23.6 
5.  The  Navy  9  16.4 
6.  Law  and  Order  4  7.2 
7.  Building  Work  5  9.1 
8.  Army  and  Land  Defences  11  20.0 
9.  Commerce  13  23.6 
10.  The  German  Duchies  3  5.5 
Table  2.2.  Number  of  Letters  to  Rigsrid  Members  Without  Office 
Sources:  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve  I-  VII; 
J.  Skcvgaard,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve,  (Klbenhavn,  1928),  VIII. 
The  reason  that  foreign  affairs  appear  so  important  is  because  a 
number  of  rigsrad  members  were  chosen  to  go  on  diplomatic  missions  to 
foreign  powers.  The  rest  of  the  figures  show  a  fairly  even  spread  be- 
tween  the  subjects,  as  might  be  expected. 
67 2.2.2.  Rigshofinester 
The  rigshofinester  was  the  highest  office  of  state  and  was  in  essence  a 
viceroy.  He  appeared  to  hold  complete  authority  over  the  government,  was 
accountable  only  to  the  king,  and  acted  as  his  deputy  in  his  absence. 
When  Baron  Cormenin18  visited  Copenhagen  in  1629  he  noted  that  the 
'grand  Maistre'  was  'le  souverain  pouvoir  apres  le  Roy,  sur  les  affaires 
concernans  l'Estat  &  le  Royaume,  c'est  comme  le  Lieutenant  au  gouverne- 
ment'  (the  sovereign  power  after  the  king,  in  affairs  concerning  the  state 
and  the  monarchy,  that  is  like  the  Lieutenant  of  government). 
This  was  essentially  true,  although  a  little  simplified.  The  role  was 
primarily  a  financial  one,  being  directly  responsible  for  the  running  of 
the  rentekammer  (treasury).  This  supervision  of  state  finance  also  meant 
that  the  operation  of  the  navy  and  the  army,  fortifications  and  crown 
building  works  also  came  under  his  jurisdiction. 
An  oath  was  drawn  up  by  Christian  IV  outlining  the  responsibilities 
of  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  when  he  took  up  the  post  in  1643'9.  The  principal  com- 
mitment  was  that  he  was  to  'haffue  god  och  fliitig  opsiicht  pa  E:  k:  M:  In- 
decht  och  udgiifft,  saat  derudi  E:  k:  M:  inted  skal  skee  forkordt  y  Nogen 
made'  (have  good  and  diligent  supervision  over  His  Royal  Majesty's  income 
and  expenditure  so  that  His  Royal  Majesty  will  not  thereby  be  in  any  way 
left  short).  Ironically  in  the  light  of  Ulfeldt's  subsequent  behaviour20, 
much  of  the  oath  details  that  his  authority  was  to  be  used  to  limit  any 
fraud  or  embezzlement  that  might  occur  within  in  the  administration  and 
its  suppliers: 
------------------ 
18.  Des  Hayes,  Les  voyages  de  Monsieur  Des  Hayes,  Baron  de  Covrmesvin,  en  Dannemarc  (Paris, 
1664),  245.  ' 
19.2  April  1643.  egenhandige  Breve]  VIII1  234-5. 
20.  See  Chapter  3. 
68 Rendtemeisterne  och  dem,  aff  dem  dependerer,  med  all  lensmend, 
toller  och  Syssemeister,  item  dem,  som  till  Holmen,  Briggers  och 
Bagers,  Prouyandthus  och  Artholoriit  Regnis,  med  all  dem  som  nogiit 
vnder  henderne  haffuer,  will  ieg  vden  Respect  Indseend  haffue,  tiil 
derris  Egiit  Nytte  och  E:  k:  M:  til  skade.  Ieg  uyl  med  al  fliid  och 
Authoritet  holde  Enhuer  y  sit  sted,  At  dy  derris  betroede  Embede 
troeligen  och  uel  forrestaar,  Och  at  dy  g4r  Arlygen  Regenskab  for 
derris  Administration  Och  Ingen  Respitt  giiffue  dem,  som  skildig 
bliffuer,  at  dy  io  betaler  ded,  dy  skiildig  bliiffuer,  mens  strax  lade 
dem  forfcplge  med  Retten,  saat  E:  k:  M:  ingen  skade  deroffuer  lyder. 
I  will  supervise  the  rentemestre  and  their  subordinates,  along  with 
all  lensm.  nd,  toll  collectors  and  excisemen,  and  those  who  are  ac- 
counted  with  the  dockyard,  brewers  and  bakers,  victualling  store 
and  Artillery,  with  all  those  who  have  connection  with  these,  to  en- 
sure  they  do  not  operate  to  their  own  advantage,  and  to  His  Royal 
Majesty's  loss.  I  will  with  all  diligence  and  authority  keep  everyone 
in  their  place,  ensure  that  they  faithfully  and  thoroughly  under- 
stand  the  office  entrusted  to  them  and  that  they  complete  yearly 
accounts  for  their  administration,  and  give  no  respite  to  those  who 
are  debtors  and  if  they  do  not  pay  up,  to  immediately  prosecute 
them  in  court,  so  that  His  Royal  Majesty  will  not  thereby  be  put  at 
a  loss. 
In  addition  he  was  to  have  no  connection  with  any  native  or  foreigner 
without  the  express  command  of  the  king,  and  was  to  obey  all  of  the 
kings  orders,  so  help  him  God. 
69 The  analysis  of  letters  bears  out  the  fact  that  the  rigshofinester 
was  involved  in  all  aspects  of  the  state  administration.  Although  not 
specifically  mentioned  in  his  oath,  the  most  frequent  subject  in  the  cor- 
respondence  was  foreign  affairs,  all  of  which  dates  from  the  1640s  when 
discord  with  Sweden  was  increasing. 
Subiect  No.  % 
1.  The  Royal  Court  80  23.4 
2.  Foreign  Affairs  123  34.9 
3.  Finance  86  24.4 
4.  Government  Administration  79  22.4 
5.  The  Navy  77  21.9 
6.  Law  and  Order  23  6.5 
7.  Building  Work  42  11.9 
8.  Army  and  Land  Defences  80  22.7 
9.  Commerce  52  14.8 
10.  The  German  Duchies  16  4.5 
Table  2.3.  Number  of  Letters  to  Rigshofinestre 
Sources:  C,  F,  Bricka  I  J.  A.  Frederida  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  brev4  I-  VII 
J.  Skovgaard,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerc  egenhandige  brevg  (K$benhavn,  1928),  VIII. 
Despite  its  seeming  importance  it  was,  as  previously  mentioned,  the 
least  likely  of  the  state  offices  to  be  filled.  The  reason  for  this  was  un- 
doubtedly  Christian  IV's  unwillingness  to  have  such  a  powerful  member  in 
his  rigsrad  and  thereby  concede  a  greater  amount  of  political  power  to  it 
than  he  was  prepared  to  sanction.  The  appointment  of  Christoffer  Valken- 
dorf  to  the  post  in  1596  can  be  regarded.  largely  as  a  rebuff  to  the 
minority  government,  when  Christian  IV  was  trying  to  establish  his  own 
authority.  The  ageing  Valkendorf  was  at  that  time  nearing  the  end  of  his 
long  political  career  and  did  not  have  much  of  an  impact  in  the  post, 
apart  from  his  accounting  duties  at  the  rentekammer,  and  was  definitely 
under  Christian  IV's  shadow21.  He  died  in  1601. 
-------------------- 
21.  Arthur  G.  Hass,  Rigshofinester  Kristoffer  Valkendorf  to  Glorup  (1525-1601),  (K$benhavn,  1933), 
174-88. 
70 More  than  thirty  years  then  elapsed  before  Christian  IV  felt  able  to 
appoint  someone  else  to  the  post.  As  Cormenin  observed  'cette  Charge 
West  pas  remplie,  ä  cause  que  le  dernier  qui  la  possedoit  s'etoit  rende 
trop  puissant'  (that  office  is  not  occupied  because  the  last  who  held  it 
proved  too  powerful).  The  choice  fell  on  Frans  Rantzau,  the  first  of  his 
sons-in-law  and  a  close  drinking  companion,  whom  Christian  IV  obviously 
believed  he  could  trust  not  to  subvert  his  own  power.  Rantzau  did  not 
have  long  to  prove  his  abilities,  however,  as  within  a  few  months  of  his 
appointment  he  drowned  in  the  castle  moat  after  a  particularly  heavy 
drinking  session  with  the  king. 
A  further  decade  then  elapsed  before  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  another  son- 
in-law,  was  chosen  to  take  the  office  in  1643.  Christian  IV  came  to 
severely  regret  this  decision  after  Ulfeldt  turned  against  him  and  used 
his  position  and  influence  to  indulge  in  large  scale  embezzlement  and 
pompous  delusions  of  grandeur. 
The  king's  inability  to  restrain  the  activities  of  Ulfeldt  would 
perhaps  suggest  that  he  had  been  right  to  contravene  his  hindfxstning 
by  not  having  the  office  filled  at  all  times.  However,  the  king's  growing 
old  age  did  make  it  easier  for  someone  like  Ulfeldt  to  take  advantage  of 
the  trust  placed  in  them. 
2.2.3.  Kongens  Kansler 
In  direct  contrast  to  that  of  the  rigshofinester  the  position  of  kongens 
kansler  (or  simply  kansler)  was  always  filled.  The  choice  of  kansler  was 
the  sole  prerogative  of  the  king  and  was  particularly  important  as  he 
tended  to  operate  as  the  king's  right  hand  man  and  confidante  in  the  ab- 
sence  of  a  rigshofinester.  However,  unlike  the  rigshofinester  his  power 
was  limited  by  the  fact  that  he  was  not  such  an  autonomous  figure,  but 
the  leader  of  the  government  and  general  secretary  of  the  rigsräcP  . 
22.  Svend  E11eh#j,  Christian  IV.  s  tidsalder,  (Danmarks  historiq  7),  (K$benhavn.  1964)ß  61. 
71 No  formal  description  of  the  duties  of  the  kansler  exists  but  it  is 
clear  that  he  had  two  main  administrative  functions  within  the  state,  as 
leader  of  both  the  rigsrAd  and  of  the  Danske  kancelli,  as  well  as  having 
many  other  minor  duties. 
As  the  leader  of  the  rigsrid  he  was  the  intermediary  between  it 
and  the  king  and  was  therefore  in  the  difficult  position  of  trying  to  keep 
both  satisfied.  Quite  how  much  political  leadership  in  the  rigsräd  he  was 
expected  to  have  is  hard  to  judge,  but  it  appears  that  he  may  have  been 
more  of  a  spokesman  than  a  real  'leader'.  He  was  also  responsible  for 
overseeing  the  establishment  of  all  new  laws  and  statutes  approved  by 
the  rigsrAd,  copies  of  which  were  kept  in  the  state  archives  along  with 
all  previous  legislation.  The  kansler  was  the  sole  key-holder  of  these  ar- 
chives  and  was  therefore  the  custodian  of  the  constitution23. 
Being  in  charge  of  the  Danske  kancelli  was  also  a  great  respon- 
sibility.  It  was  the  administrative  body  through  which  most  correspon- 
dence  concerning  the  internal  running  of  the  state,  as  well  as  that 
directed  to  Sweden  and  Russia  was  controlled.  It  is  probably  reasonable 
to  assume  that  the  kansler  was  not  actually  involved  in  its  day  to  day 
running,  given  the  number  of  his  other  duties,  but  he  kept  a  watchful 
eye  on  its  operation  under  the  command  of  its  chief  secretary. 
Other  areas  of  responsibility  which  the  kansler  was  charged  with 
included  education,  principally  as  chancellor  of  Copenhagen  University, 
the  church,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  courts  of  law. 
-------------------- 
23.  Ole  Degn.  Christian  4.  s  kansler,  (Viborg.  1987),  47-8. 
72 Subiect  No.  % 
1.  The  Royal  Court  128  28.0 
2.  Foreign  Affairs  209  45.7 
3.  Finance  99  21.7 
4.  Government  Administration  158  34.8 
5.  The  Navy  37  8.1 
6..  Law  and  Order  43  9.6 
7.  Building  Work  30  6.6 
8.  Army  and  Land  Defences  77  16.8 
9.  Commerce  51  10.9 
10.  The  German  Duchies  28  6.1 
Table  2.4.  Number  of  Letters  to  Kongens  Kanslere 
Sources:  C.  F.  Bricka  I  JA  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenbndip  breve  I-  VII; 
J.  Skovgaard,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhvdige  brevß  (4benhavn,  1928),  VIII. 
As  can  be  seen  from  Table  2.4.,  the  kansler  was  also  closely  in- 
volved  with  finances  and  all  other  aspects  of  the  administration.  Those 
letters  dealing  with  the  navy  and  building  works  date  mainly  from 
periods  when  there  was  neither  rigshofinester  nor  stadtholder,  during 
which  time  the  kansler  also  partly  assumed  leadership  of  the  rentekam- 
mer. 
2.2.4.  Stadtholder  i  Kobenhavn 
The  position  of  stadtholder  i  Kobenhavn  was  an  anomaly.  Technically  it 
was  not  one  of  the  high  state  offices,,  but  because  the  position  of  rig- 
shofinester  was  so  seldom  filled  it  assumed  a  much  greater  importance 
than  it  ought  to  have  warranted.  In  many  ways  being  stadtholder  was  a 
form  of  apprenticeship  to  becoming  rigshofinester.  All  three  of  the  men 
appointed  to  the  post  in  Christian  IV's  reign  had  previously  held  the 
position  of  stadtholder,  although  Breide  Rantzau  did  hold  the  post  of 
stadtholder  for  18  years  without  being  promoted. 
It  is  not  clear  what  happened  to  the  position  when  a  rigshofmester 
was  appointed.  Either  both  positions  were  held  by  the  same  man  or  the 
office  of  stadtholder  then  became  redundant.  At  no  time  was  there  ever 
both  a  rigshofinester  and  a  stadtholder  i  Kobenhavn  simultaneously. 
73 The  responsibilities  of  the  office  were  laid  down  in  1637  when  Cor- 
fitz  Ulfeldt  took  office24.  In  short  the  duties  were  outlined  as  follows: 
1.  He  is  to  represent  the  king  in  his  absence  without  bringing 
him  into  disrepute 
2.  He  is  to  comport  himself  with  decency  at  home  and  abroad, 
and  when  foreign  ambassadors  or  others  of  importance  visit  he  is 
to  accompany  and  entertain  them  to  the  best  of  his  abilities. 
3.  He  is  to  ensure  that  justice  is  upheld  in  Copenhagen. 
4.  He  is  not  to  allow  anyone  to  trade  outwith  the  lawful  statues, 
and  is  to  meet  the  town  factor  once  a  week  to  supervise  the  collec- 
tion  of  excise  duty. 
5.  He  is  to  hold  the  key  to  Osterport  and  ensure  that  it  is 
opened  and  closed  at  the  correct  time  every  day.  The  keys  to  the 
other  gates  are  to  be  entrusted  to  the  burgomasters  who  are  to 
open  and  close  them  at  the  correct  time. 
6.  All  gates  are  to  be  locked  immediately  in  the  event  of  a  mur- 
der  or  manslaughter  and  are  not  to  be  opened  until  the  guilty  man 
is  caught.  All  other  escape  routes  are  also  to  be  guarded. 
7.  Those  at  the  town  gates  are  to  report  every  day  to  the  stad- 
tholder  the  numbers  who  have  entered  and  left  the  town  by  horse, 
wagon  or  on  foot. 
8.  A  watch  is  to  be  kept  on  the  harbour  and  every  day  a 
report  is  to  be  given  on  all  those  who  have  entered  the  town  by 
sea.  No-one  is  to  enter  the  town  from  the  harbour  without  permis- 
sion  nor  are  men  or  goods  to  be  shipped  there  without  permission. 
9.  He  is  to  oversee  all  buildings  as  far  as  Sjaelland  stretches 
and  to  ensure  that  none  are  altered  without  express  permission. 
------------------ 
24.24  April  1637,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  130-32. 
74 Apart  from  the  first  two  points  these  terms  of  reference  in  no  way 
convey  the  importance  which  the  stadtholder  held  within  the  government. 
The  description  provided  by  Baron  Cormenin25  of  the  role  of  Frans 
Rantzau  as  stadtholder  in  1629  is  much  more  instructive: 
il  ya  encores  la  Charge  de  Statholder  du  Royaume,  c'est  ä  dire 
Viceroy,  &  bien  qu'il  n'ait  sceance  au  Conseil  du  Royaume,  que  par 
cette  qualite  de  Conseiller  jointe  ä  la  premiere,  &  encores  ä  la 
sceance  selon  le  tems  de  sa  reception;  C'est  la  plus  belle  Charge  du 
Royaume,  -  aujourd'huy  c'est  comme  Sur-Intendent  des  Finances,  & 
plus  encores,  sa  fonction  est  en  l'absence  du  Roy  de  donner  pas- 
seports,  de  remedier  ä  tout  les  Finances  du  Roy,  tous  les  petits 
receveurs  du  Lot  des  Domaines,  soit  de  la  Tolle  d'Elseneur,  rendent 
conte  aux  Rentemestres,  qui  sont  comme  Tresoirs  de  1'Espargne,  & 
les  deux  Rentemestres  rendent  comte  au  Statholder,  qui  ne  rend 
conte  de  toute  sa  Charge  ä'  personne  qu'au  Roy:  son  pouvour  est 
encores  plus  absolu  que  M.  Ransau  ne  le  fait  valoir,  partie  de  ses 
fonctions  luy  sont  disputees  par  le  Chancelier  du  Roy,  mesmes  la 
qualite  de  Statholder  du  Royaume,  qu'il  veut  reduire  ä  Statholder  de 
Copenhague  seulement,  mais  cettuy-cy  est  appuye  de  la  faveur  & 
authorite  de  son  Maistre;  on  ne  connoist  pas  bien  encores  la  vraye 
fonction  de  cette  Charge,  d'autant  quelle  n'est  establie  que  depuis 
que  celle  de  grand  Maistre  n'a  plus  este  remplie,  laquelle  si  elle 
l'estoit,  le  statholder  n'auroit  rien  ä  faire;  quant  ä  moy,  je  croy 
que  c'est  une  Charge  a  lieu  de  lautre,  avec  changement  de  tiltre, 
pour  diminuer  l'authorite  de  la  premiere,  &  la  faire  comme  renaistre 
en  cette  seconde,  avec  moins  de  credit  &  d'authorite 
------------------- 
25.  Des  Hayes,  Les  voyages  de  Monsieur  Des  Hayes,  245-253. 
75 There  is  also  the  office  of  Stadtholder  of  the  Realm,  that  is  to  say 
Viceroy,  and  although  he  has  a  seat  on  the  Council  of  the  Realm 
only  by  virtue  of  this  stature  of  Councillor  held  with  the  first 
(office  of  state,  i.  e.  rigshofinester),  and  only  has  the  seat  according 
to  the  terms  of  his  admittance;  It  is  the  greatest  office  of  the  realm 
today,  it  is  like  the  Surintendant  de  Finances  and  much  more  be- 
sides,  his  function  is,  in  the  absence  of  the  king,  to  issue 
passports,  to  supervise  all  finances  of  the  king,  all  the  small 
revenues  from  the  domains,  as  well  as  the  tolls  of  Helsinggr, 
provide  details  to  the  rentemestre,  who  are  like  the  Tresoriers  de 
1'Epargne,  and  the  two  rentemestre  deliver  accounts  to  the  stad- 
tholder,  who  provides  all  details  of  his  office  to  no-one  but  the 
king;  his  powers  are  even  more  absolute  since  M.  Rantzau  does  not 
value  the  portion  of  his  powers  which  are  disputed  with  the  Chan- 
cellor  of  the  King  (kongens  kansler),  even  the  status  of  Stadtholder 
of  the  Realm,  though  he  could  be  reduced  to  Stadtholder  of 
Copenhagen  alone,  but  that  he  is  supported  by  the  favour  and 
authority  of  his  master;  one  does  not  know  well  the  old  function  of 
this  office,  especially  since  it  has  been  established  only  after  that 
of  grand  master  (rigshofinester)  has  been  left  unfilled,  which  if  it 
were,  the  stadtholder  would  have  nothing  to  do;  as  far  as  I  can 
judge,  I  believe  it  is  an  office  like  the  other  with  a  change  of  title, 
to  diminish  the  authority  of  the  first,  and  revived  as  this  second, 
with  less  credit  and  authority. 
Thus  the  suspicion  that  the  post  of  stadtholder  was  used  as  a  sub- 
stitute  for  rigshofinester,  but  with  limited  authority,  is  confirmed. 
Despite  the  terms  of  office  drawn  up  by  Christian  IV,  which  make 
no  mention  of  the  rentekammer,  it  is  clear  that,  like  the  rigshofinester, 
the  stadtholder  was  its  overseer.  This  supposition  is  further 
76 strengthened  by  evidence  from  Christian  IV's  letters.  When  Rantzau  died 
in  1632  the  number  of  letters  to  the  rentekammer  soared.  As  soon  as  Ul- 
feldt  was  installed  in  1637  the  number  immediately  drops  again20.  Further 
evidence  that  by  the  early  1640s  the  rentekammer  was  under  his  direct 
control  is  provided  by  a  letter  which  the  king  addressed  to 
'Stadtholderen  H:  Corfidtz  wlfeld  till  hand,  Och  y  hans  frauerrelsse  Ren- 
temeisterne  at  Opbriide'  (Stadtholder  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  by  hand,  and  in  his 
absence  the  rentemestre  to  set  in  motion)27. 
Although  not  expressly  mentioned  in  the  terms  of  office,  the  navy, 
the  victualling  store  and  the  arsenal  also  came  under  his  jurisdiction,  all 
being  based  in  Copenhagen.  In  addition  point  nine  of  the  terms  of  office 
hardly  reflects  the  huge  importance  that  the  stadtholder  had  with  respect 
to  the  supervision  of  building  works  in  Copenhagen.  Most  of  Christian 
IV's  building  projects  were  carried  out  under  the  immediate  superinten- 
dence  of  the  stadtholder,  working  closely,  of  course,  with  the  king  him- 
self. 
Subiect  No.  % 
1.  The  Royal  Court  48  21.4 
2.  Foreign  Affairs  119  53.1 
3.  Finance  45  20.1 
4.  Government  Administration  27  12.1 
5.  The  Navy  77  34.4 
6.  Law  and  Order  19  8.5 
7.  Building  Work  39  17.4 
8.  Army  and  Land  Defences  41  18.3 
9.  Commerce  49  21.9 
10.  The  German  Duchies  7  3.1 
Table  2.5.  Number  of  Letters  to  the  Stadtholder  i  Kobenhavn 
Sources,  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve,  I.  VII; 
J.  Skovgaard,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve,  (K$benhavn,  1928),  VIII. 
-------------------- 
26.  Engberg  suggests  that  Ulfeldt  may  not  have  officially  taken  over  the  supervision  of  the  Ren- 
tekammer  until  after  the  death  of  the  kongens  kansler  in  1639.  (Jens  Engberg,  Danske  finanshis- 
torie  i  1640'erne,  (Aarhus  1972).  44  &  131). 
27.8  May  1641,  egenhandige  Breve,  V,  86. 
77 The  figures  in  Table  2.5.  are  very  similar  to  the  distribution  of  let- 
ters  for  the  rigshofinester,  further  substantiating  the  view  that  the  stad- 
tholder  was  a  kind  of  apprentice  rigshofinester.  The  only  significant  dif- 
ference  being  in  foreign  affairs,  which  is  accounted  for  by  the  entertain- 
ment  of  foreign  ambassadors  as  dictated  in  the  terms  of  reference. 
2.2.5.  Rigsmarsk 
The  rigsmarsk  (State  Marshal)  was  the  official  in  charge  of  the  Danish 
military,  although  in  practice  he  held  rather  more  political  than  ad- 
ministrative  power28.  The  main  duties  were  the  recruiting  of  troops,  espe- 
cially  the  rostjeneste  (noble  cavalrymen),  and  the  command  of  the  army  in 
wartime.  Within  the  rigsrid  the  rigsmarsk  also  played  an  influential  part 
in  the  granting  of  finances  to  the  army. 
Unlike  the  previous  positions  the  selection  of  a  rigsmarsk  had  to 
be  approved  by  the  rigsrad.  This  authority  was  enforced  in  1627  when 
Christian  IV  was  forced  to  accept  the  appointment  of  Jprgen  Skeel  to  the 
post  after  his  own  leadership  of  the  army  had  proved  so  disastrous.  The 
appointment  thereby  ensured  that  the  military  and  financial  command  of 
the  army  was  brought  back  within  the  control  of  the  r-igsrjd29  .  At  the 
same  time  a  generalkrigskommisswr  (War  Commissioner)  was  appointed  to 
take  on  the  day  to  day  administration  of  the  war  effort,  leaving  the 
rigsmarsk  relatively  free  of  actual  administrative  duties. 
------------------- 
28.  Elleh$j,  Danmarks  Historie,  63-4. 
29.  E.  Ladewig  Petersen,  'Defence  War  and  Finance:  Christian  1V  and  the  Council  of  the  Realm 
1596-1629',  Scandinavian  Journal  of  History,  7  (1982),  309. 
78 That  the  rigsmarsk  had  few  administrative  duties  is  demonstrated 
by  the  fact  that,  despite  the  office  being  occupied  for  most  of  the  reign, 
only  13  letters  were  addressed  to  a  rigsmarsk,  and  of  those,  eight  were 
jointly  addressed  to  either  kansler  or  stadtholder  and  were  largely  con- 
cerned  with  matters  pertaining  to  the  Court. 
2.2.6.  Rigsadmiral 
Like  the  rigsmarsk,  the  main  responsibilities  of  the  rigsadmiral  (State 
Admiral)  were  not  administrative  but  operational.  He  was  expected  to  com- 
mand  the  fleet  at  sea  both  in  peace-time  and  in  times  of  war,  and  the 
position  would  therefore  seem  to  have  required  an  established  naval  of- 
ficer  with  extensive  seagoing  experience,  although  this  was  not  always 
the  case. 
The  office  itself  was  only  stabilised  when  Peder  Munk  assumed  con- 
trol  during  the  Northern  Seven  Years  War.  The  earlier  commanders  of  the 
navy  held  varying  titles  including  Kongens  Admiral  (the  king's  admiral) 
and  Overste  Admiral  (highest  admiral)  and  held  office  for  only  one  or  two 
years30.  Peder  Munk  was  promoted  to  Overste  Admiral  in  1567  and  by 
1575  he  became  known  as  Rigens  Admiral,  a  title  he  held  until  his  promo- 
tion  to  rigsmarsk  in  1596. 
The  first  official  terms  of  office  date  from  1616  when  Albert  Skeel 
was  appointed  to  the  post3l.  In  summary  his  duties  were  as  follows: 
1.  To  command  the  navy  in  peace  and  war,  sail  to  wherever  the 
the  king  directs,  and  carry  out  his  orders  to  the  best  of  his 
ability. 
------------------ 
30.  H.  D.  Lind,  Fra  kong  Frederik  den  andens  bd.  (Kobenhavn,  1902). 
31.1  December  1616,  egenhandige  Breve,  I,  108-110. 
79 2.  To  maintain  good  order  and  discipline  and  uphold  the  king's 
reputation  in  home  and  foreign  ports. 
3.  To  inspect  the  fleet  yearly  and  report  to  the  king  on  its 
strength,  so  that  at  all  times  it  can  be  kept  ready  to  sail,  should 
the  need  arise. 
4.  To  keep  a  register  of  all  seamen  in  his  service. 
5.  To  keep  a  register  of  the  number  of  seamen  able  to  be  con- 
scripted  in  the  king's  lands. 
6.  To  protect  the  men  of  the  king's  navy  against  any  wrong- 
doing,  and  to  judge  and  sentence,  according  to  the  king's  articles. 
7.  To  order  his  Captains,  skippers  and  other  officers  not  to 
fraternise  with  the  ordinary  seamen. 
8.  To  hold  religious  services  every  morning  and  evening  and  to 
employ  chaplains  to  conduct  them. 
The  role  of  the  rigsadmiral  within  the  central  administration  was  very 
much  linked  to  the  use  of  the  navy  as  an  instrument  of  foreign  policy. 
Only  five  of  the  36  letters  addressed  to  the  rigsadmiral  make  no  mention 
of  the  navy  and  of  those,  three  are  primarily  concerned  with  foreign  af- 
fai  rs. 
Subiect  No.  % 
1.  The  Royal  Court  0  0.0 
2.  Foreign  Affairs  19  52.7 
3.  Finance  3  8.3 
4.  Government  Administration  2  5.6 
5.  The  Navy  31  86.1 
6.  Law  and  Order  3  8.3 
7.  Building  Work  0  0.0 
8.  Army  and  Land  Defences  2  5.6 
9.  Commerce  4  11.1 
10.  The  German  Duchies  0  0.0 
Table  2.6.  Number  of  Letters  to  Rigsadmiraler 
Sourcesc  C.  F.  Bricka  I  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve,  I-  Vü  ; 
J.  Skovgaard,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve,  (Kobenhavn,  1928),  VIII. 
80 2.2.7.  Rigskansler 
The  rigskansler  was,  as  his  latin  title  of  Justitiarius  suggests,  the  equiv- 
alent  of  the  English  Lord  Chancellor.  He  was  the  chancellor  of  the  Kon- 
gens  Retterting  (high  court),  acting  as  the  king's  deputy  at  times  when 
he  was  unable  to  preside  in  court  himself.  He  was  responsible  for  draw- 
ing  up  all  new  statutes  of  judicial  law  and  for  the  administration  of  jus- 
tice  throughout  the  realm.  In  addition  he  was  the  secretary  of  the  Her- 
redag,  the  assembly  of  the  nobility  and  high  clergy. 
Until  1646,  when  Christian  IV  raised  the  status  of  both  rigskansler 
and  stadtholder  i  Norge  to  the  same  ranking  as  rigsadmiraP2,  the  post 
was  not  officially  restricted  to  members  of  the  rigsrrd,  although  it  in- 
variably  was  in  practice.  It  was  usually  filled  by  someone  of  very  great 
wisdom  and  learning  such  as  Arild  Huitfeldt  or  Jakob  Ulfeldt. 
There  are  only  eight  letters  extant  from  the  king  to  his 
rigskanslere,  most  of  which  are  concerned  with  government  administra- 
tion.  Strangely  none  is  concerned  with  law  and  order. 
2.2.8.  Stadtholder  i  Norge 
The  position  of  stadtholder  i  Norge  (Norwegian  stadtholder)  was  created 
in  1572,  after  the  Northern  Seven  Years  War,  and  supplanted  the  earlier 
position  of  Norge  riges  kansler  (Norway  state  chancellor)33.  For  most  of 
the  time  it  was  merely  an  additional  title  for  the  holder  of  the  largest 
Norwegian  len  of  Akershus,  and  their  responsibilities  tended  to  be 
restricted  simply  to  their  own  len.  Their  main  duties  were  the  collection 
of  taxes  and  tolls,  the  maintenance  of  an  army,  and  the  administration  of 
justice. 
------------------ 
32.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  &  Christen  Thomesen  Sehested.  21  May  1646,  egenhandige  Breve,  VIII, 
384-6. 
33.  Rolf  Fladeby,  Norges  historie,  6,  (Oslo,  1977).  87-91. 
81 When  Hannibal  Sehested  took  over  the  post  in  1642  he  extended  his 
powers  to  cover  the  whole  of  Norway  and  acted  very  much  as  a  viceroy 
in  that  kingdom.  Under  his  leadership  there  grew  a  separate  Norwegian 
central  administration  with  its  own  rentekammer.  Sehested  also  established 
a  strong  independent  Norwegian  army,  and  administered  the  operation  of 
the  defensionskibe  fleet34. 
Again  the  number  of  letters  to  the  stadtholder  i  norge  is  scant. 
Only  eight  exist,  concerning  matters  mainly  to  do  with  finance  and 
government  administration. 
2.3.  The  Administrative  Institutions  of  Government 
In  addition  to  the  rigsrad  there  were  three  principal  institutions  of 
government  which  dealt  with  the  administration  of  the  state.  These  were 
the  Danske  kancelli  (Danish  chancellery),  the  Tyske  kancelli  (German 
chancellery),  and  the  rentekammer,  which  relate  in  very  simplistic  terms 
to  the  'home  office',  the  'foreign  office'  and  the  'treasury'.  Both  the 
Tyske  kancelli  and  the  rentekammer  had  their  origins  as  sub-departments 
within  the  Danske  kancelli  but  by  the  17th  century  had  become  distinct 
bodies  in  their  own  right,  although  nominally  still  remaining  under  its 
supervision. 
Both  the  Danske  kancelli  and  the  rentekammer  were  controlled  by 
members  within  the  rigsrad.  In  contrast  the  Tyske  kancelli  effectively 
had  no  noble  supervision  and  was  very  different  in  the  way  in  which  it 
was  run. 
The  distinction  between  what  should  be  dealt  with  by  the  Danske 
kancelli  and  the  Tyske  kancelli  was  dictated  not  by  subject  matter  but 
by  the  language  in  which  it  was  to  be  written.  As  many  of  the 
functionaries  and  servants  of  the  state  were  of  German  origin,  or  under- 
------------------- 
34.  Sverre  Steen,  Det  norske  folks  liv  og  histories,  6,  (Oslo  1930),  79-93. 
See  also  Chapter  10  for  details  of  Sehested's  role  as  a  shipbuilding  contractor. 
82 stood  German  better  than  Danish,  there  was  a  great  deal  of  overlap  be- 
tween  the  boundaries  of  the  two  chancelleries  with  regard  to  matters 
within  the  kingdom  of  Denmark-Norway. 
2.3.1.  The  Danske  Kancelli 
The  Danske  kancelli  dealt  with  all  state  correspondence  which  was  written 
in  Danish.  This  meant  that  its  areas  of  responsibility  encompassed  the  in- 
ternal  functioning  of  the  Danish  and  Norwegian  kingdoms  as  well  as  for- 
eign  relations  with  Sweden  and  occasionally  Russia.  Its  business  was  or- 
ganised  by  geographical  region  rather  than  by  subject  matter  and 
separate  copy-books  were  kept  for  each  province.  This  may  have  been 
suitable  from  the  point  of  view  of  len  administration  but  was  clearly  inef- 
ficient  as  a  means  of  central  government. 
It  was  supervised  by  the  kongens  kansler,  but  governed  on  a  day 
to  day  basis  by  an  oversekretwr  (chief  secretary).  Beneath  him  were  a 
number  of  under-secretaries  and  clerks.  These  positions  were  manned 
largely  by  young  noblemen  who  were  working  their  way  up  the  career 
ladder  to  eventually  become  rigsrad  members  or  lensma'ncP5  For  a  short 
time  Iver  Vind  functioned  as  both  rigsrad  member  and  oversekret.  r. 
Table  2.7.  shows  those  letters  specifically  directed  to  the  Danske 
kancelli,  excluding  those  to  the  kongens  kansler  whose  many  other  duties 
would  only  confuse  matters.  As  might  be  expected  the  majority  of  letters 
are  concerned  with  matters  to  do  with  the  court  and  government. 
------------------- 
35.  Daniel  0.  Fisher.  'Kongens  unge  mend:  Christian  4.  s  kancellisekretarer',  in  K.  J.  V.  Jespersen 
(ed.  ),  Rigsr.  d,  adel  og  opposition  1570-1648  (Odense,  1980),  169-94. 
83 Subiect  No.  % 
1.  The  Royal  Court  11  50.0 
2.  Foreign  Affairs  4  18.2 
3.  Finance  0  0.0 
4.  Government  5  22.7 
5.  The  navy  2  9.1 
6.  Law  and  order  2  9.1 
7.  Building  work  0  0.0 
8.  Army  and  land  defences  0  0.0 
9.  Commerce  2  9.1 
10.  The  German  duchies  0  0.0 
Table  2.7.  Letters  to  Danske  kancelli  officials 
Sources;  C.  F.  Bricks  &  J.  A.  Fredeiiäa  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  brevß  I-  VII; 
J.  Skovgaard,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve  (K$benhavn,  1928),  VIII, 
2.3.2.  The  Tyske  Kancelli 
The  Tyske  kancelli  dealt  with  all  correspondence  written  in  German  and 
in  Latin.  Its  principle  concern  was  with  the  German  duchies  and  foreign 
relations  with  the  German  states,  the  Netherlands,  France,  Britain  and 
Spain.  However  this  did  not  exclude  it  from  also  dealing  with  domestic  or 
with  Swedish  or  Russian  matters. 
Unlike  the  Danske  kancelli  it  was  run  almost  entirely  by  commoners 
of  the  burgher  class,  many  of  them  from  the  German  duchies  and  states. 
Only  one  official  of  the  Tyske  kancelli  later  went  on  to  become  a  rigsrad 
member-16.  Theoretically  it  should  have  come  under  the  supervision  of  the 
kongens  kansler  but  in  practice  Christian  IV  himself  took  a  very  active 
personal  control  of  it.  This  brought  him  into  conflict  with  the  rigsrAd 
who,  justifiably,  were  concerned  about  the  accountability  of  such  an  im- 
portant  section  of  the  Danish  administration,  and  tried  to  enforce  the 
kongens  kansler's  right  to  oversee  its  running. 
-------------------- 
36.  Jespersen,  'Rekrutteringen  til  rigsrddet',  35-92. 
84 The  Tyske  kancelli,  like  the  Danske  kancelli,  was  led  by  an 
oversekret&r  but  in  this  case  their  political  power  was  very  much 
greater.  For  most  of  Christian  IV's  reign  the  position  was  held  by 
Frederik  Günther,  who  was  his  chief  adviser  on  non-Swedish  foreign  af- 
fairs  for  many  years. 
The  Danish  involvement  in  the  Thirty  Years  War  brought  with  it  a 
greater  need  for  German  diplomacy.  In  1628  a  new  post  of  tyske  kansler 
(German  chancellor)  was  created  to  head  the  chancellery.  However,  he  was 
based  principally  in  Glückstadt  and  appears  initially  to  have  operated 
more  as  a  royal  ambassador  in  the  German  duchies  and  states  rather  than 
as  an  administrative  official.  In  addition  the  Holstein  stadtholder,  Chris- 
tian  Pentz,  became  increasingly  involved  in  Danish  foreign  policy  after 
marrying  one  of  the  king's  daughters,  much  to  the  disgust  of  the 
rigsrAdU.  To  compound  their  annoyance  the  appointment  of  Ditlev 
Reventlow  as  Tyske  kansler  in  1632  effectively  resulted  in  the  kongens 
kansler,  and  therefore  the  rigsrJd,  finally  losing  all  control  of  this  chan- 
cellery. 
However,  despite  all  these  changes  the  oversekretvr  back  in 
Copenhagen  still  retained  much  of  his  power  and  authority,  and  Günther 
remained  the  chief  official  with  whom  the  king  corresponded  on  matters 
concerning  the  Tyske  kancelli.  The  great  number  of  letters  addressed  to 
Günther  and  other  members  of  the  Tyske  kancelli,  shown  in  Table  2.8., 
demonstrate  how  important  Christian  IV  viewed  this  body,  not  least  be- 
cause  of  the  autonomy  it  allowed  him  away  from  the  interference  of  the 
rigsräd. 
-------------------- 
37.  E1lehmj,  Danmarks  Historie  296-7. 
85 Subiect  No.  % 
1.  The  Royal  Court  41  18.1 
2.  Foreign  Affairs  144  63.4 
3.  Finance  53  23.3 
4.  Government  10  4.4 
5.  The  navy  3  1.3 
6.  Law  and  order  3  1.3 
7.  Building  work  5  2.2 
8.  Army  and  land  defences  27  11.9 
9.  Commerce  26  11.5 
10.  The  German  duchies  99  43.6 
Table  2.8.  Letters  to  Tyske  kancelli  officials 
Sources:  C.  F.  Bricks  &  JA.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egnnhandip  brev4  I-  VII  ; 
J.  Skovgaard,  Kong  Christfan  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve  (K$benhavn,  1928),  VIII. 
2.3.3.  The  Rentekammer 
The  rentekammer  was  the  department  through  which  most,  though  by  no 
means  all,  state  revenue  and  expenditure  was  administered38.  It  was 
originally  a  subsidiary  of  the  Danske  kancelli  but  by  the  early  17th  cen- 
tury  it  had  become  a  virtually  independent  institution  in  its  own  right, 
although  much  of  its  correspondence  was  still  directed  through  the  kan- 
celli. 
At  its  head  were  an  a'ldste  rentemester  and  an  anden  rentemester 
(senior  and  junior  treasurer),  both  of  noble  lineage.  From  1625  it  was 
decreed  that  one  should  undertake  the  principal  accounts  of  the  ren- 
tekammer  itself,  while  the  other  audited  the  accounts  of  all  other  state 
offices.  The  rentemestre  were  selected  personally  by  the  king  and  were 
invariably  promoted  from  the  position  of  sekretmr  in  the  Danske  kancelli. 
Eventually  a  rentemester  could  hope  to  become  a  member  of  the  rigsrid. 
In  the  early  1640s  Jprgen  Vind  was  promoted  to  the  rigsrAd  whilst  still 
-------------------- 
38.  Details  of  precisely  which  finances  were  dealt  with  by  the  rentekammer  are  discussed  in 
Chap  S. 
86 maintaining  his  position  as  rentemester,  but  this  was  unusual.  During  this 
time  an  underrentemester  (under  treasurer)  was  appointed,  who  even- 
tually  superseded  Vind  as  full  rentemester. 
Beneath  the  rentemestre  were  two  Overste  renteskrivere  (senior 
treasury  clerks)  and  a  staff  of  around  25  junior  renteskrivere.  In  con- 
trast  to  the  Danske  kancelli  these  junior  positions  were  manned  by  com- 
moners,  albeit  from  an  elite  class  of  wealthy  burghers3g. 
The  rentekammer  was  overseen  from  the  rigsrad  by  the  rigshof- 
mester  or  stadtholder,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  by  the  kongens  kansler, 
when  neither  of  these  positions  were  filled.  Judging  by  the  number  of  his 
petty  requests  for  payment  the  king  himself  also  kept  a  very  close  eye 
on  its  day  to  day  running. 
Being  in  charge  of  virtually  all  state  expenditure  meant  that  the 
rentekammer  also  became  very  much  involved  in  the  procurement  of 
materials  and  the  supervision  of  state  suppliers.  This  was  particularly 
true  with  respect  to  the  dockyard,  arsenal,  and  victualling  store  where 
their  duties  extended  much  further  than  simple  accounting.  The  reasoning 
behind  this  was  presumably  that.  if  they  ensured  that  they  operated  effi- 
ciently  there  could  be  considerable  savings  for  the  state.  Table  2.9.  is 
based  solely  on  the  king's  letters  to  the  rentemestre  and  renteskrivere, 
not  the  stadtholder  or  rigshofinester,  and  shows  the  wide  range  of  duties 
with  which  they  were  concerned,  outwith  the  strictly  financial. 
-------------------- 
39.  Engberg,  Danske  finanshistoriq,  29-43. 
87 Subiect  No.  % 
1.  The  Royal  Court  110  20.9 
2.  Foreign  Affairs  26  4.9 
3.  Finance  239  45.4 
4.  Government  Administration  40  7.6 
5.  The  Navy  73  13.9 
6.  Law  and  Order  25  4.8 
7.  Building  Work  93  17.7 
8.  Army  and  Land  Defences  16  3.0 
9.  Commerce  191  36.3 
10.  The  German  Duchies  6  1.1 
Table  2.9.  Number  of  Letters  to  Rentekammer  Officials 
Sources  C.  F.  Bricka  &  JA  Frederida  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  brav  I-  VII; 
J.  Skovgaard,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  breve  (K$benhavn,  1928),  VIII. 
2.3.4.  An  Administrative  System? 
From  the  above  analysis  it  can  be  seen  that  the  central  administration 
was  very  disjointed  and  inefficient.  So  much  depended  on  personality  and 
context,  and  on  personal  relationships  with  the  king  that  any  formal 
definition  of  roles  becomes  virtually  meaningless,  which  explains  the  very 
fluid  boundaries  between  the  state  officials  and  even  the  central  institu- 
tions  of  government.  Many  of  the  practices  were  outmoded  and  much  too 
rudimentary  for  the  growing  responsibilities  and  workload  which  the 
central  administration  was  having  to  undertake.  In  fact  the  size  of 
government  was  actually  very  small,  amounting  to  not  much  more  than 
around  sixty  or  seventy  permanent  members  of  staff  in  the  rigsrad  and 
the  three  government  institutions40.  Given  the  geographical  size  of 
Denmark-Norway,  and  the  ambitions  that  Christian  IV  had  for  its  expan- 
sion,  the  central  government  would  appear  far  too  small  to  govern  effec- 
tively,  certainly  when  compared  to  the  size  of  the  administrations  in 
England,  France,  and  above  all  Spain4l. 
------------------ 
40.  Approximately  30  staff  in  the  rentekammer,  20  in  the  Danske  kanceih,  12  in  the  Tyske  Kan- 
celli  and  the  six  high  state  officials  in  the  rigsrAd 
41.  Among  the  most  informative  studies  on  the  central  administrations  of  these  countries  are: 
G.  E.  Aylmer,  The  King's  Servants:  The  Civil  Service  of  Charles  I  1625-164Z  (London  &  Boston, 
1974),  7-68;  J.  H.  Shennan,  Government  and  Society  in  France  1461-1661,  (London,  1969); 
I.  A.  A.  Thompson,  War  and  Government  in  Habsburg  Spain  15W-1624  (London,  1976). 
88 Despite  these  inadequacies  no  attempt  was  made  by  the  king  to 
reform  the  system,  and  much  of  its  functioning  continued  to  depend  on 
his  direct  supervision.  This  was  in  part  a  deliberate  ploy  to  maintain  as 
much  political  control  as  possible.  The  background  behind  this  reasoning, 
and  the  profound  impact  that  it  had  on  the  control  of  the  navy,  ought 
now  to  be  addressed. 
2.4.  The  King,  the  Rigsrad,  and  Political  Control  of  the  Navy 
The  issues  raised  in  Chapter  One  gave  some  indication  of  the  character 
and  personality  of  Christian  IV,  but  it  is  worth  now  looking  more  closely 
at  this  and  how  it  affected  his  relations  with  the  rigsrad.  This  is  a  sub- 
ject  which  has  aroused  great  passions  with  historians  for  centuries  and 
each  generation  has  moulded  his  character  to  suit  their  own  political 
ideologies42.  The  first  historians,  such  as  Ludvig  Holberg  and  Niels  Slange 
writing  in  the  early  part  of  the  18th  century,  were  patriotically  minded 
and  portrayed  him  as  a  righteous  and  noble  king  who  stood  up  to  the 
'bad  neighbour'  and  his  meddlesome  rigsrhd,  and  who  was  simply  unlucky 
when  things  went  wrong.  This  idealised  and  romantic  view  held  sway  un- 
til  the  late  19th  century  when  there  began  a  critical  backlash  from  liberal 
historians  like  J.  A.  Fredericia,  and  especially  the  marxist,  Erik  Arup,  who 
painted  him  as  an  arrogant,  incompetent,  and  brutal  tyrant  who  subjected 
his  people  to  unnecessary  war  and  hardship.  Thankfully  the  debate  has 
moved  on  significantly  in  recent  years43  and  it  is  now  possible  to  attempt 
a  more  reasonable  and  subjective  assessment  of  the  king  and  his  political 
-------------------- 
42.  Leo  Tandrup.  'En  brav,  blakket  eller  brutal  konge:  Christian  IV  I  den  monsterdannende 
danske  histories  kri  vni  ng  og  litteratur  fra  Holberg  til  vor  tid',  in  Elleh$j  (ed.  ),  Christian  IVs  ver- 
den,  (K*benhavn,  1998),  378-411. 
43.  The  works  of  Svend  Elleh$j,  Leo  Tandrup  and  E.  Ladewig  Petersen  stand  out  above  all 
others.  Lockhart's  recent  study  also  assesses  Christian  IV's  character  but  he  display's  an  ob- 
vious  affection  for  his  subject  and  perhaps  overstates  the  king's  ingenuity  in  foreign  affairs. 
Paul  Douglas  Lockhart,  Denmark  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  1618-1648:  King  Christian  IV  and  the 
Decline  of  the  Oldenburg  Statu  (London,  1996),  55-80. 
89 talents  and  shortcomings. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Christian  IV  was  an  arrogant  and 
self-centred  monarch  whose  belief  in  his  own  destiny  was  overpowering. 
He  was  a  king  who  believed  that  if  his  own  and  his  realm's  power 
remained  static  then  it  was  a  sign  of  weakness  and  decline,  and  he  was 
therefore  constantly  striving  for  greater  prestige  and  recognition,  both 
at  home  and  abroad".  This  in  part  explains  his  innate  distrust  of  subor- 
dinate  officials  and  his  inability  to  delegate  effectively.  He  seems  to  have 
felt  that  by  delegating  duties  to  anyone  else  he  was  in  some  way 
diminishing  his  own  powers. 
A  common  fault  attributed  to  him  is  that  this  inability  to  delegate 
meant  that  he  was  so  caught  up  in  the  minutiae  of  every-day  activities 
that  he  often  failed  to  see  the  bigger  picture.  This  is  undoubtedly  true  to 
some  extent,  but  despite  being  frequently  distracted  by  so  many  seem- 
ingly  trivial  matters,  he  never  lost  sight  of  his  overall  objectives  for 
long. 
The  long-term  approach  was  a  definite  problem  for  him,  though.  It 
was  his  nature  to  go  all  out  on  whatever  project  had  taken  his  fancy  at 
the  time.  Once  he  was  bitten  by  a  certain  scheme  or  other  his  enthusiasm 
was  often  overwhelming  and  any  opposition  he  encountered  was  fre- 
quently  quelled  by  bullying  his  opponents  into  submission.  If  things  did 
not  at  first  go  as  well  as  he  had  hoped  he  easily  lost  interest  and  tried 
to  achieve  his  aims  by  an  easier  route,  or  else  was  diverted  altogether  by 
some  other  project.  This  character  trait  was  as  true  in  foreign  policy  as 
in  his  various  building  projects,  and  was  a  serious  obstacle  to  his  greater 
acceptance  in  diplomatic  circles. 
44.  Tandrup,  Mod  triumf  eher  tragedie  I,  88-90. 
90 Christian  IV  was  seriously  affected  by  his  defeat  in  the  Thirty 
Years  War.  Everything  he  had  done  previously  was  aimed  at  increasing 
his  power  base.  Defeat  was  simply  not  a  possibility  to  be  contemplated.  To 
make  things  even  worse,  in  the  same  year  as  this  defeat,  his  lover 
Kirsten  Munk  left  him  for  another  man,  and  Kronborg  Castle,  the  great 
symbol  of  Danish  supremacy  on  the  Baltic,  was  burnt  down.  Thus  in  the 
space  of  a  few  short  years  his  position  as  a  monarch,  as  a  warrior,  and 
even  simply  as  a  man,  had  suffered  irreparable  damage. 
After  1629  Christian  IV's  feeling  of  confidence  was  replaced  by  bit- 
terness.  Whereas  before  his  policies  were  based  on  an  assumption  of 
divine  right  and  royal  prerogative,  afterwards  his  main  motives  seem  to 
have  been  based  more  on  vengeance  and  jealousy,  and  a  vain  attempt  to 
restore  his  previous  position  of  supremacy. 
His  relationship  with  the  rigsrad  was  fundamental  to  the  effective 
governing  of  the  state,  but  from  the  very  beginning  it  was  highly 
strained.  It  has  been  suggested  that  this  was  due  to  his  long  minority, 
during  which  time  the  rigsrad  delayed  his  coronation  until  his  nineteenth 
year,  despite  his  assumption  of  sovereignty  of  the  German  duchies  at 
sixteen45.  The  fact  that  the  rigsrad  also  won  the  bitter  struggle  with  his 
mother  to  supervise  his  education  also  played  a  strong  part. 
The  rigsrad  was  much  more  conservative  than  the  king.  Its  mem- 
bers  were  first  and  foremost  landowners  and  this  mentality  can  be  seen 
to  influence  virtually  all  their  decisions.  The  high  nobility  owned  their 
estates  and  administered  the  most  important  len  in  the  rich  farming  areas 
of  Jutland  and  Scania.  Their  livelihoods  were  therefore  threatened  by  any 
actions  which  would  lead  to  fighting  in  these  border  areas  and  their  ini- 
tial  reaction  was  always  to  safeguard  peace  at  all  costs. 
----  -  ----  --- 
45.  Knud  J.  V.  Jespersen,  'Herremand  i  kongeklmder',  in  E1lehmj  (ed.  ),  Christain  IV's  Verden, 
(K$benhavn,  1988),  126-30. 
91 Christian's  policy  of  expansion  in  Sweden  and  northern  Germany 
was  consequently  in  direct  opposition  to  their  own  wishes.  Quite  apart 
from  the  loss  of  revenue  caused  by  warfare  they  stood  to  lose  a  great 
deal  of  their  power  and  privilege  if  Christian  IV  gained  any  more  ter- 
ritory  outside  of  Denmark.  Their  fears  of  an  ever  increasing  German  ad- 
ministration  have  already  been  mentioned,  but  if  Christian  were  also  to 
succeed  in  gaining  Sweden  then  the  Danish  rigsräd  would  become  the 
ruling  council  of  only  one  part  of  a  joint  state  in  which  Christian 
regarded  himself  as  hereditary  and  absolute  monarch  of  Norway  and 
Sweden48. 
In  matters  of  foreign  policy  they  therefore  always  sought  the 
easiest  route  to  the  preservation  of  peace,  which  frequently  meant  a 
policy  of  appeasement.  They  were  so  concerned  with  preserving  the 
status  quo  that  they  failed  to  recognise  that  at  times  the  best  means  of 
defence  was  attack.  Only  reluctantly  did  they  eventually  agree  to  the  Kal- 
mar  War  after  Swedish 
-manoeuvring  had  gone  too  far,  and,  more  sig- 
nificantly,  after  Christian  IV  had  threatened  to  declare  war  independently 
as  Duke  of  Holstein. 
Thereafter  they  steadfastly  refused  to  sanction  any  aggression 
against  their  neighbour.  Their  stubborn  attitude  is  demonstrated  by  their 
response  to  the  crisis  in  1624.  By  refusing  to  back  up  the  king  by  grant- 
ing  taxes  to  enable  a  naval  mobilisation  they  managed  to  avoid  a  conflict 
with  Sweden.  However,  they  failed  to  appreciate  the  impact  this  humilia- 
tion  would  have  on  Christian,  IV  who  immediately  sought  to  save  face  by 
defying  his  council  and  hastily  entered  the  Thirty  Years  War  as  Duke  of 
Holstein. 
------------------- 
46.  If  Sweden  were  taken  then  it  would  also  negate  the  Stettin  Treaty  which  guaranteed  many  of 
the  rigsrdds  priviliges.  (Tandrup,  Mod  triumf  eller  tragedie+  106). 
92 As  this  campaign  turned  to  disaster  the  rigsrad  managed  to  gain 
significant  financial  and  political  concessions  from  the  king  in  return  for 
their  help  in  extricating  him  from  the  mess.  In  return  for  their  granting 
funds  to  enable  the  war  to  be  continued  the  rigsrad  gained  control  of  all 
war  finances.  However  Christian  IV  in  turn  also  managed  to  extort  funds 
from  the  rigsrad  by  threatening  not  to  sign  the  Treaty  of  Lübeck47. 
The  relations  between  king  and  rigsräd  became  increasingly  more 
strained.  The  king  had  lost  his  financial  independence  and  was  now 
forced  to  consult  the  rigsräd  more  regularly48  and  was  unable  to  keep 
the  high  offices  of  state  unfilled  for  any  significant  length  of  time.  Chris- 
tian  IV  sought  to  compensate  for  this  loss  of  power  by  promoting  his 
sons-in-law  to  the  high  state  posts.  However  as  we  have  seen  this  policy 
largely  back-fired  as  they  in  turn  exploited  their  own  positions  of  power. 
The  policy  also  served  to  antagonise  the  other  council  members  and  the 
rigsräd  gradually  split  into  two  factions. 
With  this  background  of  distrust  and  tension  between  the  king  and 
rigsräd,  especially  in  the  field  of  foreign  policy,  it  comes  as  no  surprise 
that  Christian  IV  was  determined  to  maintain  a  free  hand  in  the  leader- 
ship  of  the  navy.  This  determination  is  reflected  in  the  appointment,  or 
otherwise,  of  officials  to  the  post  of  rigsadmiral. 
Right  from  the  very  beginning  of  his  reign  Christian  IV  began 
manipulating  the  role  of  this  office.  Peder  Munk,  who  had  been  the  lead- 
ing  admiral  since  the  1560s,  could  have  presented  a  threat  to  Christian 
IV's  personal  control  if  he  remained  in  office  as  rigsadmiral.  He  was  also 
no  doubt  regarded  as  too  old  and  set  in  his  ways  to  be  of  any  use  to 
Christian  IV  in  the  more  dynamic  role  he  saw  for  the  navy.  Despite  being 
------------------- 
47.  See  Chapter  3  for  a  fuller  discussion  of  this. 
48.  The  average  number  of  rigsrAd  and  Herredag  meetings  before  1627  was  1.6  per  year.  After 
1627  this  figure  rises  to  3.1.  (Erslev,  Aktstykker,  I.  500-5;  II6644-50;  III4454-5.  ) 
93 old  and  feeble  and  unable  to  follow  the  Court49,  he  obviously  still 
presented  a  potential  threat  and  rather  than  being  injudiciously  removed 
from  power  altogether  Munk  was  promoted  to  the  office  of  rigsmarsk60. 
This  move  would  have  tempered  any  allegations  that  such  an  influential 
naval  leader  was  being  removed  from  his  post  for  political  reasons,  since 
he  still  remained  in  the  rigsräd,  although  it  certainly  looks  as  though 
Munk  was  promoted  out  of  harms  way. 
Thus  Christian  IV  took  away  any  political  control  which  the  rigsrad 
had  with  regard  to  the  navy  and  now  held  that  control  himself.  When 
rigshofinester  Christoffer  Valkendorf  died  in  1601  he  also  assumed  com- 
plete  financial  control  over  it  as  well. 
This  control  was  immediately  exerted  and  the  navy  began  to  be 
used  less  as  a  defensive  force  and  much  more  as  an  instrument  of  for- 
eign  policy,  as  witnessed  by  the  Arctic  expeditions  and  the  voyage  to 
England  in  160651.  The  naval  build-up  Christian  IV  presided  over  also 
enabled  him  to  begin  to  seriously  threaten  Sweden  and  helped  to  force 
the  rigsrdd  into  granting  permission  for  the  Kalmar  war. 
The  appointment  of  Mogens  Ulfeldt,  who  was  considered  'the  king's 
man'52,  as  rigsadmiral  in  1610  can  be  seen  as  a  convenient  ruse  to  gain 
support  for  the  Swedish  war.  Ulfeldt  was  a  born  warrior  who  had  im- 
pressed  the  king  as  vicekaptejn  (vice  captain)  during  his  1599  trip  to 
the  North  Cape,  and  as  underadmiral  on  the  English  trip  in  1606.  Just 
------------------- 
49.  Fynes  Moryson.  The  fourth  Part  of  an  Itinerary,  Library  of  Corpus  Christi  College.  Oxford. 
MS.  C.  C.  C.  94,  f.  235. 
50.  Heiberg  maintains  that  Munk  retained  his  position  as  rigsadmiral  but  all  records  after  1596 
refer  to  him  simply  as  rigsmarsk,  even  when  he  commanded  the  naval  squadron  to  England  in 
1606.  (Steffen  Heiberg,  'Peder  Munk',  Dansk  Biogafisk  Lexikon,  10.126-7;  and  Christian  4.: 
monarken,  mennesket  og  myten.  (K4'benhavn,  1988),  49) 
51.  See  Chapter  1. 
52.  Heiberg,  Christian  4.,  165. 
94 prior  to  his  appointment  as  rigsadmiral  he  had  also  been  in  charge  of  the 
naval  manoeuvres  in  the  Baltic  designed  to  reinforce  Denmark's  dominium 
maris  BalticP. 
By  appointing  Ulfeldt  Christian  IV  gained  in  two  ways.  Firstly 
Ulfeldt's  views  on  the  Swedish  war  were  similar  to  his  own  and  so  he 
gained  a  valuable  political  lever  within  the  rigsräd.  This  is  demonstrated 
by  the  fact  that  Ulfeldt  was  one  of  the  few  rigsrid  members  not  to  vote 
against  the  war  moves.  In  addition  Christian  IV  could  also  claim  that  the 
rigsrad  was  regaining  some  control  over  the  navy  since  a  new  rigsadmiral 
had  been  appointed  for  the  first  time  during  his  reign. 
While  Ulfeldt's  appointment  can  be  seen  as  an  astute  move  by  the 
king,  the  appointment  of  his  successor  Albert  Skeel,  after  Ulfeldt's  death 
in  1616,  must  be  viewed  as  decidedly  odd.  Skeel  was  not  at  all  like  Ul- 
feldt.  He  was  primarily  a  professional  politician,  with  only  limited  ex- 
perience  at  sea.  He  was  certainly  not  so  well  disposed  to  the  king's  for- 
eign  policy  objectives  or  to  the  use  of  the  navy  as  an  extension  of  royal 
power54. 
It  is  perhaps  significant  that  when  he  took  up  office  as  rigsadmiral 
in  1616  he  had  to  sign  Christian  IV's  terms  of  office  which  strictly  limited 
his  areas  of  responsibility  to  operational  matters.  It  is  tempting  to  think 
that  while  Christian  IV  was  becoming  more  preoccupied  with  his  machina- 
tions  in  northern  Germany  he  needed  someone  in  Copenhagen  to  supervise 
the  running  of  the  navy.  However,  if  this  were  the  case  then  why  not 
then  choose  someone  more  attuned  to  the  running  of  the  navy?  It  also 
seems  very  odd  that  Skeel  was  also  used  extensively  in  negotiations  in 
Bremen  and  Verden.  It  may  be  that  Christian  IV  felt  he  could  not  risk 
------------------- 
53.  Leo  Tandrup,  'Mogens  Ulfeldt',  Dansk  biografisk  leksikon,  15,151-2;  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian 
den  Fjerde  og  hans  Ma'nd  paa  Bremerholm,  (K$benhavn,  1889),  39-43. 
54.  Leo  Tandrup,  'Albret  Skeel',  Dansk  biografisk  leksikon,  13,418-21;  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og 
hans  M&nd,  43-5. 
95 the  possibility  of  a  more  professional  seaman  wresting  control  from  him  in 
his  absence.  By  involving  Skeel  in  Germany  so  much  he  could  also  keep  a 
close  eye  on  him  and  prevent  him  assuming  too  much  control  over  the 
navy,  although  this  would  seem  to  defeat  the  object  of  appointing  him  in 
the  first  place. 
Skeel's  appointment  appears  even  more  peculiar  in  the  light  of  his 
subsequent  violent  disagreements  over  the  Swedish  situation.  If  the  navy 
was  designed  to  maintain  the  Danish  dominium  and  prevent  any  Swedish 
encroachment,  why  then  appoint  someone  as  rigsadmiral  who  belonged  to 
the  camp  of  rigsrAd  members  who  believed  in  peace  at  any  price?  In  the 
end  Skeel  became  so  outraged  at  Christian  IV's  political  manoeuvring  that 
he  had  to  resign  his  post  in  1622-55  after  a  particularly  heated  argument. 
But  perhaps  this  situation  was  astutely  engineered  by  Christian  IV  in  or- 
der  to  once  again  take  over  complete  control  of  the  navy  at  a  time  when 
his  attentions  were  becoming  once  more  focused  on  Sweden. 
In  any  event  the  post  of  rigsadmiral  now  became  vacant,  and  with 
the  post  of  rigsmarsk  also  vacant,  Christian  IV  assumed  complete  political 
control  over  all  the  country's  armed  forces.  This  undoubtedly  played  its 
part  in  the  precipitation  of  the  Swedish  crisis  in  1624  and  the  subse- 
quent  entry  into  the  Thirty  Years  War. 
After  things  had  gone  badly  and  Jutland  had  been  overrun  in  1627 
it  seems  as  though  Christian  IV  initially  panicked  over  the  lack  of  a  rig- 
sadmiral.  He  wrote  to  the  rigsrad  in  November  asking  for  their 
suggestions56,  although  they  were  not  at  all  clear  whether  it  was  a 
'general  rigens  admiral,  somb  tilforn  havfer  verred'  (rigsadmiral  which 
-------------------- 
55.  Tandrup,  Mod  triumf  eller  tragedie,  I,  95-6. 
56.  Letter  to  rigsrdd  11  November  1627,  egenh--ndige  Breve,  II,  117. 
96 there  previously  has  been),  or  a  'sqe  admiral,  som  pro  tempore  skulde 
commandiere  en  particulier  flode'  (sea  admiral  who  should  temporarily 
command  a  particular  fleet)57.  For  the  former  post  they  suggested  Jens 
Sparre,  a  nobleman  who  was  not  a  member  of  the  rigsrad,  though  whom 
they  obviously  wished  to  be.  Christian  IV  was  not  convinced  though.  The 
fact  that  he  had  already  appointed  four  new  rigsräd  members  that  year 
as  well  as  a  rigsmarsk  who  inevitably  also  became  a  member  shortly 
thereafter,  seems  to  have  influenced  his  decision,  and  he  opted  instead  to 
go  for  an  existing  rigsrad  member  in  Klaus  Daa68. 
Again  this  was  a  rather  curious  choice.  Daa  had  no  experience  of 
the  navy  or  seafaring.  He  was  much  more  experienced  with  army  affairs, 
having  served  in  the  Kalmar  War  as  a  cavalryman,  and  was  krigskommis&r 
to  the  army  in  1626.  In  fact  Daa  was  not  actually  appointed  to  the  post  of 
rigsadmiral  until  1630,  and  by  then  he  had  taken  an  active  role  in  forc- 
ing  the  review  of  war  finance  which  brought  it  under  the  control  of  the 
rigsrAci9.  So  again  Christian  IV  appointed  someone  with  little  practical 
knowledge  of  the  navy  and  who  was  an  open  critic  of  his  policies. 
It  is  clear  that  Christian  IV  was  not  happy  with  the  choice.  After 
the  initial  panic  had  abated  he  managed  to  avoid  actually  installing  him  in 
his  post.  In  1629  he  attempted  to  persuade  Jens  Juel  to  take  on  the  post, 
who  would  have  been  a  much  more  suitable  candidate.  Although  he  was 
not  a  professional  seaman  he  had  great  administrative  gifts  and  as  Nor- 
wegian  stadtholder  he  had  supervised  the  establishment  of  the  defen- 
sionskibe  programme  and  had  greatly  improved  the  recruitment  of  seamen 
-------------------- 
57.  Erslev,  Aktstykker,  II,  77-8. 
58.  Letter  to  rigsrAcx  15  November  1627,  egenhandige  Brevq  II.  125. 
59.  Steffen  Heiberg,  'Claus  Daa',  Dansk  biografisk  leksikon,  4,89-90;  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans 
Mend,  45-6. 
97 in  Norway80.  He  declined  to  take  the  post  ostensibly  on  health  grounds 
but  it  seems  there  was  something  more  behind  his  decision.  Christian  IV 
was  furious  at  his  refusal  to  take  the  post8l: 
y  nu  med  hannem  om  samme  leiiglighed  skall  taale  och  hannem 
demonstrere,  at  hannem  sliig  vndskilling  inted  anstaar,  eptherdi 
hand  er  disse  Riiger  obligerit  at  tiene  y  huiss  maade  hannem 
mueligt  Er. 
you  (the  rigsra)  should  now  take  the  opportunity  to  speak  to  him 
and  demonstrate  that  he  has  no  suitable  excuses,  since  he  is 
obliged  to  serve  this  state  in  whatever  way  he  possibly  can. 
Ill  health  was  only  one  of  the  many  reasons  cited  why  he  could  not 
take  up  the  post,  which  clearly  did  not  impress  the  king,  and  he  was  im- 
mediately  stripped  of  his  post  as  Norwegian  stadtholder.  Whatever  the 
real  reason  for  his  refusal  it  did  not  prevent  him  from  accepting  the  post 
of  rigsmarsk  in  1631. 
This  left  the  post  of  rigsadmiral  still  unfilled  and  it  is  likely  that 
the  rigsrad,  no  doubt  fully  aware  of  Christian  IV's  earlier  proposal  to 
appoint  Klaus  Daa,  forced  his  hand  and  compelled  him  to  honour  his  pre- 
vious  commitment.  Daa  was  finally  appointed  as  rigsadmiral  in  July  1630, 
although  he  had  received  some  orders  concerning  the  navy  the  previous 
year. 
Almost  immediately  he  was  put  in  charge  of  the  fleet  sailing  to  at- 
tack  Hamburg,  which  he  had  explicitly  advised  against  in  the  rigsräd.  His 
lack  of  experience  and  reluctance  for  the  fight  is  shown  by  the  steady 
--- 
60. 
-------- 
Steffen 
--------- 
Heiberg,  'Jens  Juel'  Dansk  biografisk  leksikon,  7,562-3. 
61.  Letter  to  rigsrJd,  April  1629,  egenh.  ndige  Breve,  II,  197-8. 
98 stream  of  letters  to  him  from  Christian  IV  concerning  the  conduct  of  the 
battle.  The  initial  failure  of  the  attack  was  blamed  on  him,  although  in  his 
defence  he  could  claim,  with  some  justification,  that  he  had  received  no 
training  for  his  office. 
Daa  remained  in  office  throughout  the  period  of  armed  neutrality  in 
the  1630s  and  despite  the  rigsrads  nervousness  at  putting  the  fleet  to 
sea  Daa  seems  to  have  acquitted  his  duties  as  rigsadmiral  as  well  as 
could  be  expected  of  him.  Christian  IV  seems  to  have  kept  a  very  close 
eye  on  him  though  and  of  the  36  letters  addressed  to  his  rigsadmiraler 
32  were  addressed  to  Daa.  This  may  simply  reflect  the  growing  concern 
with  naval  matters  in  the  1630s  and  the  fact  that  Daa  proved  the  longest 
serving  of  any  rigsadmiral,  but  it  does  seem  disproportionate  and  sug- 
gests  that  perhaps  Christian  IV  could  not  trust  him  to  act  on  his  own  in- 
itiative. 
In  1634  the  king's  illegitimate  son  Hans  Ulrik  Gyldenlgve  was  sent 
to  Copenhagen  to  learn  about  the  navy  and  artillery62.  It  has  been  sug- 
gested  that  he  was  in  fact  being  groomed  to  take  over  as  rigsadmiral,  al- 
though  he  was  still  only  19.  He  did  go  to  sea  on  a  number  of  occasions  in 
the  following  years  but  he  did  not  take  to  the  sea  well  and  his  naviga- 
tion  instructor  declared  that  he  'havde  intet  Hoved  eller  Ingenium  dertil' 
(had  no  head  or  talent  for  it)63. 
Quite  how  serious  the  intention  was  to  make  Hans  Ulrik  rigsadmiral 
is  unknown.  If  this  was  in  fact  the  true  intention  then  it  reflects  poorly 
on  Daa's  competence,  although  it  would  make  sense  from  a  political 
perspective,  with  the  king's  son  naturally  expected  to  be  much  more  com- 
--- 
62. 
------- 
Letter 
---------- 
to  rentemestrene,  27  November  1634,  egenhandige  Breve6  III,  302-3. 
63.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Mang  299-302. 
99 pliant  with  any  political  objectives  than  Daa.  Even  after  Daa's  death  in 
1641  Hans  Ulrik  did  not  take  up  the  post.  Later  that  year  Erik  Ottesen 
was  temporarily  suspended  from  his  post  as  Holmens  admiral84  and  Hans 
Ulrik  appears  to  have  taken  charge  of  Bremerholm,  in  tandem  with  ren- 
temester  Sten  Beck65.  However,  this  was  only  a  temporary  measure,  and 
the  post  of  rigsadmiral  remained  vacant. 
Even  before  the  death  of  Daa  the  rentemester  J40rgen  Vind  had  be- 
come  increasingly  more  involved  with  naval  affairs.  He  was  a  well  ex- 
perienced  seaman  and  had  been  a  trusted  naval  captain  during  the  1620s, 
before  joining  the  rentekammer6.  His  naval  experience  was  used  to  good 
effect  to  help  out  Daa  as  rigsadmiral  and  a  number  of  letters  on  naval 
affairs  were  jointly  addressed  to  both  men.  After  Daa's  death  Vind  essen- 
tially  became  rigsadmiral  elect,  as  can  be  seen  from  his  instructions  given 
just  a  few  weeks  afterwards: 
Han  skal  have  tilsyn  med  Bremerholm  for  Klbenhavn,  at  Arbejdet 
som  er  befalit  at  forfmrdiges  der  gaar  for  sig.  Desuden  skal  han 
have  opsyn  med  Flaaden,  som  Jigger  for  Kiobenhavn87. 
He  shall  have  command  of  Bremerholm  in  Copenhagen,  so  that  the 
work  which  has  been  ordered  is  completed.  In  addition  he  shall 
have  supervision  over  the  navy,  which  lies  in  Copenhagen. 
-------------------- 
64.  See  Chapter  6. 
65.  Letters  to  Sten  Beck  and  Hans  Ulrik  Gyldenl4pve1  13  and  18  June  1641,  egenhandige  Breve,  V. 
98  &  104. 
66.  Hans  Fussing.  *'J$rgen  Vind',  Dansk  biografisk  leksikon,  15,576-7,  Lind,  Kong  kristian  og  hans 
mend  46-9. 
67.  Instructions  to  Jmrgen  Vind,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  18  June  1641. 
100 He  still  retained  his  post  in  the  rentekammer,  however,  until  1643, 
when  preparations  for  the  renewed  offensive  against  Hamburg  saw  him 
installed  formally  as  rigsadmiral.  Like  Mogens  Ulfeldt  Vind  appears  to 
have  been  a  supporter,  or  at  any  rate  not  an  active  opponent,  of  Chris- 
tian  IV's  naval  politics,  and  with  his  experience  at  sea,  the  king  once 
again  had  a  man  he  could  trust. 
Unfortunately  for  the  king,  Vind  was  wounded  in  action  at  the 
Battle  of  Kolberger  Heide  in  1644  and  died  of  his  wounds  shortly  there- 
after.  This  left  Christian  IV  with  a  tricky  decision  in  the  middle  of  a 
naval  campaign  which  could  prove  vital  to  the  security  of  the  nation.  The 
choice  was  again  made  in  haste,  and  again  the  man  chosen  was  not 
perhaps  the  most  suitable. 
Ove  Giedde  was  a  curious  man  who  has  gone  down  in  Danish 
folklore  as  the  leader  of  the  first  East  India  expedition.  The  truth  of  the 
matter  was  that  it  was  Jens  Munk  who  was  the  original  choice  for  this 
mission  and  it  seems  that  Giedde  exerted  his  influence  in  the  court  to 
gain  this  potentially  valuable  command68.  He  had  no  previous  experience 
at  sea  and  proved  to  be  a  poor  master  and  a  poor  judge  of  the  political 
intricacies  of  the  mission.  He  was  however  a  good  self-publicist  and 
retained  his  contacts  in  the  court.  On  his  return  he  was  awarded  the 
post  of  lensmand  to  one  of  the  larger  Norwegian  lenWO. 
Apart  from  his  East  Indian  journey  he  had  had  little  to  do  with 
naval  affairs,  although  he  was  responsible  for  the  transfer  of  the  Nor- 
wegian  galley  fleet  to  Copenhagen  in  1628.  As  a  Norwegian  lensmand  he 
was  also  put  in  charge  of  a  fleet  of  defensionskibe  at  the  start  of  the 
-------------------- 
68.  Thorkild  Hansen,  Jens  Munk,  (K$benhavn,  1965),  240-7. 
69.  He  wrote  his  own  glowing  account  of  the  Indian  expedition.  (Ove  Giedde,  'Fortegnelse  paa  alt, 
hvad  paa  den  Indianske  Reise  forfalden  er',  in  Schlegel  (ed.  )Samlung  zur  Danischen  Geschichtet  I, 
(Kopenhagen,  1772).  ) 
70.  His  administrative  competence  here  later  came  under  scrutiny. 
101 Torstenssonkrig  but  he  did  not  distinguish  himself  very  well  in  this 
respect,  failing  to  arrive  off  Goteborg  in  time  for  Christian  IV  to  maintain 
the  blockade». 
It  is  strange  then  that  when  Vind  died  Giedde  was  chosen  as  rig- 
sadmiral.  On  the  face  of  it  he  was  far  from  an  ideal  choice  at  such  a 
critical  time,  and  it  has  been  suggested  that  he  gained  his  post  through 
his  friendship  with  the  Norwegian  stadtholder,  Hannibal  Sehested,  who 
was  at  the  time  the  king's  favourite  son  in  law.  This  certainly  sounds 
plausible  since  there  were  other  more  distinguished  noble  admirals  who 
would  surely  have  had  a  better  claim  to  the  post. 
His  reputation  as  rigsadmiral  was  poor  and  his  only  contribution  to 
the  war  in  1645  was  to  wreck  his  flagship  Store  Sophia,  one  of  the 
largest  ships  of  the  navy,  and  lose  another  ship  to  the  Swedes.  An  in- 
vestigation  later  found  Giedde  completely  to  blame  and  recommended  that 
he  pay  70,000  Rdlr.  compensation,  although  this  was  never  enforced.  It. 
was  later  said  of  him  that  'Rigsadmiralen  har  vaeret  i  Indien,  men  har  in- 
tet  godt  Navn,  ej  heller  holdes  for  at  vaere  en  god  Somand'  (the  rigsad- 
miral  has  been  to  India,  but  does  not  have  a  good  name,  neither  is  he 
considered  a  good  seaman)2. 
Given  this  damning  judgement  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  a  rigs- 
viceadmiral  (state  vice  admiral)  was  appointed  for  the  first  time  in  1645. 
The  reason  was  ostensibly  that  Giedde  had  broken  his  leg  in  escaping 
from  Store  Sophia  and  was  unable  to  continue  with  his  duties,  but  for 
the  king  to  create  a  completely  new  position,  with  a  seat  on  the  rigsrad, 
within  just  a  few  months  of  Giedde's  appointment  shows  just  how  worried 
he  must  have  been  about  the  competence  of  Giedde.  This  is  shown  in  his 
communications  with  the  rigsrid13  : 
-------------------- 
71.  Th.  Tops$e-Jensen,  'Ove  Giedde',  Dansk  biografisk  leksikon,  5,179-81;  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og 
hans  Mend  49-53. 
72.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Man4  49-53. 
73.  Raadet,  31  May  1645,  Erslev,  Aktstykker,  III,  69. 
102 Efterad  dette  bref  var  skrefven,  kom  rigens  admiral  Ove  Gedde  med 
floden  her  paa  reden,  hvilket  hans  Mayt.  hafver  verrit  ilde  tilfreds 
med.  Nu  hafver  hand  Mayt.  resolverit  sig  strax  at  forordne  tvende 
vice  admiraler;  den  fgrste  skulle  stedse  blifve  udi  bestillingen  och 
nu  commendere  floden,  den  anden  skal  vere  admiralen  paa  Holmen. 
Er  os  derfore  strax  befalit  at  talle  med  Niels  Trolle,  som  forschrefne 
ferst  vice  admirals  bestilling  strax  skulle  antage  och  forestaa,  mens 
hand  vegrer  sig  endnu  der  udi,  praetenderendis  sin  uforfarenhed 
udi  slig  en  hqi  office. 
After  that  letter  was  written  the  rigsadmiral  Ove  Giedde  came  with 
his  fleet  upon  the  roadstead,  which  his  majesty  has  been  poorly 
satisfied  with.  His  majesty  has  now  resolved  to  immediately  appoint 
two  vice  admirals;  the  first  should  always  be  in  position  and  now 
command  the  navy,  the  second  shall  be  admiral  on  Bremerholm74.  We 
therefore  are  immediately  ordered  to  talk  to  Niels  Trolle,  to  be  im- 
mediately  put  in  charge  of  the  aforementioned  first  vice  admiral 
position,  although  he  still  asserts  his  inexperience  for  such  a  high 
office. 
Giedde  was  clearly  not  a  man  to  be  trusted,  and  any  correspon- 
dence  concerning  the  navy  thereafter  referred  to  Giedde  in  tandem  with 
either  one  or  both  of  his  new  vice  admirals.  However,  the  choice  of  Niels 
Trolle  is  again  slightly  curious  since,  although  he  came  from  a  strong 
seafaring  family,  he  had  very  little  experience  of  the  sea  himself.  It  can 
only  be  assumed  that  Christian  IV  had  been  impressed  with  him  in  his 
------------------- 
74.  i.  e.  the  post  of  Holmens  admiral,  see  chapter  6. 
103 earlier  position  of  lensmand  for  Copenhagen  Castle,  which  would  have 
given  him  some  insight  into  the  navy's  victualling  and  the  workings  of 
Bremerholm75. 
Having  now  assessed  the  appointments  and  abilities  of  the  men  ap- 
pointed  to  the  post  of  rigsadmiral  it  is  worth  looking  at  who  actually  held 
the  real  political  control  over  the  navy.  Clearly  the  primary  control  lay 
with  the  king  while  the  rigsadmiral  could  be  considered  as  the  second  in 
command  of  its  operational  side.  Given  this,  Christian  IV's  selection  of 
rigsadmiraler,  apart  from  Mogens  Ulfeldt  and  Jgrgen  Vind,  therefore  ap- 
pears  very  strange.  It  seems  likely  that  he  was  panicked  into  appointing 
both  Klaus  Daa  and  Ove  Giedde  in  times  of  war  when  the  Danish  position 
had  become  perilous,  but  the  reasoning  behind  the  appointment  of  Albert 
Skeel  still  remains  a  mystery.  However,  as  we  have  seen,  when  the 
rigsadmiral's  own  political  views  concerning  the  navy  came  into  conflict 
with  the  king's  they  did  not  really  have  much  sway.  Skeel  was  forced  to 
resign  his  position,  and  Daa  was  forced  into  naval  operations  to  which  he 
was  opposed. 
The  absence  of  a  rigsadmiral  in  the  earlier  part  of  his  reign  meant 
that  Christian  IV  could  basically  do  what  he  wanted  with  the  navy  on  the 
operational  side  with  little  regard  to  the  rigsrad.  When  it  came  to  the 
civil  control  of  the  navy,  i.  e.  its  financing  and  the  running  of  the  dock- 
yard,  the  situation  became  much  more  complex.  The  rigsadmiral  really  had 
little  to  do  with  the  navy's  infrastructure,  and  this  aspect  of  naval  con- 
trol  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  rigshofinester,  stadtholder,  or  to  a  lesser 
extent  the  kansler,  depending  on  which  office  was  filled  at  the  time. 
------------------ 
75.  In  the  early  16th  century  the  lensmand  of  Copenhagen  Castle  carried  out  the  functions  of 
the  Holmens  admiral  and  probably  retained  some  involvement  with  Bremerholm  even  after  this 
post  was  established.  J4rgen  H.  Barfod,  Christian  3.  s  flädq  (K$benhavn,  1995),  124;  Lind,  Kong 
Kristian  og  hans  Mmnd  53-6. 
104 However  no  strict  delineation  of  responsibilities  can  be  made,  and 
again  much  depended  on  personality  and  circumstance.  In  the  23  years 
that  Breide  and  Frans  Rantzau  held  the  post  of  stadtholder  they  each 
received  only  two  direct  instructions  from  the  king  concerning  the  navy, 
but  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  in  just  6  years  received  more  than  70.  Heiberg76  sug- 
gests  that  the  reason  that  naval  affairs  were  not  included  in  Ulfeldt's 
oath  of  office  was-  because  Christian  IV  wanted  to  restrict  his  remit  until 
he  was  sure  of  his  loyalty,  so  in  effect  he  was  really  on  a  kind  of  proba- 
tion.  This  argument  seems  plausible,  since  although  Ulfeldt  received  just 
as  many  instructions  concerning  the  navy  as  stadtholder  as  he  did  as 
rigshofinester,  these  are  skewed  very  much  towards  the  end  of  his  stad- 
tholdership.  However,  this  theory  may  prejudge  attitudes  stemming  from 
his  later  behaviour  to  some  extent.  From  around  1640  Ulfeldt  became  in- 
creasingly  more  involved  with  naval  affairs  and  it  may  be  that  with  the 
king  now  in  his  sixties  he  was  glad  of  the  opportunity  of  delegating  some 
of  his  responsibilities  to  someone  he  thought  he  was  able  to  trust.  Ulfeldt 
after  becoming  rigshofinester  became  essentially  the  chief  political  leader 
of  the  civil  side  of  the  navy,  a  position  which  he  was  to  exploit  to  his 
own  advantage.  However,  after  the  suspicion  of  maladministration  came  to 
light  at  the  start  of  the  Torstenssonkrig77,  only  a  handful  of  instructions 
concerning  minor  details  were  issued  to  Ulfeldt  and  it  can  reasonably  be 
assumed  that  the  king  once  again  took  a  more  active  role  in  the  civil  side 
of  the  navy. 
The  formation  of  the  Norwegian  defensionskibe  fleet  also  serves  to 
complicate  matters.  Although  they  were  ostensibly  privately  owned  armed 
merchantmen,  they  came  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Norwegian  stad- 
tholder.  So  from  the  late  1620s  this  official  also  had  some  control  over 
-------------------- 
76.  Steffen  Heiberg.  Enhjprningen:  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  (Kobenhavn.  1993),  30-31. 
77.  See  chapter  3. 
105 naval  affairs.  This  became  increasingly  so  under  the  stadtholdership  of 
Hannibal  Sehested  who  also  radically  reformed  the  Norwegian  administra- 
tion  to  create  a  virtually  independent  Norwegian  navy.  Although  this  came 
under  the  direct  control  of  the  king  and  rigsadmiral  in  times  of  war,  its 
civil  administration  remained  basically  autonomous. 
The  most  striking  fact  that  comes  out  this  analysis  is  that  the 
boundaries  between  different  officials  was  so  fluid.  This  may  reflect  the 
fact  that  the  high  officials  were  also  lensmaend  and  had  responsibilities  to 
their  local  administration  as  well  as  to  the  central  administration.  The  is- 
suing  of  orders  was  therefore  greatly  influenced  by  who  happened  to  be 
in  Copenhagen  at  the  time  and  actually  able  to  carry  out  any  instructions 
concerning  the  navy,  rather  than  by  any  strict  delineation  of  duties.  This 
probably  also  partly  explains  why  the  rentemestre  occasionally  received 
large  numbers  of  instructions,  since  they  were  more  likely  to  remain  in 
Copenhagen  than  any  of  the  high  officials78.  This  lack  of  formal  bound- 
aries  is  demonstrated  by  the  number  of  letters  that  Christian  IV  ad- 
dressed  to  more  than  one  official  and  those  which  he  addressed  rather 
enigmatically,  for  example,  to  'Riigens  Admirall  Eller  huem  som  Paa  Brem- 
merholmen  commanderer'  (rigsadmiral  or  whoever  is  in  command  at 
Bremerholm)79. 
In  terms  of  policy  formation  the  king  held  absolute  sway.  However, 
he  was  only  able  to  carry  out  his  policies  freely,  even  when  key  posts  in 
the  administration  were  deliberately  kept  vacant,  up  to  the  point  when 
large  amounts  of  money  were  needed,  at  which  point  the  rigsräd  was  able 
to  influence  naval  policy.  Arild  Huitfeldt,  in  his  history  of  Denmark,  took 
-------------------- 
78.  The  "verste  sekretzr  of  the  Danske  kancelli  also  recieved  detailed  instructions  concerning  the 
repair  of  ships  at  one  stage.  (Letter  to  Iver  Vind,  14  January  1639,  egenhvndige  Breve,  VIII, 
136-7). 
79.13  June  1637,  egenh.  ndige  Breve6  IV,  143. 
106 pains  to  stress  the  need  for  a  strong  'krigs  Armada',  stating  that  'huer 
veed  at  den  er  forn(Pden,  oc  en  Deel  voris  Velmact  staar  der  paa,  Thi 
disse  Lande  ere  omflot'80  (everyone  knows  that  it  is  necessary,  and  a 
part  of  our  security  depends  on  it,  since  these  lands  are  afloat),  but 
defence  was  to  be  its  only  role.  The  rigsrdd  consistently  reiterated  its 
belief  that  the  navy  was  simply  a  defensive  force  and  ought  to  be  kept 
at  a  level  that  maintained  the  security  of  the  state,  but  any  wider  objec- 
tives,  which  they  considered  might  endanger  the  status  quo,  ought  to  be 
resisted. 
Only  by  achieving  financial  independence  from  the  rigsräd,  or  by 
manipulating  events  so  that  the  rigsräd,  or  individual  officials,  were 
forced  to  accept  his  wishes,  was  Christian  IV  able  to  maintain  his  control 
over  the  navy  and  use  it  as  he  saw  fit.  After  the  Kejserkrig  he  lost  his 
financial  independence  and  also  to  a  large  degree  his  political  freedom,  in 
that  he  was  forced  to  be  more  consistent  in  keeping  the  high  offices 
filled,  even  if  the  men  selected  did  not  share  the  king's  own  political 
views.  However,  to  '  some  extent  the  views  of  the  the  king  and  rigsräd 
coincided  in  the  1630s,  with  both  recognising  the  need  to  keep  a  large 
fleet  in  readiness  for  the  security  of  the  realm.  Where  they  differed 
though  was  that  while  Christian  IV  wanted  to  re-establish  Danish 
supremacy,  the  rigsrad  preferred  a  more  pacific  approach  with  regard  to 
both  Sweden  and  the  Imperial  forces. 
Despite  the  political  and  financial  concessions  granted  to  the 
rigsrAd,  the  fact  that  both  their  interests  roughly  coincided  meant  that 
the  king  was  able  to  retain  almost  absolute  political  control.  The  fight 
against  Hamburg  in  163081  proved  a  decisive  phase  in  the  king's  ability 
to  retain  this  power.  In  April  the  king  had  insisted  to  the  rigsrid  that  a 
-------------------- 
80.  Arild  Huitfeldt.  Historiske  Beskriffuelse  om  ...  Christiern  den  Forste,  (Danske  Kr*nicke6  5  Bd.  ). 
(Kmbenhavn,  1599)  f.  bij. 
81.  See  Chapter  1. 
107 squadron  ought  to  put  to  sea  in  the  Baltic,  but  they  in  turn  declared 
that  although  the  fleet  should  be  kept  in  readiness  it  should  not  put  to 
sea82.  When  Hamburg  blockaded  Glückstadt  the  rigsrad  strongly  urged  the 
king  not  to  proceed  with  any  retaliation  as  the  navy  was  now  the 
country's  only  line  of  defence.  By  June  Christian  IV  had  completely  dis- 
regarded  their  wishes  by  not  only  putting  the  fleet  to  sea  but  removing 
most  of  it  from  the  Baltic  altogether.  Thus  the  Hamburg  attack  on 
Glückstadt  provided  a  convenient  excuse  not  just  to  subject  Hamburg  to 
Christian  IV's  sovereignty,  but  also  for  him  to  re-exert  control  over  the 
navy  and  to  impose  his  will  on  a  reluctant  new  rigsadmiral. 
That  the  king  succeeded  in  retaining  his  political  control  is 
demonstrated  by  the  increasingly  heavy  handed  use  of  the  navy  in  the 
Sound  and  the  Baltic  in  the  late  1630s  and  early  1640s.  Even  though  U1- 
feldt  had  largely  assumed  leadership  of  the  civil  side  of  the  navy  the 
king  remained  its  military  leader.  When  the  Swedes  attacked  in  1643  there 
was  therefore  no  question  but  that  Christian  IV  would  personally  super- 
vise  the  preparations  and  lead  the  military  campaigns  of  the  navy  in  the 
coming  season. 
By  the  end  of  his  reign  Christian  IV  had  therefore  come  full  circle 
and  held  virtually  absolute  control  of  both  the  civil  and  military  sides  of 
the  navy.  At  the  start  of  his  reign  this  was  a  deliberate  policy  but  by 
the  end  a  combination  of  bad  luck  and  bad  judgement  left  him  with  an 
incompetent  rigsadmiral  and  a  dishonest  rigshofinester,  which  forced  the 
situation  upon  him. 
------------------- 
82.  Erslev,  Aktstykker,  II,  227. 
108 3.  The  Financial  Administration  of  the  Navy 
With  the  navy  proving  such  a  contentious  issue  in  terms  of  the  running 
of  the  state  we  should  now  turn  our  attention  to  one  of  the  principal 
areas  of  dispute:  naval  finance.  The  cost  of  building  and  maintaining  a 
large  navy  was  phenomenal,  and  both  the  raising  of  finance  for  it  and 
the  running  of  its  financial  administration  proved  to  be  problematic  issue 
for  both  king  and  rigsrad.  Before  looking  in  detail  at  these  problems  we 
should  first  outline  the  way  in  which  the  machinery  of  state  and  naval 
finance  worked. 
3.1.  The  Machinery  of  Naval  Finance 
Danish  state  finance  in  the  early  17th  century  was  essentially  still  or- 
ganised  along  late  medieval  lines  and,  although  many  improvements  were 
instituted  in  the  late  16th  century,  the  system  became  increasingly  inade- 
quate  for  the  ever  growing  state  budget'.  The  machinery  of  naval  finance 
was  therefore  extremely  rudimentary  and  ill-defined.  With  the  size  of  the 
navy  rapidly  expanding  the  system  was  stretched  to  its  limits,  and  the 
financing  of  the  navy  became  highly  complex  and  confusing.  Expenditure 
on  the  navy  accounted  for  between  a  third  and  a  half  of  the  total  state 
budget  and  so  the  management  of  the  navy's  finances  was  inextricably 
linked  to  the  overall  financial  administration  of  the  state,  and  its  complex 
and  confusing  nature  is  a  reflection  of  the  as  yet  immature,  and  conse- 
quently  chaotic,  system  of  state  finance. 
-------------------- 
1-  Two  excellent  studies  of  Danish  state  finance  (Surren  Balle,  Statsfinanserne  pä  Christian  3.  s  tic( 
(Aarhus,  1992),  and  Jens  Engberg,  Dansk  finanshistorie  I  1640'erne,  (Aarhus,  1972))  show  that 
there  was  little  structural  change  between  the  1540s  and  the  1640s. 
109 The  immature  nature  of  the  Danish  state  economy  is  reflected  by 
the  fact  that  the  state's  income  and  expenditure  were  by  no  means  paid 
only  in  hard  cash.  Lensmwnd  regularly  paid  their  revenues  in  kind  with 
goods  produced  on  their  land,  that  were  'paid'  directly  into  the  central 
victualling  store,  or  used  locally  to  feed  troops.  Crown  servants  and  con- 
tractors  could  also  expect  to  be  paid,  at  least  partly,  in  kind.  When  cash 
was  used  there  were  so  many  different  parallel  units  of  currency  in  cir- 
culation  that  its  true  value  was  often  unclear.  It  is  therefore  impossible 
to  assess  the  financial  situation  of  the  state  without  first  looking  at  the 
Danish  system  of  currency. 
In  the  late  16th  century  an  attempt  was  made  to  rationalise  the 
currency  system.  From  1582  it  was  based  on  the  Daler  (Dlr.  )  a  silver  coin 
of  30  grams,  that  was  divided  into  4  Marks  (Mk.  )  at  16  Skilling  (Sk.  or 
ß).  The  skilling  was  further  divided  into  12  Penning.  However,  the 
Danish  currency  was  still  tied  very  much  to  the  German  markets  and  the 
constant  inflation  and  fluctuation  in  exchange  rates  saw  the  number  of 
Skilling  reckoned  in  the  silver  Daler  increase  rapidly2.  The  original  64 
Sk.  Daler,  however,  continued  in  accounting  practice  and  was  known  as  a 
Sletdaler  (poor  daler). 
In  1619  the  currency  system  was  altered  again  and  two  new  daler 
were  introduced.  The  silver  Rigsdaler  (Rdlr.  )  was  fixed  at  96  skilling  and 
replaced  the  fluctuating  Daler  while  the  Kurantdaler  (Kdlr.  )  was  essen- 
tially  an  accounting  daler  reckoned  at  80  skilling.  Both  were  divided  into 
4  Marks,  with  the  Rigsmark  (or  Ort)  equivalent  to  24  skilling  and  the 
Kurantmark  to  20  skilling.  The  skilling  continued  to  be  equivalent  to  12 
Penning. 
-------------------- 
2.  Hans  J*rgen  Marker,  'Sletdalerbegrebet  i  f4orste  fjerdedel  of  17.  Srhundrede',  ilistorie,  XV 
(1985).  633-40. 
110 Around  1626  the  pressure  of  inflation  meant  that  the  new  silver 
Rigsdaler  coin  had  now  also  become  undervalued.  To  account  for  this  the 
coins  themselves  w  ere  now  termed  Enkende  daler  (Edlr.  )3  and  were  re- 
valued  initially  to  100  skilling.  This  was  increased  in  1627  to  102,  and 
then  in  1647  to  104  skilling4.  The  96  skilling  Rigsdaler,  however,  continued 
as  the  principal  accounting  currency.  The  skilling  equivalent  of  the  dif- 
ferent  daler  in  use  at  varying  times  is  shown  in  Table  3.1. 
Dlr.  Mark  Rdlr.  Rmk.  Kdir.  Kink.  Edlr.  Sletdaler  Sletinark 
1582-1602  64  16  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1602-1609  66  16.5  -  -  -  -  -  64  16 
1609-1610  68  17  -  -  -  -  -  64  16 
1610-1616  74  16.5  -  -  -  -  -  64  16 
1616-1618  80  20  -  -  -  -  -  64  16 
1618-1619  84  20/21?  -  -  -  -  -  64  16 
1619-166  -  -  96  24  80  20  -  64  16 
1626-1627  -  -  96  24  80  20  100  64  16 
1627-1W  -  -  96  24  80  20  102  64  16 
1641-1648  96  24  80  20  104  64  16 
Table  3.1.  Skilling  equivalents  of  Daler/Rigsdaler 
Sources  Hans  J4rgen  Marker,  'Sletdalerbegrebet  i  ferste  fjerdedel  of  17.  lrbundre  i,  Hisfc  iß  XV  (19M), 
1.  Wilcke,  Christian  IV's  Iyn*tk  1588-1624  (K$benhavn,  1919);  Rentenesterregnskaber  1996i97  -1641p8. 
Foreign  coins,  particularly  the  German  thaler,  also  continued  in 
common  circulation  and  revenues  from  tolls  brought  in  coinage  from  all 
over  Europe.  The  summaries  in  the  account  books  listing  all  the  different 
coinages  passing  through  the  rentekammer  frequently  run  into  several 
pages.  The  most  common  of  these  was  probably  the  gold  Rose  Noble, 
which  was  generally  reckoned  at  400  skilling.  All  these  different  cur- 
rencies  were  liberally  mixed  up  in  the  accounts  and  little  attempt  was 
ever  made  to  rationalise  them. 
3.  Engberg.  Dansk  finanshistorie,  57. 
4.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli.  Rentekammer.  Rentemesterregnskaber. 
111 The  state's  accounting  procedures  were  fairly  simple  in  concept.  Its 
income  and  expenditure  were  divided  into  'ordinary'  and  'extra-ordinary' 
categories.  The  ordinary  income  was  further  divided  into  'certain'  and 
'uncertain'  incomes,  depending  on  whether  they  could  be  accurately  es- 
timated,  such  as  len  revenues  and  town  taxes,  or  whether  they  varied 
from  year  to  year,  such  as  tolls  and  excise  duties.  Extraordinary  income 
included  all  taxes  which  were  raised  for  special  purposes  such  as  the 
payment  of  troops  in  wartime  or  for  the  marriage  celebrations  of  royal 
offspring,  and  had  to  be  specially  voted  by  the  rigsräd.  As  the  financial 
burdens  on  the  state  increased  through  Christian  IV's  reign  these  ex- 
traordinary  taxes  became  ever  more  regular  and  could  really  be  called 
extraordinary  in  name  only.  The  state's  expenditures  were  also  divided 
into  'certain'  and  'uncertain'  categories. 
Because  of  the  great  importance  attached  to  the  navy  for  the 
defence  of  the  realm,  expenditure  on  it  was  classified  as  an  ordinary  ex- 
pense.  However,  only  part  of  its  budget  could  be  considered  as  'certain' 
and  a  large  proportion  of  naval  expenditure  came  under  the  heading  of 
'uncertain'.  To  further  complicate  matters  expenditure  only  up  to  a  cer- 
tain  level  came  under  the  'ordinary'  classification.  If  extensive 
manoeuvres  or  wars  were  planned  then  any  additional  funds  had  to  be 
raised  from  extraordinary  taxation. 
There  were  two  principal  bodies  responsible  for  state  finances,  the 
rentekammer,  which  was  supervised  jointly  by  the  king  and  rigsrhd,  and 
the  Kongens  eget  Kammer  (king's  own  chamber),  which  was  administered 
by  the  king  alone  with  no  government  control  whatsoever.  There  were  no 
------------------- 
5.  There  were  in  fact  two  other  government  financial  institutions,  the  Generalkrigszahlkommis- 
sariat  established  temporarily  in  1628  and  then  permanently  from  1637,  and  the  Landkommis- 
sariat  established  in  1638.  Although  technically  a  part  of  the  central  administration  their  or- 
ganisation  was  purely  provincial  and  were  concerned  solely  with  the  collection  of  taxes  and  their 
disbursement  on  a  local  level.  They  had  no  influence  over  naval  finances  and  their  administra- 
tion  need  receive  little  further  consideration  in  this  study. 
f 
112 formal  boundaries  or  rules  governing  which  expenses  were  paid  by  which 
institution  and  a  lot  depended  on  the  circumstances  prevailing  at  any 
particular  time. 
There  was  no  one  dedicated  official  whose  duty  it  was  to  oversee 
naval  finances6.  The  stadtholder  or  rigshofinester,  as  head  of  the  ren- 
tekammer,  was  the  one  who  bore  the  main  responsibility,  although  as  pre- 
viously  shown7  this  was  by  no  means  their  only  task.  However,  as  with 
all  matters  of  state  administration,  it  was  Christian  IV  who  took  ultimate 
control,  but  only  as  far  as  the  rigsrad  would  allow  him. 
3.1.1.  The  Rentekammer 
The  rentekammer  had  two  main  functions,  firstly  to  supervise  all 
'ordinary'  state  income  and  expenditure,  and  secondly  to  audit  the  ac- 
counts  of  all  the  other  state  offices.  Although  it  was  a  key  part  of  the 
central  administration  it  did  not  monitor  the  income  and  expenditure  of 
the  state  as  a  whole,  but  simply  the  transactions  which  went  through  its 
own  books.  Much  of  the  state's  income  and  expenditure  was  administered 
on  a  provincial  level  and  therefore  only  a  certain  percentage  of  the 
country's  total  income  ever  made  it  as  far  as  Copenhagen.  Some  extraor- 
dinary  taxes  were  deposited  in  the  rentekammer,  but  these  were  fre- 
quently  kept  separate  by  the  rigsräd  or  estates  who  had  imposed  it,  and 
therefore  do  not  appear  in  the  rentekammer  accounts. 
The  rentekammer's  main  account  books  were  the  rentemester- 
regnskaber  which  were  fairly  rudimentary,  having  changed  little  since 
their  introduction  in  the  mid  16th  century.  No  attempt  was  made  at 
double  entry  book-keeping  and  roman  numerals  were  still  used  for  all 
-------------------- 
6.  There  was  for  a  time  in  the  1620s  a  renteskriver  with  the  title  skriver  over  sm-  og 
baadsfolkef  but  their  precise  duties  are  unknown  and  the  title  was  short  lived.  (Kancelliets 
Brevb*ger.  16  April  1625). 
7.  See  Chapter  2. 
113 figures.  The  accounts  were  simply  divided  into  income  and  expenditure, 
and  records  of  any  transactions  were  entered  under  their  appropriate 
subject  heading,  one  after  the  other. 
The  rentekammer's  principal  role  in  naval  finance  was  the  supervi- 
sion  of  its  two  subsidiaries,  the  klmdekammer  and  the  provianthus,  which 
managed  the  payment  of  wages  and  the  allocation  of  victuals  for  most 
naval  personnel.  The  provision  of  shipbuilding  materials  also  came  under 
its  control.  The  administration  of  all  materials  received  and  issued  to  the 
navy  was  carried  out  by  the  materialskrivere  at  Bremerholm,  who  came 
under  rentekammer  control,  and  the  registerprisegodsskriveren  (clerk  of 
prize  goods)  administered  all  prize  goods,  many  of  which  were  issued 
directly  to  Bremerholm,  or  were  used  to  pay  the  navy's  creditors9.  Cash 
payments  to  private  contractors  were  also  usually  made  directly  from  the 
ren  tekammer. 
3.1.2.  The  Kltedekammer 
In  theory  the  simplest  element  of  naval  expenditure  to  determine  was  the 
payment  of  wages  for  seamen  and  dockyard  workers.  The  k1wdekammer 
(cloth  chamber)  was  initially  the  room  in  Copenhagen  castle  where  cloth 
was  received  and  clothing  issued  to  court  officials  and,  since  the  navy 
was  based  in  Copenhagen,  to  naval  personnel.  Towards  the  end  of  the 
16th  century  it  was  reorganised  to  become  essentially  the  office  for  the 
state  pay-roll  and  came  under  the  supervision  of  the  rentekammer.  In 
1592  its  organisation  was  formalised  and  it  moved  from  the  castle  to  its 
own  building  beside  the  Kancelli  building,  where  the  rentekammer  had  its 
offices'o. 
-------------------- 
8.  A  full  description  of  this  post  is  given  in  Chapter  6. 
9.  Engberg,  Danske  ffnanshistorie4  85-6. 
10.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  den  Fjerde  og  hans  Mend  paa  Bremerholm,  (Kobenhavn,  1889),  82-7. 
114 Although  the  klmdekammer  was  technically  a  sub-department  of  the 
rentekammer,  it  held  its  own  cash  reserves  and  was  only  partly  funded 
by  the  rentekammer.  It  also  received  funds  directly  from  the  mint  and 
certain  taxes  were  also  sometimes  paid  directly  to  the  klmdekammera1. 
It  was  run  by  the  klmdekammerskriver  with  the  assistance  of  a 
small  number  of  underskrivere.  The  Holmens  admiral  was  responsible  for 
informing  the  klmdekammer  of  the  wages  and  other  payments  to  be  made, 
but  the  klmdekammerskriver  was  responsible  ultimately  to  the  stadtholder 
or  rigshofinester. 
Despite  the  relatively  simple  remit  of  the  klmdekammer  there  were, 
as  ever,  complications  which  serve  to  confuse  the  role  of  the  institution. 
Men  were  not  paid  simply  in  cash  but  would  also  receive  part  of  their 
wages  in  kind.  All  State  employees  received  their  wages  in  a  strange  mix- 
ture  of  cash,  clothing  and  foodstuffs.  The  level  of  payment  depended  not 
only  on  the  seniority  of  the  post  but  also  the  nature  of  the  work,  for  ex- 
ample  a  carter  could  expect  an  allowance  for  shoes12,  while  blacksmiths 
would  receive  leather  for  protective  clothing  and  up  to  twelve  barrels  of 
beer13.  The  clothing  was  accounted  for  through  the  k1  dekammer  but  the 
foodstuffs  were  administered  by  the  provianthus. 
The  confusion  was  also  heightened  by  the  fact  that  some  naval  per- 
sonnel,  such  as  shipwrights,  were  at  times  classified  as  hoftjenere  (court 
servants)  and  their  wages  were  paid  directly  from  the  rentekammer 
rather  than  the  kla'dekammer,  and  sometimes  seamen  were  paid  through 
the  Kongens  eget  Kammer. 
-------------------- 
11.  Engberg,  Danske  finanshistorie  87. 
12.  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  27  Jun  1597. 
13.  Kancelliets  arevboger.  27  April  1626. 
115 The  accounting  system  of  the  klmdekammer  was  far  from  precise 
and  the  methods  of  payment  chaotic.  The  officers,  gunners,  and  the 
highest  level  of  dockyard  workers  were  paid  yearly,  some  lesser  ranks 
were  paid  monthly,  and  others  were  on  a  day  rate.  Sea-going  personnel 
were  accounted  for  twice  a  year  while  the  dockyard  personnel  were  ac- 
counted  for  three  times  a  year.  Sometimes,  however,  men  would  receive 
little  or  no  wages  one  year  with  the  shortfall  being  made  up  in  later 
years.  The  means  of  payment  also  varied  widely.  For  example,  Daniel 
Sinclair,  despite  theoretically  being  supposed  to  receive  400  KDIr.  in 
specie  yearly,  was  one  year  given  336  KDIr.  365  plus  a  total  of  1501  alen 
of  different  types  of  cloth  plus  24  pairs  of  striped  stockings14.  Another 
time  he  received  his  entire  year's  wages  in  salt  to  the  value  of  400  KDIr., 
provided  by  the  proviantskriver  but  entered  in  the  klmdekammer 
regnskaber45. 
3.1.3.  The  Provianthus 
The  provianthus  (victualling  store)  administered  the  issue  of  all 
foodstuffs  to  the  navy.  It  developed  as  an  offshoot  of  the  office  of  the 
clerk  of  Copenhagen  Castle,  who  originally  supervised  the  issue  of  vict- 
uals  to  both  Court  and  navy.  In  1597  a  separate  official  was  appointed 
with  the  title  proviantskriver  paa  Bremerholm  to  look  after  the  running 
of  the  provianthus  and  supervise  the  victualling  of  the  navy.  Some  other 
Crown  servants  and  employees  were  issued  goods  through  this  office 
such  as  military  personnel,  certain  members  of  the  clergy,  and  Crown 
factors,  but  their  numbers  were  not  large  and  the  proviantskriver  could 
really  be  considered  as  a  dedicated  naval  official16. 
-------------------- 
14.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Kladekammer  regnskaber  1632/33. 
15.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  K1a:  dekammer  regnskaber  1622/23,  f.  42. 
16.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  mend  95. 
116 The  issue  of  foodstuffs  took  two  basic  forms,  firstly  the  payment  in 
bulk  of  foodstuffs  granted  as  wages,  and  secondly  the  daily  provision  of 
meals  at  the  dockyard  and  aboard  ship.  To  this  end  the  proviantskriver 
was  responsible  for  receiving,  measuring  and  documenting  all  supplies 
from  the  royal  farms  and  len,  as  well  as  supervising  all  the  mills, 
bakeries,  breweries,  slaughterhouses  and  salting  works  which  the  state 
operated.  He  was  responsible  jointly  to  the  Holmens  admiral  and  to  the 
rentekammer,  which  audited  the  accounts. 
Despite  the  enormity  of  this  operation  the  proviantskriver  was  not 
that  well  paid,  at  just  200  KDIr.  per  annum.  He  had  just  one  underskriver 
and  one  junior  clerk  to  help  with  the  accounts,  and  a  small  workforce  of 
seven  or  eight  workmen  to  measure,  pack  and  store  the  foodstuffs17.  By 
1626  it  was  becoming  apparent  that  the  proviantskriver  could  no  longer 
cope  with  all  his  duties  and  a  rigsrJd  commission  was  set  up  to  inves- 
tigate  the  wording  of  the  terms  of  office's.  The  length  of  the 
proviantskriver's  commission,  and  therefore  his  responsibilities,  had  al- 
most  doubled  between  1621  and  1625,  so  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  dif- 
ficulties  were  experienced.  The  enquiry  did  make  some  changes,  but  these 
were  minimal,  reducing  the  number  of  individual  points  of  instruction 
from  36  to  3419.  In  1635,  though,  a  further  two  clerks  were  appointed20, 
bringing  the  total  staff  to  eleven. 
It  is  difficult  to  put  any  clear  figures  to  the  finances  of  this 
operation,  particularly  as  much  of  its  business  was  carried  out  independ- 
ently  of  any  real  money.  The  lensmmnd  delivered  their  produce  direct  to 
the  provianthus  which  was  then  processed  into  one  of  the  staple  foods  of 
------------------- 
17.  Kancelliets  Brevboger.  4  June  1627. 
18.  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger.  13  September  1626. 
19.  Kancelliets  Brevbvpger,  16  April  1625;  and  4  June  1627. 
20.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  5  Dec  1635. 
117 bread,  beer,  dried  peas  and  salt  meat,  and  then  loaded  aboard  ships  or 
cooked  in  the  dockyard  kitchen,  without  any  money  ever  changing  hands. 
The  only  genuine  financial  transactions  occurred  when  additional  supplies 
had  to  be  procured  from  local  merchants,  and  when  any  excess  food  or 
by-products  from  the  food  processing,  such  as  hides  and  tallow,  were 
sold. 
The  rentekammer  kept  a  record  of  goods  supplied  to  the  proviant- 
hus  from  the  len  but  no  indication  is  given  of  what  was  destined  for 
naval,  Court,  or  other  use.  The  only  surviving  accounts  from  the 
proviantskriver  are  the  annual  account  books  which  were  arranged  under 
headings  of  ship  and  work-place.  It  was  therefore  theoretically  possible 
to  determine  how  much  was  issued  to  the  provianthus  and  how  much  was 
then  issued  for  naval  use,  but  the  nature  of  the  accounts  would  have 
made  this  very  difficult.  No  monetary  value  was  ever  placed  on  the  goods 
either,  so  the  job  of  auditing  these  accounts  must  have  proved  virtually 
impossible. 
3.1.4.  Kongens  eget  Kammer 
The  Kongens  eget  Kammer  was  the  second  most  important  of  the  financial 
institutions  but  because  it  was  administered  almost  secretively  by  the 
king  himself,  and  its  meagre  accounts  are  obscure  and  incomplete,  much 
of  its  workings  remain  a  mystery.  It  has  in  fact  been  described  as  'an 
institution  with  no  real  staff,  no  real  accounts  and  no  fixed  place  of 
office'21.  It  did  actually  have  one  member  of  staff,  the  kammerskriver, 
appointed  for  the  first  time  in  1632.  However,  the  only  record  of  its  in- 
come  and  expenditure  were  the  king's  own  diaries,  and  his  records  of 
transactions  at  the  Kiel  money  market,  which  are  characteristically 
idiosyncratic. 
-------------------- 
21.  Engberg,  Dansk  finanshistorie,  345. 
118 The  primary  function  of  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer  was,  as  its  name 
suggests,  for  the  king  to  have  a  certain  amount  of  money  for  his  own 
use,  without  the  need  for  him  to  continually  go  to  the  rentekammer.  This 
function  was  distorted  greatly  by  the  fact  that  its  income  derived  prin- 
cipally  from  the  vast  amounts  generated  from  the  Sound  and  the  Elbe 
tolls,  with  smaller  though  still  significant  revenues  from  the  crown  lands 
in  the  duchies  and  from  the  Kiel  money  market.  This  gave  the  king  con- 
trol  over  vast  sums  of  money  that  could  easily  exceed  those  administered 
through  the  rentekammer. 
Technically  much  of  the  money  paid  into  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer 
belonged  to  the  state  but  this  was  mixed  in  with  the  king's  own  private 
revenues  in  a  completely  haphazard  way.  Although  the  king  had  tradi- 
tionally  been  able  to  keep  any  surplus  from  the  Sound  tolls  and  use  it 
freely  without  having  to  first  ask  approval  from  the  rigsrJ  ,  Christian 
IV  manipulated  the  situation  to  his  own  advantage.  Rather  than  keeping 
just  the  surplus,  after  all  state  expenditure  had  been  met,  he  began  to 
regard  the  revenues  in  their  entirety  as  his  own  personal  property,  and 
ensured  that  they  were  paid  directly  into  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer. 
During  his  minority  the  rentekammer  regularly  received  more  than  50%  of 
the  Sound  toll  revenue,  but  after  Christian  IV's  accession  this  figure 
rapidly  dropped  until  by  1607  it  was  receiving  little  more  than  1-2%23. 
These  machinations  were  quickly  and  conveniently  forgotten  by  the 
king  when  the  financial  state  of  the  country  became  critical.  As  he  later 
stated  to  the  rigsract.  'Tollen  y  Sundit  haffuer  aldtiid  y  vorre  forfehdris 
och  y  uorris  tiid  verrit  worre  handpenge'  (the  tolls  in  the  Sound  have 
always  in  our  ancestors  and  in  our  time  been  our  own  money)24.  Thus, 
-------------------- 
22.  Balle.  Statsfinanserne  p3  Christian  3.  s  tid  356. 
23.  E.  Ladewig  Petersen.  'Defence,  War  and  Finance:  Christian  IV  and  the  Council  of  the  Realm 
1596-1629',  Journal  of  Scandinavian  History,  7  (1982),  288. 
24.  Letter  to  rigsrAd  9  November  1647,  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den 
Fjerdes  egenhandige  Breve.  VI,  349. 
119 rightly  or  wrongly,  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer  ceased  to  be  simply  a  per- 
sonal  reserve  and  became  an  integral  part  of  the  state  financial 
machinery.  This  gave  the  king  a  great  deal  of  power  over  the  rigsrad 
who  basically  had  to  rely  on  his  goodwill  to  pay  out  money  to  help 
finance  the  running  of  the  state,  and  thus  payments  from  the  Kongens 
eget  Kammer  took  on  a  political  significance  that  served  to  further  com- 
plicate  the  already  chaotic  system  of  state  finance. 
From  the  surviving  diaries  of  Christian  IV25  some  idea  of  the  role 
of  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer  can  be  determined.  Those  from  1607,1608, 
1614,1616,  and  1621  contain  no  details  of  payments  for  naval  purposes 
whatsoever.  In  1618  1000  Dlr.  was  issued  to  M.  David26  presumably  as 
payment  for  shipbuilding  work,  and  the  shipbuilding  contractor  Peter 
Michelsen  was  given  5000  Dlr.  and  2000  'styck  von  Achten'  for  the  build- 
ing  of  a  ship,  with  aa  further  3000  Dlr.  paid  in  1619.  In  1620  two 
Flensburg  merchants  where  paid  2000  Rdlr.  fora  ship  they  had  built  un- 
der  contract,  and  Daniel  Sinclair  was  paid  500  Rdlr.  as  part  payment  for 
a  ship  under  construction.  In  1635  1000  Rdlr.  was  paid  for  a  cargo  of 
ship  timber. 
In  addition  to  these  payments,  the  Sound  toll  collectors  also  came 
under  the  king's  direct  control,  and  through  them  large  payments  were 
also  made  for  the  purchase  of  naval  materials,  before  the  money  ever 
reached  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer27.  Along  with  details  of  other  pur- 
chases  contained  in  Christian  IV's  letters  it  can  be  seen  that  the  majority 
------------------- 
25.  J.  H.  Schlegel  (ed.  ),  'Kong  Christian  IV  Almanak  for  Aaret  1607,  &  1608',  Samlung  zur  Danis- 
chen  Geschichte,  2  Bd.  3  Stk.,  29-84.;  Suhm  (ed.  ),  'Kong  Christian  IVdes  Skrivkalander  for  Aarene 
1614  og  16',  Nye  Samlinger,  2  Bd.,  91-114.;  Schlegel  (ed.  ),  'Kong  Christian  IV  Almanak  for  Aaret 
1621'.  Samlung  zur  Danischen  Geschichte,  2  Bd.  1  Stk.,  43-74;  Rasmus  Nyerup,  Kong  Christian  den 
Fjerdes  Dagboger  for  Aarene  1618,1619,1620,1625,1635,  udgivne  efter  Originalerner  (Kobenhavn, 
1825). 
26.  i.  e.  Mester  David  Balfour 
27.  For  example  2000  Rdlr.  assigned  for  the  purchase  of  hemp,  23  May  1641,  egenhandige  Brevß 
V,  89. 
120 of  the  expenditure  was  concerned  with  the  payment  of  fairly  large  sums 
of  money  to  contractors  and  the  purchase  of  materials.  This  would  appear 
to  suggest  that  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer  paid  primarily  the  navy's  capi- 
tal  expenditure,  but  the  details  of  the  accounts  are  so  fragmentary  that 
no  firm  conclusions  can  really  be  drawn. 
The  situation  became  even  more  ambiguous  during  the  financial 
crises  of  the  1630s  and  1640s.  Despite  frequently  making  payments  for  all 
manner  of  supplies  Christian  IV  could  suddenly  state  that  'Stangiern,  Blii 
Och  kabelgarn,  Daa  haffuer  ded  altiid  bleffuen  betaliid  aff  Riigens  In- 
dkomst,  Och  inted  aff  kammeriid'  (iron  bars,  lead,  and  cable  yarn  have 
always  been  paid  for  out  of  the  state's  income  and  not  the  Kammer's)28, 
even  though  just  the  previous  year  he  had  himself  purchased  5000  Rdlr. 
worth  of  cable  yarn29. 
Payments  to  seamen  also  became  a  regular  occurrence  since  the 
rapid  increase  in  personnel  occurred  before  any  proper  provision  was 
made  to  pay  for  them30.  The  fact  that  large  numbers  of  ships  began  to  be 
stationed  on  the  Elbe  also  played  its  part  since  the  king's  kammerskriver 
was  frequently  resident  in  Glückstadt31,  making  it  much  more  convenient 
for  payments  to  be  made  through  him.  At  one  stage  Christian  IV  even 
seemed  to  operate  as  paymaster  for  one  -  particular  ship,  with  weekly  pay- 
ments  to  its  crew  noted  in  his  diary32.  However,  he  was  at  pains  to 
stress  that  these  payments  to  seamen  were  merely  loans  which  ought  to 
be  repaid  by  the  state3. 
--------------  -- 
28.  Letter  to  rentemester  Jgrgen  Vind,  7  August  1636,  egenhandige  Brevq  IV.  54-5. 
29.  Letter  to  rentemestrer  13  February  1636,  egenhmndige  Breve,  III,  334. 
30.  Grants  of  interim  payments  from  the  king  were  made  on  21  October  1634,5  March  &3  May 
1635,9  February  1636,  egenhandige  Breve,  III,  286,244,368-9;  and  IV,  9. 
31.  Letters  to  kammerskriver  Henrik  Müller.  29  October  &  14  December  1637,  egenhandige  Brevß 
IV,  156  &  166-8. 
32.  Payments  were  made  to  the  crew  of  Fladlusen  on  12  Jan,  22  Jan,  7  Feb,  17  Feb,  23  Feb,  22 
Mar,  and  29  Mar  1635.  (Nyerup,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Dagbmger,  152-8). 
33.  Letter  to  rentemestrenß  9  February  1636.  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  9. 
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121 Thus  it  could  be  said  that  in  broad  terms  the  rentekammer  super- 
vised  the  payment  of  the  navy's  running  costs  while  the  Kongens  eget 
kammer  paid  for  its  capital  expenditure.  This  is  of  course  a  gross 
simplification  as  the  rentekammer  paid  for  a  significant  amount  of  ship- 
building  materials  while  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer  at  times  paid  for 
seamen's  wages.  Another  way  of  viewing  the  break-down  in  respon- 
sibilities  is  that  the  rentekammer  paid  for  the  'ordinary'  expenditure  and 
the  'extra-ordinary'  expenditure  sanctioned  by  the  rigsrAd,  while  the 
Kongens  eget  Kammer  paid  for  any  additional  unsanctioned  expenses.  But 
again  this  attempt  at  a  rigid  delineation  breaks  down  since  many  of  the 
payments  made  from  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer  were  either  initially  or  ul- 
timately  sanctioned  by  the  rigsrad  and  repaid  by  the  rentekammer. 
Any  attempt  to  determine  a  strict  delineation  between  the  two  in- 
stitutions,  though,  is  meaningless.  In  the  same  way  that  the  government 
can  be  described  as  dyarchic  then  the  system  of  state  finance  was  also 
dyarchic,  with  each  part  of  the  government  in  control  of  its  own  financial 
institution.  Given  the  state  of  ill-feeling  between  the  king  and  rigsräd  it 
is  not  surprising  that  the  issue  of  naval  finance  was  one  which  caused  a 
great  deal  of  antagonism  and  hostility.  With  the  dual  system  of  finance 
the  two  institutions  became  inextricably  intertwined  into  a  confused 
muddle,  with  both  parties  trying  to  use  their  influence  for  political  ends 
at  the  expense  of  any  rational  approach  to  solving  the  growing  problems 
of  how  to  finance  an  expanding  navy  in  a  declining  state  economy. 
Before  looking  at  these  problems  in  greater  detail  it  is  worth  just 
giving  one  small  example  from  the  rentemesterregnskaber  to  illustrate  how 
the  different  financial  institutions  and  currencies  were  all  interlinked: 
Thend  31  Jannuarij  giffuidt  Mester  Dauid  Baldfordt  Ko:  Ma:  Schiffs 
biugmester  411  16ß  (@  96ß)  huor  med  hand  nu  aldielis  er  bleffuer 
forn(piedt  oc  affbetaldt  100  dr.  Current  som  hannom  paa  Ko:  Ma: 
ý. 
122 weigne  er  beuilget  for  een  Jagt  hand  Vnderdanigst  haffuer  biugt 
och  forferdigedt  for  Ko:  Ma:  och  aff  hans  Ma:  eigedt  Chamer  effter 
herliggende  Sten  Willumsen  Admirall  hans  der  paa.  offuer  giffuere 
Vnderschreffuere  Contractis  formelding  Och  huis  dee  50  Dr.  Current 
sig  belanger  som  hannom  Rester  vdj  forschreffne  sin  befalling  der 
om  er,  hannom  giffuer  seddel  och  befalling  till  Madtz  Dauidßen 
proviantschriffuer  her  for  Kigbenhaffenns  Slott  adt  hand  schall 
forn4ye  och  betalte  hannom  med  Roug,  huer  Thgnde  Roug  at  antage 
for  15  Mk  dansche  slett  m4)ndtt.  34 
The  31st  January,  given  to  Master  David  Balfour,  H.  M.  master 
shipwright:  411  Rdlr.  160  (@9613)35,  with  which  he  has  now  been 
fully  paid  and  received  100  Kdlr  which  he  has  been  granted  by 
H.  M.  's  will  for  a  jagt  he  has  humbly  built  and  outfitted  for  H.  M., 
and  from  his  Majesty's  own  Chamber,  in  accordance  with  the  condi- 
tions  of  the  contract  submitted  and  authorised  by  admiral  Sten  Vil- 
lumsen,  and  for  the  remaining  50  Kdlr.  promised  in  his  contract,  he 
shall  be  given  a  note  and  instructions  to  proviantskriver  Mads 
Davidsen  here  in  Copenhagen  Castle  that  he  shall  satisfy  and  pay 
him  with  rye,  each  barrel  to  be  reckoned  at  15  Danish  Sletmarks. 
Thus  the  simple  matter  of  the  payment  of  the  relatively  small  sum  of  150 
Kdlr.  was  made  by  three  different  bodies,  the  rentekammer,  the  Kongens 
eget  Kammer,  and  the  provianthus,  accounted  for  using  three  different 
forms  of  currency,  and  paid  in  both  specie  and  in  kind.  It  is  therefore 
--------------  -- 
34.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1622/23,78,  f.  195. 
35.  =  50  Kdlr.  @  80ß 
`i 
123 no  wonder  that  so  much  confusion  surrounded  financial  matters  at  the 
time,  and  has  continued  to  confuse  historians  ever  since.  It  is  with  this 
in  mind  that  we  now  turn  to  the  actual  financing  of  the  navy. 
3.2.  The  Financing  of  the  Navy 
3.2.1.  Naval  Expenditure 
The  first  task  that  must  be  attempted  is  to  determine  the  'ordinary'  ex- 
penditure  on  the  navy.  Since  no  separate  naval  accounts  were  kept  this 
is  virtually  impossible  with  any  accuracy.  What  is  possible,  though,  is  an 
assessment  of  the  payment  of  dockyard  personnel  and  seamen's  wages. 
These  appear  in  the  rentemesterregnskaber  accounts  at  first  under  the 
heading: 
ad  giffue  kon  Maietts  Schiffs  Hgffuidsmennd,  Schiffs  Prester,  Schip- 
pere,  Styrmend,  Bmssesk(ptter,  Baadzmend,  Aars  Tommermennd, 
Saugskierer,  Och  ellers  i  andre  maade  till  hans  Maietts  och  Brem- 
merholmenns  behouff 
given  to  H.  M.  's  ship  captains,  ship's  chaplains,  skippers,  masters, 
gunners,  seamen,  carpenters,  sawyers,  and  others  who  serve  H.  M. 
and  Bremerholm's  needs 
This  was  later  changed  to:  'Udbetalt  til  klaedekammerskriveren  til 
Bremerholms  folk  og  skibsfolkene  til  besolding  og  kostpenge'  (paid  to  the 
klmdekammerskriver  for  the  payment  of  wages  to  Bremerholm's  and  ships' 
personnel).  These  figures  are  shown  in  Figure  3.136. 
------  -  ------  --- 
36.  Accounts  for  1599/1600  and  1605/06  were  undergoing  conservation  at  the  time  of  consultation. 
All  payments  in  different  units  of  currency  have  been  rationalised  to  the  value  of 
Daler/Rigsdaler  current  at  the  time.  ' 
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Figure  3.1.  Payments  of  Seamens  Wages 
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Great  caution  must  be  used  in  interpreting  these  figures.  They  do 
not  represent  the  total  expenditure  on  the  navy  by  the  rentekammer, 
since  payments  to  contractors  and  some  personnel  appear  under  other 
headings  in  the  accounts.  Nor  do  they  represent  the  total  klmdekammer 
budget  since  it  also  received  other  funds  as  well37.  At  best  they  provide 
only  an  indication  of  the  changing  rate  of  naval  funding.  The  most  strik- 
ing  evidence  from  the  graph  are  the  huge  variations  in  the  level  of  fund- 
ing,  with  at  no  time  a  consistent  rate  from  one  year  to  the  next.  By 
taking  a  five  year  rolling  average  some  of  these  fluctuations  can  be 
smoothed  out  and  a  clearer  picture  of  the  trends  emerges.  This  is  pretty 
much  as  expected  from  our  knowledge  of  the  fluctuating  size  of  the 
fleet,  with  a  small  peak  at  the  time  of  the  Kalmar  War  and  a  rapid  in- 
crease  from  around  1630  to  a  high  point  in  the  early  1640s,  followed  by  a 
sharp  decrease  after  the  Torstenssonkrig. 
Perhaps  the  most  surprising  evidence  is  the  dramatic  drop  in  naval 
funding  from  the  rentekammer  immediately  after  Christian  IV's  accession. 
This  shows  that  as  well  as  funding  an  extensive  naval  building 
programme  at  this  time  Christian  IV  must  also  have  taken  on  a  large  part 
of  the  running  costs  of  the  navy.  This  should  be  seen  in  the  light  of  his 
political  motives  at  the  start  of  his  reign  to  become  the  sole  leader  and 
owner  of  the  navy  and  to  limit  any  influence  that  the  rigsrad  might  have 
over  it39.  This  continued  until  the  outbreak  of  the  Kalmar  War,  when 
funding  from  the  rentekammer  again  reach  the  levels  of  before  the  acces- 
sion. 
------------------- 
37.  The  klaedekammer  regnskaber  have  not  been  used  for  this  study  as  they  are  extant  only 
after  1621,  and  they  contain  no  easily  accessible  summaries  of  naval  expenditure. 
38.  See  Chapter  4. 
39.  See  Chapter  2. 
126 The  percentage  of  the  total  rentekammer  budget40  that  these 
figures  represent  also  varies  wildly,  from  just  0.5%  in  1619/20  to  nearly 
32%  in  1645/46.  This  comparison  is  a  little  misleading,  for  the  reasons 
stated  above,  but  it  does  show  the  general  trend  of  a  steadily  increasing 
significance  of  naval  expenditure  within  the  overall  state  budget.  Thus, 
although  an  accurate  estimate  of  total  naval  expenditure  is  impossible 
over  the  entire  reign,  the  payments  of  wages  from  the  rentekammer  do 
provide  a  useful  tool  in  determining  the  basic  trends. 
Whilst  the  rentekammer  did  not  as  a  rule  make  budget  estimates  it 
fortunately  did  so  on  a  number  of  occasions,  and  these  provide  a  more 
complete  picture  of  naval  funding  than  is  possible  from  the  actual  ac- 
counts.  Not  all  of  these  estimates  have  survived  but  those  that  have 
cover  the  period  from  1600  to  1646,  and  show  clearly  the  tremendous 
changes  that  occurred  during  Christian  IV's  reign. 
These  estimates  were  an  attempt  to  reconcile  the  states  ordinary 
income  and  expenditure  and  therefore  contain  only  those  items  which 
were  considered  as  'ordinary'  expenditures  which,  thankfully  for  this 
study,  most  naval  expenditure  was.  They  are  particularly  useful  in  that 
they  give  monetary  values  to  materials  and  foodstuffs  which  did  not 
otherwise  appear  in  the  accounts. 
The  first  three  estimates  cover  the  period  1600-160241  and  are 
identical  in  their  format.  The  figures  are  given  in  table  3.2. 
------------------- 
40.  These  figures  are  based  on  Danish  currencies  only.  No  foreign  currencies  were  included  in 
the  calculation  and  so  they  roughly  approximate  to  the  total  domestic  expenditure. 
Summary  pages  are  missing  in  the  accounts  for  1637/38  and  1638/39  so  the  total  expenditure  for 
these  years  cannot  be  readily  calculated. 
41.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  0202.  a-c.  The  estimate  for  1602  (B202.  c.  )  has  been  published  in: 
Schlegel  (ed.  ),  'Kort  Overslag  paa  alt  Rigens  Indtmgt  og  Udgift,  som  er  nu  giort  og  tilsam- 
mendragen  den  24  Decembris  Ann  1602',  Samlung  zur  Danischen  Geschichte6  1  Bd.  1  stk.  (1773), 
23-113. 
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1600 
Given  yearly  in  wages  to  Ships'  captains,  chaplains 
and  surgeons,  skippers,  masters,  gunners,  seamen, 
cooks,  block-makers,  wheel-makers,  coopers  and 
other  Eke  men  who  are  in  H.  W.  's  daily  service  23,279 
Victualling  at  Bremerholm  and  the  transport  ships: 
Paid  for  hemp,  cable,  sail-canvas,  pump  leather,  iron, 
resin,  lead,  tin,  and  other  Eke  wares  for  ship  use 
Wages  for  smiths  in  the  forge  at  Bremerholm 
Paid  yearly  to  surgeons  who  are  ordered  aboard  H.  M.  's 
ships,  as  well  as  tailors  who  make  seamen's  clothes 
Paint,  oil,  varnish,  and  other  like  wares  for  ship  use 
The  Purchase  of  firewood  for  the  casle,  Bremerholm 
and  the  ships: 
Cod: 
Paid  for  the  transport  of  victuals  to  Copenhagen: 
TOTAL 
27,782 
1601 
A1311 
26,000 
1602 
19,913  Dir. 
23,000  Dlr. 
11,640  17,640  11,640  Dlr. 
2015  3,120  2,800  Dir. 
300  300  300  Dir. 
250  250  250  Dlr. 
MOO  zo2,000  Mr. 
960  950  800  Dlr. 
2,000  2,000  ZOOO  Dlr. 
7216  723911  68,703  Dlr. 
Table  3.2.  Estimates  of  Naval  Expenditure  1600-02 
Sources;  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kanceih,  8202.  a-c. 
In  addition  to  these  items  there  appeared  at  the  end  of  these  es- 
timates  a  number  of  items  which  were  considered  too  difficult  to  estimate 
as  they  varied  so  much  from  year  to  year.  In  this  category  came  the 
building  of  new  ships  for  which  'ikke  for  nogen  visse  Summa  kan  her  in- 
dsettes,  efterdi  den  belgber  hgit  og  ringe  efter  leigligheden'  (no  certain 
sum  can  here  be  allocated,  since  it  varies  high  and  low  according  to 
circumstances). 
An  estimate  from  160842,  shown  in  Table  3.3.,  was  very  similar, 
apart  from  a  slight  increase  in  costs  across  the  board.  The  most  sig- 
------------------- 
42.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  B202.  d.  Published  in:  Johan  Gruntvig  (ed.  ).  'Rigens  Intmgt  og 
Udgift  1608',  Meddelelser  fra  Rentekammerarchivet,  (K$)enhavn,  1872),  93-8. 
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nificant  difference  is  the  breaking  up  of  wages  for  the  different  person- 
nel,  but  the  costs  of  shipbuilding  are  still  considered  too  variable  to  es- 
timate. 
Paid  to  the  Smith  and  his  men  in  the  Great  Forge  3,928  Dlr. 
Victualling  for  Bremerholm  and  the  transport  ships  18,509  Dlr. 
Paid  for  hemp,  cable,  sail  canvas,  pump  leather, 
iron,  resin,  lead,  tin,  spikes  and  nals, 
and  other  Tike  wares  for  ship  use  18,056  Dlr.  }  Ilk. 
Pint,  oil,  varnish  and  other  Eke  wares  for  ship  use:  250  Dir. 
Paid  to  ships  officers:  2,370  Dlr. 
Cd:  450  Dir. 
The  Purchase  of  firewwd  for  the  castle, 
Bremerholm  and  the  ships  ZO  Dlr. 
Wages  of  ships  chaplains:  299  Dlr. 
Wages  of  ships  trumpeters:  246  Dlr. 
Wages  of  master  gunners  and  gunners:  2,60  Dlr. 
Wages  of  styrmand  1,8821  Dlr. 
Wages  of  yearly-paid  carpenters,  rope  makers, 
sail  makers  and  block  makers:  5741  Dlr. 
Wages  of  day-rate  carpenters:  1,896  Dlr.  13  Mk. 
Wages  of  pursers,  seamen,  ships  boys,  cooks, 
pipers  and  drummers  14,3121  Dlr. 
Paid  in  cloth  and  victuals  from  the  kladekammer.  406  Dlr. 
Wages  for  the  provianfskriver  and  his  assistants:  516  Dlr. 
Wages  of  ships  surgeons:  150  Dlr. 
Paid  for  the  transport  of  victuals  to  Copenhagen:  2,000  Dlr. 
TOTAL  70,5551  Dlr. 
Table  3.3.  Estimate  of  Naval  Expenditure  1608 
Sources  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kanceni,  B202& 
129 The  next  surviving  estimate  is  for  163043,  shown  in  Table  3.4.,  and 
this  reverts  to  the  less  detailed  style  of  the  earlier  estimates  in  terms  of 
the  listing  of  wages  but  contains  a  number  of  additional  items.  The  costs 
of  shipbuilding  are  again  still  considered  too  difficult  to  estimate. 
Paid  in  wages  from  the  ki  dekammer  for  H.  W.  's  naval 
personnel  and  the  watches  at  Bremerholm  and  the  arsenal:  120,937  Rdir.  4 
Paid  to  29  captains  and  10  heutenant&  4,933  Rdlr.  200 
Wages  for  the  proviantskriver  and  his  assistants:  413  Rdlr. 
Was  for  98  smiths  in  the  Great  For  00  Rdlr. 
Paid  for  hemp,  cable,  sail  canvas,  pump  leather,  iron,  resin, 
lead,  tin,  spikes  and  nails,  and  other  like  wares  for  ship  use  4,099  Rdlr.  28ß 
Paid  for  firewood  and  charcoal:  1,3101  Rdir.  24ß 
Paid  for  coal  for  the  Great  Forge,  the  Breweries,  and  other  places;  4,604j  Mr,  120 
Paid  for  the  transport  of  victuals  to  Copenhagen:  4,504  Rdlr.  200 
Paid  for  various  timber,  planks  and  deals  for 
shipbuilding  and  other  building  work:  34,694}  Rdir.  320 
Paid  in  wages  for  men  at  the  large  new  brewery.  Z259  Mr.  160 
Paid  in  victuals  from  the  provianthus  to  naval  personnel 
at  Bremerhelm,  the  arsenal  and  other  places:  166,150  Mr.  11 
Pad  to  Copenhagen  town  council  for  buoys  lid 
in  Copenhagen  roadstead  400  Rdir. 
Paid  for  61,  paint,  painters  and  gold  and  silver  worker's 
wages  used  on  H.  M.  's  ships,  also  for  various  other 
materials  and  craftsmen  used  by  the  Court  and  navy;  5,000  Rdir. 
TOTAL  394,041  Rdlr. 
Table  3.4.  Estimate  of  Naval  Expenditure  1630 
Source  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  B202e. 
-------------------- 
43.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  0202.  e.  Published  in  'Overslag  paa  hele  Rigets  Indtagt  og  Udgift 
1630',  Budstikken,  60,  (Christiania,  1824),  473-82. 
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The  next  estimate  comes  from  164244  and  there  are  again  slight 
variations  in  the  grouping  of  wages,  victuals  and  materials,  however,  for 
the  first  time  a  figure  is  given  for  the  costs  of  shipbuilding.  The  figures 
are  given  in  Table  3.5. 
Victualling,  wages,  and  clothing  for  2775  officers 
and  men  aboard  18  warships  and  15  cargo  ships:  159,767  Rdlr.  I  Ort  110 
Victualling  of  154  prisoners  in  Bremerholm's  iron:  4,4901  Mr.  180 
Paid  for  2  warships  which  each  year 
shall  be  built  and  outfitted  18,000  Rdlr. 
Given  for  oil  and  other  paint,  painter's  gold  and  silver, 
and  for  wages  paid  for  decorating  H.  M.  's  ships  ZOO)  Rdlr. 
Given  for  various  wares  for  the  navy  and  Bremerholm, 
including  canvas,  leather,  hemp,  pitch  and  tar,  copper, 
brass,  tin,  lead,  iron,  steel,  and  various  types  of 
spikes  and  nails:  54,  ]59  Mr. 
Various  types  of  timber  and  plank:  43541  Rdir. 
Paid  in  wages  and  clothing  to  smiths  in  Bremerholm's  forge  3,615  RdIr. 
Given  for  coal  for  the  forges  at  the  Bremerhalm  4,6641  Rdlr. 
Wages  for  the  miller  to  the  provianthus  113}  Mr. 
Wages  for  the  bakers  in  the  provianthus  bakery:  2,073  Mr. 
Wages  for  brewers  and  coopers  in  the  provianthus  brewery:  ?,  259  Mr. 
Copenhagen  town  council  for  buoys  400  Mr. 
Firewood  and  charcoal:  5,000  Mr. 
Transport  of  victuals:  4,504  Mr. 
TOTAL  288,660  Rdlr. 
Table  3.5.  Estimate  of  Naval  Expenditure  1642 
Source  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kanceili,  6202f. 
-------------------- 
44.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  B202.  f.  Published  in:  Chr.  Bruun  (ed.  ),  'Kort  Overslag  over  Rigens 
Indtaegt  og  Udgift  1642',  Danske  Samlinger,  6  (1870-71),  325-47. 
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Although  shipbuilding  costs  are  included  there  are  other  flaws.  The 
main  one  being  that  the  wages  for  a  further  906  dockyard  personnel  were 
not  included  in  the  calculation,  estimated  by  Engberg  at  around  100,000 
Rdlr.  4-5  It  was  also  noted  that  the  actual  expenditure  on  timber  was  for 
the  third  year  running  double  the  given  estimate  and  a  warning  was 
given  that  the  cost  of  shipbuilding  would  increase  if  any  more  than  the 
two  projected  ships  a  year  were  built. 
The  1642  estimate  should  be  viewed  with  some  caution  since  it  was 
intended  by  Christian  IV  to  demonstrate  that  the  state  could  no  longer 
support  its  ordinary  expenditure  from  its  ordinary  income  in  an  attempt 
to  push  through  a  reform  of  the  len  system.  Even  though  some  of  the 
naval  expenditures  were  so  obviously  underestimated,  the  rigsräd  were 
not  happy  with  some  of  the  figures  and  suspected  that  the  income  was 
under-estimated  and  the  expenditure  over-estimated. 
In  1645  Christian  IV  requested  the  rentemestre  to  re-appraise  the 
expenditure  figures  and  attempt  to  put  costs  to  those  items  which  were 
omitted  in  their  previous  estimate.  This  was  completed  in  1646  but  unlike 
the  previous  estimates  it  has  not  survived  as  an  official  document.  It 
does  exist  however  in  the  notebook  of  the  rentemester  Oluf  Daa48.  It  is 
summarised  in  Table  3.6. 
45.  Enberg,  Dansk  finanshistorf4  120. 
46.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  B186,  Oluf  Daa's  Optegnelsesbog,  f.  39-40  &  68-63.  Published,  with 
a  number  of  mistakes,  in:  P.  Hoick,  'Flaadelister  omkring  Krigsaarene  1644-45',  Tidsskrift  for 
S4vasen,  114  (1943),  481-94. 
132 Paid  to  Copenhagen  town  council  for  buoys:  400  Rdlr. 
Paid  for  firewood:  8,213  Rdlr. 
Paid  in  wages  and  victuals  to  H,  M.  's 
ships  officers,  seamen  and  gunners:  357,136  Rdlr. 
Victuals  for  100  prisoners;  3,767  Rdlr. 
For  the  construction  of  two  warships:  16,000  Rdlr. 
For  ml,  paint  painter's  gold  and  silver.  1,190  Rdlr. 
Various  materials  for  ships  use  69,446  Rdlr. 
For  timber  and  planks  for  ships:  19,572  Rdlr. 
Wages  for  the  Great  Forge:  8,986  Rdlr. 
Coal:  4,074  Rdlr. 
Wages  for  the  provianthus  antler.  842  Rdlr. 
Wages  for  the  baker  and  his  men:  2,407  Rdir. 
Paid  for  the  large  new  Brewery:  3,048  Rdir. 
TOTAL  557,081  Rdlr. 
Table  3.6.  Estimate  of  Naval  Expenditure  1646 
Source  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  B18fi,  Oluf  Was  Optegnelsesbog,  f.  39-40. 
These  revised  figures  must  be 
.  viewed  with  even  more  caution  than 
the  1642  estimate.  The  rigsräd  was  certainly  very  sceptical  and  doubted 
that  the  total  state  expenditure  could  increase  by  50%  in  the  space  of 
just  four  years,  as  the  revised  estimate  suggested. 
The  results  of  the  different  estimates  are  summarised  in  Table  3.7. 
Although  the  estimates  were  not  all  calculated  on  the  same  basis,  with 
some  items  included  or  excluded  for  different  years,  they  provide  the 
best  available  picture  of  total  naval  expenditure.  It  can  be  seen  that  the 
relation  between  wages  and  victualling  and  materials  and  shipbuilding 
'f  I 
133 remained  fairly  constant,  but  the  actual  sums  involved  increased  dramati- 
cally  and  the  navy's  percentage  of  state  expenditure  had  effectively 
doubled  in  the  latter  half  of  the  reign. 
1600  1608  1630  1642  1646 
Dlr.  %  Dlr,  %  Mr.  %  Mr.  %  Rdir,  % 
Wages  6  Victualling  55,316  73  49,800  71  305,938  78  111,542  62  316,186  68 
Materials  20,840  27  20,756  29  88,109  22  93,118  32  162,995  29 
Shipbuilding  -  -  -  -  -  -  18,000  6  18,000  3 
Total  Naval  Expenditure  16,216  29  70,556  33  394,047  64  288,660  47  557,081  59 
Court  etc. 
Arsenal  I  Garrisons 
148,116 
3,5,384 
57 
14 
121,285 
2Z646 
57 
10 
194,988 
26,197 
32 
4 
308,303 
21,336 
50 
3 
371,834 
9,563 
40 
1 
Total  Expenditure  260,316  -  214,481  -  615,232  -  618,299  -  94478  - 
Table  3.7.  Estimated  Naval  Expenditure  1600-1646 
The  huge  increase  in  funding  between  1608  and  1630  is  remarkable, 
representing  more  than  a  five-fold  increase.  This  can  be  explained  largely 
by  the  fact  that  the  size  of  the  navy  had  more  or  less  doubled  in  this 
time.  In  addition  inflation  and  the  change  in  the  currency  system  would 
also  have  had  an  effect.  The  increase  between  1642  to  1646  can  partly  be 
explained  by  the  inclusion  of  the  wages  and  victuals  that  were  omitted  in 
the  1642  estimate,  and  by  the  fact  that  the  size  of  the  navy  had  grown 
during  the  Torstenssonkrig,  but  whether  these  would  account  for  a  dou- 
bling  of  the  estimated  expenditure  is  debatable.  It  is  not  wholly  in- 
feasable  though,  as  a  further  estimate  from  1656,  albeit  much  less 
detailed,  gives  a  remarkably  similar  figure  of  543,500  Rdlr.  for  the  total 
naval  expenditure47. 
------------------ 
47.  Rigsarkiv.  Danske  kancelli.  B202.  g. 
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134 The  percentages  are  also  a  little  misleading  since  the  total  es- 
timated  expenditure  is  only  the  'ordinary'  expenditure,  and  does  not  in- 
clude  so-called  extraordinary  expenditures,  such  as  the  new  standing 
army  from  1637.  So  while  in  the  1630  and  1640s  the  navy  accounted  for 
between  50-60%  of  the  ordinary  budget  it  represented  far  less  in  terms 
of  the  overall  state  budget.  Unfortunately,  since  many  of  the  extraordi- 
nary  expenses  were  administered  outwith  the  rentekammer,  any  attempt  to 
calculate  the  total  state  budget  is  impossible.  This  also  explains  why  the 
expenditure  on  the  army  decreases  in  percentage  terms  so  dramatically 
after  the  establishment  of  the  Generalkrigszahlkommissariat  in  1628,  since 
this  administered  the  bulk  of  army  expenditure  on  a  purely  provincial 
basis. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  arsenal  was  considered  as  a  com- 
pletely  separate  entity  in  the  administration  and  in  these  estimates.  Since 
a  large  proportion  of  the  arsenal  was  concerned  with  naval  ordnance  the 
total  naval  budgets  have  been  underestimated  to  a  certain  extent. 
However,  no  distinction  was  made  between  land  and  naval  ordnance,  and 
it  would  be  impossible  to  try  and  calculate  the  percentage  of  the  arsenal 
budget  that  related  to  the  navy. 
In  1647  the  leaders  of  the  army  and  navy  were  requested  to  inves- 
tigate  the  total  expenditure  on  the  military,  including  all  ordinary  and 
extraordinary  expenditures,  whether  they  were  'certain'  or  'uncertain'. 
This  was  the  first  time  that  such  an  all-inclusive  budget  had  been  at- 
tempted,  but  unfortunately  the  work  remained  incomplete  at  the  time  of 
Christian  IV's  death,  and  was  never  finished48. 
Having  now  come  to  some  kind  of  estimate  of  naval  expenditure,  al- 
beit  rather  flawed,  it  is  worth  now  looking  briefly  at  where  the  money 
came  from  which  financed  it. 
-------------------- 
48.  Engberg,  Dansk  finanshistoriß  128-9. 
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3.2.2  Funding  for  the  Navy 
It  is  often  stated  as  a  truism  in  works  on  Danish  history  that  the  navy 
was  paid  for  by  the  Sound  dues.  This  is  indeed  partly  true  but,  as  will 
already  have  been  made  evident,  the  real  situation  was  far  more  compli- 
cated  than  that.  Very  little  of  the  state's  ordinary  income  was  ever  ear- 
marked  for  its  ultimate  use,  so  before  looking  specifically  at  funding  for 
the  navy  we  must  look  first  at  the  state's  income  as  a  whole.  The  income 
of  the  state  can  be  divided  broadly  into  three  categories:  len  revenues; 
taxes;  and  tolls  and  excise. 
There  were  basically  three  types  of  len4.  The  tjenestelen  (service 
len)  were  awarded  to  the  highest  state  officials  in  return  for  their  serv- 
ices.  These  len  were  not  required  to  provide  the  state  with  any  revenue. 
The  afgiftslen  (duty  len)  were  required  to  pay  a  fixed  sum  to  the  state, 
while  the  genantlen  (remuneration  len)  paid  a  fixed  sum  to  the  lensmand 
and  the  remainder  was  given  over  to  the  state.  Much  of  the  len  revenues 
were  used  locally  to  pay  for  government  officials  and  the  army  and  only 
when  these  expenses  were  met  was  any  excess  sent  to  the  rentekammer 
or  the  provianthus.  In  practice  by  far  the  largest  proportion  of  len 
revenues  sent  to  Copenhagen  were  paid  in  kind. 
Taxes  comprised  three  main  elements.  The  principal  form  of  taxation 
were  the  'extraordinary'  landeskatter  (land  taxes),  which  were  voted  by 
the  rigsräd  on  a  more  or  less  yearly  basis.  They  were  nominally  raised 
for  some  particular  purpose,  such  as  royal  weddings,  expeditions,  war,  or 
for  special  building  works,  and  depending  on  the  perceived  need,  a 
single,  double,  or  half  tax  was  raised-50.  However,  the  taxes  raised  did  not 
necessarily  all  go  to  their  intended  use  and  ended  up  as  general  revenue 
-----------  -  -- 
49.  Engberg  details  a  total  of  eight  different  types,  but  the  fine  distinctions  between  many  of 
them  are  of  little  relevence  here.  (Engberg,  Dansk  finanshistoriee  154.  ) 
50.  A  single  tax  raised  in  the  order  of  100,000  Rdlr. 
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in  the  state  coffers.  They  were  paid  either  into  the  rentekammer,  if  paid 
in  cash,  or  to  the  provianthus,  if  paid  in  kind.  However,  from  1637  these 
taxes  were  reorganised  and  renamed  unionsskatter  (union  taxes).  From 
this  date  they  were  raised  solely  to  pay  for  the  new  standing  army  and 
were  administered  on  a  purely  provincial  level  by  the  generalkrigszalkom- 
missaria4  so  the  rentekammer  was  thereafter  deprived  of  this  form  of 
taxation  for  naval  use. 
The  second  form  of  tax  was  a  municipal  tax  raised  from  towns  in 
return  for  their  privileges  as  a  market  town.  These  were  'ordinary'  taxes 
collected  on  a  yearly  basis  without  the  need  to  be  voted  specially.  The 
third  form  of  taxes  were  the  sttnderskatter  (estate  taxes).  From  1638  the 
estates  were  granted  powers  to  raise  their  own  taxes  which  were  voted 
by  them  and  paid  to  a  provincial  landkommissmr.  Like  the  new 
unionsskatter,  these  taxes  never  reached  the  rantekammer  or  the 
provianthus,  and  therefore  did  not  contribute  to  naval  funding. 
Tolls  and  excise  were  divided  into  two  main  groups.  The  rigets  og 
kronens  tolde  (state  and  crown  tolls)  comprised  the  tolls  raised  from  ex- 
ported  goods,  primarily  cattle  from  Denmark  and  timber  from  Norway, 
harbour  dues,  and  general  excise  duties.  These  revenues  were  principally 
paid  to  the  rentekammer  or  provianthus,  although  some  were  paid  to  the 
Kongens  eget  Kammer  or  used  directly  by  the  toll  collectors  to  pay  for 
goods  and  services.  The  strrmtolde  (channel  tolls)  were  those  tolls  im- 
posed  on  ships  using  the  state's  channels,  i.  e.  the  Sound  and  the  Elbe 
dues51.  These  were  paid  primarily  into  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer,  al- 
though  large  payments  were  often  made  directly  by  the  toll  collectors, 
and  occasionally  revenues  were  deposited  in  the  rentekammer. 
-------------------- 
51.  Also  the  tolls  paid  on  the  Storebalt  and  Lillebalt.  but  these  were  of  minor  importance  com- 
pared  to  the  Sound  and  Elbe. 
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All  these  revenues  could  really  be  said  to  have  gone  into  the 
state's  general  funds,  whether  they  were  paid  to  the  rentekammer, 
provianthus,  or  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer.  In  addition  there  were  also 
certain  revenues  which  were  raised  specifically  for  the  navy's  use. 
The  bädsmandshvervningskat  was  a  tax  paid  by  the  coastal  towns 
to  exempt  them  from  supplying  seamen  to  the  navy.  The  level  of  taxation 
depended  on  the  number  of  men  in  each  town  engaged  in  fishing  or  ship- 
ping,  with  1  Rdlr.  to  be  paid  for  every  man  and  I  Rdlr.  for  every  boy 
engaged  in  these  trades52.  The  collection  of  this  tax  was  administered  by 
the  lensmxnd  and  the  revenue  was  paid  into  the  rentekammer. 
The  bJdsmandsvaningstold  was  a  toll  imposed  on  all  ships  entering 
Danish  harbours.  It  was  raised  initially  in  1631  to  pay  for  the  building  of 
the  Nyboder  seamen's  accommodation  but  from  1640  only  a  certain  amount 
was  reserved  for  this  purpose  and  the  remainder  was  used  for  general 
naval  expenses53. 
There  were  also  the  extraordinary  taxes  voted  by  the  rigsrad  ex- 
plicitly  for  naval  use.  These  usually  took  the  form  of  a  madskat  (food 
tax)  or  a  kornskat  (corn  tax)  and  the  foodstuffs  raised  by  this  method 
were  delivered  to  the  provianthus.  An  example  of  one  such  tax  comes 
from  1635  when  the  rigsrAd,  following  a  proposal  from  Christian  IV, 
agreed  that  10  ships  should  set  sail  to  rid  the  seas  of  pirates.  To 
provide  bread  and  beer  for  these  ships  each  freeholder  in  Denmark- 
Norway  should  give  a  sixth  of  a  barrel  of  rye  and  a  third  of  a  barrel  of 
barley.  Alternatively  they  could  pay  3  Ort  in  cash.  Copyholders  were  re- 
quired  to  contribute  a  quarter  of  this  amount54. 
----------------- 
52.  Missive  to  lensmand  Kancelliets  Orevbmger.  15  August  1633. 
53.  Engberg,  Dansk  finanshistori4  245-7.  See  also  p.  33. 
54.  Raadets  Betankning.  3  December  1635,  Kr.  Erslev,  Aktstykker  og  oplysninger  til  rigsraad  og 
stzndermmdernes  historie  i  Kristian  IV's  tid,  (K$benhavn,  1883-90),  II,  405. 
138 It  i 
Apart  from  these  various  direct  and  indirect  taxes  and  tolls  there 
were  other  ways  in  which  funds  could  be  found  for  the  navy.  For  ex- 
ample  Daniel  Sinclair  was  paid  some  of  the  costs  of  building  ships  at  Slot4 
from  funds  of  the  local  church5s.  Also  merchants  and  contractors  were 
increasingly  used  not  only  to  supply  goods  on  credit  but  also  to  pay 
sums  of  money  other  contractors  and  state  employees,  for  example  the 
merchant  Marcus  Radebandt  paid  3000  Rdlr.  to  David  Balfour  as  part  pay- 
ment  for  the  construction  of  two  ships  in  1631N.  However,  although  cer- 
tain  payments  could  be  deferred  in  this  way,  they  still  did  eventually 
have  to  be  paid  either  by  the  rentekammer  or  Kongens  eget  kammer.  In 
the  1630s  some  lensmwnd  were  also  asked  to  supply  ships  as  part  of 
their  len  revenues  so  that  their  true  costs  were  disguised  and  paid  for 
only  indirectly  by  the  rentekammer67. 
There  is  no  way  of  determining  how  much  each  of  these  elements 
contributed  to  the  overall  funding  of  the  navy.  However  it  was  evident 
that  by  the  1630s  the  income  of  the  state  was  failing  to  meet  the  require- 
ments  of  its  expenditure.  The  rapidly  expanding  navy  clearly  played  a 
major  part  in  the  growing  financial  crisis  and  we  should  now  look  at  how 
this  crisis  developed  and  the  measures  taken  to  try  and  resolve  it. 
-------------------- 
55.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  B223,  III,  litra  S. 
56.  Receipt  for  Marcus  Radebandt,  20  October  1631.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer,  216.221,  Afregninger, 
VI.  57. 
57.  See  Chapter  10. 
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From  the  very  beginning  Christian  IV  was  aware  that  expenditure  on  the 
navy  was  getting  out  of  hand.  In  1597  he  noted  that: 
Der  er  hidtil  aarlig  gaaet  en  maerkelig  stor  bekostning  med  paa  Hol- 
men  for  Kgbenhavns  slot  baade  til  skibsfolkenes  Ion  og  underhold  og 
til  udrustning  of  skibene58 
there  has  previously  been  a  noticeably  large  yearly  expenditure  on 
Bremerholm  for  seamen's  wages  and  subsistence  and  the  upkeep  of 
ships 
The  rigshofinester  was  therefore  ordered  to  ensure  that  no-one  was 
employed  without  his  knowledge,  and  to  prepare  three  ships  to  be  sold. 
The  ships  were  apparently  not  in  the  end  sold,  but  it  does  show  how 
concerned  Christian  IV  was  about  the  cost  of  the  navy  at  this  early 
stage,  and  payments  to  naval  personnel  did  drop  sharply  in  the  first  few 
years  after  his  accession59. 
However,  this  immediate  crisis  passed  and  the  budget  estimates  be- 
tween  1600  and  1608  show  that  the  state's  ordinary  income  comfortably 
met  the  requirements  of  its  expenditure.  This  surplus,  however,  was  due 
mainly  to  the  inclusion  of  the  Sound  toll  revenues,  and  with  Christian  IV 
increasingly  diverting  these  large  sums  into  his  own  coffers  the  ensuing 
crisis  became  inevitable.  Significantly  the  later  estimates  which  showed 
heavy  deficits  did  not  include  the  Sound  toll  revenues  in  the  state's  or- 
dinary  income. 
------------------- 
58.  Missive  to  Hofinesteren,  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  13  December  1597. 
59.  See  Figure  3.1. 
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This  enabled  the  king  to  gain  a  financial  independence  previously 
unknown.  This  independence  was  used  to  finance  various  projects  which 
he  later  claimed  to  have  been  in  the  state's  interest,  and  therefore  he 
ought  to  be  reimbursed  by  rigsräd  by  the  raising  of  extraordinary  taxes. 
Some  of  the  projects,  such  as  defence  works,  were  undoubtedly  in  the 
national  interest,  but  the  large  sums  expended  on  pursuing  his  policies  in 
northern  Germany  could  only  be  so  described  very  loosely.  This  policy 
meant  that  some  projects  were  effectively  paid  for  twice  and  amounted 
to  what  Ladewig  Petersen  has  called  a  'cumulative  extortion'81  of  the 
rigsrJd.  In  effect  Christian  IV  was  increasing  his  own  liquidity  at  the  ex- 
pense  of  the  state  in  order  to  pursue  his  own  foreign  policy  agenda. 
With  this  independence  he  was  able  to  finance  the  initial  phases  of 
the  Kalmar  War  with  ease,  and  although  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer  was  ex- 
hausted  by  the  end  of  the  campaign  it  was  quickly  replenished  by  the 
Sound  dues  and  the  Alvsborg  ransom.  Again  in  the  Kejserkrig  the  'initial 
phase  of  the  war  was  financed  almost  entirely  by  the  Kongens  eget  Kam- 
mer,  but  the  outcome  was  less  fortunate  and  the  military  defeat  was  fol- 
lowed  quickly  by  financial  crisis. 
The  signs  of  the  growing  crisis  had  been  recognised  in  the  early 
1620s  when  Christian  IV  tentatively  floated  the  idea  of  len  reforms62. 
These  came  to  nothing,  but  it  was  evidently  becoming  clear  that  something 
had  to  be  done  to  balance  the  ordinary  budget.  The  trouble  was  that  the 
income  from  the  len  had  stabilised  while  state  expenditure  was  rapidly  in- 
---------------  --- 
60.  In  actual  fact  the  state  only  paid  once,  through  payments  from  the  Kongens  eilet  Kammer,  and 
the  taxes  raised  were  used  solely  to  restore  the  king's  capital  reserves. 
61.  Ladewig  Petersen,  'Defence,  War  and  Finance',  301. 
62.  Steffen  Heiberg,  'De  ti  tinder  guld:  Rigsräd,  kongemagt  og  statsfinanser  i  1630'erne',  Historisk 
Tidsskrift  76,  (1976),  26. 
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141 creasing.  Ladewig  Petersen  has  analysed  the  collapse  of  the  len  system  in 
depth63  and  has  shown  that  the  proportion  of  len  revenues  to  the  total 
state  budget  dropped  from  around  70%  in  1600  to  just  30%  in  the  1640s. 
The  Kejserkrig  marks  the  turning  point  in  the  transition  of  the 
state  economy.  The  Kongens  eget  Kammer  quickly  became  exhausted  after 
the  initial  phases  of  the  war,  and  len  and  toll  revenues  were  drastically 
affected  by  the  overrun  of  Jutland.  The  Kiel  money  market,  where  Chris- 
tian  IV  had  previously  been  able  to  raise  finance,  was  also  suspended. 
Therefore  the  only  way  of  raising  finance  to  extricate  Denmark  from  the 
war  was  to  increase  tax  and  toll  revenues  and  to  obtain  credit.  However, 
before  granting  any  new  taxes  to  pay  for  what  they  considered  was 
Christian  IV's  folly,  the  rigsrad  ensured  that  they  would  thereafter  con- 
trol  all  war  financeM. 
The  king  had  clearly  lost  the  financial  independence  which  he  had 
so  carefully  cultivated,  and  the  rigsrad  had  gained  important  new  fiscal 
powers.  But,  in  an  effort  to  regain  his  independence,  Christian  IV9  before 
agreeing  to  sign  the  Treaty  of  Lübeck,  sought  assurances  from  the 
rigsrad  that  he  would  be  granted  'ti  tender  guld'  (ten  barrels  of  gold,  = 
one  million  Rdlr.  )  in  compensation  for  the  personal  expenses  he  had  spent 
during  the  war.  The  rigsrad  reluctantly  agreed  to  this  condition  and  the 
money  was  to  be  raised  by  taxation  and  paid  over  a  number  of  years. 
This  did  not  in  fact  help  Christian  IV  much,  since  most  of  the  'ten  bar- 
rels  of  gold'  were  assigned  to  state  expenses  long  before  they  ever 
reached  the  king.  At  the  same  time  revenues  from  the  Sound  tolls  were 
-------------------- 
63.  Among  the  most  important  works  not  already  cited  are:  E.  Ladewig  Petersen.  Fra  standssam- 
fund  til  rangssamfund  1500-1700:  Dansk  social  histories,  3  Bd.,  (Kmbenhavn,  1980);  'From  Domain 
State  to  Tax  State',  Scandinavian  Economic  History  Review,  23  (1975),  116-48;  'War,  Finance  and 
the  Growth  of  Absolutism:  Some  Aspects  of  the  European  Integration  of  Seventeenth  Century 
Denmark',  in  G.  Rystad  (ed.  ).  Europe  and  Scandinavia  (Lund,  1983),  33-49. 
64.  Ladewig  Petersen,  'Defence,  War  and  Finance',  308-13. 
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being  affected  by  the  escalating  war  in  Europe  and  the  prospect  of 
Christian  IV  restoring  his  previous  position  of  financial  strength  was 
poor65. 
The  growing  financial  crisis  was  therefore  as  much  a  consequence 
of  the  power  struggle  between  the  king  and  the  rigsrad  as  the  need  to 
pay  off  war  debts.  The  financial  position  of  the  state  was  undoubtedly 
poor  but,  rather  than  working  towards  a  common  solution,  both  sides 
sought  to  protect  their  own  interests  at  the  others  expense  and  the 
financial  crisis  steadily  deepened.  The  poor  financial  position  at  the  end 
of  the  war  was  made  even  worse  during  the  1630s  when  the  country  en- 
tered  a  period  of  perpetual  armed  neutrality,  with  expenditure  on  naval 
hardware  and  personnel  increasing  at  an  alarming  rate. 
Despite  the  rigsräd  agreeing  that  the  navy  provided  the  only  ef- 
fective  means  of  national  defence,  and  that  it  ought  to  be  strengthened, 
they  were  unwilling  to  grant  the  funds  needed  to  achieve  this  and  com- 
plained  of  the  increasing  amount  of  money  being  spent  on  it.  Christian  IV 
in  turn  retorted  that  most  of  the  new  shipbuilding  costs  had  been  met  at 
his  own  expense: 
At  skiibsfloden  aff  oss  udi  dy  forrige  tiider  saledis  Er  forbedriid 
och  holden  ued  macht,  Er  skeed  med  uorris  Skouiis  udi  holsten, 
derris  vdhuggelsse,  aff  huilcke  de  thre  Croner,  Victor,  Recompens 
och  Iustitia  erre  biigdt,  dii  andre  alle,  som  tiil  Itzehou  biigde  Erre, 
med  reeds  penning  tiil  omslaag  betaaliid,  saatt  dii  Riigid  icke  En 
daaler  kostid  haffuer66. 
------------------- 
65.  This  also  helps  to  explain  why  Christian  IV  was  so  keen  to  pursue  the  attack  on  Hamburg  in 
1630  and  impose  tolls  on  the  Eibe. 
66.  Letter  to  rigsrid  12  April  1633,  egenhrndige  Brevß  111,102-3. 
143 That  the  navy  in  recent  times  has  been  strengthened  and  kept  in 
readiness  by  us  has  been  achieved  using  our  woods  in  Holstein,  the 
timber  from  which  Tre  Kroner,  Victor,  Recompens  and  Justitia  have 
been  built,  all  the  others  which  were  built  in  Itzehoe  were  paid 
with  money  from  the  Kiel  money  market,  so  that  they  have  not  cost 
the  state  one  Daler. 
Not  only  were  these  capital  expenses  being  met  by  the  Kongens 
eget  Kammer,  but  during  the  1630s  payments  were  beginning  to  have  to 
be  made  in  order  to  pay  for  seamen's  wages.  In  fact  the  strain  on  the 
Kongens  eget  Kammer  was  becoming  ever  greater,  with  expenditure  con- 
tinuing  to  rise  and  the  rentekammer's  revenues  at  best  remaining  static. 
The  situation  became  even  more  critical  after  1637  when  the  'ten  barrels 
of  gold'  had  effectively  been  paid  off  and  extraordinary  taxation  was 
decentralised  and  put  in  the  hands  of  provincial  commissioners,  ensuring 
that  the  burden  of  naval  expenditure  fell  even  more  heavily  on  the  Kon- 
gens  eget  Kammer87.  -  As  a  consequence,  the  disputes  over  naval  funding 
started  to  become  even  more  bitter  and  acrimonious. 
By  1640  things  were  becoming  so  acute  that  ships  were  prevented 
from  sailing  on  voyages  that  would  take  them  away  from  the  len's  supply 
of  rye  and  barley,  since  there  was  no  money  to  pay  for  any  excess68. 
The  rumoured  Dutch  attempt  to  break  the  Sound69  shortly  afterwards 
demonstrated  the  need  to  maintain  a  strong  navy,  and  Christian  IV  used 
the  opportunity  to  submit  the  following  plea  to  the  rigsrädo0: 
------------------- 
67.  It  is  significant  that  the  penultimate  landeskatter1  raised  in  1636,  was  used  primarily  to  pay 
seamen.  (Letter  to  rentemester  J$rgen  Vind,  7  August  1636,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  54-5.  ) 
68.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  17  January  1640,  egenhandige  Brevq  IV,  288-9. 
69.  See  Chapter  1. 
70.  Letter  to  rigsrdd  26  May  1640,  egenha'ndige  Breve,  IV,  343-4. 
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holdt  Holmen  med  fladen  med  ded,  som  deraff  dependerer,  ved 
macht,  fordi  at  Cronens  Indkomst  inted  kunde  strecke  tyl  ded,  som 
Tiid  epther  anden  derpa  spenderit  Er,  Som  aff  huosfpiiede  designa- 
tion,  som  uorris  Rentemeistere  pa  den  dageliige  udgiifft  och  Inted 
uyder  giiordt  haffuer  Er  att  Erfahre, 
Huoraff  nocksom  Erfahris,  oss  Inted  lenger  att  kunde  vdsta 
sligdt  vden  uorris  totall  Ruin,  Huorfor  Riigens  Raad  sliigdt  med  all 
fliid  skall  Offuerueye  och  tencke  pa  myddel,  huorued  uy  kunde  Er- 
lange  uorris  store  vdlagde  penning  ygen,  Och  siiden  at  fladen 
framdelis  kunde  holliis  ued  macht,  som  ded  siig  hqr. 
Since  we  now  for  a  long  time  have  with  great  injury  kept 
Bremerholm,  and  the  navy  and  that  which  depends  on  it,  powerful, 
because  the  Crown's  income  cannot  stretch  to  that,  which  time  after 
time  is  spent  on  it,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  attached  account  of 
the  daily  expense  and  no  more,  compiled  by  our  rentemestre.  From 
which  it  is  apparent  that  we  cannot  further  suffer  the  like  of  such 
experience  without  our  total  ruin,  which  is  why  the  rigsrAd  with  all 
expediency  shall  consider  and  think  of  means  whereby  we  can 
recoup  our  great  outlay  again,  so  that  the  navy  should  still  be 
kept  powerful,  as  is  proper. 
The  rigsräd  duly  considered  this  request  and,  after  first  giving 
excuses  as  to  why  taxes  could  not  be  raised,  came  up  with  a  formula  for 
increasing  various  tolls  to  raise  finance71: 
-  ---------------  - 
71.  Chr.  Bruun  (ed.  ),  'Rigens  Raads  Betankning  til  Kong  Christian  IV.  om  Tilveiebringelsen  of 
Penge  til  Holmen  og  Flaaden.  16401,  Danske  Samlinger,  6  (1870-71),  81-84. 
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1.  Of  the  toll  raised  to  build  the  Nyboder,  only  16,000  Rdlr. 
should  be  used  and  the  rest,  which  amounts  to  around  28,000 
Rdlr.  should  be  used  for  Bremerholm's  needs. 
2.  Export  tolls  on  large  horses  should  be  raised  by  1  Rdlr.  and 
on  small  horses  by  3  Ort. 
3.  Similarly  tolls  for  every  sheep  should  be  raised  1  Ort. 
4.  On  a  'dyssin  kort'  (playing  cards?  )  1  Ort. 
S.  Those  among  the  burger  class  that  have  large  weddings 
should  pay  100  Rdlr.,  and  50  Rdlr.  for  festive  beer. 
6.  On  those  timbers  which  are  not  currently  on  the  toll  register, 
should  be  levied  a  toll,  which  should  yield  around  5,000  Rdlr. 
7.  On  one  pound  of  tobacco  1  Mk. 
8.  On  a  fat  pig  1  Ort 
9.  On  a  goose  4Sk. 
10.  On  a  hide  1  Rdlr. 
Other  than  these  rather  bizarre  suggestions  the  rigsrAd  claimed  it 
could  do  no  more  to  help.  Clearly  these  measures  would  have  little  impact 
on  the  large  sums  needed  and  the  intention  was  made  clear  that  the  king 
ought  to  use  the  revenues  from  the  Sound  tolls  to  meet  the  difference.  In 
return  for  these  measures  the  rigsrJd  asked  the  king  to  ensure  that  he 
kept  on  good  terms  with  the  'neighbours'  and  preserve  the  current  state 
of  peace72. 
Not  surprisingly  these  measures  did  little  to  alleviate  the  problem, 
and  shortly  afterwards  Christian  IV  was  again  complaining  about  the  lack 
of  money  to  man  the  fleet,  saying  that  'Gud  giffue,  huor  man  tager  penge 
-------------------- 
72.  Ironically  it  was  the  raising  of  Sound  tolls  that  in  large  part  precipicated  the 
Torstenssonkrig,  see  Chapter  I. 
146 tiil  dem'  (God  knows  where  to  find  the  money  for  them)73.  He  was  becom- 
ing  increasingly  more  irritated  and  emotional  about  the  whole  subject  and 
a  few  weeks  later  he  further  complained  that: 
Tiil  dy  300  badtzmend  at  werbe  ma  mand  kunde  faa  penge,  Ellers  Er 
der  huos  mig  wnd  Raad  tiil  penge.  Skal  ded  saledis  lenge  ga  tyl, 
som  ded  gar,  Da  Er  ded  ett  slett  werck  at  uerre  konning  y  dan- 
nemarck.  Skal  ieg  huerdt  Aar  sette  tiil,  da  bliiffuer  heer  Pocker 
lg)ss.  Skall  andre  haffue  Profiitten  Och  ieg  wmagen74 
For  the  300  seamen  being  recruited  money  must  be  found,  otherwise 
it  is  to  me  the  rigsrad  comes  for  money.  If  it  continues  long  the 
way  it  has,  then  it  is  poor  work  being  king  in  Denmark.  If  I  have 
to  put  money  in  every  year,  then  we  shall  be  in  real  trouble.  Are 
others  to  take  the  profit  and  I  the  pain? 
Eventually  he  ordered  the  1642  budget  estimate  to  be  carried  out, 
with  the  threat  that  unless  improvements  could  be  made  then  Sweden 
would  provide  a  good  example,  where  there  were  few  lensmxnd  and  the 
Crown's  income  proved  much  higher75.  Christian  IV  had  in  fact  long  been 
trying  to  push  through  a  reform  of  the  len  system  and  the  1642  and  1646 
estimates  were  intended  as  a  means  of  proving  that  a  reform  was  neces- 
sary.  Although  the  rigsräd  disputed  the  figures  in  the  estimates  they  did 
in  the  end  approve  a  limited  reform  in  1646,  whereby  some  smaller  len 
------------------- 
73.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  30  December  1641,  egenhandige  Breve,  V.  162. 
74.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  18  January  1642,  egenhmndige  Breve,  V,  169. 
76,  Letter  to  J$rgen  Vind;  17  February  1642,  egenhandige  Breve  V,  177-82. 
ýý  } 
147 would  be  combined  and  some  of  the  afgiftslen  converted  to  genantlen.  But 
this  did  not  happen  without  further  histrionic  displays  by  the  king  who 
at  one  stage  threatened  to  sell  the  navy  if  help  was  not  forthcoming: 
Skal  man  Icke  haffue  mehre  hiielp  til  at  holde  den  in  esse,  End  som 
hiidindtil  skeed  Er,  da  Er  ded  Ingen  vnder,  Om  lysten  forgar  mig 
at  see  megiit  epther  Den,  Mens  y  tyde  selge  den,  ymens  den  Endnu 
aff  andre  kan  brugis,  Tii  paa  den  wiis  kan  ded  ingen  bestand 
haffue76. 
If  I  shall  get  no  more  help  than  hitherto  to  keep  it  in  being,  then 
it  is  little  wonder  that  I  loose  the  desire  to  look  after  it,  but 
rather  eventually  sell  it,  while  it  can  still  be  used  by  others,  for  in 
the  present  way  it  cannot  go  on. 
The  reforms  came  too  late  to  have  any  impact  on  the  funding  of  the 
navy  during  the  Torstenssonkrig  which  appears  to  have  been  provided 
by  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer,  and  by  using  loans  and  credit  from  mer- 
chants.  However  the  controversy  over  naval  funding  was  taken  up  again 
with  vigour  at  the  end  of  the  campaign  and  the  king's  desire  to  recover 
his  autonomy  was,  if  anything,  strengthened. 
He  ordered  the  rigsräd  to  investigate  'Huad  for  moderation  pa 
vdgiifften  dy  gode  herrer  Siinis  at  kunde  forretagis  pa  fladen'  (what 
moderation  in  expense  the  good  lords  think  can  be  made  to  the  navy)78. 
The  rigsadmiral's  recommendations  were  that,  since  the  navy  had  been 
severely  reduced  during  the  war  and  was  now  insufficient  to  meet  the 
76.  Letter  to  Christen  Thomesen  Sehested.  20  November  1642,  egenhandige  8revq  V,  265. 
77.  Letter  to  rigsrdd,  11  September  1645,  egenh&ndige  Brevß  VI1  73-4. 
78.  Letter  to  rigsrid  11  April  1647.  egenhandige  Breve,  VI,  266. 
ýý 
148 increased  threat  from  Sweden,  and  since  naval  ships  would  take  a  long 
time  to  built  and  be  ready,  that  privileges  should  be  extended  to  Danish 
merchants  to  build  and  maintain  good  warships,  as  in  Norway7g.  In  other 
words  the  size  of  the  state  navy  ought  to  be  reduced  to  come  into  line 
with  the  available  funding  and  more  reliance  placed  on  armed  mer- 
chantmen. 
They  considered  that  the  navy  should  now  only  cost  300,000  Rdlr. 
annually80,  which  should  be  paid  for  by  the  king.  Christian  IV  in  turn 
declared  that  the  anticipated  revenue  of  300,00  Rdlr.  from  the  Sound  tolls 
was  only  just  sufficient  for  his  own  needs  and  that  the  navy  ought  to  be 
funded  by  other  means81.  The  rigsräd  replied  in  characteristic  manner 
saying  that  if  they  could  determine  the  size  and  number  of  ships  (i.  e.  es- 
sentially  take  over  control  of  the  navy),  then  they  would  be  willing  to 
grant  an  increase  in  the  following  tolls  for  the  navy's  use:  16  Sk.  per 
barrel  of  rye,  malt  and  wheat;  25  Sk.  per  barrel  of  ordinary  flour;  3  Mk. 
per  barrel  of  sifted  flour;  J  Mk.  per  barrel  of  oats;  and  1  Rdlr.  per  bar- 
rel  of  buttere. 
This  proposal  did  not  go  down  well  with  Christian  IV  and  the  argu- 
ment  was  taken  up  again  in  more  emotional  vein  several  months  later 
when  he  declared  that  other  monarchs  in  the  world  were  allowed  to  keep 
their  own  money  and  that  while  he  was  paying  for  everything  the 
lensmmnd,  with  their  freedom  from  taxation,  were  paying  for  nothing.  He 
also  reiterated  that  he  felt  that  the  state's  resources  ought  to  be  used  to 
pay  for  the  navy  as  a  matter  of  course83.  However,  the  death  that  year 
-------------------- 
79.  Ove  Giedde  and  Niels  Trolle  to  RigsrAd,  10  May  1647.  Erslev,  Aktstykker,  111,361-2. 
80.  Letter  to  Christen  Thomesen  Sehested,  Ove  Giedde,  Hannibal  Sehested  and  Niels  Trolle,  1  June 
1647,  egenh--ndige  Breve,  VI,  283-5. 
81.  Letter  to  rigsrid.  5  June  1647,  egenh.  ndige  Breve  VI,  286. 
82.  Raadets  Betmnkning,  17  Juli  1647,  Erslev,  Aktstykker,  III,  398. 
83.  Letter  to  rigsrdd,  9  November  1647,  egenhandige  Breve  VI,  349. 
ýý1 
149 of  his  elected  successor,  Prince  Christian  (V),  meant  that  he  was  in  a 
weakened  position  if  the  election  of  his  younger  son  Frederik  was  to  be 
secured.  A  number  of  the  len  reforms  were  withdrawn,  and  it  is  likely 
that  he  was  forced  to  meekly  accept  whatever  the  rigsrad  offered  in 
terms  of  naval  funding.  In  any  case  Christian  IV  was  dead  within  a  few 
months  and  in  Frederik  III's  hAndffstning  the  len  reforms  were  reversed 
and  specific  new  powers  were  granted  to  the  rigsrad  over  the  navy  so 
that  the  dispute  could  not  continue  as  it  had  done. 
In  many  ways  this  crisis  in  naval  funding  was  artificial,  since  the 
main  focus  of  the  debate  was  whether  the  king  or  the  state  should  foot 
the  bill,  and  as  we  have  seen  much  of  the  king's  wealth  was  in  fact  tech- 
nically  state  revenue.  The  real  crux  of  the  matter  was  that  Christian  IV 
had  engineered  his  financial  independence  in  the  early  years  of  his  reign 
at  the  expense  of  the  state,  but  when  the  state  was  in  desperate  need 
for  financial  assistance  he  was  unwilling  to  lose  this  independence  or  to 
concede  any  further  powers  to  the  rigsrad.  The  situation  was  not  helped 
by  the  fact  that  without  any  formal  accounting  procedures  to  give  an  ex- 
act  and  objective  overview  of  naval  finance  the  arguments  became  highly 
subjective  and  emotional,  with  each  side  desperately  fighting  its  own  cor- 
ner.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  though,  that  Christian  IV  genuinely  came  to 
believe  that  the  Sound  dues  were  his  own  income,  and  the  argument  es- 
sentially  came  about  as  a  result  of  his  own  delusions. 
It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to  suggest  that  there  would  have  been 
no  crisis  if  king  and  rigsrad  had  co-operated.  The  internal  state  economy 
could  no  longer  cope  with  the  burdens  being  placed  upon  it  since  the  len 
revenues  could  not  easily  be  improved  and  the  tax  burden  on  the  popula- 
tion  was  reaching  saturation  point.  There  was  a  desperate  need  for  a 
sweeping  reform  of  the  len  system,  made  even  more  critical  after 
t$ 
150 revenues  from  Halland  were  lost  after  its  cession  to  Sweden  in  1645,  but 
this  was  not  possible  while  the  high  nobility  still  held  power  under  the 
dyarchic  system  of  joint  sovereignty. 
As  a  result  an  ever  increasing  reliance  was  placed  on  private  con- 
tractors  for  the  supply  of  naval  materials,  especially  on  those  that  could 
supply  goods'  or  services  on  credit.  Although  a  certain  amount  of  goods 
had  always  been  procured  from  private  merchants  the  Kejserkrig  saw  a 
rapid  increase  in  this  means  of  supply.  This  trend  escalated  dramatically 
in  the  1630s4,  and  by  the  1640s  naval  supplies  were  just  as  likely  to 
come  from  private  merchants  as  from  the  len.  With  it,  this  new  policy 
brought  about  increased  opportunities  for  fraud  and  embezzlement,  which 
further  deepened  the  crisis  in  naval  finance.  It  is  therefore  to  this  grow- 
ing  corruption  in  the  naval  administration  that  we  must  now  turn  our  at- 
tention. 
3.2.4.  Corruption 
The  state  officials  who  could  most  easily  indulge  in  embezzlement  were 
those  that  handled  large  amounts  of  money  or  materials  with  a  certain 
degree  of  independence.  In  terms  of  the  naval  administration  this  situa- 
tion  was  found  in  the  klmdekammer  and  the  provianthus  and,  although 
their  accounts  were  audited  by  the  rentekammer,  it  comes  as  no  surprise 
to  find  that  the  two  officials  who  most  regularly  came  under  suspicion 
were  the  klmdekammerskriver  and  the  proviantskriver. 
In  terms  of  outright  theft  the  klmdekammer  provided  the  best  op- 
portunity  but  only  two  of  the  six  men  who  held  this  position  actually 
aroused  suspicion.  Anders  Olufsen  (kla'dekammerskriver  1612-1625)  was 
-------------------- 
84.  Payments  to  contractors  in  the  first  four  years  after  the  war  more  than  trebled.  (Heiberg, 
'De  ti  tmnder  guld',  43). 
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151 found  to  have  stolen  5245  Rdlr.,  although  his  corruption  was  discovered 
only  after  he  had  left  office  and  it  was  not  until  after  his  death  that  his 
widow  was  ordered  to  repay  the  money85.  Knud  Christensen 
(kla'dekammerskriver  1625-1647)  came  under  suspicion  in  1634  after  a 
theft  from  the  k1  dekammer  was  discovered.  He  was  temporarily  removed 
from  office  while  his  accounts  were  audited  and  a  total  of  11,544  Rdlr. 
was  found  to'  be  missing  for  the  years  1630-35.  The  thief  was  caught  but 
was  found  not  to  have  had  money  or  goods  to  this  value,  and  Christensen 
was  obliged  to  repay  the  difference.  This  of  course  does  not  prove  that 
he  was  dishonest  but  would  suggest  that  he  may  have  taken  advantage  of 
the  situation.  In  any  case  he  was  allowed  to  continue  in  office  after  this 
incident  was  resolved,  which  would  imply  that  he  was  not  considered 
overly  corrupt88. 
In  the  provianthus  the  opportunities  for  corruption  were  much 
greater.  Although  little  cash  passed  through  its  books  the  sheer  amount 
of  goods  processed,  and  the  poor  accounting  procedures  employed,  made 
it  relatively  easy  for  the  proviantskriver  to  conspire  with  suppliers  and 
falsify  measures  to  siphon  off  goods  for  his  own  profit. 
The  first  ever  proviantskriver,  Niels  Paaske,  was  removed  from  of- 
fice  in  1598  after  only  a  year,  in  which  time  his  accounts  had  amassed  a 
shortfall  of  68,757  Dlr.  It  seems,  though,  that  this  was  more  through  in- 
eptitude  than  malice  since  he  was  absolved  of  the  debt  in  160187. 
---------------  -  --- 
85.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  mend  89-90. 
86.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  mend  90-2;  Letters  to  rentemestre,  10  December  1637,  and  to 
Jurgen  Vind,  2  January  1638,  egenhandige  Breve`  IV,  165-6  &  169-70. 
87.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  manor  105-6;  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  22  May  1601. 
152 Mads  Davidsen  (proviantskriver  1621-24)  was  suspected  of  em- 
bezzlement  but,  although  he  got  into  trouble  for  not  preparing  his  ac- 
counts  in  time,  he  was  not  formally  charged  with  any  offence.  Jon 
Olafsson  does  relate,  though,  that  he  was  twice  imprisoned  in  Copenhagen 
Castle  and  threatened  with  his  life88. 
His  successor  Kurt  von  Busk  lasted  only  about  a  year  before  his 
death,  and  again  suspicions  were  raised  over  his  administration89. 
Similarly  Bartolomaeus  Haagensen  (proviantskriver  1625-26)  came  under 
suspicion  and  was  removed  from  office  after  the  provianthus  went  up  in 
flames  in  1626,  and  was  ordered  to  pay  2000  Rdlr.  in  compensation90.  His 
accounts  were  also  thoroughly  scrutinised  for  misdealings  but  no  firm 
evidence  was  ever  found  before  his  death  in  164391. 
Laurits  Eskildsen  (proviantskriver  1631-40)  was  found  guilty  of 
false  accounting  in  1637  but  was  allowed  to  continue  in  office  after 
swearing  an  additional  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  king92.  He  was  eventually 
forced  to  resign  though  after  further  trouble  with  his  accounts  but  no 
formal  charges  of  fraud  were  ever  brought.  His  successor,  Morten  Mik- 
kelsen  (proviantskriver  1640-54),  was  also  accused  of  maladministration 
but  in  his  case  the  king's  investigations  found  little  to  complain  of  in  his 
running  of  the  provianthus  4. 
-------  ----  --- 
88.  Memorier  og  Breves,  I,  Islanderen  Jon  Olafssons  oplevelser  som  bmssekytte  under  Christian  IV, 
(Kjýbenhavn,  1966),  79. 
89.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  mrnd  107-8. 
90.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  14  September  1626. 
91.  Lind.  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  mend  108-10. 
92.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  17  &  18  February  1637. 
93.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  mend,  112-4. 
94.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  mend,  114-5. 
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Thus  virtually  all  of  the  men  appointed  to  the  post  of 
proviantskriver  during  Christian  IV's  reign  came  under  suspicion  at  one 
time  or  another  of  either  incompetent  maladministration  or  downright  em- 
bezzlement.  However,  given  the  nature  of  the  accounting  procedures  it 
was  virtually  impossible  to  prove  anything.  Although  so  many  men  came 
under  suspicion  and  were  removed  from  office,  very  few  were  actually 
charged  for  their  suspected  crimes.  Corruption  was  made  even  more  dif- 
ficult  to  detect  since  many  of  the  officials  had  private  business  interests 
that  included  supplying  materials  to  the  Crown,  and  their  books  would 
have  inevitably  included  a  degree  of  false  accounting  that  would  have 
been  impossible  to  detect. 
The  various  dockyard  clerks  were  also  able  to  take  advantage  of 
their  positions,  such  as  Jakob  Jensen,  of  whom  it  was  accused  that 
'deeleskriiffueren  med  En  anden  haffuer  uillid  contrahere  om  1000  Riix 
daler  mig  at  Defrudere'  (the  deleskriver,  with  another,  has  deliberately 
made  a  contract  which  defrauds  me  of  1000  Rdlr.  )95. 
It  was  less  easy  for  corruption  to  occur  in  the  rentekammer  but 
many  of  its  officials  also  had  private  business  interests,  or  were  family 
members  of  Crown  suppliers,  and  inevitably  there  was  a  degree  of 
favouritism  and  bribery  involved  in  many  of  the  contracts.  However, 
despite  its  prevalence,  corruption  at  this  level  was  of  relatively  minor 
consequence  when  compared  to  the  deeds  of  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  whose  finan- 
cial  chicanery  dominates  any  discussion  of  corruption  in  the  naval  ad- 
ministration. 
Ulfeldt's  position  as  leader  of  both  the  rentekammer  and  the  civil 
administration  of  Bremerholm  put  him  in  a  position  that  was  ideal  for  in- 
dulging  in  large-scale  embezzlement.  Before  taking  up  office  he  had  been 
a  struggling  nobleman  with  large  debts  but  within  just  a  few  years  he 
------------------- 
95.  Letter  to  rentemestren4  6  November  1634.  egenh--ndige  Brevß  III,  289. 
154 had  become  one  of  the  wealthiest  men  in  Copenhagen.  This  sudden  rise  in 
his  fortunes  was  impossible  to  explain  simply  just  from  his  wages  of  1200 
Rdlr.  per  annum,  and  it  became  an  open  secret  that  he  was  earning  the 
majority  of  his  wealth  from  his  illegal  dealings. 
Suspicions  over  his  dishonesty  were  aroused  in  Christian  IV  as 
early  as  1641  when  he  stated  that  he  and  Hannibal  Sehested  were  largely 
responsible  for  the  poor  state  of  the  state's  finances  since  they  had  'En 
tgnde  guld  y  blgd'  (soaked  up  a  barrel  of  gold)96.  It  was  not  until  he  be- 
came  rigshofinester  in  1643,  though,  that  his  financial  misdealings  took  on 
an  unprecedented  scale.  Previously  all  rentekammer  contracts  had  had  to 
be  signed  by  the  two  rentemestre  as  well  as  Ulfeldt  as  stadtholder.  Now, 
however,  Ulfeldt  could  authorise  any  contract  with  just  his  own  signature 
as  rigshofinester. 
When  Ulfeldt  became  rigshofinester  Christian  IV  no  longer  became 
involved  in  the  placing  of  contracts:  'Jeg  haver,  siden  Ulfeldt  haver 
vaeret  Hofmester,  intet  bekymret  mig  om  nogen  Kpbmandshandel'  (I  have, 
since  Ulfeldt  has  been  rigshofinester,  not  concerned  myself  with  any 
business  with  merchants)97.  A  select  few  merchants  began  to  be  favoured 
by  Ulfeldt  as  Crown  suppliers  and  prices  were  set  artificially  high  and 
the  difference  allegedly  split  between  Ulfeldt  and  the  contractors.  By  1644 
Christian  IV  had  begun  to  realise  what  was  going  on  and  was  complaining: 
At  Nogle  faa  her  y  Byen  haffuer  all  leffuerandtzen,  derpa  Er  Indted 
att  thuiffle.  Om  dy  nu  contribuerer  mehre  End  dii  andre,  som  Ingen 
fordell  haffuer  hafft  aff  leuerandtzen,  ded  staar  tiil  at  Erfahre.  I 
-------------------- 
96.  Letter  to  Christen  Thomesen  Sehested.  8  December  1641,  egenh,  ndige  Brevet  V,  152- 
97.  H.  D.  Lind,  'Undersimb  paa  Bremerholm  under  Korfits  Ulfeldts  Finansstyrelse',  Historisk 
tidsskrif4  6  Rk.  V  bd.  (1895),  39. 
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155 min  vngdom  da  flick  dy  leffuerandtzen,  som  uylle  giiffue  best  kg)b,  lý 
Och  motte  dog  biie  Epther  Pengen,  Indtil  man  kunde  komme  dem 
affsted.  98 
That  only  a  few  here  in  the  town  get  all  the  contracts  no-one  is  in 
doubt.  Now,  whether  they  contribute  more  than  the  others,  who 
have  had  no  advantage  from  the  contract  is  yet  to  be  ascertained. 
In  my  youth  whoever  would  give  the  best  deal  got  the  contract, 
and  they  even  had  to  wait  for  the  money  until  it  was  available. 
Ulfeldt  responded  to  this  by  saying  that  because  the  quantities  of 
materials  now  required  for  the  navy  were  so  great  only  the  largest  sup- 
pliers  would  be  able  to  meet  the  demand99,  which  was  to  a  large  degree 
true.  However,  the  scale  of  contracts  awarded  to  a  small  handful  of  mer- 
chants  was  quite  exceptional  and  it  was  generally  accepted  that  Ulfeldt 
was  taking  a  large  cut  in  the  contract  price  for  himself. 
Strangely  no  direct  allegations  were  ever  brought  against  Ulfeldt 
during  Christian  IV's  reign  and  the  king  even  signed  a  document  that  ex- 
onerated  him  of  any  wrong-doing  during  his  period  of  office,  stating 
rather  unbelievably  that  he  had: 
fra  forste  tid  indtil  denne  dag  i  alle  din  ombemeldte  bestillinger 
aerligen,  troligen,  flitteligen  og  vel  har  forholdet,  altid  segt  mit  og 
rigernes  gavn  og  bedste'00 
-------------------- 
98.  Letter  to  Christen  Thomesen  Sehested,  November  1644,  egenh.  ndige  Breve`  V,  538-1. 
99.  Chr.  Molbech,  'Om  Corfits  Ulfedt  som  Landsforra-der  og  om  hans  politiske  Charakteer  og 
Handlinger',  Hfstorisk  tidsskrift  i  rk.  III  bd.,  453. 
100.  Rigens  hofmesters  kvittans,  18  November  1647,  published  in  Engberg,  Dansk  finanshistori4, 
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156 from  the  first  until  this  day  in  all  your  honourable  positions,  be- 
haved  well,  honourably,  faithfully,  diligently  and  always  sought  mine 
and  the  states  benefit 
This  was  obviously  completely  contrary  to  his  previous  beliefs  and  this 
turnaround  was  probably  connected  with  attempts  to  ensure  the  election 
of  Frederik  after  the  death  of  Prince  Christian  (V).  It  certainly  does  not 
represent  the  truth,  or  indeed  Christian  IV's  true  feelings. 
It  was  not  until  after  Christian  IV's  death  that  the  true  extent  of 
Ulfeldt's  embezzlement  became  known.  At  first  his  administration  of  toll 
collection  came  under  scrutiny.  Then,  when  it  was  then  discovered  that 
he  had  authorised  a  contract  with  Albert  Baltser  Berns  worth  95,000  Rdlr. 
for  the  supply  of  a  ship  which  was  later  valued  at  only  63,000  Rdlr.,  an 
investigation  was  immediately  ordered  into  his  administration  of  the  ren- 
tekammer  and  Bremerholm'ol. 
During  his  period  in  office  Ulfeldt  -had  not  made  many  friends 
among  his  fellow  noblemen.  He  acted  in  a  vain  and  pompous  manner  that 
fuelled  resentment  at  his  growing  affluence,  whilst  everyone  else  around 
him  was  feeling  the  harsh  effects  of  the  years  of  financial  crisis.  When  a 
rigsrAd  commission  was  set  up  in  1650  to  carry  out  the  investigation  into 
his  affairs  it  was  'little  wonder  that  its  members  proved  so  hostile  to  him, 
and  were  so  thorough  in  their  efforts  to  find  fault  in  his  administration. 
When  the  commission's  findings  were  made  known  in  1653  they  ad- 
judged  that  goods  had  been  regularly  purchased  at  too  high  a  price,  ac- 
counts  and  receipts  had  been  falsified,  and  Ulfeldt  had  had  his  own  clerk 
at  Bremerholm,  working  without  a  royal  appointment.  The  question  of  tim- 
ber  supply  proved  of  particular  interest  to  them  and  they  found  that: 
------------------- 
101.  Steffen  Heiberg,  Enhj*rningen:  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  (K$benhavn,  1993),  104. 
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157 of  Tgmmer  alene  paa  6  Aars  Tid  fra  Ao.  1642  indtil  Ao.  1648 
opskrives  at  vaere  leveret  naesten  for  13  tcDnder  Guld,  uanset  ikke  et 
Skib  deraf  er  bygt,  ikke  heller  nogen  stor  Landbygning  gjort; 
mens  vel  beregnes  til  et  Skib  at  reparere  at  veere  medgangen 
TOmmer  for  36,000  Rdlr.  og  til  et  andet  for  35,000  Rdlr.  102 
of  timber  alone  in  a6  year  period  from  1642  to  1648  it  is  noted 
that  nearly  1,300,000  Rdlr.  was  supplied,  despite  not  one  ship  being 
built  with  it,  nor  any  large  land  building  being  built;  while  it  is 
estimated  that  to  repair  one  ship  would  need  36,000  Rdlr.  of  timber 
and  for  another  35,000  Rdlr. 
The  timber  supplied  regularly  lay  in  the  timber  yard  for  over  a 
year  without  being  checked,  which  meant  that  most  of  it  could  not  be 
traced  back  to  any  one  supplier,  making  it  easy  to  falsify  the  accounts 
by  making  double  or  triple  payments  for  the  same  material.  The  prices 
paid  for  timber  were  often  ridiculously  high,  averaging  more  than  twice 
the  market  value,  but  for  the  select  band  of  suppliers  in  Ulfeldt's  pocket 
the  contract  price  could  be  as  high  as  eleven  times  the  market  price.  As 
Frederik  III  succinctly  stated:  'Aff  tpmmer  har  hand  ladet  gi4re  store 
liurantzer  paa  Holmen  for  ganscke  wmaadelig  och  excessif  priis'  (He  has 
issued  large  contracts  for  timber  at  Bremerholm  for  really  enormous  and 
excessive  prices)'03. 
The  circumstantial  evidence  was  overwhelming  and  the  fact  that  Ul- 
feldt  fled  the  country  in  1651  further  pointed  to  his  guilt,  but  surpris- 
ingly  the  commission  did  not  find  any  direct  evidence  that  he  had  been 
-------------------- 
102.  Lind.  'Underslab  paa  Bremerholm.  372-3. 
103.  Frederik  III  to  rlgsrad,  13  July  1651;  C.  Rise  Hansen,  Aktstykker  og  opplysninger  tit 
rigsrAdets  og  standerm4dernes  historie  i  Frederik  III's  tic,  (K$benhavn,  1973),  2(1),  194. 
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158 guilty  of  fraud.  H.  D.  Lind'04  suggests  that  the  scale  of  embezzlement  was 
not  actually  quite  as  large  as  the  hostile  commission  had  made  out,  and 
Engberg105  further  points  out  that  the  level  of  Ulfeldt's  embezzlement, 
probably  totalling  in  the  region  of  one  million  Rdlr.,  was  in  fact  fairly 
small  compared  to  some  European  government  officials.  The  whole  Ulfeldt 
story,  though,  is  highly  charged  and  many  of  the  later  allegations  levelled 
against  him  were  influenced  by  his  subsequent  defection  to  Sweden  and 
his  traitorous  behaviour  leading  to  the  Peace  of  Roskilde  in  1658.  He  was 
undeniably  corrupt,  but  whether  he  was  as  corrupt  as  he  is  sometimes 
made  out  to  be  is  a  matter  of  contention. 
With  this  level  of  corruption  going  on  there  must  have  been  a  cer- 
tain  complicity  with  some  of  the  other  officials.  Certainly  Ulfeldt  had  his 
own  clerk,  Hans  Numesen,  operating  at  Bremerholm  and  other  men  were 
also  suspected  of  being  in  Ulfeldt's  pay.  In  particular  the  Holmens  ad- 
miraler  Erik  Ottesen  and  Kristoffer  Lidenov,  and  the  materialskriver 
Gotfried  Mikkelsen,  must  have  been  at  least  aware,  if  not  actual  par- 
ticipants,  of  the  fraud.  However,  not  everyone  was  involved  in  the  con- 
spiracy,  and  the  complaints  levelled  against  the  proviantskriver  Morten 
Mikkelsen  by  Ulfeldt  are  thought  to  have  been  an  attempt  to  punish  him 
for  refusing  to  participate  in  his  schemes. 
In  comparison  to  other  countries  though  Denmark  was  surprisingly 
free  from  corruption.  England  and  Spain  were  notorious  for  the  scale  of 
corruption  in  their  naval  administration  at  all  levels.  This  was  due  mainly 
to  their  dependence  on  contractors  for  virtually  all  supplies.  In  Denmark 
the  len  system  by-passed  many  of  the  opportunities  for  corruption  but 
obviously  did  not  eliminate  them  altogether.  Apart  from  petty  pilfering, 
only  officials  in  the  higher  offices  had  any  opportunity  to  practice  theft 
-------------------- 
104.  Lind,  'Underslab  paa  Bremerholm',  367-410. 
105.  Engberg,  Dansk  finanshistorie,  148-50. 
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or  fraud  on  any  significant  level,  and  with  an  administration  that  had  so 
few  high-level  officials  the  possibilities  for  corruption  were  minimised. 
However,  it  did  mean  that  for  those  few  who  did  hold  high  office,  such  as 
Ulfeldt,  the  opportunities  were  very  great  indeed.  It  is  also  notable  that 
the  majority  of  the  corruption  stems  from  the  time  when  private  contrac- 
tors  were  being  used  on  a  much  greater  scale  than  ever  before. 
So,  in  conclusion,  it  can  be  said  that  the  financial  administration 
of  the  Danish  navy  was  chaotic  and  to  some  extent  corrupt.  The  financial 
institutions  of  government  were  inefficient  and  inadequate  for  their  tasks, 
and  their  accounting  procedures  were  confused  and  difficult  to  under- 
stand.  No-one  in  government  had  any  idea  of  the  true  state  of  naval 
finances,  which  meant  that  when  problems  arose  there  was  no  easy  way 
of  resolving  them.  The  lack  of  any  clear  accounting  practices  and  the 
dual  financial  leadership  also  led  to  a  situation  where  naval  finance  be- 
came  a  highly  contentious  political  issue,  with  the  king  and  rigsrAd  ac- 
ting  against  each  other  rather  than  working  together  to  find  a  common 
solution. 
There  really  is  little  positive  that  can  be  said  of  the  navy's  finan- 
cial  administration.  The  len  system  did  provided  a  means  of  supplying  the 
navy  to  some  degree  without  the  need  for  large  sums  of  money,  but  this 
system  was  of  limited  value  and  far  too  rigid  to  cope  with  a  rapidly  ex- 
panding  navy.  When  private  contractors  began  to  be  used  to  compensate, 
corruption  became  a  significant  factor,  but  the  small  size  of  the  ad- 
ministration  meant  that  at  least  this  corruption  was  not  quite  as  bad  as  it 
might  have  been.  Having  said  this,  however,  Danish  naval  finance  was  was 
no  worse  than  that  of  many  other  states  at  this  time  and  corruption  and 
inefficiency  seemed  to  be  the  norm  in  early  modern  financial  administra- 
tion. 
160 In  terms  of  keeping  the  navy  running,  the  financial  administration 
was  muddled,  inefficient  and  wasteful,  and  came  very  close  to  breaking 
down  altogether.  However,  it  must  be  said  that  the  navy  had  been  ex- 
panded  to  a  much  higher  level  than  the  administration  was  designed  for, 
and  probably  far  higher  than  the  state  was  actually  able  to  afford.  It  is 
therefore  little  wonder  that  so  many  problems  were  encountered  in  the 
attempts  to  keep  the  navy  financed. 
If 
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PART  B 
THE  NAVY  AND  ITS 
ADMINISTRATION 
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4.  The  Ships  of  The  Navy 
4.1.  The  Total  Strength  of  the  Navy 
The  various  roles  that  Christian  IV's  navy  undertook  required  a  number 
of  different  types  of  vessel.  Large  capital  ships  of  around  50-80  cannon 
were  designed  to  increase  the  navy's  prestige  and  were  used  mainly  as 
royal  flagships  and  for  diplomatic  duties.  Smaller  battleships  of  between 
20-50  cannon  were  much  more  suited  to  the  type  of  operational  duties 
that  were  most  frequently  encountered,  such  as  blockading  ports  and  in- 
shore  coastal  bombardment.  Small  swift  and  highly  manoeuvrable  vessels 
were  needed  to  combat  toll  evasion  and  piracy,  and  were  also  well  suited 
for  expeditionary  purposes.  A  fleet  of  oared  galleys  was  also  maintained 
for  their  usefulness  in  coastal  protection  and  for  riverine  operations. 
It  is  difficult  to  obtain  accurate  information  on  the  number  and  size 
of  ships  in  the  navy.  There  was  as  yet-  no  formal  navy  list  and  the  best 
source  of  information  comes  from  the  proviantskriver  regnskaber' 
(victualling-  accounts),  the  materialskriver  regnskaber2  (materials 
accounts),  the  tojhusregnskaber3  (arsenal  accounts)  and  from  the 
kl  dekammer  regnskaber4  (state  pay-roll).  However,  these  are  of  limited 
use  since  ships  are  only  listed  in  these  accounts  if  they  receive  either 
victuals,  spares  or  ordnance,  or  are  manned  in  any  given  year.  Unfor- 
-------------------- 
1"  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1855,  Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  Regnskaber;  13.1627/28;  14. 
1642/3,1644/45,1645/46,1646/47?,  1647/48. 
2.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  f4or  1655,  Bremerholms  Materialskrivers  Regnskaber;  17.1598/99;  18- 
1626/27,1627/28;  20.1628/29;  21.1629/30.1630/31,1631/32;  22.1633/34;  23.1634/45;  24.1635/36; 
25.1638/39,1639/40. 
3.  Rigsarkiv,  Fmstningsregnskaber,  IV,  c.  1-2.,  K$benhavns  tgjhusregnskaber,  1592/93;  1602-04; 
1607/08;  and  1609/10. 
4.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  La.,  Klmdekammer  Regnskaber,  1607/08;  1621/22;  1622/23; 
1624/25;  1625/26;  1626/27;  1628/29;  1629/30;  1630/31;  1631/32;  1632/33;  1633/34;  1634/35.  After  1635 
the  men  were  no  longer  listed  under  the  ships  they  served  in. 
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tunately  many  of  these  account  books  have  not  survived  and  definitive 
information  therefore  exists  only  for  certain  years.  If  a  ship  was  laid  up, 
or  if,  for  example,  it  happened  to  be  in  the  East  Indies  and  no  victuals 
or  stores  were  issued  to  it,  then  it  may  not  necessarily  appear  in  these 
accounts. 
These  accounts  provide  valuable  information  on  the  number  of  ships 
in  the  navy  but  unfortunately  have  limited  use  in  determining  the  size  of 
them.  The  victualling  lists  give  the  number  of  crew  on  individual  ships, 
but  this  can  sometimes  be  misleading  if  a  large  number  of  seamen  are  bil- 
leted  aboard  a  ship  over  the  winter.  The  materials  accounts  provide  no 
easy  means  of  assessing  the  size  or  type  of  ships,  other  than  the  quan- 
tity  of  material  issued,  which  again  can  be  misleading,  and  only  one  of 
the  arsenal  accounts  (1609/10)  details  the  number  of  cannon  issued  to  in- 
dividual  ships.  In  all  these  accounts  the  ships  appear  in  random  order, 
although  from  1644/45  the  victualling  lists  separate  the  galleys  and  jagte 
and  the  cargo  ships  from  the  other  ships. 
Fortunately  contemporary  lists  of  ships  for  individual  years  can  be 
found  in  a  number  of  sources  which  help  to  fill  the  gaps  left  by  the  lack 
of  dockyard  accounts.  A  list  of  ships  in  operation  in  1610  has  been 
published5  and  the  reports  of  the  Swedish  agent  in  the  Sound  give  useful 
details  for  1621  and  16246,  and  another  Swedish  list  survives  from  16477. 
There  is  also  a  list  from  1630  in  the  Rigsarkivs  which  gives  the  number 
of  both  cannon  and  crew.  The  letters  of  Christian  IV  also  give  lists  of 
ships  for  certain  years,  between  1628-1645,  with  varying  degrees  of  com- 
-------------------- 
5.  'Mogens  Ulfelds  Tog  udi  Osters$en  med  Kongelig  Majestets  Skibs-flode  1611W',  Danske  Magazin, 
Rk.  1,  Bd.  1,  (1745).  114-118. 
6.  Leo  Tandrup,  Svensk  agent  ved  Sunde4  (Aarhus,  1971),  118-21,451-3,  &  517-8. 
7.  'Fortegnelse  paa  Danmarks  Flaade  1647'.  published  in  Christian  Bruun.  Curt  Sivertsen  Adelaer, 
(K$)enhavn,  1871),  420-22. 
8.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli  B164,  IX,  Pk.  07,1-mg  30. 
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pleteness.  Two  extremely  useful  lists  also  exist  for  1653,  which  were 
drawn  up  in  connection  with  the  Danish-Dutch  alliance  treaty  of  that 
year.  The  first  is  an  official  Danish  document')  and  the  second  was  made 
by  the  Swedish  resident  Magnus  Durell10.  Both  give  the  age  and  place  of 
building  for  many  ships  as  well  as  principal  dimensions,  the  number  of 
cannon  ports,  cannon,  and  crew  numbers.  Occasional  snippets  of  informa- 
tion  on  individual  ships  can  also  be  found  in  Christian  IV's  letters  and  in 
many  other  contemporary  sources  too  diverse  to  enumerate. 
Despite  its  reputation,  there  has  been  surprisingly  little  published 
on  the  ships  of  Christian  IV's  navy.  H.  D.  Lind  published  a  list  of  ships  in 
189011  which  contained  a  total  of  276  vessels.  Unfortunately  this  is  not  as 
comprehensive  or  as  accurate  as  it  might  have  been  since  he  did  not  con- 
sult  the  victualling,  materials,  or  arsenal  accounts,  which  include  many 
more  ships  and  contain  details  that  contradict  some  of  his  assumptions.  In 
the  1940s  Victor  Jensen  also  published  a  list  of  Christian  IV's  ships12, 
but  this  was  based  primarily  on  Lind's  work  and  added  little  new  infor- 
mation.  Preben  Hoick  published  details  of  the  fleet  during  the 
Torstenssonkrig13,  which  was  far  more  comprehensive  than  Lind,  but 
otherwise  there  has  been  very  little  research  carried  out  on  the  total 
strength  of  Christian  IV's  navy. 
9.  Published  in  Holck,  'Flaadelister  omkring  Krigsaarene  1644-45',  Tidskrift  for  S,  vasen,  114. 
(1943).  483-504  &  545-65. 
10.  Suhm  (ed.  ),  'Magni  Durells  relation  om  Danmark',  Samlinger  til  den  danske  historie, 
(K$benhavn,  1784),  2  bd.,  III  hafte,  78-82;  also  published  in  Bruun,  Curt  Sivertsen  adelaer,  422-9. 
11.  H.  D.  Lind,  '0m  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Orlogsflaade,  III.  Flaadeliste',  Tidskrift  for 
S,  pv.  Psen,  (1890),  409-52. 
12.  Victor  Jensen,  'Om  Kong  Christian  IV's  Orlogsflaade',  Under  Dannebrog,  (1940),  84,90-92,99- 
102;  (1941),  59,74-6,109-110. 
13.  Holck,  'Flaadelister  omkring  Krigsaarene  1644-45',  483-504  &  545-65. 
165 
;ý 
ý' 
ýý 
a' 
s 
r 
i 
ý_. 
,: ,ýf 
As  a  result  of  the  present  research  a  total  of  378  named  ships  have 
now  been  identified,  but  this  fleet  list  is  still  far  from  perfect.  Confusion 
arises  with  the  language  and  spelling  of  some  of  the  ships,  for  example 
Raabukken  (the  Roebuck)  may  or  may  not  be  identical  with  Hjorten  (the 
Hind),  but  Hirschjagt  can  definitely  be  taken  as  simply  a  germanic  ver- 
sion  of  Flyvende  Hjort  Some  ships  also  appear  to  have  had  a  descriptive 
name  as  well  as  a  proper  name,  such  as  Prindsens  spil  Jagt  (the  Prince's 
pleasure  yacht)  which  seems  also  to  have  been  known  as  Gule  /Fble 
(Yellow  Apple).  To  complicate  matters  even  further  some  ships  had  their 
names  changed,  like  Patentia  which  was  originally  named  Charitas  Patric, 
and  Papegoien  which  was  renamed  Stormarn  before  it  was  even  completed. 
Further  confusion  also  arises  when  two  ships  of  the  same  name  appear  in 
the  fleet,  such  as  the  two  ships  named  Markatten  in  the  list  for  1610.  It 
then  becomes  almost  impossible  to  determine  with  any  accuracy  when  the 
newer  ship  entered  service  or  when  the  older  one  went  out  of  service,  or 
if  indeed  there  was  a  third  ship  which  came  between  the  two  known  ves- 
sels. 
Although  it  is  common  practice  to  classify  ships  by  their  number  of 
cannon  there  is  a  great  deal  of  confusion  inherent  in  this  method  for  the 
early  modern  period.  The  earlier  ships  of  Frederik  II's  navy  may  have 
carried  a  large  number  of  cannon  but  these  were  probably  of  a  much 
smaller  calibre  than  the  later  ships.  There  is  also  the  confusion  that  al- 
though  a  ship  may  have  been  designed  to  carry  a  certain  number  of  can- 
non  the  number  actually  issued  to  it  may  have  varied  from  year  to  year. 
It  was  highly  unusual  for  the  number  of  cannon  carried  to  equal  the 
number  of  cannon  ports  built  into  the  ship's  structure.  In  Magnus 
Durell's  account  the  first  twenty  ships  listed  had  a  total  of  1047  ports, 
but  the  number  of  cannon  carried  totalled  only  882,  so  on  average  a  ship 
carried  roughly  only  85%  of  its  capacity,  although  two  of  the  ships  did 
actually  carry  two  cannon  more  than  the  number  of  ports.  In  wartime  the 
166 total  number  of  cannon  available  were  distributed  among  the  whole  fleet, 
as  well  as  to  merchantmen,  so  ships  would  carry  very  much  less  than 
their  full  capacity.  Certain  ships  were  also  rebuilt  and  their  cannon  car- 
rying  capacity  increased  or  decreased.  There  is  also  the  added  complica- 
tion  that  for  many  of  the  ships  identified  there  are  no  details  of  how 
many  cannon  they  carried.  In  such  cases  the  number  of  crew  or  the 
ships  measurements  are  used  to  classify  the  ships,  but  where  these 
details  are  also  missing  the  classification  falls  on  pure  guesswork,  al- 
though  if  little  is  known  of  a  ship  it  can  reasonably  be  assumed  that  it 
was  probably  a  small  and  fairly  insignificant  vessel.  In  the  following 
analysis  the  maximum  figures  given  at  any  time  in  a  ship's  life  are  used 
to  classify  the  ship14. 
Figure  4.1.  gives  as  good  a  picture  as  possible  of  the  size  of  the 
navy  during  Christian  IV's  reign.  This  is  distorted  to  some  extent  by  the 
availability  of  information.  If  a  ship  appears  in  the  accounts,  which  tend 
to  run  from  May  to  May,  just  once  then  it  is  counted  in  the  two  calendar 
years  that  the  account  straddles.  If  however  a  ship  appears  at  one  stage, 
disappears  for  a  number  of  years,  and  then  reappears  again  it  is  counted 
in  all  the  intervening  years  as  well.  Ships  which  appear  only  once  in 
other  sources  are  counted  only  for  the  particular  year  in  which  they  are 
mentioned.  The  most  difficult  data  to  determine  are  the  dates  of  decom- 
missioning,  and-'where  precise  details  are  not  known  the  date  at  which 
the  ship  is  last  mentioned  is  taken  as  its  last  year  of  service.  To  some 
extent  therefore  these  figures  represent  an  underestimate.  The  period 
where  the  greatest  error  is  likely  is  from  1600-1620  since  there  are  very 
few  dockyard  accounts  from  this  period.  The  sudden  drop  in  1600  prob- 
ably  reflects  that  absence  of  accounts  after  1599  rather  than  a  true  drop 
------------------- 
14.  The  maximum  number  of  cannon  actually  carried  rather  than  the  number  of  ports  available 
has  been  used  since  stability  or  sea-keeping  requirements  may  have  prevented  the  full  load 
from  being  carried.  This  is  especially  true  in  the  brackish  waters  of  the  Baltic  where  buoyancy 
is  reduced. 
167 in  the  size  of  the  fleet,  and  it  would  be  reasonable  to  assume  that  the 
number  of  ships  from  1600-1620  would  be  slightly  higher  than  shown,  al- 
though  the  accounts  from  1621-1626  would  suggest  that  the  figures  from 
the  earlier  period  cannot  be  too  far  wrong. 
The  sudden  increase  in  the  number  of  galleys  from  1627  reflects 
the  fact  that  when  the  threat  of  a  sea-borne  invasion  arose  many  of 
those  previously  stationed  in  local  harbours  were  brought  into  the  main 
fleet  at  Copenhagen  and  therefore  begin  to  appear  in  the  Bremerholm  ac- 
count  books.  In  effect  the  figures  given  here  show  the  main  fleet  based 
in  Copenhagen,  with  the  majority  of  small  coastal  protection  vessels 
dotted  around  the  realm  not  accounted  for. 
Figure  4.1.  Danish  Naval  Strength 
168 Taking  these  points  into  consideration  the  number  of  ships,  exclud- 
ing  galleys,  remains  remarkably  steady  at  between  30-40,  apart  from 
during  the  periods  of  conflict  when  the  number  could  rise  as  high  as  50. 
However,  the  size  of  ships  can  be  seen  to  steadily  increase,  with  the 
proportion  of  ships  between  20-50  cannon  increasing  at  the  expense  of 
the  smaller  ships  with  under  20  cannon.  The  graph  showing  the  total 
cannon  carrying  capacity  of  the  fleet  is  again  rather  inaccurate  since  the 
figure  is  unknown  for  so  many  of  the  smaller  ships,  but  the  general 
trend  is  unmistakable  with  the  number  of  cannon  effectively  doubling  by 
the  1630s. 
This  quantitative  analysis  contradicts  many  assumptions  which  have 
previously  been  made  about  the  navy.  First  of  all  the  navy  was  not 
nearly  as  weak  after  the  minority  as  was  formerly  thought15  and  there- 
fore  the  new-building  programme  instituted  by  Christian  IV,  although  still 
very  impressive,  was  certainly  not  as  dramatic  as  some  have  assumed. 
The  lack  of  serious  scholarly  research  on  the  early  modern  Danish  navy 
has  meant  that  many  conclusions  have  been  drawn  from  the  works  of 
Garde  and  Lind  which  simply  do  not  stand  up  to  scrutiny.  For  example  a 
well  respected  historian  such  as  Leo  Tandrup  can  make  the  assertion  that 
the  navy  doubled  in  size  between  Christian  IV's  accession  and  the  Kalmar 
War1e,  but  the  present  research  shows  that  this  simply  did  not  happen. 
As  far  as  the  available  sources  allow  us  to  make  any  firm  conclusions 
about  the  period  before  the  Kejserkrig,  the  navy  seems  to  have  been  a 
fairly  stable  force  in  terms  of  numbers  of  ships,  and  the  impact  of  Chris- 
tian  IV  can  therefore  be  seen  to  have  been  over-estimated  to  a  certain 
------------ 
15.  H.  G.  Garde,  Den  dansk-norske  sipmagts  histories  (K$benhavn,  1861),  107. 
16.  Leo  Tandrup,  Mod  triumf  eller  tragediß  (Aarhus,  1979),  1.74. 
169 extent.  Perhaps  the  fact  has  been  overlooked  that,  even  though  many 
ships  may  have  been  built,  an  equally  large  number  of  ships  were 
regularly  decommissioned. 
The  situation  in  the  1630s  is  also  very  interesting.  Many  historians 
have  again  taken  as  an  accepted  truth  that  there  was  a  massive  naval 
expansion  in  this  decade,  but  no  direct  documentary  evidence  has  yet 
been  found  to  corroborate  this.  There  was  indeed  a  significant  increase 
in  the  size  of  the  navy  after  the  Kejserkrig,  but  this  was  created  largely 
by  the  now  centralised  galley  fleet.  There  was  also  certainly  a  very  ac- 
tive  new-building  programme  in  the  1630s,  but  this  was  probably  much 
more  influenced  by  practical  rather  than  political  motives.  Baltic  oak  was 
actually  not  that  good  for  the  building  of  ships,  especially  large  hulls17, 
and  so  the  maximum  expected  life  of  a  ship  in  the  Baltic  at  the  time  was 
only  around  30  years18.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  start  replacing  the 
ships  built  at  the  start  of  the  reign  around  this  time.  In  fact  after  1635 
the  total  number  of  ships  actually  began  to  decline.  The  replacement 
ships,  however,  were  generally  larger  than  their  predecessors  and  so  the 
strength  of  the  navy  can  be  said  to  have  increased,  but  certainly  not  to 
the  massive  degree  that  some  historians  have  previously  assumed. 
What  does  not  show  up  on  the  graph  is  the  number  of  ships  ac- 
tually  in  commission,  since  a  large  number  of  the  ships  listed  could  be 
laid  up  over  a  long  period.  Older  ships  which  had  been  converted  into 
harbour  blockships  also  continue  to  appear  in  the  lists  after  they  are  no 
longer  fit  to  put  to  sea.  The  letters  of  Christian  IV  indicate  that  the  main 
sailing  fleet  consisted  on  average  of  about  20  ships  in  peace-time.  The 
17.  R.  G.  Albion,  Forests  and  Sea  Power,  (Hamden.  Conn..  1965).  17-23. 
18.  Fynes  Moryson  noted  in  1593  that  Danish  ships  were  similar  to  English,  'saue  that  they  last 
not  so  long  by  tenne  years  at  the  least'  and  that  'their  Shipps  built  of  the  Oaks  in  Norway  last 
not  aboue  twenty  yeares'.  Fynes  Moryson.  The  fourth  Part  of  an  Itinerary,  Library  of  Corpus 
Christi  College.  Oxford.  MS.  C.  C.  C.  94,  f.  242-3. 
170 victualling  accounts  also  show  that  a  large  number  of  the  ships  listed 
took  on  board  no  stores  or  else  only  took  on  saltgto  keep  the  pumps 
working  and  candles  for  the  shipkeepers.  The  accounts  for  1642/4319 
show  that  of  the  77  ships  listed  23  were  laid  up  for  the  whole  year,  and 
many  of  the  others  were  mobilised  for  only  a  few  weeks.  This  does  not 
quite  equate  with  Christian  IV's  assertion  that  only  18  warships  were 
needed  that  years  but  it  does  highlight  the  difficulty  in  assessing  the 
Navy's  true  strength  at  any  one  time.  Thus  the  graph  really  shows  the 
potential  number  of  ships  able  to  be  mobilised  rather  than  the  actual 
operational  strength  of  the  navy. 
4.2.  Ship  Types 
4.2.1.  Prestige  Ships 
Prestige  ships  were  the  largest  in  the  navy  and  were  designed  more  as  a 
symbol  of  sea  power  than  as  useful  fighting  warships.  For  the  purposes 
of  definition  a  prestige  ship  has  been  taken  as  one  of  over  50  cannon. 
Clearly  some  ships  were  much  larger  than  others  and  those  which  could 
be  considered  as  true  prestige  ships  are  not  easy  to  determine. 
In  the  following  lists  of  ships  crew  numbers  represent  the  maximum 
combined  total  of  seamen,  gunners  and  soldiers  allocated  at  some  stage  in 
its  life,  although  this  figure  constantly  varied  from  year  to  year.  In  some 
cases  the  figure  also  includes  officers.  Two  lengths  are  given,  the  keel 
length  (LK),  which  was  a  design  dimension,  and  the  length  between  stem 
and  stern  posts  (LBp),  which  was  measured  when  the  ship  was  complete. 
Where  known  the  design  breadth  is  given,  otherwise  an  'as  built' 
measurement  is  given.  All  dimensions  are  given  in  Sjaellandske  alen 
(Sjaelland  ells;  i.  e.  0.627  metres)21. 
18.  a.  Salt  was  needed  to  prevent  the  water  from  freezing  in  winter. 
19.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fir  1655.14.  Bremerholms  Proviantskrivers  Regnskab  1642/43. 
20.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  17  May  1642.  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ).  Kong  Christian  den 
Fjerdes  egehandige  Breve,  VIII,  173-4. 
171 Entered  Left 
Name  Service  Guns  Crew  lp  lac  Breadth  Sauics 
Fortuna  1567  68  -  KI  68.8  21.9  1607 
St  Olaf  1573  -  -  -  61.4  -  1600 
Prindse  Barken  1583  64  -  -  -  -  1599 
Samson  1589  62  -  -  -  -  1618 
Jusaphat 
. 
1589  52  -  -  -  -  1612 
Argo  1601  54  214  16.5  54.5  17.5  1635 
Tre  kroner  1604  80  -  -  56  22  1624 
Recompens  1614  54  214  65.15  -  16.25  1643 
Patenba  1616  54  300  -  -  -  1644 
Spas  1624  54  260  52  -  16  1674 
Store  Sophia  1677  54  265  -  58.5  16.5  1645 
Tre  kroner  1630  60  260  60.5  -  16  in 
Maske  L  1634  52  260  $175  %5  15  1666 
Sorte  Rytte'  1635  52  195  56.5  42  14.5  1685 
TmWghed  1642  60  265  71  -  18  1676 
Pelikanen  1642  50  150  59  -  14,15  161 
Hannibal  1641  60  280  70.5  -  17.5  1659 
Vicinria  1641  56  280  15  50  17.25  1653 
Table  4.1.  Prestige  Ships 
It  is  uncertain  whether  some  of  the  earlier  ships  on  this  list  were 
really  prestige  ships  since  the  large  number  of  cannon  were  probably  of 
a  much  smaller  calibre  than  the  others.  This  appears  to  be  confirmed  by 
the  fact  that  some  were  down-graded  in  later  years  and  even  served  as 
cargo  ships.  There  were  certainly  some  prestige  ships  prior  to  Christian 
IV's  accession  as  Herman  von  Zesterflet  noted  in  160022: 
Et  skib  saae  vi  som  var  meget  stprre  end  alle  de  andre.  Alle  forsik- 
krede  eenstemmig,  at  det  var  1500  laester  dremgtig.  Det  var  bygt  of  K. 
Friderich  II,  og  hans  forgyldte  Vaaben  glimrede  paa  Forstavnen. 
21.  Before  around  1615  the  Wasser-alen  (0.55m)  was  also  used,  but  to  give  a  true  comparison  all 
dimensions  have  been  converted  to  Sjmllandske  alen.  Niels  Probst.  'Wasser-alern  et  hidtil  overset 
langdemAl  fra  Christian  IV's  tid',  Historisk  Tidsskift  92  (1992),  288-300. 
22.  Suhm  (ed.  ).  'Udtog  of  en  Reise  til  Danmark  Aar  1600',  Nye  samlinger  til  den  danske  histori4  3 
bd..  (K$)enhavn,  1794),  99. 
172 One  ship  which  we  saw  was  much  bigger  than  all  the  rest.  All  were 
in  agreement  that  its  tonnage  was  1500  lasts.  It  was  built  by  king 
Frederik  II,  and  his  gilded  arms  glimmered  on  the  bows. 
Unfortunately  he  does  not  give  the  name  of  this  ship  and  its  identity 
cannot  be  ascribed  with  any  certainty,  but  it  is  likely  to  be  either  the 
St.  Olaf  or  Fortuna,  which  was  rebuilt  in  1592.  Fynes  Moryson23 
described  Fortuna  as  one  of  the  best  ships  of  the  navy: 
The  burthen  whereof  was  1400  tonns  (the  very  ballast  being  700 
tonns),  and  to  man  and  furnish  the  same,  were  required  400 
Marines,  300  Gunners,  and  700  Soldiers,  ...  and  the  broadth  was  25 
Ells  the  length  of  the  Keele  67  and  above  the  hatches  108  Ells,  the 
depth  of  the  hold  was  Eleuen  Ells  and  a  halfe,  and  it  bore  in  the 
lower  orlob  22  Cannon  s,  in  the  middle  22  Culverines,  and  in  the 
upper  orlob  24  Sakers,  the  mast  was  37  fadoms  long,  and  36  Pal  mes 
Girth  and  it  cast  out  seuen  Ankers  lying  in  the  harbor. 
Some  of  these  figures  are  no  doubt  exaggerated  but  it  must  still 
have  been  a  very  impressive  ship.  The  most  notable  prestige  ship  built 
for  Christian  IV  in  the  early  years  of  his  reign  was  the  Tre  kroner,  com- 
pleted  in  1604.  This  was  a  very  large  ship  of  1500  tons.  It  certainly  did 
its  job  as  far  as  its  role  as  a  symbol  was  concerned,  and  during  Chris- 
tian  IV's  visit  to  England  in  1606  it  drew  great  praise  from  observers,  as 
the  following  extracts  demonstrate: 
23.  Fynes  Moryson.  The  fourth  Part  of  an  Itinerary.  published  in.  Martin  Bellamy,  'En 
engla"nders  beretning  om  den  danske  fl3de,  1593'.  Marinehistorisk  Tidsskrift  4/1995,106-10. 
173 the  Admirall,  wherein  his  owne  person  came,  being  a  most 
huge  ship,  is  esteemed  of  1500  tunnes;  which  ship  is  so 
adorned  with  rich  gold  and  very  excellent  workemanship,  as 
many  thousands,  upon  report  thereof,  of  purpose  have  gone 
to  Gravesend,  where  she  doth  ryde,  to  view  her.  Besides  the 
beautie  and  riches  of  this  great  ship,  she  is  appointed  with 
most  huge  ordinance,  men,  and  victualls,  fit  for  so  Kingly  a 
presence24. 
The  Ship  wherin  the  King  of  Denmarke  went,  was  a  moste 
goodly  and  famous  Vessell,  and  as  some  Ship-men  reported, 
about  the  burthen  of  ten  or  twelve  hundred  tunne,  shee 
boare  in  her,  three  tyer  of  Ordinance,  all  brasse,  both  great 
and  large:  her  poope,  her  forecastle  and  Beake-head,  were  all 
fayre  carued  and  ritchly  guilt,  so  were  the  port-holes  for 
her  peeces,  her  tops,  top-masts  &  other  places25. 
the  King  of  Denmarke's  greatest  shippe,  commonly  called  the 
Admirall, 
....  was  a  gallant  shippe  of  a  very  hie  and  narrow 
building,  the  beakhead,  the  stearne,  and  her  three  galleries, 
were  fairly  gilded,  the  wast  and  halfe  deck  adorned  with  ar- 
ras  and  other  rich  ornaments26. 
24.  Henry  Roberts,  The  most  royall  and  honourable  Entertainment  of  the  most  famous  and 
renowmed  King  Christiern  the  Fourth,  King  of  Denmarke,  1606.  Reprinted  in  Nichols,  Progresses  of 
James  1.  (London,  1828).  II,  56-57. 
25.  The  King  of  Penmarkes  Welcome]  Printed  by  Edward  Allde,  1606,  British  Museum,  1093.  b.  71. 
26.  Howes  account,  Reprinted  in  Nichols,  Progresses  of  James  1;  II889. 
174 However,  in  practice  both  the  Fortuna  and  the  Tre  kroner  proved 
to  be  poor  sailers,  with  deep  draughts  which  limited  their  usefulness  in 
the  Baltic.  It  was  noted  of  the  Fortuna  that  'the  best  Seamen  judged  (it) 
more  fitt  to  serue  as  a  ffort  in  a  Riuer  than  to  fight  at  Sea  where  lesse 
and  swifter  Shipps  would  haue  great  advantage  of  it'27.  In  fact  both 
ships  seem  to  have  spent  most  of  their  lives  laid  up  in  Copenhagen  doing 
nothing,  apparently  not  even  participating  in  the  Kalmar  War.  The  smaller 
prestige  ships  of  between  50-60  cannon,  if  not  quite  so  imposing,  were  far 
more  effective  and  were  able  to  sail  with  the  main  battle  fleet  in  times  of 
war. 
The  1640s  brought  an  upsurge  in  the  building  of  larger  ships.  This 
may  have  been  in  response  to  the  building  of  other  capital  ships  in 
Europe  in  the  late  1630s,  such  as  The  Sovereign  of  the  Seas  in  England 
and  La  Couronne  in  France.  It  may  also  have  been  the  result  of  a  review 
of  sea  fighting  tactics  after  a  squadron  of  smaller  Danish  warships  was 
easily  overcome  by  heavier  armed  Swedish  and  Dutch  vessels  in  the 
battle  of  Femern  Bmlt  in  164428.  The  remaining  ships  in  the  navy  were 
steadily  rebuilt  after  this  incident,  increasing  their  cannon  carrying 
capacity  by  as  much  as  50%29.  There  was  probably  also  an  element  of 
restoring  lost  pride  after  the  Torstenssonkrig,  although  the  growing  num- 
ber  of  large  ships  was  also  in  part  simply  a  reflection  of  the  technical 
developments  in  shipbuilding  and  sail  design  which  enabled  larger  ships 
to  sail  more  effectively. 
After  the  completion  of  the  two  large  ships,  Hannibal  and  Victoria, 
in  1647,  another  three  were  ordered.  These  ships,  Sophie  Amalie, 
Frederik,  and  Prinds  Christian  were  truly  massive  and  were  among  the 
------------------- 
27.  Fynes  Moryson,  The  fourth  Part  of  an  Itinerary,  f.  242-3. 
28.  Niels  Probst,  'Slaget  i  Femern  Bs1t  13.  oktober  1644',  Marinehistorisk  Tidskrif4  2/1986,17-8. 
29.  Niels  Probst,  'Snarensvend,  et  orlogskib  fra  Christian  IV's  tid',  Marinehistorisk  Tidskrift, 
1/1987,11-15. 
175 largest  in  the  world  at  the  time,  with  100,96  and  91  cannon  respectively. 
However,  although  ordered  by  Christian  IV,  they  did  not  appear  in  the 
navy  until  after  his  death. 
4.2.2.  Battleships 
The  ships  that  made  up  the  majority  of  the  main  battle  fleet  were  those 
between  20  and  50  cannon,  of  the  type  generally  termed  galleons30.  These 
were  large  enough  to  provide  sufficient  firepower  in  an  all-out  battle  in 
the  open  sea,  but  not  so  large  as  to  make  them  unmanoeuvrable.  Since 
battle  tactics  had  yet  to  reach  their  full  evolution  at  this  time  it  is  pru- 
dent  to  classify  these  ships  simply  as  battleships,  rather  than  as  true 
ships  of  the  line,  which  the  larger  ships  were  to  develop  into  in  the  next 
generation  of  warship. 
There  is  in  fact  a  case  for  subdividing  this  classification  even  fur- 
ther  as  a  considerable  number  of  shallow  draught  ships  were  constructed 
to  a  similar  design  around  the  20-30  cannon  range,  which  were  well  suited 
to  coastal  duties  in  the  shallow  waters  of  the  Baltic. 
Entered  Left 
Name  Service  Guns  Crew  Lr  1,  Breadth  Seyke 
(Nnrske)  Dragee  1580  42  --  --  1611 
Josua  1590  48  --  --  1600 
Raphael  1582  22  --  --  1612 
Gideon  1585  38  154  -  --  1612 
Hercules  1594  42  --  --  1603 
Victor  1597  44  --  --  1636 
Archa  Rasa  1604  -  --  1623 
Leoparden  1604  22  --  -  161 
Stjernen  1607  22  --  --  1611 
St  Anna  1608  31  280  -  40?  -  1645 
Enhjpingen  1609  21  40  -  --  1620 
Krokodillnnn  1809  24  --  --  1611 
Markaffen  1609  28  80  -  --  1653 
Table  4.2.  Battleships,  continued... 
30.  The  term  galleon  was  never  apparently  used  in  the  Baltic  but  the  Danish  warships  were  in 
many  respects  similar  to  those  described  as  galleons  in  the  English  and  Dutch  navies.  See  Chap- 
ter  11  for  a  detailed  comparison  of  ship  design. 
176 Entered  Left 
Name  Service  Guns  Crew  1,  4  Breadth  Sevice 
Justitia  1609  44  226  55  -  15  1658 
Mlalkepigen  1611  24  -  -  -  1612 
Sees  1611  30  62  -  16  1623 
Svenske  Hector  1612  26  -  -  -  -  1624 
rides  1616  30  135  65.15  45  15  1644 
Raphael  1611  32  135  -  -  -  1615 
Havhesten  1618  20  82  -  -  1644 
Sorte  Rytter  1619  40  150  -  50  15.5  1671 
P)leb1adet  1620  36  134  53.15  45  15  1644 
Flensborg  1621  20  80  -  -  -  1632 
Trost  1621  24  80  -  -  1653 
Hvide  Love  1621  34  110  -  -  1624 
Alle  Love  1622  36  300  -  -  1645 
Hummeren  1624  22  135  -  40  13  1639 
Gabriel  1624  26  80  -  -  -  1645 
Svanen  1625  40  150  -  50?  16?  1653 
Linabraen  1627  40  290  -  50  16  1644 
Oidenborg  1628  42  290  -  51  15  1644 
Store  Lykkepot  1629  36  140  50  -  1215  1660 
Lammet  1630  32  160  61  40  13  1658 
To  Lover  1630  32  135  52.5  42  13  1644 
Tre  Lover  1630  32  135  -  42  13  1637 
Kronet  Fisk  1630  32  135  -  40  13  1644 
Delmenlarst  1633  44  134  6.5  42  14  1644 
Gak  *d  1635  34  160  -  -  -  1664 
Hvide  Bjjrn  1635  42  154  57.5  -  13.5  1661 
Heilands  Fregat  1610  26  36  -  -  -  1653 
Tre  Lover  1640  46  200  -  471  15  1644 
Forkxne  Sin  -1642  20  94  -  -  -  1651 
Fenix  1642  34  150  51.5  42  10  1653 
Graa  U1v  1642  36  160  58.15  -  10  1659 
Sorte  Bjorn  1642  38  120  59  -  15  1614 
P  ptuna  1644  28  80  -  -  -  1644 
Stornarn  1644  32  112  -  -  -  1644 
'  firnen  1644  40  -  -  -  -  1644 
Forgylte  torn  1645  38  94  55  -  12.25  1651 
t4  ske  Fregat  1646  26  -  -  -  -  1658 
Rode  Uiv  1647  36  -  -  -  -  1650 
R$*  Rav  1648  40  -  -  -  -  1652 
Table  4.2.  Battleships  (continued) 
4.2.3.  Small  Warships 
The  largest  proportion  of  the  fleet  in  the  early  period  of  the  reign  was 
made  up  of  small  warships-of  up  to  20  cannon.  These  varied  from  small 
pleasure  yachts  which  could  be  fitted  with  a  cannon  or  two  in  wartime,  to 
quite  large  vessels  almost  on  a  par  with  the  battleships.  Although  the 
many  different  small  ship  types  cannot  be  identified  with  any  degree  of 
177 accuracy  some  ships'  names  give  a  clue  as  to  their  type,  which  were 
usually  a  corruption  of  Dutch  or  English  merchant  shipping  terms.  Table 
4.3.  shows  the  more  common  types  of  small  warship. 
Ship  Type  Deck  Masts  R 
Pinas  Full  3  Square 
Fl4ite  Half  3  Square 
Pink  Full  2-3  Square 
Galiot  Open  1-2  Fore  &  Aft 
Table  4.3.  Small  Warship  Types  in  the  Danish  Navy 
Source  Ole  Morhen*,  Renassancens  F&t  jer.  M7ads  og  $fart  i  Danmark  1550-1654  (Rudk$bing,  1995). 
These  definitions  were  far  from  rigid,  however,  and  the  differences 
between  the  types  could  often  be  minimal.  There  is  also  a  great  laxity  in 
terminology  with  some  vessels  being  indiscriminately  classified  from  year 
to  year.  Another  small  ship  type  was  the  pram,  which  was  essentially  a 
dockyard  barge  which  could  be  mounted  with  a  number  of  cannon  to  act 
as  a  temporary  block-ship.  Cargo  ships  were  also  frequently  converted 
into  warships  by  fitting  them  with  a  small  number  of  cannon.  The  list  of 
small  warships  given  in  Table  4.4.  includes  all  vessels  which  at  some 
stage  in  their  career  carried  cannon.  Although  some  were  intermittently 
classified  as  cargo  ships  they  obviously  had  the  potential  to  be  fitted  out 
as  a  warship  if  need  be. 
Small  ships  tended  to  drift  in  and  out  of  the  navy  far  more  fre- 
quently  than  larger  vessels.  Many  were  acquired  as  prizes  or  were  pur- 
chased,  allowing  the  naval  shipwrights  to  concentrate  on  building  larger 
vessels.  The  smaller  ships  were  therefore  of  less  intrinsic  value  and, 
since  they  could  be  acquired  relatively  easily,  less  care  was  taken  of 
them.  Their  average  lifetime  was  therefore  much  less  than  for  larger  ves- 
sels. 
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I Entered  Left 
Name  Service  Guns  Crew  lea  Lac  Breadth  Sevice 
Falk  von  Bergen  1559  -  ---  -  1599 
Pelikanen  1572  -  ---  -  1608 
Dansk  Vüdman  1512  ---  -  15 
Forgylte  Liven  1572  16  ---  -  1s 
Gabriel  1580  12  80  --  -  1623 
St.  Michael  1582  12  ---  -  1623 
Lº11e  Fortun  1586  -  ---  -  16 
Bias  Due  1586  18  ---  -  15 
Hattergalen  1581  -  ---  -  1610 
Hvide  Due  1590  -  ---  -  1608 
Graa  Falk  1590  -  ---  -  16 
Musen  Pinke  1590  -  --  -  1597 
B1aa  love  1590  -  ---  -  1606 
Unge  Hjort  1590  -  ---  -  15 
P  *WW  1592  -  1599 
Hollands  Jomfru  1992  -  ---  -  15 
Hanes  1593  -  ---  -  1608 
Lybske  Vildman  1593  -  ---  -  1620 
Gammel  Hjort  1593  -  ---  1599 
Rolands  Esping  1593  -  --  -  1599 
Engelske  Christnffer  1994  6  ---  -  15 
Hector  1594  14  150  --  -  1635 
Engelske  Janas  1594  18  ---  -  10 
Gotlandske  Grit  1596  6  ---  -  1599 
R1de  Love  1596  14  48  1621 
Barken  1596  18  ---  -  1631 
Svenen  1598  -  ---  -  1599 
Haly  mm  1598  -  ---  -  1599 
N  1gers  Esping  1598  -  ---  -  1599 
Angelica  1599  -  "-  -  1599 
Li1ium  Periit  1599  -  -  -  1599 
Neptuns  1599  -  -- 
1603 
Raabukken  1599  -  ---  -  1599 
Charitas  1601  -  --  -  1611 
Trost  1602  12  48  --  1621 
Penitens  1603  -  10  1631 
St  Peter  1603  -  ---  -  1623 
Argo  Danica  1603  -  ---  -  1603 
(Gaslands)  Katten  1605  -  12  --  -  1611 
Markatten  1605  8--  -  1623 
Turtleduen  1605  -  --  -  1619 
Angefibrandt  1605  10  16  --  -  1610 
firnen  15%  -  50  --  -  1618 
Lindormen  1607  -  ---  -  1612 
Linden  1607  -  --- 
1608 
Engelske  Kittre  1601  2  ---  -  1610 
Dynkerker  Skib  1607  6  ---  -  1610 
Makarel  1607  6  ---  -  1612 
Store  Katte  1609  4  ---  -  1611 
Store  Lybske  David  1610  -  ---  -  1618 
Fransk  Skib  1610  -  ---  -  1610 
Herringnas  1610  -  ---  -  1625 
Sorte  Hund  1610  -  --  -  1612 
Juppiter  1610  -  ---  -  10 
Table  4.4.  Small  Warships,  continued... 
179 Entered  Left 
Name  Service  Guns  Crew  Ls  In  Breadth  Sevice 
Svenske  Love  1610  -  -  -  1611 
Spurven  1610  -  -  --  -  1610 
Forlorne  SM  1610  -  -  -  1626 
Sorte  Rytter  1610  -  -  --  -  1610 
Tre  Kroner  1611  -  -  -  -  1611 
St  Peter  1611  -  -  -  -  1612 
Concordia  1611  -  -  --  -  1611 
Summa  Surtanarum  1611  6  -  --  1612 
Ride  Love  1611  16  -  --  -  1611 
Jonas  1612  -  -  --  1612 
Elephanten  1618  -  -  --  -  1624 
Gilben  1618  16  80  --  -  1646 
Nassau  1621  -  60  --  -  1631 
Store  Pram  1621  -  11  --  -  16X 
Pos171ionen  1624  16  80  -  33  9  1654 
Salhunden  1626  -  28  33  9  1635 
Flyvende  Fisk  1626  16  60  -  33  9  1657 
Gabriel  Flute  1627  -  60  --  -  In 
Harem  1627  17  50  -  33  9  1636 
Mynden  1627  18  50  -  33  9  1636 
Skieltusen  1628  -  -  --  -  1636 
Bredal  Pris  1628  -  -  --  -  1631 
Elephanten  Pris  1628  -  -  --  -  1629 
Mandhunden  1628  -  -  --  -  1631 
Danziger  Pris  1629  -  -  -  -  1629 
Gule  Love  1630  -  7  --  -  1645 
Nordlandske  L+ve  1630  -  70  --  -  1646 
Ligreb  1630  -  -  --  16 
Lille  Lykkepot  1630  8  80  --  -  1636 
Stingsotten  1631  -  -  -  -  1632 
Store  Esping  1633  -  -  --  -  1634 
Sells$e  Pram  1633  -  -  --  -  1634 
Fenix  1633  -  -  --  -  1635 
Christians  Ark  1633  12  40  - 
1653 
Rosen  Bomb  1635  1636 
Snarensvend  1637  16  90  5225  -  115  1653 
Forste  Pram  1641  -  80  --  -  1648 
Anden  Pram  1641  -  90  --  -  1648 
Lybske  Fortuna  1643  -  8  1648 
Rebekka  1643  -  12  1648 
Paradis  Fugle  1643  -  -  -  -  1645 
ATlekammen  1643  -  -  --  -  1644 
K  Mai  Galiot  1644  -  14  -  -  1645 
Svenske  Strudse  1644  -  7  1648 
Norske  Sophia  1644  -  -  --  -  1645 
Engelskmanden  1645  -  -  -- 
1645 
Norske  Gahot  1645  -  1  --  -  1646 
Norske  Catrina  1645,  -  70  --  -  1646 
Post  Rytteren  1645  -  36  --  -  1647 
Blaa  Due  1645  10  -  -- 
1653 
Gallenten  1641  -  -  --  -  1641 
Adleren  1641  4  -  --  -  1653 
Griben  1641  8  -  --  -  1658 
Table  4.4.  Small  Warships  (continued) 
f°,  a 
180 4.2.4.  Galleys  &  Jagts 
Galleys  were  introduced  into  the  Danish  navy  in  the  mid  16th  century 
and  were  used  principally  for  coastal  protection  work  and  for  action 
against  pirates.  They  were  stationed  in  harbours  all  over  the  realm,  par- 
ticularly  in  Norway.  Technically  most  of  them  were  either  Mediterranean 
style  galeasses  or  a  form  of  square-rigged  oar/sail  hybrid  which  were 
built  'after  the  English  mould  and  fashion'31.  They  had  as  many  as  three 
masts  as  well  as  oars,  and  had  a  gun  deck  over  the  oarsmen  with  trans- 
verse  mounted  cannon.  Typically  they  were  around  40-50  alen  (25-31m) 
long,  had  30-50  oars,  and  were  also  able  to  sail  in  squadron  along  with 
other  sailing  ships32.  There  must  also  have  been  a  number  of  more  tradi- 
tional  galleys  since  the  only  surviving  plan  of  an  oared  vessel  from  the 
period  shows  a  classic  Mediterranean  style  galley  section33. 
As  with  Mediterranean  practice,  the  galley's  oars  were  manned 
mainly  by  prisoners,  while 
a  ready  made  captive  wor 
Bremerholm's  iron'34,  but 
regionally  based  galleys. 
Towards  the  end  of 
the  sails  were  operated  by  seamen.  There  was 
kforce  in  Copenhagen  with  the  prisoners  'in 
free  men  may  well  have  been  used  for  the 
the  Kejserkrig  most  of  the  regional  galleys 
were  called  in  to  Copenhagen,  presumably  to  assist  in  preventing  the 
threatened  sea-borne  invasion.  However,  they  were  of  poor  quality  and 
Christian  IV  stated  that  they  were  'ganske  briistfellig'  (absolutely 
dilapidated)  and  provided  'meere  forhindring  end  lettelse'35  (more 
----------  ------- 
31.  Thomas  North,  mariner,  to  Walsingham,  24  April  1582,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Foreign), 
1581-82,649. 
32.  Thomas  Hauge,  'Galeier  i  den  dansk-norske  marine',  (Norsk)  Tidskrift  for  Smvasen,  69,1954, 
351-8. 
33.  Rigsarkiv,  S3etatens  Kort  og  Tegning  Samling,  Des.  E.  3.  See  also  Chapter  11. 
34.  See  chapter  6. 
35.  Letter  to  rigsrid  18  August  1629.  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ).  Kong  Christian  den 
Fjerdes  egenhandige  Brevet  II,  222. 
181 hindrance  than  help),  which  no  doubt  influenced  his  decision  to  sell  off 
all  the  galleys  at  Bremerholm  in  1631  'til  hvam  der  begerer  dem'  (to 
whoever  desires  them)36.  This  was  probably  just  an  over-reaction  on 
Christian  IV's  part,  and  it  can  be  seen  from  the  fleet  list  that  many  of 
the  galleys  remained  in  the  navy.  The  usefulness  of  galleys  as  a  class 
was  certainly  not  questioned  and  many  more  were  constructed  after  this 
date. 
There  was  also  a  smaller  class  of  galleys  called  roersiachter  (row- 
yachts)  which  were  'bygd  paa  den  Norske  maaner'37  (built  in  the  Nor- 
wegian  manner).  This  would  suggest  that  they  were  clinker  built  and  may, 
in  contrast  to  the  larger  galleys,  have  been  derived  from  the  viking  ship 
tradition38.  They  carried  around  six  small  cannon  and  were  propelled  by 
12  oars.  Some  were  also  converted  by  cutting  down  larger  galleys: 
den  galeii,  som  Rassmus  Samsyng  uylle  haffue  tiil  en  Roer- 
siacht  at  bruge  ued  holmen,  brugis  dertiil,  naar  den  bliiffuer 
leet  fortpmmerid  och  giiordt  saledis,  at  man  derpa  kan  bruge  4 
Regiimendst4,  cker.  39 
the  galley,  which  Rasmus  Samsing  will  have  for  a  row-yacht 
for  use  at  Bremerholm  can  be  used  there,  when  its  timbers 
are  slightly  altered  and  made  such  that  four  regiment  pieces 
can  be  used  upon  it. 
36.  Kancelliets  Brevb  ger,  16  March  1631. 
37.  Ship  list,  6  December  1635,  egenhendige  Breve  III,  451-2. 
38.  Claus  Daa  complained  in  1819  that  no  shipbuilders  could  be  found  in  Trondheim  len  who 
could  built  carvel  ships.  (Olav  Bergersen,  Fra  Henrik  Bielke  til  Iver  Huitfeli:  (Oslo,  1953).  I,  32.  ) 
39.  Letter  to  Christian  Friis  &  Klavs  Daa,  3  June  1635,  egenhandige  Breveo  III.  393. 
182 From  1644  jagts  were  classified  together  with  the  oared  galleys,  al- 
though  many  of  these  were  undoubtedly  the  small  one-masted  sailing 
ships  that  are  more  normally  associated  with  the  term  yacht.  However,  it 
is  impossible  to  differentiate  which  ships  were  row-yachts  and  which 
were  sailing  yachts  and  so  all  jagts  have  been  included  in  the  following 
list.  The  laxity  in  terminology  further  complicates  matters  as  included  in 
the  classification  were  some  ships,  such  as  Dynkerker  Bojert  and  Hollands 
Fregai  which  were  clearly  neither  galleys  nor  jagts. 
There  was  also  a  still  smaller  type  of  oared  vessel  called  a  ska'rbad 
(skerry-boat)  or  a  skyttebäd  (cannon-boat).  Some  were  built  around  20-24 
alen  (12.5-15m)  long  which  carried  a  few  small  cannon40,  though  many  of 
them  were  so  small  that  they  did  not  even  merit  names  and  were  prob- 
ably  little  more  than  armed  rowing  dinghys.  When  the  fleet  sailed  in  1643 
behind  each  of  the  13  ships  was  to  be  towed  a  'Roerss  bade'  (Row  boat), 
each  manned  with  five  men41.  It  is  likely  that  these  were  some  kind  of 
skmrbade. 
Table  4.5.  includes  only  those  galleys  and  jagts  which  have  been 
identified  with  names.  There  were  actually  very  many  more,  and  the 
reason  that  so  few  appear  between  1600-1625  is  probably  more  to  do  with 
the  fact  that  so  few  dockyard  accounts  exist  for  these  years  than  any- 
thing  else42.  Contracts  exist  for  the  building  of  galleys  in  these  years 
but  their  identification  is  uncertain.  An  indication  of  their  number  can  be 
gained  by  the  fact  that  in  1618  21  galleys  were  ordered  to  be  built  in 
Norway43,  and  in  1624  a  total  'of  38  were  said  to  have  been  mustered«. 
40.  Hauge,  'Galeier  i  den  dansk-norske  marine',  353. 
41.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  25  January  1643,  egenhandige  Breve,  V,  292. 
42.  Although  most  regionally  based  galleys  did  not  appear  in  the  accounts  there  would  undoub- 
tedly  have  been  a  number  stationed  in  Copenhagen. 
43.  Bergersen,  Fra  Henrik  Bielke  til  Ivor  Huitfeld4  I,  31-2. 
44.  Hauge,  'Galeier  i  den  dansk-norske  marine',  355. 
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Entered  Left 
Name  Service  Guns  Crew  Sevice 
David  Galej  1580  10  -  1599 
Baroman  Galej  1580  10  -  1622 
Jacob  Galej  191  10  -  1599 
Dronningens  Jagt  1593  -  -  1599 
Aarhus  Jagt  1593  -  -  1599 
Bkkinge  Galej  1598  -  -  1599 
»orske  Jagt  1602  -  -  1608 
Leapardens  Jagt  1607  -  -  163 
St  Mikkels  Jagt  1607  -  -  1N8 
Life  Katte  Jagt  1609  4  -  1611 
kolding  Skibet  1612  -  14  1628 
Lamprenen  1612  -  16  1625 
B1aa  DM  1612  -  -  1630 
Haabet  Gakj  1618  -  16  1648 
Liden  Jagt  1619  -  12  1640 
Frederikstad  Galej  1620  -  -  1629 
Hans  Rsterlings  Jagt  1620  -  -  1620 
Dragen  1622  -  -  1632 
Sorte  Ravn  of  Bergen  1624  16  80  1634 
K  Maj  Liden  Jagt  1626  -  21  1656 
Charitas  Gale]  1627  -  70  1631 
Narstrands  Plage  Galej  1627  80  1645 
St  Olaf  Gale]  1627  -  "  24  1639 
Smdervigs  Galej  1627  -  24  1631 
VTdsvinet  1627  -  30  1634 
Blaa  Wynde  Galej  1627  -  24  1631 
Afld"m  j  .  16  -  26  1628 
Rode  L#ve  Galej  1671  -  30  1634 
St  Hm  Galej  1621  -  30  1635 
Smaa  Jagt  1621  -  12  1n 
St  Per  Galej  1621  -  -  1m 
Lybske  Jagt  1627  -  -  1628 
Flyvende  Hjort  1621  6  18  1640 
Tre  Kroner  Galej  1627  6  25  1645 
Prindsens  Jagt  1627  6  4  1644 
St  Peter  Galej  1627  8  24  1648 
Bargens  Gabi  1628  -  -  1m 
st  bhan  Galej  16  8  -  -  1632 
Gunde  Langes  Jagt  1628  6  1648 
Nordlandske  Galej  1628  -  -  1631 
Skier  Galej  1628  -  -  1640 
Sorte  Ravn,  Stavanger  1626  -  -  1632 
Galej  Stjernen  1620  -  -  1631 
U  Gyldenstjerns  Jagt  1628  -  -  1629 
Kronet  Galej  1628  6  19  1645 
Samson  Galej  1628  8  34  1645 
Rzen  Ghj  1620  11  34  1645 
Ekers  Galej  169  -  -  1629 
Trondheim  Galej  1629  -  -  1629 
Varberg  Jagt  1629  -  -  164 
Marbjerg  Jagt  10  -  -  1643 
Liden  Ny  Jagt  1629  -  -  1632 
Table  4.5.  Galleys  and  Jagt%  continued... 
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Name  Service  Guns  Crew  Sevice 
Rnerbnds  Gakj  1629  -  -  1630 
Krokodi7len  Galej  10  12  21  1634 
Tunsserg  Gakj  1630  -  -  1630 
Flensburg  Salej  1630  -  -  1631 
Flyvende  NW  1630  6  23  1& 
Ny  lMsted  Jagt  1631  -  -  1634 
. 
bnfru  Svenden  1635  6  22  1653 
Linden  Gakj  1635  6  16  1653 
Dybendal  1635  9  24  1653 
H  jjenhald  1635  12  26  1658 
Arnes  1635  12  11  1653 
Ny  Kolding  Galej  Brn  1637  -  15  1648 
St  Jsrgen  Jagt  1636  6  10  163 
Flyvende  Hjort  1641  14  24  1653 
Iki  lands  6akj  1642  -  15  1648 
Prindsens  Ny  jagt  1642  10  20  1657 
Emden  1643  -  -  164 
Spil  Jagt  1644  -  7  1660 
Prindsens  Skarbaad  1644  -  5  1648 
Beret  Ornings  Jagt  1645  -  7  164 
Prindsens  Spit  Jagt  1646  -  3  1648 
Flyvende  Prl  1641  6  -  1653 
Solbiadet  Jagt  1611  12  23  1659 
Hannibal  Jagt  1648  -  -  1658 
Table  4.5.  Galleys  and  Jagts  (continued) 
4.2.5.  Transport  Ships 
To  ensure  that  the  transport  of  the  vast  amounts  of  materials  and  vict- 
uals  needed  to  man  and  maintain  the  navy  could  be  guaranteed  the  navy 
kept  a  certain  number  of  its  own  cargo  ships.  These  ships  could  also  be 
enlisted  as  troop  transporters  if  the  need  arose.  Their  number  increased 
steadily  from  only  around  four  or  five  in  the  early  years  to  more  than  20 
in  the  1630s  and  1640s,  which  gives  an  indication  of  the  ever  growing 
need  for  supplies  as  the  size  of  the  navy  grew  during  the  reign. 
Very  few  cargo  ships  were  specifically  built  for  the  navy  and  so 
the  types  of  ship  used  were  diverse,  depending  on  what  could  be  bought 
or  captured.  The  majority  were  probably  of  Dutch  or  English  design,  but 
there  were  two  indigenous  Danish  cargo  ship  types.  The  skude,  which 
185 grew  out  of  the  viking  tradition,  was  a  small  open-decked  clinker-built 
vessel  capable  of  carrying  up  to  around  40  tons,  while  the  krejer  was  a 
slightly  larger  carvel-built  vessel  carrying  up  to  around  60  tons45.  Table 
4.6.  shows  the  characteristics  of  the  principal  cargo  ship  types  to  sail  in 
the  Danish  navy,  and  Table  4.7.  shows  the  transport  ships  that  have  been 
identified. 
Type  Deck  Masts  Ri 
Bysse  Full  3  Square 
Floite  Half  3  Square 
Krejer  Half  3  Square 
Kat  Open  2  Square 
Galiot  Open  1-2  Fore  &  Aft 
Bojert  Open  1-2  Fore  &  Aft 
Jagt  Open  1-2  Fore  &  Aft 
Skude  Open  1-2  Square 
Table  4.6.  Principal  Cargo  Ship  Types  in  the  Danish  Navy 
SOuº  x  Ob  Morfiensln,  Renassancens  Ffljer.  se1lads  og  $fvt  i  Danmark  159).  1&4  (Rudk$bing,  1995) 
*gen  H.  8arfod,  DanAiark-»W  handelstläde  1E50-17X  (Kronborg,  1967),  0-117. 
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Norne  Berke  Crew  Sevice 
Hvide  Rose  1572  -  1599 
Den  Lille  Engel  1591  -  1610 
Hvide  Falk  1592  -  1623 
Rinden  1593  -  1611 
Uglen  1593  -  1599 
Hojeren  1593  -  1599 
Karudsen  1595  -  1599 
Brandt  Jagt  1596  -  1599 
Charitas  1599  -  1606 
Grindfisken  1607  -  1608 
Lollandske  Baad  1607  -  1611 
Lollands  Skude  1607  -  1611 
Rºdby  Skude  1607  -  1611 
Saxkj  jbing  Skude  1607  -  1631 
Lollands  Bunde  1607  -  1608 
Hoflands  Bysse 
. 
1610  11  1648 
Lybske  Fortuna  1611  -  1611 
Table  4.7.  Transport  Ships,  continued... 
45.  Ole  Mortens$n,  Renassancens  Fartojer.  sejlads  og  spfart  i  Danmark  1550-1650,  (Rudk*bing, 
1995),  95-110. 
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Name  Service  Crew  Sevice 
Mg  Trefoldigheden  1611  -  1611 
Forgylte  Mane  1611  -  1623 
Hoflands  Turtleduen  1611  -  1611 
Wismar  Skulle  1611  -  1611 
Nordlands  Bysse  1611  -  1611 
Gr  n  Fisk  1611  -  1611 
1,11e  Bysse  1611  -  1611 
legeren  1611  -  1639 
Lybske  Krejer  1611  -  10 
Paafuglen  1611  -  1611 
Haahet  1611  -  1611 
Krabben  1612  -  1620 
Sams  n  1618  14  1624 
Norske  Bojert  1618  -  1632 
Engel  Gabriel  1618  -  1623 
Gammel  Haderslev  Skude  1618  -  1621 
My  Haderslev  Skude  1618  12  1650 
Forbrudte  Mlander  1618  -  1618 
Pbven  1618  -  1618 
Ribe  Pris  1618  -  1623 
Ale'ander  1618  -  1618 
Hoflands  Flote  1619  -  1628 
ftstlen  1619  -  1619 
Honands  Jager  10  -  1623 
K+ge  Krejer  1620  -  1622 
Lybske  Skude  1620  5  1628 
Skotske  Pris  1620  -  1623 
Stavanger  Pris  Bojert  1620  1  1648 
Ystad  Skibet  1620  15  1631 
Hailing  his  1621  -  1622 
b*  Skude  1621  8  1631 
Perlen  1621  -  1626 
Hvide  Bj#  n  1622  -  1623 
Neringer  Bysse  1622  -  1623 
Hvide  lamb  1622  -  1624 
Enhjorning  Skude  1626  10  1631 
Bends  Tiden  Ny  Skib  1626  -  1627 
No  Svan  Skude  1621  6  1631 
Ekelfjord  Skude  1627  6  1628 
Halmsted  Skude  1627  30  1628 
Rostocker  Pris  Skude  1627  10  1629 
Lille  Svan  Pris  1627  7  1628 
K  Waj  Bojert  1627  10  1628 
Jageren  Skude  1621  8  1626 
Oldborrig  Skude  1627  6  1628 
K  Mai  Rostock  Pris  1621  8  1628 
Den  Li11e  Buck  1628  -  1629 
Hulemmer  Skit  1628  -  1629 
brnbucker  1628  -  1629 
Fortuna  Bojert  1628  12  1648 
Steen  Skude  1628  -  1629 
Blaa  Due  1628  -  1629 
My  Kotberg  Pris  1628  -  1629 
Table  4.7.  Transport  Ships,  continued... 
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Name  Service  Crew  Sevice 
Oranjebom  1629  -  1630 
Peder  Brons  Smakke  1629  -  1630 
Daniel  Troies  Bojert  1629  -  1630 
Forgylte  L#ve  Bojert  10  -  1639 
Hollands  Pris  Bojert  1629  9  1648 
Peeler  Daringholms  Krejer  15  9  -  1631 
, argen  Switrens  Kreier  1630  -  1631 
Fladlusen  1630  40  1648 
Rode  Live  Pils  1630  -  1631 
Lilie  Ny  Bojert  1630  -  1631 
St  Maria  Bojert  1630  -  1638 
Hamburger  Fortuna  1631  12  1648 
Hamburger  Pris  Bojert  1631  -  1635 
Krigsmanden  1631  -  1635 
Ska  nd  Bojert  1632  -  1631 
Blod  Hunden  1632  -  1634 
Hollands  Pris  Krejer  1632  -  1641 
Graa  Hest  1632  -  1640 
St  Pleder  1633  -  1639 
Samsings  Pris  1633  -  1636 
Samson  Pils  1634  -  1635 
F  lgesvenden  1634  -  1639 
Stumm  bette  1635  38  1651 
Hollands  Pris  1635  -  1639 
Haabet  Pris  1635  -  1646 
Hoflands  Prls  Skude  1635  -  1648 
St  Jsrgen  Pris  Skude  1635  -  1639 
Harnborg  Christtofer  1638  -  1640 
Robert  1638  -  1839 
Solen  10  1639 
St  Maria  Bojert  1639  11  1651 
Vildkatten  1639  -  1641 
Alexander  1839  -  1640 
Dynkerker  Bojert  1642  20  1658 
Hvide  Lpe  1642  14  1675 
Makarel  1642  9  1644 
Vyborg  Skude  1642  -  1645 
Laurids  Christensen  Slob  1642  -  1643 
Nattergalen  1642  9  1644 
Dugbaaden  1642  1  1645 
Falken  1642  7  1645 
Svensk  Pris  Bojert  1643  8  1648 
Galioten  Den  Sorte  Hund  1644  12  1614 
Norske  Hophill  1644  -  1645 
Svensk  Fortan  Pris  1644  8  1645 
Kieler  Fjord  1644  -  1645 
Amager  1645  23  1646 
Svensk  Skude  St  Jacob  1645  10  1652 
Norske  St  Anna  1645  40  1646 
Haabet  Bojert  1646  9  1664 
St  Michael  1646  -  1648 
Jokum  Becks  Jagt  1647  -  1648 
Frank  Skib  1647  -  1647 
Table  4.7.  Transport  Ships,  (continued) 
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4.3.  A  Short  Note  on  Ships'  Names 
The  names  of  Danish  warships  give  an  interesting  insight  into  how  Chris- 
tian  IV  regarded  the  role  of  his  navy:  many  of  the  names  were  ap- 
parently  chosen  to  reflect  aspects  of  royal  prestige,  power  and  piety. 
The  navy's  role  in  protecting  Christian  IV's  northern  empire  is 
reflected  in  the  large  number  of  names  associated  with  heraldic  represen- 
tations  of  various  parts  of  the  empire.  Denmark  is  represented  by  2  Lover 
(2  Lions)  and  3  Lover  (3  Lions);  Iceland  by  Kronet  Fisk  (the  Crowned 
Fish)  and  Falken  (the  Falcon);  Greenland  by  Hvide  Bjorn  (White  Bear);  the 
Faroes  by  Lammet  (the  Lamb)  and  Flyvende  Vxdder  (Flying  Ram);  Holstein 
by  Nelledladet  (the  Nettle  Leaf);  the  Ditmarshes  by  Sorte  Rytter  (Black 
Knight);  Stormarn  by  Svanen  (the  Swan);  Osel  by  Ornen  (the  Eagle); 
Bornholm  by  Dragen  (the  Dragon);  and  the  Wendish  lands  by  Lindormen 
(the  Wyvern).  The  Tre  kroner  (Three  Crowns)  was  also  the  symbol  of  the 
Kalmar  union  of  the  three  Scandinavian  kingdoms  which  Christian  IV 
hoped  to  re-create46. 
Greek  and  Roman  gods  and  warriors  such  as  Neptune,  Hercules  and 
Hector  were  used  to  reinforce  the  image  of  Christian  IV  as  a  powerful 
monarch  in  the  classical  tradition,  but  figures  from  Nordic  mythology  are 
strangely  absent47. 
Religious  names  also  appear  perhaps  less  frequently  than  might  be 
expected  from  a  monarch  who  set  himself  up  as  the  leader  of  the  Evan- 
gelical  League,  but  the  Trefoldighed  (Trinity),  Penitens,  Gabriel,  and 
various  other  angels,  saints,  and  figures  from  the  bible  helped  to  project 
an  image  of  piety. 
-------------------- 
48.  R.  Steen  Steensen,  'Det  danske  Rigsvaaben  og  Flaadens  gamle  Skibsnavne'.  Tidsskrift  for 
S4pvasen,  (1949).  169-86. 
47.  Scenes  from  Nordic  mythology  formed  an  important  part  of  the  festivities  at  the  large  royal 
double  wedding  in  1634  and  featured  in  the  decoration  of  Kronborg  Castle  after  it  was  rebuilt  in 
the  1630s.  H.  D.  Schepelen  and  Ulla  Houkj--r,  The  Kranbor®  Series:  King  Christian  IV  and  his  Pic- 
tures  of  Early  Danish  History,  (K$benhavn.  1988). 
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Animal  names,  apart  from  those  associated  with  Denmark's  empire, 
were  also  very  popular.  The  mythical  Pelican,  which  pecked  its  breast  to 
feed  its  young,  was  used  frequently  as  a  symbol  of  Christian  IV's 
sacrifices  to  his  people,  and  appeared  regularly  as  a  ship  name. 
Other  less  symbolic  animals  were  either  sea  creatures  such  as  Hum- 
meren  (the  Lobster),  Krabben  (the  Crab)  or  Havhesten  (the  Seahorse),  or 
else  they  were  animals  which  were  powerful,  fast  or  skilful.  In  this 
category  come  Hanen  (the  Cock),  Leoparden  (the  Leopard),  Mynden  (the 
Greyhound),  and  the  Rode  Ra'v  (Red  Fox).  There  were  also  some  surpris- 
ing  names  for  warships  such  as  Paradis  Fugt  (Bird  of  Paradise),  Spurven 
(the  Sparrow)  and  Hvide  Due  (White  Dove). 
Names  of  those  in  the  royal  court  also  appear  on  Christian  IV's 
warships.  Store  Sophia  was  named  in  honour  of  his  mother,  Hannibal  after 
his  son-in-law  Hannibal  Sehested,  and  Trost  after  his  favourite  dog.  Not 
all  the  names  were  complimentary,  though,  as  Stumpet  Dorette  was  named 
after  Kirsten  Munk's  daughter  by  another  man,  Dorothea  Elisabeth,  whom 
Christian  IV  referred  to  as  'Din  stumpede  Dorothea'  (your  squat 
Dorothea)48. 
Ships  sometimes  also  had  their  names  changed  as  the  following 
entry  in  Christian  IV's  diary  for  29  April  161749  shows: 
Om  Hatten  ymellom  Mandag  och  tysday  uar  ted  saadan  En 
storm,  att  mange  aff  Skiiben  dreff  paa  grunden,  och  Ett  Skib 
ved  Naff  Charitas  faldt  om  paa  syden.  Epther  den  samme  dag 
bleff  samme  skiib  kallit  Patentia. 
48.  P.  Ho1ck,  'Gamle  Skibsnavne'.  Tidsskrift  for  S4vasen,  (1941),  378-80. 
49.  C.  F.  Bricka  (ed.  ),  'Kong  Christian  IV's  kalenderoptegnelser  fra  Aarene  1617,1629  09  1639', 
Danke  Samlinger,  V  (1869-70),  49-88. 
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During  the  night  between  Monday  and  Tuesday  there  was 
such  a  storm  that  many  of  the  ships  were  driven  aground, 
and  one  ship  by  the  name  of  Charitas  fell  on  its  side.  Since 
that  day  the  ship  has  been  called  Patentia 
In  a  similar  vein,  a  ship  that  was  saved  after  being  sunk  during  building 
was  called  Forloren  Son  (the  Prodigal  Son). 
Perhaps  the  most  touching  name,  though,  was  the  Svende  forglem- 
mer  Jomfruen  aldrig  (Swain  who  never  forgets  his  maiden)  which,  not 
surprisingly,  was  usually  shortened  to  just  Jomfru  Svenden. 
4.4.  The  Danish  Navy  in  a  European  Context 
The  Danish  navy  in  the  early  modern  period  differed  from  the  rest  of 
Europe  in  one  major  respect,  arising  from  the  unique  circumstances  sur- 
rounding  the  possession  of  the  Sound.  With  so  many  ships  passing 
through  Danish  waters  there  was  little  reason  for  a  strong  domestic  mer- 
chant  fleet  to  be  established  since  merchants  could  import  or  export 
goods  so  easily  in  Dutch,  English  or  Hanse  ships.  The  Danish  state  was 
therefore  unable  to  utilise  armed  merchant  ships  as  an  auxiliary  naval 
force  in  the  same  way  that  other  nations  could.  As  a  consequence  the 
Danish  state  navy  was  far  more  powerful  than  it  would  otherwise  have 
been,  and  the  comparison  with  other  nations  must  take  this  situation  into 
account. 
The  country  whose  naval  needs  most  resembled  Denmark's  was 
Spain.  Their  roles  were  broadly  similar  in  that  the  Mediterranean  was 
Spain's  Baltic  and  the  Atlantic  her  Northern  seas.  The  main  difference 
was  one  of  scale,  reflecting  the  much  larger  area  of  sea  that  was  control- 
----------------- 
50.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655,24.  Materialskriver  Regnskaber  1635/36. 
Without  context  the  translation  is  a  bit  tricky  and  it  may  mean  the  maiden  who  never  forgets 
her  swain',  although  the  shortened  version  of  the  name  would  tend  to  suggest  the  former  trans- 
lation. 
191 ird 
led  and  the  fact  that  Spain  was  on  a  war  footing  for  virtually  the  whole 
period.  The  term  Spanish  Navy,  however,  is  a  misnomer  at  this  time  since 
the  various  different  fleets  such  as  the  Atlantic  armada,  the  Flanders  ar- 
mada,  and  the  Mediterranean  galley  fleet  all  existed  as  separate  entities 
and  each  operated  within  a  different  administrative  set-up.  The  contract- 
ing  out  system  was  also  embraced  to  varying  degrees  within  each  fleet  at 
different  times,  so  any  attempt  to  calculate  the  total  number  of  ships 
which  made  up  the  permanent  Spanish  state  navy  would  be  virtually  im- 
possible.  As  a  rough  estimate,  the  Atlantic  armada  fluctuated  around  the 
20-30  ship  mark,  and  the  galley  fleet  around  60-70.  Combined  with  the 
numerous  other  fleets  the  total  number  of  ships  sailing  under  the 
Spanish  flag  was  well  in  excess  of  a  hundred,  although  the  number  ac- 
tually  owned  by  the  state  could  on  occasion  number  no  more  than  a 
handfuls'. 
Likewise  the  provincial  nature  of  the  Dutch  fleet  makes  any  attempt 
to  enumerate  a  Dutch  state  navy  impossible  before  around  1650,  and  in 
any  case  their  heavy  reliance  on  armed  merchantmen  would  mean  that  any 
figures  would  greatly  underestimate  the  Dutch  naval  strength. 
Therefore  any  meaningful  quantitative  comparison  of  the  Danish 
navy  can  only  realistically  be  made  with  England,  Sweden,  and  from  the 
1620s,  France.  Figure  4.2..  shows  the  relative  sizes  of  these  navies.  The 
data  has  been  taken  from  Glete52,  so  the  figures  for  Sweden  can  be  taken 
as  near  perfect  as  possible;  the  English  and  French  navies  have  also 
been  the  subject  of  exhaustive  research53  and  their  figures  are  likewise 
51.  I.  A.  A.  Thompson,  War  and  Government  in  Habsburg  Spain  1560-182Q  (London,  1976). 
52.  Jan  Glete,  Navies  and  Nations:  Warships,  Navies  and  State  Building  in  Europe  and  America, 
1500-1864  (Stockholm,  1993),  Appendix  2. 
53.  Glete  cites  numerous  sources  but  the  main  ones  for  this  period  are:  R.  C.  Anderson.  List  of 
English  Men-of-War,  1509-164-9  (London,  1959);  and  Jacques  Vichot  (ed.  ),  Repertoire  des  Navires 
de  Guerre  Francais,  (Paris,  1967). 
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very  accurate.  In  the  case  of  Denmark  Glete's  figures  were  based  mainly 
on  Lind's  fleet  list  which,  as  demonstrated  above,  is  far  from  perfect  or 
complete54.  The  current  research  has  therefore  been  used  in  the  graph 
for  a  more  accurate  assessment. 
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Figure  4.2.  Com  parative  Strength  of  European  Navies 
There  are  certain  flaws  in  this  approach  since  there  is  the  danger 
of  not  comparing  like  with  like.  Glete  excluded  all  vessels  with  a  displace- 
ment  lower  than  100  tonnes,  but  since  data  on  the  smaller  Danish  vessels 
is  so  scant  it  has  not  been  possible  to  make  this  distinction  accurately. 
Some  of  the  more  obviously  small  vessels  have  been  edited  out  but  the 
figures  probably  still  represent  a  certain  overestimate  on  this  count. 
However,  since  the  methodology  of  assessing  the  number  of  ships 
produces  a  slight  underestimate  the  two  errors  will  cancel  each  other  out 
-------------------- 
54.  Barfod  has  already  shown  that  Glete's  Danish  figues  from  an  earlier  period  are  underes- 
timated.  Jurgen  H.  Bartod,  'Den  danske  orlogsfläde  for  1560',  Historisk  Tidsskrift  (1994),  261-70. 
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to  some  extent.  Since  Glete  also  uses  displacement  as  the  means  of  clas- 
sification  rather  than  number  of  cannon,  the  boundaries  between  classes 
of  ships  must  be  taken  as  a  rough  guide  only.  This  approach  though  is 
felt  justified  as  Glete  has  consistently  underestimated  the  strength  of  the 
Danish  navy,  most  notably  with  respect  to  the  galleys,  which  he  has  dis- 
regarded  almost  completely  for  the  entire  period,  when  as  we  have  seen 
there  was  a  substantial  increase  in  these  vessels  from  the  1620s  on. 
By  taking  this  approach  though,  we  are  denied  using  Glete's 
greatest  achievement,  that  of  using  displacement  as  the  basis  of  com- 
parison  between  fleets.  Not  knowing  which  Danish  ships  he  has  already 
counted,  or  the  precise  coefficients  used  to  calculate  their  displacement, 
and  not  having  accurate  data  for  so  many  of  the  new  ships  now  iden- 
tified  it  is  totally  impractical  to  even  attempt  to  update  his  displacement 
figures.  Danish  ships  are  therefore  classified  simply  by  their  cannon 
carrying  capacity. 
The  immediate  surprise  from  the  graph  is  the  relative  strengths  of 
the  Danish  and  Swedish  navies  up  to  1610.  The  large  Swedish  navy  in 
1600  was  a  result  of  the  Russian  campaigns  and  the  civil  war,  where  both 
sides  had  a  considerable  fleet,  and  this  naval  strength  was  maintained 
over  succeeding  years.  Judging  by  these  figures  Danish  naval  superiority 
in  the  Kalmar  War  was  not  therefore  a  foregone  conclusion,  but  the  sig- 
nificant  factor  was  that  the  majority  of  Swedish  ships  were  small  inshore 
craft  while  Denmark,  in  contrast,  had  a  greater  number  of  larger  ships55. 
England's  proportion  of  large  ships  was  always  the  greatest, 
reflecting  the  English  defence  strategy  of  meeting  the  enemy  in  force  on 
the  high  seas.  Although  some  small  vessels  were  maintained,  the  strong 
reliance  placed  on  privateers  meant  that  there  was  little  need  to  keep 
any  significant  force  of  small  ships  or  galleys.  The  French  navy  which 
------------------ 
55.  Roberts  states  that  the  majority  of  the  Swedish  fleet  was  also  in  a  poor  state  of  repair. 
Michael  Roberts,  Gustavus  Adolphus:  A  History  of  Sweden  1611-163Z  II,  (London,  1958),  285-6. 
194 burst  onto  the  scene  in  the  1620s  in  contrast  was  at  first  based  mainly 
on  these  small  ships,  with  just  a  few  larger  ships,  although  their  number 
increased  rapidly  in  the  1630s. 
No  navy  had  a  stable  size.  This  represents  the  powerful  opposing 
influences  of  war  and  finance  on  state  navies.  Wars  obviously  brought 
about  an  increase  in  the  number  of  ships,  but  financial  strictures  en- 
sured  that  in  times  of  peace  the  number  was  reduced  again,  and  so  there 
is  an  inevitable  fluctuation  in  relative  naval  strengths  between  countries 
as  they  drift  in  to  and  out  of  war. 
In  terms  of  numbers  of  ships  Denmark  had  the  largest  state-owned 
navy  in  Europe  from  the  1620s  through  to  the  1640s,  but  was  probably 
not  as  large  as  England's  in  terms  of  tonnage  or  firepower.  The  high 
figures  for  1630  represent  the  aftermath  of  the  Kejserkrig,  and  although 
the  number  of  ships  did  steadily  reduce,  for  Denmark  to  retain  such  a 
strong  naval  force  through  a  period  of  nominal  peace  in  the  1630s  is  ex- 
ceptional  compared  to  other  countries.  Therefore,  even  though  the  con- 
cept  of  a  massive  naval  expansion  in  this  decade  has  been  shown  to  have 
been  inaccurate,  it  is  still  nevertheless  remarkable  that  such  a  strong 
fleet  was  maintained  and  renewed. 
The  reasons  why  the  Danish  state  navy  was  maintained  at  such  a 
high  level  throughout  the  period  were  a  direct  consequence  of  the  pos- 
session  of  the  Sound.  Danish  policies  here  were  largely  at  variance  with 
the  wishes  of  all  other  maritime  nations  and  had  the  combined  effect  that 
the  threat  of  a  direct  foreign  attack  was  made  a  distinct  possibility,  and 
at  the  same  time  the  chance  of  an  alliance  with  any  of  these  powers  was 
made  virtually  impossible.  If  Denmark  were  to  become  involved  in  any 
maritime  engagement  then  she  would  have  to  be  able  to  meet  that  threat 
entirely  with  her  own  forces. 
195 In  conclusion  then  Denmark  can  be  seen  to  have  had  a  consistently 
large  state-owned  navy  throughout  the  entire  period  with  a  relatively 
high  proportion  of  large  sized  vessels.  Sweden's  navy  on  the  other  hand 
went-through  a  significant  transformation  after  the  accession  of  Gustav 
Adolf,  when  the  large  number  of  coastal  ships  were  replaced  by  a  smaller 
number  of  larger  ships.  Sweden's  naval  strength  apparently  approached, 
though  apparently  never  quite  equalled  Denmark's  strength°.  The  French 
navy  grew  from  nothing  into  a  major  player  in  the  space  of  just  a  few 
years.  The  figures  are  clouded  a  little  by  the  fact  that  two  separate 
navies  were  established  on  the  Atlantic  and  the  Mediterranean,  but  the 
Atlantic  fleet  included  a  fairly  high  proportion  of  medium  and  large  sized 
ships57.  Although  on  paper  France  had  for  a  time  more  ships  than 
England,  the  situation  was  a  little  more  complicated  than  that  and  in  many 
ways  Richelieu's  fleet  represented  a  false  dawn  for  the  French  navy  and 
it  was  already  on  the  decline  by  the  1640s.  England,  with  her  much  larger 
ships,  must  therefore  be  regarded  as  the  most  powerful  of  the  state- 
owned  navies  in  northern  Europe.  This  is  borne  out  by  Glete's  data  on 
total  displacements  which  consistently  places  England  as  the  largest 
navy,  beaten  only  by  Sweden  in  1605  when  the  English  navy  was  in  the 
doldrums  after  the  accession  of  James  I/VI.  In  relative  terms  though  the 
English  navy's  influence  steadily  waned  before  the  civil  war,  while  French 
naval  strength  came  to  almost  equal  England's.  The  two  Baltic  navies  were 
maintained  at  a  slightly  lower  level  than  these  powers  essentially  because 
geography  provided  an  effective  barrier  from  outside  intervention,  and 
their  main  threats  therefore  came  chiefly  from  each  other. 
56.  Glete  actually  puts  the  Swedish  navy  ahead  of  Denmark's,  but  given  the  errors  inherent  in 
calculating  these  figures  it  should  probably  be  said  that  both  the  Baltic  navies  were  more  or 
less  equal  in  strength.  Certainly  neither  had  a  significant  numerical  superiority  over  the  other. 
57.  E.  H.  Jenkins,  A  History  of  the  French  Navy,  (London,  1973),  15-31. 
196 If  we  look  wider,  though,  at  state-controlled  navies  then  the  situa- 
tion  is  slightly  different  and  the  question  of  armed  merchantmen  becomes 
of  major  importance.  The  general  trend  of  the  17th  century  was  for 
navies  to  become  ever  more  centralised,  with  less  reliance  placed  on 
privately  owned  forces,  but  this  was  a  slow  process  before  the  1650s,  and 
in  the  first  half  of  the  century  merchant  ships  still  made  up  a  large 
proportion  of  a  fighting  navy's  strength. 
Before  the  defensionskibe  programme  came  into  force  in  the  1630s 
this  simply  was  not  a  real  option  for  Denmark,  and  even  afterwards  the 
available  number  of  large  privately-owned  ships  remained  negligible.  Al- 
though  around  30  defensionskibe  and  other  merchant  ships  were  mobilised 
by  Denmark  in  the  Torstenssonkrig  they  were  mainly  involved  in  convoy 
duty  and  coastal  defence,  with  only  a  handful  actually  involved  in  the 
naval  battles.  Thus  the  number  of  ships  in  the  Danish  navy  gives  a  fairly 
accurate  representation  of  true  naval  strength.  The  same  must  also  be 
said  of  Sweden,  who  likewise  had  a  very  small  merchant  marine.  This  was 
in  stark  contrast  to  England  and  the  Netherlands  who  could  call  upon 
significant  numbers  of  armed  merchantmen  to  bolster  the  ranks  of  the  of- 
ficial  navy.  This  is  demonstrated  by  the  first  Anglo-Dutch  War  (1652-54) 
when  the  proportion  of  state-owned  fighting  ships  in  the  two  fleets  was 
roughly  only  about  two  thirds  for  the  English  and  just  one  third  for  the 
Dutch58. 
The  situation  with  Spain  was  slightly  different  due  to  the  contract- 
ing  out  system  employed,  where  contracts  were  placed  with  entrepreneurs 
to  build,  victual  and  man  warships  for  the  state.  These  were  neither 
armed  merchantmen  nor  state-owned  ships  but  privately  owned  warships 
serving  under  contract  to  the  state.  The  strength  of  the  Spanish  mer- 
chant  service  also  ensured  that  considerable  numbers  of  armed  mer- 
58.  The  First  Anglo  Dutch  War,  Vols.  1-6.  (Navy  Records  Society,  Vols.  XII,  XVII,  XXX,  XXXVII, 
XLI,  LXVI,  London,  1899-1930). 
197 chantmen  were  also  available  in  times  of  conflict,  although  reliance  on 
them  can  be  seen  to  have  diminished  significantly  between  the  armadas  of 
1588  and  163959. 
Thus,  although  precise  figures  are  unknown,  the  navies  sailing  un- 
der  the  flags  of  Spain  and  the  Netherlands,  each  with  more  than  a 
hundred  ships  readily  available,  outweighed  all  others  and  must  be 
regarded  as  the  largest  naval  forces  of  the  period.  After  their  defeat  of 
the  Spanish  armada  in  the  Battle  of  the  Downs  in  1639  the  Dutch  navy 
became  the  single  largest  force.  However,  this  still  leaves  Christian  IV's 
navy  as  one  of  the  leading  forces  on  the  early  modern  sea-ways,  with  a 
significant  role  to  play  in  the  balance  of  northern  European  naval  power. 
-------------------- 
59.  Glete,  Navies  and  Nations,  152. 
198 5.  The  Development  of  the  Naval  Dockyards 
In  parallel  with  the  growth  of  Denmark's  naval  strength  Christian  IV 
recognised  the  need  to  have  an  adequate  infrastructure  which  could  build 
and  maintain  his  ships.  As  his  navy  grew  he  made  sure  that  shore 
facilities  were  also  developed  which  could  cope  with  the  ever  increasing 
workload  of  many  more,  larger  and  more  complex  ships  than  had  hitherto 
been  known  in  Denmark.  Copenhagen  was  naturally  the  main  base  for  the 
navy,  but  significant  developments  were  also  made  near  Nakskov  to  ex- 
ploit  local  resources,  and  at  Glückstadt  to  service  the  permanent 
squadron  on  the  Elbe.  There  were  also  a  number  of  much  smaller  bases 
dotted  around  the  country  which  kept  a  number  of  vessels  for  coastal 
defence. 
A  naval  dockyard  is  defined  as  a  permanent  base  where  naval  ships 
could  be  built,  repaired  and  stationed  all  year  round.  This  excludes  the 
small  temporary  shipyards  which  sprang  up  all  over  the  realm  to  exploit 
specific  areas  of  woodland,  and  all  the  numerous  seasonal  operational 
bases,  stretching  from  Osel  and  Bornholm  in  the  Baltic  up  to  the  north  of 
Norway,  where  there  were  little  if  any  shore  facilities. 
5.1.  Copenhagen 
5.1.1.  The  Development  of  a  Fortified  Port  City 
Ever  since  Erik  of  Pomerania  created  the  foundations  of  the  Danish  na- 
tional  fleet  in  the  early  15th  century'  Copenhagen  had  been  an  important 
naval  base.  In  its  early  form  the  navy  was  essentially  a  royal  possession, 
and  it  was  natural  for  it  to  be  based  at  the  centre  of  royal  power,  and 
at  the  heart  of  the  then  Danish  realm.  Its  location  made  it  equally  easy 
1.  Jurgen  H.  Barfod.  Fladens  t4dsel  (Kobenhavn,  1990).  21-33. 
199 for  ships  to  reach  the  Baltic  and  the  North  Sea,  and  it  was  ideally  placed 
for  policing  the  Sound.  The  geography  of  Copenhagen  and  Amager  also 
created  a  natural  harbour  which  could  be  easily  defended,  and  its 
latitude  ensured  that,  compared  to  Swedish  ports,  it  remained  relatively 
ice  free  for  much  of  the  year. 
King  Hans  was  apparently  the  first  to  create  a  naval  shipbuilding 
yard  in  Copenhagen,  in  the  early  16th  century,  but  this  could  only  have 
been  an  area  of  rough  ground  which  was  set  aside  for  the  purpose,  and 
certainly  had  no  great  infrastructure  associated  with  W.  It  was  not  until 
the  16th  century  that  any  attempt  was  made  to  create  what  could  be 
termed  a  proper  naval  dockyard.  Christian  III  more  than  ever  built  his 
navy's  ships  in  Copenhagen3  and  built  a  small  arsenal  and  a  few  other 
small  buildings  associated  with  the  navy,  but  it  was  Frederik  II  who 
really  began  the  process  of  creating  a  formal  naval  dockyard  on'  the 
former  island  of  Bremerholm. 
The  term  Holmen  had  been  in  use  since  1460  but  it  was  most  likely 
Slotsholmen  which  was  being  referred  to,  where  ships  were  built  at  the 
back  of  Copenhagen  Castle4.  Bremerholm  was  also  used  to  some  extent  in 
the  16th  century,  but  the  only  physical 
pear  to  have  been  a  small  smithy  where 
and  repaired,  and  possibly  a  few  other 
Bremerholm,  in  the  area  known  as  Kra 
been  created  where  ships  could  be  laid 
in  services. 
structures  that  were  present  ap- 
the  workers  tools  were  fabricated 
small  buildings5.  Off  the  coast  of 
bbel4ýkke,  an  anchorage  had  also 
up  over  the  winter,  or  when  not 
2.  Barfod,  FlAdens  fmdseI  122-5. 
3.  Sven  Cedergreen  Bech,  Danmarks  historie,  (Kobenhavn,  1963),  6,265-6. 
4.  Barfod,  Fladens  fi  dse4  42-3. 
5.  H.  D.  Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  tid.  Bidrag  ti  den  dansk-norske  s*magts  historie 
1559-158$  (K$benhavn,  1902).  185. 
6.  H.  D.  Lind,  10m  Kong  Christian  den  Fjordes  Orlogsflaade,  I.  Flaadens  leis',  Tidskrift  for 
SOvasen,  (1890),  321-2.1 
200 When  Frederik  II  first  took  office  he  immediately  demonstrated  his 
strong  interests  in  maritime  commerce  and  naval  warfare.  One  of  the  first 
things  accomplished  after  he  assumed  the  throne  in  1559  was  to  mark  all 
the  harbours  of  the  realm  with  lights  and  buoys,  and  publish  a  chart 
which  marked  all  the  areas  to  which  he  claimed  sovereignty.  He  also  es- 
tablished  the  SOret  which  created  for  the  first  time  a  maritime  law  for 
Danish  waters. 
At  the  same  time  he  began  to  establish  the  physical  structures 
which  would  create  a  formal  dockyard  at  Bremerholm.  He  first  constructed 
a  building  in  1560  for  naval  stores  and  for  the  accommodation  of  shipcar- 
penters.  A  new  forge  was  built  in  1563,  and  there  then  followed  a  rope- 
walk,  a  sail-making  workshop,  kitchens,  and  a  defensive  blockhouse7.  The 
boundaries  of  Bremerholm  were  also  defined  and  gates  were  erected  to 
restrict  access.  Outside  of  Bremerholm  he  created  a  victualling  store  and 
powder  mills.  There  was  also  an  area  set  aside  known  as  the  Admiral- 
gaard,  where  the  rigsadmiral  had  his  residence,  but  also,  more  impor- 
tantly,  acted  as  a  small  farm  for  the  supply  of  fresh  produce  to  the 
navy's  personnel.  Although  these  developments  were  all  fairly  small  scale 
they  were  a  major  improvement  on  anything  which  had  previously  existed, 
and  laid  the  foundations  of  the  future  developments  which  Christian  IV 
was  to  institute. 
Figure  5.1.  shows  Copenhagen  and  the  naval  infrastructure  in- 
herited  by  Christian  IV  in  1596.  This  is  largely  based  on  a  hand-drawn 
map  from  the  1590s8  and  a  19th  century  estimation9,  but  due  to  the  lack 
of  accurate  source  material  much  of  this  plan  is  conjectural. 
---  -----------  -- 
7.  Jurgen  H.  Barfod,  Christian  3.  s  flJde4  (Kobenhavn,  1995),  265. 
8.  Vilhelm  Lorenzen,  Haandtegnede  kort  over  Kobenhavn  1600-1669  (Kobenhavn,  1930),  plan  I. 
9.  G.  F.  Lassen,  Documenter  og  Actstykker  til  Kjobenhavns  Befmstnings  historier  (Kobenhavn,  1855). 
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202 Almost  immediately  after  Christian  IV  assumed  power  he  set  about 
redeveloping  the  town  and  harbour  of  Copenhagen.  His  first  major  project 
was  an  impressive  new  fortified  harbour  on  Slotsholmen.  This  incor- 
porated  a  massive  new  arsenal,  known  as  the  TOjhus,  measuring  163 
metres  long  by  23  metres  wide'°,  a  provianthus  (victualling  store)  laying 
parallel  to  it  of  the  same  length  but  slightly  narrower,  and  a  svovlhus 
(powder  store)  to  one  side.  The  layout  created  a  virtually  sealed  harbour 
where  ships  could  take  on  ordnance  and  victuals  in  safety,  and  also  with 
a  certain  degree  of  secrecy.  The  buildings  were  begun  in  1598  and  com- 
pleted  around  1606.  The  harbour  itself  was  begun  in  1603  but  not  finally 
completed  until  1614.  It  was  excavated  to  a  depth  of  14  feet  and  allowed 
access  to  vessels  of  up  to  1000  tons".  Inside  the  harbour  complex  there 
were  bays  set  aside  for  boat-building,  but  it  is  not  known  to  what  extent 
these  were  ever  used.  The  architect  of  the  harbour  development  is  un- 
known  but  it  is  considered  more  than  likely  that  Christian  IV  himself  had 
a  hand  in  its  design12.  Shortly  after  it  was  built,  in  1608,  he  had  ä  fan- 
ciful  statue  erected  outside  its  entrance  in  the  form  of  Leda  and  the 
Swan  sitting  on  a  tall  pillar,  which  acted  as  a  sea  mark. 
In  parallel  with  this  development  he  set  about  replacing  the  existing 
town  walls,  which  had  changed  little  since  medieval  times.  The  work  was 
begun  in  1606  to  a  design  which  was  heavily  influenced  by  Dutch  models. 
By  1608  the  new  harbour  complex  was  also  provided  with  a  defensive  wall 
along  its  western  flank. 
------------------ 
10.  Joakim  Skovgaard.  A  King's  Architecture,  Christian  IV  and  his  buildings,  (London,  1973).  39. 
11.  Lind,  'Christian  den  Fjerdes  Orlogsflaade',  317. 
12.  Skovgaard,  A  King's  Architecture.  39. 
203 New  accommodation  was  provided  in  1614  for  the  naval  personnel, 
on  what  had  previously  been  the  Admiralgaard.  These  houses  became 
known  as  the  Skipperboder,  although  it  was  far  from  only  skippers  who 
lived  there13.  This  provided  the  men  with  good  housing,  but  also  enabled 
their  superiors  to  keep  a  watchful  eye  on  them.  This  is  borne  out  by  the 
fact  that  the  district  came  under  the  direct  jurisdiction  of  the  naval, 
rather  than  the  civic  authorities,  and  strict  naval  discipline  was  expected 
to  be  kept  there.  At  the  same  time  a  new  and  much  larger  Admiralgaard 
was  laid  out  to  the  north  of  Bremerholm. 
Figure  5.2.  shows  the  first  stage  of  Christian  IV's  redevelopment  of 
Copenhagen  and  its  dockyard,  around  1615.  Much  of  the  information  for 
this  plan  has  been  taken  from  Jan  van  Wijck's  prospect  of  1611  (Figure 
5.3.  ),  Rombout  van  den  Hoeyen's  prospect  from  a  slightly  later  date 
(Figure  5.4.  ),  and  from  an  anonymous  oil  painting14,  as  well  as  by  ex- 
trapolation  back  from  later  maps15. 
------- 
13.  A 
------------ 
register  from  1620  shows  that  a  total  of  120  were  given  housing  here,  divided  among  1 
captain,  36  skippers,  13  Styrmano  28  hmjbaadsmxna4  34  bidsmand,  4  widows  and  4  other  miscel- 
laneous  naval  personnel.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  8164,  IX,  06,  laeg  26. 
14.  Steffen  Heiberg,  Christian  4,  Monarken,  mennesket  og  myten,  (K$benhavn,  1988),  170. 
15.  See  later. 
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Figure  5.3.  Jan  van  Wijck's  prospect  of  Copenhagen,  1611. 
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Figure  5.4.  Rombout  van  den  Hoeyen's  prospect  of  Copenhagen,  c.  1615. 
207 The  next  phase  in  the  development  of  Copenhagen  was  the  con- 
struction  of  the  fortified  town  of  Christianshavn  on  reclaimed  land  on  the 
island  of  Amager.  It  may  have  originally  been  intended  as  a  fully  manned 
garrison  town's,  and  indeed  the  first  plan  drawn  up  by  the  Dutchman 
Johan  Semp  was  similar  to  that  for  an  ideal  military  camp17.  However 
these  plans  were  quickly  modified  and  a  contract  was  placed  with  Semp 
in  December  1617  to  create  a  high  class  merchant  town,  which  was  to  be 
completed  within  two  years.  Christianshavn  was  to  be  an  autonomous 
town,  separate  from  Copenhagen,  with  its  own  rights  and  privileges,  and 
with  its  own  civic  administration.  It  proved  a  highly  popular  area  for  the 
well  to  do  dignitaries  and  state  officials  in  Copenhagen  and  became  in 
effect  a  wealthy  suburb.  To  link  Christianshavn  to  Copenhagen  a  bridge 
incorporating  a  customs  house  was  built. 
At  the  same  time  Christian  IV  also  set  about  improving  the  commer- 
cial  harbour  of  Copenhagen.  The  existing  harbour  facilities,  on  the  north 
bank  of  the  water  between  Slotsholmen  and  the  town,  had  changed  little 
since  the  15th  century.  Larger  ships  could  not  enter  this  harbour  and 
had  to  lie  in  Gr4innegArds  Havn  and  have  their  goods  trans-shipped  to 
smaller  vessels.  This  was  clearly  no  longer  adequate  for  Christian  IV's 
mercantile  ambitions  and  plans  were  drawn  up  for  a  new  commercial  har- 
bour,  with  an  integrated  bourse,  by  the  Dutch  architect  Laurens  van 
Steenwinckel.  Laurens  died  before  work  began  and  the  contract  was  given 
to  his  brother,  Hans  van  Steenwinckel  the  Elder,  in  1619.  Work  was  slow 
and  hampered  by  the  frequent  intervention  of  Christian  IV  and,  although 
much  of  the  building  was  finished  by  1625,  it  was  not  finally  completed 
until  164018. 
-------------------- 
16.  Mogens  Lebech,  Gamle  skibe  -  gamle  huse4  (K4ibenhavn,  1959),  12. 
17.  Josef  W.  Konvitz.  Cities  and  the  Sea,  (Baltimore,  1978),  38. 
18.  Skovgaard,  A  King's  Architecture,  87-91. 
208 Other  developments  at  this  time  included  the  conversion  of  the 
powder  house  beside  the  new  harbour  into  a  brewery19  around  1619.  This 
brewery  was  burnt  down  in  163220  and  rebuilt  on  a  massive  scale  the 
following  year21. 
The  final  phase  of  Christian  IV's  development  of  the  town  of 
Copenhagen  was  begun  in  1629.  A  plan  was  drawn  up  in  1627  to  more 
than  double  the  size  of  the  existing  town.  This  plan  consisted  of  extend- 
ing  the  new  city  fortifications  further  to  the  north  and  east,  culminating 
in  a  massive  citadel  on  the  coast.  Within  these  new  walls  the  city  was  to 
be  developed  in  a  radial  fan  plan22. 
The  fortifications  were  more  or  less  completed  by  the  time  of  his 
death  in  1648,  but  of  the  planned  new  town  only  one  small  section  was 
completed.  This  was  the  new  accommodation  for  seamen  and  artisans 
known  as  Nyboder,  which  served  as  an  extension  to  the  Skipperboder. 
Christian  IV  first  presented  his  ideas  on  the  subject  to  the  rigsrad  in 
January  163123,  but  had  to  battle  hard  to  ensure  that  the  necessary 
finance  was  forthcoming24.  He  took  an  almost  obsessive  interest  in  their 
construction  and  regularly  went  there  to  check  on  their  progress25.  In 
total  616  new  homes  were  provided  here.  A  church  was  also  begun  close 
to  these  houses  in  1640,  but  was  never  completed  due  to  lack  of 
finance26.  The  rest  of  the  area  within  the  new  fortifications  remained 
-------------------- 
19.  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ).  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egehmndige  Breve,  I,  Note, 
170. 
20.  Letter  to  rigsri  12  April  1633,  egenha'ndige  Breve,  Vol.  III,  103. 
21.  Skovgaard,  A  King's  Architecture,  39. 
22.  Konvitz,  Cities  and  the  Sea,  38-44. 
23.  Letter  to  rigsrJo  7  January  1631,  egenhandige  Breve,  II,  319. 
24.  Letters  to  rigsadmiral  Klaus  Daa,  27  June  1631,  and  rigsrdd  28  July  1631,  egenhandige  Breve, 
II,  344  &  348. 
25.  Letter  to  rentemestren4  26  June  1636,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  48. 
26.  Skovgaard,  A  King's  Architecture,  83. 
209 largely  redundant  since  there  was  neither  the  commercial  nor  demographic 
need  for  its  development.  What  developments  there  were  largely  took  the 
form  of  pleasure  or  market  gardens. 
Figure  5.5.  shows  the  extent  of  Christian  IV's  new  city  by  the  time 
of  his  death  in  1648.  This  plan  is  much  more  accurate  than  the  previous 
ones  and  is  based  principally  on  maps  drawn  to  depict  the  Swedish  siege 
in  165827. 
5.1.2.  The  Bremerholm  Dockyard 
During  the  initial  phase  of  the  rebuilding  of  Copenhagen  little  attention 
was  paid  to  the  development  of  the  Bremerholm  dockyard  itself.  It  was 
even  left  outside  of  the  new  town  defences  of  1606,  despite  the 
Krabbelpkke  defensive  blockhouse  having  been  replaced  in  1592  with  just 
an  office  building.  Only  minor  improvements  were  made  such  as  the 
rebuilding  of  the  weigh-house  in  1607-8  and  of  the  Holmens  Port  in  1614. 
The  first  major  new  development  was  the  Great  Forge  which  was 
begun  in  1615  and  built  over  a  12-year  period.  It  was  much  larger  than 
the  previous  forge,  measuring  about  200  metres  in  length.  It  housed  18 
forges,  as  opposed  to  the  seven  in  the  old  building,  and  had  a  large 
oxen-powered  hammer28.  This  building  can  be  seen  clearly  in  Allard's 
prospect  (Figure  5.6.  ).  The  chimneys  are  concentrated  in  the  centre  and 
the  arrangement  of  windows  show  that  the  rest  of  the  building  was  used 
for  other  workshops,  offices  and  perhaps  also  barrack  accommodation.  One 
contemporary  plan29  confirms  this  referring  to  the  building  as  'der 
schmide  mit  andern  Werkhauser'  (the  forge  with  other  workshops). 
------------------- 
27.  Pufendorff's  engraving  of  1656,  and  an  anonymous  map  of  1659.  Also  a  hand-drawn  map  of 
c.  1670.  Published  in  Lebech,  Gamle  skibe  -  gamle  hussy  29  &  49;  and  Skovgaard,  A  King's  Ar- 
chitecturg  110. 
28.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  den  Fjerde  og  hans  Mmnd  paa  Bremerholm,  (Kobenhavn,  1889),  358. 
29.  Lorenzen,  Haandtegnede  kort;  plan  V. 
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Figure  5.6.  Hugo  Allard's  prospect  of  Copenhagen,  c.  1635 
212 There  may  have  been  a  separate  smithy  for  the  manufacture  of 
spikes  and  nails.  A  new  naglebod  (nail  house)  was  built  in  1607-8  and  in 
1623  a  spmsmedje  (nail  smithy)  is  mentioned30,  although  by  this  time  it 
May  well  have  been  incorporated  into  the  larger  forge  complex. 
After  the  new  forge  came  into  operation  the  old  forge  was  con- 
verted  into  a  church  for  the  seamen  and  dockyard  personnel.  A  tem- 
porary  church  had  been  established  at  Bremerholm  in  1617  in  'det  Hus, 
som  Maaltid  holdtes  udi'  (the  house  in  which  meals  are  taken)31,  but  by 
1619  the  old  forge  was  converted.  The  original  exterior  was  at  first 
retained  but  in  1641  Christian  IV  ordered  that  it  should  be  enlarged  and 
reconstructed  in  the  shape  of  a  cross32.  There  was  also  a  dockyard 
hospital  which  was  located  beside  the  Holmens  Port,  near  to  the  new 
church,  but  this  was  removed  from  Bremerholm  to  a  site  on  the  old  for- 
tifications  around  162833  and  the  old  building  was  then  used  as  a 
school34. 
Other  workshops  and  stores  were  also  constructed  in  the  1620s.  In 
1623  a  payment  was  made  to  a  carpenter  to  erect  'en  mglle  at  stampe 
Hamp  med  paa  Bremerholm'  (a  mill  to  prepare  hemp  with  on  Bremerholm)35 
which  was  located  somewhere  near  the  rope-walk.  Another  building,  43 
bindinger  (40m  approx.  )  long,  was  constructed  in  1626  for  the  storage  of 
oars  and  yards  and  other  stores36,  but  its  precise  location  is  unknown. 
---------  --  --- 
30.  E.  Madsen,  'Bidrag  til  K$benhavns  historie,  sarlig  i  Kristian  IV.  s  tid',  lIistorisk  Meddelelser 
om  Kobenhavn,  I  Rskke,  6  Bd.  (1917),  606. 
31.  H.  D.  Lind,  'En  liden  Bremerholms-Kr$nike  1576-1648',  Museum,  (1892).  57. 
32.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfedt,  27  Feb  1641,  egenha'ndige  Breve,  V,  26. 
33.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Mand  395. 
34.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Mang  428. 
35.  Payment  to  Abraham  Krug,  1  December  1623,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  quoted  in  note, 
egenhandige  Breve,  I,  326. 
36.  Madsen,  'Bidrag  til  KObenhavns  historie',  607. 
213 ýý 
Around  1620  a  prison  was  also  constructed  to  house  the  convicts 
who  were  sentenced  to  hard  labour  at  the  dockyard37.  The  wooden  build- 
ing,  described  as  a  trunk,  must  have  been  situated  somewhere  near  the 
moat  as  prisoners  are  reported  to  have  escaped  by  crawling  down  the 
drains  and  swimming  away3s.  A  second  wooden  prison  house  was  built  in 
1635-639,  but  by  1640  Christian  IV  ordered  the  building  of  yet  another, 
more  secure  new  building40: 
Epthersom  fangerne  Endnu  dagliigen  Briider  udaff  trunchen,  daa  Er 
ded  best,  att  der  bigges  En  anden  trunch  til  dem  pa  dy  steeder, 
som  man  kan  bedre  see  tiil,  huylcken  vyl  muriis,  ty  aff  t(pmmer  kan 
den  inted  lenge  waahre  Och  uyl  koste  mehre  End  aff  Steen,  y 
sl)nderlighed  om  den  skall  g4rres  aff  gaadt  fast  t4mmer. 
Since  prisoners  still  daily  escape  from  the  trunk,  it  will  be  best  to 
build  another  trunk  for  them  in  those  places  where  it  can  be  bet- 
ter  supervised,  which  will  be  brick  built,  as  it  will  not  last  long  in 
timber  and  would  cost  more  than  if  built  of  stone,  especially  if  it  is 
to  be  made  from  good  strong  timber. 
Apart  from  the  construction  of  new  buildings  the  other  major  step 
in  the  modernisation  of  the  dockyard  in  the  1620s  was  to  create  a  proper 
wet  dock  where  supplies  could  be  delivered  and  ships  repaired  away  from 
the  shipbuilding  slipways.  There  had  long  been  an  area  of  water  beside 
the  rope-walk  where  timber  was  laid  to  be  seasoned,  as  shown  in  Figure 
-------------------- 
37.  See  Chapter  6. 
38.  Bertha  S.  Phillpotts  (Ed.  ),  The  Life  of  Jon  Olafsson,  Vol.  I.  (Hakluyt  Society,  Series  II,  Vol. 
LIII,  1923),  42-3. 
39.  Madsen,  'Bidrag  til  K$benhavns  historie',  607. 
40.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  29  March  1640,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  319. 
214 5.3.,  but  it  is  unlikely  that  vessels  were  able  to  enter  it,  and  it  looks  as 
if  it  were  little  more  than  a  marshy  area  of  waste  ground.  Christian  IV 
wanted  to  turn  this  to  better  use  and  in  1621  stated  that: 
Den  store  laade,  som  huggis  paa  holmen,  skall  verre  y  aaldt  140  al- 
len  lang,  och  skall  Abraham  Ingenipr  derepther  forkorthe  transien. 
The  large  dock,  which  is  being  excavated  on  Bremerholm,  shall  be 
140  ells  (85  m)  long  in  total,  and  Abraham  (de  la  Haye)  Engineer 
shall  thereafter  shorten  the  entrance.  41 
An  indication  of  the  impressive  nature  of  these  developments  made 
to  Bremerholm  during  this  period  comes  from  the  reports  of  the  Baron  de 
Cormenin42  who  visited  Copenhagen  in  1629: 
De  lautre  caste  de  cet  Havre,  en  entrant  ä  main  droite  hors  la  ville 
est  le  Holme;  le  long  du  quay  (avec  un  grüe),  c'est  lä  oü  les  Vais- 
seaux  les  plus  grands  touchant  du  flanc  au  quay  &  se  viennent 
master  il  ya  trois  grands  couverts,  longs  comme  un  mail,  ob  se 
filent  les  cables  &  cordages,  les  forges  des  Artisans  sont  pour  fair 
cheviliers,  traversiers  de  grand  &  de  petits  ancres,  &  tous  les 
autres  ustanciles  qui  sont  necessaires  aux  Vaisseaux,  dans  la  3. 
couverte,  est  le  bois,  les  acquis  &  calfender,  les  mats,  les  voiles, 
les  antennes,  les  pavillions  &  les  tonnes;  il  ya  toüjours  grand 
nombre  d'ouvriers  (Envir  5ä6  cens  qui  ont  10.  R  par  an  ä  gagner  & 
un  habit  &  nourris)  qui  travaillent,  sont  a  reparer  ou  calfauder, 
soit  aux  instructions  des  Vaisseaux  neufs. 
-------------------- 
41.  Letter  to  Christian  Friis,  12  February  1621,  egenhandige  Breve,  I,  191. 
42.  Des  Hayes,  Les  voyages  do  Monsieur  Des  Hayes,  Baron  de  Covrmesvin,  en  Dannemare  (1664), 
226-231. 
215 On  the  other  coast  of  this  harbour,  on  entering  on  the  right  hand 
side  outside  the  town  is  the  Holm:  along  the  quay  (with  a  crane),  is 
where  the  large  vessels  berth  alongside  the  quay  and  are  rigged. 
There  are  three  large  buildings,  long  as  a  mall,  where  cable  and 
cordage  is  spun,  the  forge  of  the  workmen  where  spikes,  cross 
pieces  for  large  and  small  anchors,  and  all  the  other  equipment 
which  is  necessary  for  ships  is  made,  in  the  third  building  is  the 
wood,  the  stores(?  )  and  caulking,  the  masts,  the  sails,  the  yards, 
the  flags,  and  the  barrels;  there  are  always  a  large  number  of 
workers  (around  5  or  6  hundred  who  earn  10  rigsdaler  a  year  in 
wages  and  a  set  of  clothing  and  victuals)  who  work  repairing  and 
caulking,  or  by  instruction  on  the  new  ships. 
Cormenin  further  noted  that  before  the  Kejserkrig  there  had  been  plans 
to  build  a  castle  at  the  end  of  the  rope-walk,  and  so  bring  the  dockyard 
within  the  town  defences: 
Proche  le  lieu  oü  sont  les  Navires,  il  ya  un  endroit  dans  la  mer, 
marque  de  pilottis  de  quarante  toises  en  quarre,  ob  le  dessein  du 
Roy  estoit  auparavant  la  guerre  d'y  bastir  un  Chateau  ä 
1'embouchure  du  Havre,  &  enfermer  le  Holme  dans  la  ville,  il  n'est 
pas  mal-aise  de  bastir-lä,  car  la  mer  y  est  douce  &  n'y  a  point  a 
reff  us. 
Near  the  place  where  the  ships  are  (Krabbelpkke),  there  is  an  area 
in  the  sea  marked  by  piles  that  is  40  tois  (79  metres)  square, 
where  the  king  planned  before  the  war  to  build  a  castle  at  the 
216 mouth  of  the  harbour,  and  enclose  the  Holm  in  the  town.  It  is  not 
awkward  to  build  there  because  the  sea  there  is  very  gentle  and 
there  is  no  ebb. 
This  plan  appears  never  to  have  got  beyond  the  initial  ground 
work  stage43  and  was  superseded  by  the  grandiose  new  fortifications 
begun  shortly  after  the  war.  In  1608-9  rubble  is  noted  as  being  cast  into 
the  deep  at  KrabbelOkke  and  shortly  after  a  'vagthus'  (watch  house)  was 
built  on  the  site  using  a  sunken  ship44.  A  blockhouse  was  also  created  on 
the  Amager  side  of  the  harbour  entrance  in  1624  which  was  again  formed 
by  sinking  a  number  of  ships  in  the  shallows45. 
The  Scots  soldier  Robert  Monro48  was  also  highly  impressed  by  the 
facilities  he  saw  when  he  visited  Copenhagen  at  around  the  same  time  as 
Cormenin: 
And  for  the  better  maintaining  of  warre,  no  kingdome  or  king  I 
know,  is  better  provided  of  a  Magazin,  then  this  magnanimous  king, 
for  Armes,  brasse  ordnance  (whereof  every  yeere  his  Majesty  doth 
cast  above  a  hundred  peeces)  being  sufficiently  provided  of  Amuni- 
tion  and  of  all  sorts  of  fiery  Engines,  to  be  used  by  Sea  or  Land, 
together  with  Armour  sufficient  for  to  arme  a  great  Armie  of  Horse. 
His  Majestie  is  also  sufficiently  well  provided  of  shipping,  and 
yearely  doth  adde  to  the  number,  which  ships  are  built  by  two 
worthy  Scottish-men,  called  Mr.  Balfoure,  and  Mr.  Sinclaire,  being 
-------------------- 
43.  The  skriverstue  office  building  at  the  end  of  the  rope-walk  was  removed  in  1615,  probably  in 
connection  with  this  development. 
44.  Madsen,  'Bidrag  til  K4obenhavns  historie',  599. 
45.  Lind,  'En  liden  Bremerholms-Kr4onike',  58. 
46.  Robert  Monro,  Monro  His  Expedition  with  the  worthy  Scots  Regiment  (called  Mac-Keyes  Regi- 
ment)  levied  in  August  1624  (London,  1637),  1,87. 
217 both  well  accounted  off  by  his  Majestie,  who  in  like  manner  hath  a 
Reprobane  at  Copmanhagen,  for  making  of  Cords  and  Cables  for  his 
shipping  and  Kingdome,  where  I  was  informed,  that  in  twenty  foure 
houres  time,  they  were  able  to  furnish  the  greatest  ship  the  King 
had,  of  Cables  and  of  all  other  tackling  and  cordage,  necessary  to 
set  out  the  Ship. 
Several  minor  changes  were  made  in  the  early  1630s.  Two  boat 
houses  were  built  at  the  seaward  end  of  the  rope-walk,  one  in  1632  and 
another  larger  one  in  163447.  The  sejlhus  sail-making  workshop  at  the 
other  end  of  the  rope-walk  was  altered  at  this  time  and  a  drogestue 
(drying  room)  added,  which  was  further  enlarged  in  164148.  A  takkelhus 
(tackle  store)  is  also  mentioned  around  1634,  where  finished  new  cordage 
was  stored4g,  but  its  size  and  location  are  unknown,  and  may  have  been 
part  of  the  converted  sejlhus. 
It  is  possible  that  the  sail-making  workshop  was  relocated  at  this 
time,  but  there  are  few  indications  of  this  other  than  a  title  deeds  which 
details  a  site  in  Silkegade  'op  til  kongens  sejlhus',  which  would  suggest 
that  it  had  been  moved  outside  the  confines  of  Bremerholm  altogether. 
However  a  new  dockyard  gate  was  built  'ved  Sejlhuset  udenfor  Osterport' 
(by  the  sejlhus  outside  Osterport)51  which  fairly  accurately  describes  its 
original  position.  A  later  deed62  also  outlines  a  plot  'mellem  sejlhuset  og 
reberbanen  paa  Bremerholm'  (between  the  sejlhus  and  the  rope-walk  on 
-- 
47. 
------------ 
Letter  to 
---- 
rentemestrene+  30  August  1634,  egenhandige  Breve,  III,  280. 
48.  Letter  to  Sten  Beck,  17  July  1641,  egenharndige  Breve,  V,  103. 
49.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Ma'nd  385. 
50.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  29  October  1632. 
51.  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  23  September  1635. 
52.  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  10  December  1644. 
218 Bremerholm).  The  answer  may  perhaps  be  that  a  separate  sejlhus  was 
built  within  the  town  which  acted  as  the  warehouse  for  incoming 
materials53,  while  the  actual  sail-making  workshops  continued  to  occupy 
the  upper  stories  of  the  original  building.  The  weigh-house  was  now  also 
located  on  the  ground  floor  of  this  building. 
A  new  road  was  also  built  into  Bremerholm  in  1634  from  the 
Nyboder  and  a  new  Port,  known  as  Vandporten,  built  beside  the  Sejlhus 
as  an  entrance  for  men  coming  in  from  this  area54.  The  draw-bridge 
across  the  now  redundant  moat  between  the  Holmens  Kirke  and  the  new 
forge  was  also  removed  and  infilled55. 
The  next  significant  addition  to  the  dockyard  facilities  was  to  at- 
tempt  the  construction  of  a  dry  dock.  The  larger  ships  were  exceedingly 
difficult  to  careen  and  at  one  state  an  application  was  even  made  to  the 
East  India  Company  in  London  to  use  their  dry-dock56  to  get  around  the 
problem.  It  would  be  far  easier  if  a  dry-dock  could  be  constructed  at 
Bremerholm  and  the  first  evidence  of  Christian  IV's  plans  for  such  a  dock 
comes  in  September  1635  when  timber  was  sent  for  which  could  be  used 
for  the  repair  of  ships  or  for  'den  Dok,  som  i  Fremtiden  muligt  bliver  an- 
lagt  paa  Holmen'  (the  dock  which  might  be  established  in  the  future  at 
Bremerholm)57.  Christian  IV  presented  his  ideas  to  the  rigsräd  a  couple 
of  months  later: 
------------------- 
53.  Forordning  om  Segelhusit  vdi  Kpbenhaffn.  17  March  1623,  British  Library,  D.  A.  6/2  (33). 
54.  Lind,  'En  Tiden  Bremerholms-Kr4nike',  60. 
55.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  23  February  1634  and  5  November  1634. 
56.  Draft  contract  with  Theophilo  Eaton,  1624?,  egenhandige  Breve,  I,  398-9;  Court  Minutes  of  the 
East  India  Co.,  22  September  1624,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  Colonial,  East  Indies  1622-24,411. 
57.  Instruks  for  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  22  September  1635. 
58.  Letter  to  rigsrdd  1  December  1635,  egenhandige  Breve,  III,  449. 
219 Epthersom  ded  er  Riigens  Admiral!  med  alle  dem,  som  oss  till  Siigs 
tiiener,  bekendt,  Att  den  Reall  flode  med  tiiden  ganske  foregaar, 
Saframdt  den  icke  udi  tyde  faar  hiielp,  Huilckid  ued  Ingen  anden 
middell  skee  kan,  vdenad  man  laader  gmrre  En  ducke,  huorudi  man 
kan  sette  dy  skiib,  som  man  uiil  hiielppe  fraa  kgllen  op. 
Since  it  is  the  knowledge  of  the  rigsadmiral  and  of  all  those  who 
serve  us  at  sea,  that  the  royal  navy  over  time  altogether  perishes, 
unless  it  is  maintained  in  good  time,  which  can  be  done  by  no 
other  means  apart  from  the  establishment  of  a  dock  in  which  ships 
can  be  sat,  so  that  they  can  be  repaired  from  the  keel  up. 
The  rigsrad  granted  the  necessary  money59  and  work  was  begun  that 
winter.  The  site  for  this  new  dry-dock  was  on  the  site  of  the  proposed 
castle  at  the  end  of  the  rope-walk,  out  towards  the  KrabbelGkke 
anchorage: 
Daa  skall  der  Buckiis  Peele  langs  dybid,  der  som  Ankerne  pleiier  at 
ligge.  Saat  man  der  kan  faa  En  braabenck.  60 
Then  there  shall  be  driven  piles  along  the  deep,  where  the  anchors 
usually  lie.  So  that  a  repair  dock  can  be  made  there. 
I  skall  uerre  derom,  at  man  kan  faa  Nogiid  fgrret(Pmmer  ued  handen 
tiil  att  slaa  En  dam  for  Enden  aff  Reeberbaanen  ind  y  dybiid,  der- 
som  den  ducke  tiil  at  Reparere  Skiiben  udi  skall  gOrris.  61 
-------------------- 
59.  Kr.  Erslev,  Aktstykker  og  oplysninger  til  rigsraad  og  standermgdernes  his  tone  i  Kristian  IV's 
tid  (K$benhavn,  1883-90),  II,  404. 
60.  Letter  to  rigsadmiral,  6  December  1635,  egenha?  ndige  Breve,  III,  453-4. 
61.  Letter  to  rentemestrene,  27  March  1636,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  24. 
220 You  shall  see  to  it,  that  you  can  get  some  fir  timber  handy  to  build 
a  dam  from  the  end  of  the  rope-walk  into  the  deep,  where  the  dock 
to  repair  ships  in  shall  be. 
This  pile-work  was  then  infilled  with  earth  over  the  next  few  years62. 
Progress  was  slow,  hampered  no  doubt  to  a  large  extent  by  the  lack  of  a 
tide  in  the  Baltic,  but  by  1642  Christian  IV  could  order63: 
Der  uyl  settis  En  Stor  och  En  liiden  kraan  ued  ded  Nii  Peluerck 
wdenfor  Reberbanen,  huorued  man  kan  kGlhale  bade  store  och  sma 
skiib,  paded  man  Icke  Er  trengdt  tyl  Braa  steder,  som  man  Nu  Er. 
There  will  be  erected  a  large  and  a  small  crane  by  the  new  pile- 
work  out  by  the  rope-walk,  with  which  both  large  and  small  ships 
can  be  careened,  so  that  they  are  not  forced  to  the  slipways,  as 
they  now  are. 
Dry  docks  at  this  time  were  fairly  rudimentary  and  basically  con- 
sisted  of  an  area  of  land  where  ships  could  be  hauled  up  out  of  the 
water,  with  a  gate  or  dam  which  could  be  built  across  the  entrance  to 
prevent  flooding64.  In  Allard's  prospect  an  area  of  rough  ground  can  be 
seen  at  the  end  of  the  rope-walk,  and  although  it  hardly  looks  impressive 
it  is  more  than  likely  that  this  was  the  new  dry  dock.  The  picture  can  be 
----------------- 
62.  Letter  to  rentemestrene,  16  June  1636,  and  to  J$rgen  Vind,  17  October  1640,  egenhandige 
Breve`  IV,  41  &  414. 
63.  Letter  to  J$rgen  Vind,  31  October  1642,  egenhandige  Breve  V,  260. 
64.  The  only  proper  dry-docks  in  Europe  at  this  time  were  in  England.  France  did  not  have  a 
dry  dock  until  the  latter  half  of  the  17th  century,  and  Spain  and  Sweden,  like  Denmark,  did  not 
have  one  until  well  into  the  18th  century.  (Jan  Glete,  Navies  and  Nations:  Warships,  Navies  and 
State  Building  in  Europe  and  America,  1500-1860.  (Stockholm,  1993),  65.  ) 
221 dated  to  between  1633  and  1640  and  it  may  be  that  the  dock  is  depicted 
whilst  still  under  construction.  In  1681  another  unsuccessful  attempt  was 
made  to  build  a  much  more  advanced  dry  dock  on  this  site65,  which 
would  suggest  that  the  facility  built  in  Christian  IV's  time  was  indeed 
very  primitive. 
There  were  plans  to  convert  the  rope-walk  in  1644,  which  would 
have  divided  it  into  four  separate  bayse6.  Again  the  king  was  insistent  on 
the  way  this  should  be  carried  out  and  drew  up  his  own  plans  for  its 
conversion67  so  that  his  proposals  were  made  perfectly  clear.  The  build- 
ing  had  already  been  converted  in  1616-7  with  the  addition  of  an  attic 
storeyes  which  may  have  been  used  in  connection  with  materials  storage. 
Certainly  in  the  early  1640s  reference  is  made  to  the  storage  of  timber  in 
the  rope-walkeg  and  the  subdivision  referred  to  in  1644  may  have  been 
intended  for  just  the  attic  storey.  In  1640  there  had  been  complaints 
about  the  noise  of  the  machinery  and  a  bell  now  had  to  be  used  to  signal 
that  the  carriage  had  reached  the  far  end  of  the  building.  Knud  Klem7° 
suggests  that  the  subdivision  of  the  rope-walk  was  an  attempt  to  reduce 
the  noise  and  to  provide  fire  protection.  He  also  suggests  that  four 
separate  rope-walks  were  now  installed  although  this  is  unlikely. 
65.  Ole  Lisberg  Jensen,  'Bremerholm  eller  Gammelholm'.  Marinehistorisk  Tidskriff  3/1988.19. 
66.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  28  January  1644,  egenhandige  Brevq  V,  439. 
67.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  16  February  1644,  egenha'ndige  Brevq  V,  448. 
68.  Madsen,  'Bidrag  til  Kmbenhavns  historie',  596-7. 
69.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  22  Nov  1640,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  421,  and  un-addressed  letter, 
19  May  1642,  egenhandige  Brevq  V.  213 
70.  Knud  Klem,  'Christian  IV  og  Bremerholm'.  Handels-  og  Smfarts  Museets  drbog,  (1977),  95-6. 
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Whatever  the  modification,  a  new  rope  spinner  was  appointed  in 
December  164471,  but  operations  must  have  ceased  not  long  afterwards 
since  in  1653  a  commission  investigating  Bremerholm  recommended  that  the 
now  disused  rope-walk  should  be  put  back  into  operation72.  Where  the 
navy  obtained  its  cordage  from  in  the  meantime  is  unknown,  but  it  is 
likely  that  the  Icelandic  company's  rope-walk  provided  some  of  the  sup- 
plies,  and  in  1646  a  merchant  was  granted  permission  to  build  another 
rope-walk  on  the  road  to  Amager73. 
The  last  dockyard  building  completed  in  Christian  IV's  lifetime  was 
the  new  navigation  school  which  was  erected  near  the  entrance  to 
Bremerholm74.  Figure  5.7.  shows  with  a  fair  degree  of  accuracy  how  the 
Bremerholm  dockyard  would  have  looked  in  1648.  Again  the  lack  of  ac- 
curate  source  material  has  meant  that  a  certain  amount  of  guess  work  is 
involved  in  regard  to  the  precise  size  and  location  of  some  of  the  build- 
ings. 
-------------------- 
71.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  2  December  1644. 
72.  H.  O.  Lind,  Kong  Frederik  den  Tredjes  S4magt:  Oct  dansk-norske  ssvarns  historie  1648-1674 
(Kobenhavn,  1896),  68. 
73.  Letter  to  Anders  Thim,  Kance)liets  Brevbmger,  27  November  1646. 
74.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Mend  429. 
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224 5.2.  Slotq 
The  first  purpose  built  naval  dockyard  in  Denmark  was  not  in 
Copenhagen  but  on  a  small  island  in  Nakskov  Fjord  which  became  known 
as  Slotp.  It  was  created  by  king  Hans  in  1509  who  ordered  a  castle,  by 
the  name  of  Engelsborg,  and  a  fortified  dockyard  to  be  built  there.  The 
construction  had  a  unique  design,  incorporating  a  round  tower  and  two 
walls  which  ran  down  to  the  shore  forming  aV  shape.  Within  these  walls 
were  a  slipway  and  various  associated  buildings  and  at  their  end  was  a 
wooden  quay75.  This  was  a  natural  place  for  Hans  to  have  a  naval  dock- 
yard  since  his  primary  sea  borne  enemies  were  Lübeck  and  the  Hanse 
towns.  It  remained  in  use  until  mid  way  through  the  16th  century,  by 
which  time  the  threat  from  northern  Germany  had  been  largely  super- 
seded  by  that  of  Sweden,  and  the  castle  and  dockyard  were  abandoned. 
By  1623  the  plentiful  woods  and  forests  in  the  area  had  caught  the 
eye  of  Christian  IV76.  Rather  than  bringing  all  this  timber  to  Copenhagen 
it  was  decided  to  build  a  large  ship  on  the  spot.  In  1624  Daniel  Sinclair 
was  appointed  as  master  shipwright  for  the  yards  and  a  small  temporary 
forge  was  ordered  to  be  erected  near  where  the  ship  was  to  be  built78. 
It  seemed  at  first  uncertain  whether  this  new  yard  would  be  on  the  site 
of  the  old  dockyard.  When  the  idea  was  being  investigated  it  was  noted 
that  'Kongen  har  sendt  Steen  Villumsen,  Admiral  paa  Bremerholm,  til 
Laaland  for  ved  Nakskov  at  udse  et  bekvemt  Sted  til  Bygning  of  et  stort 
Skib'  (the  king  has  sent  Steen  Villumsen,  Holmens  admiral,  to  Lolland  near 
------------------- 
75.  Ingolf  Ericsson,  'Engelsborg  pA  Slot$  -  skibsvarft,  fastning  og  lensmandssade  fra  kong  Hans' 
tid',.  -  Hikuin,  14  (1988).  261-74;  Barfod,  Eiiden  ffdsel,  121-2. 
76.  Missive  to  J  rgen  Grubbe,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  19  November  1623. 
77.  Memorial  to  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  31  January  1624.  Sinclair's  involvement  with 
the  yard  is  discussed  in:  Martin  Bellamy,  'Daniel  Sinclair  and  the  Danish  Naval  Dockyard  at  Slot, 
1624-34',  industrial  Heritage,  13  (1995),  2-7.  See  also  Chapter  B. 
78.  Missive  to  J$rgen  Grubbe,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  31  January  1624. 
225 Nakskov  to  select  a  suitable  site  for  the  building  of  a  large  ship)79. 
However,  shortly  afterwards  instructions  were  sent  to  the  local  lensmand 
80which  seem  to  confirm  that  the  same  site  was  indeed  used: 
Han  skal  straks  lade  opfcre  et  Hus  ved  Engelsborg  paa  Laaland,  som 
kan  bruges  til  de  TGmmermaend,  Borere,  Savskmrere  og  Baadsmaend, 
der  skulle  arbejde  paa  det  Skib,  som  kongen  vil  lade  bygge  der. 
He  shall  immediately  order  a  house  to  be  built  by  Engelsborg  on 
Lolland  which  can  be  used  by  the  carpenters,  auger-men,  sawyers 
and  seamen,  who  shall  work  on  the  ship  which  the  king  has  in- 
structed  to  be  built  there. 
This  document  also  shows  that  a  decision  had  been  made  to  estab- 
lish  a  rather  more  permanent  yard  and  outlines  in  detail  all  the  various 
buildings  and  facilities  which  were  needed  for  the  small  shipyard  to  func- 
tion.  In  total  seven  separate  buildings  of  various  sizes  were  needed.  The 
workers  barracks  mentioned  above  was  to  be  20  bindinger  (20m)  long  and 
was  to  have  two  large  fireplaces  so  that  they  could  warm  themselves  in 
winter.  A  smithy  was  to  be  built  with  two  separate  forges.  Beside  this  a 
three  apartment  building  was  to  be  built,  of  which  two  rooms  were  for 
the  smith  and  his  men  to  live  in,  and  the  third  for  their  provisions.  A 
building  with  four  rooms  was  needed  for  the  clerk,  one  room  for  his 
living  room,  one  for  his  office  and  two  for  stores.  The  master  shipwright 
also  had  a  four  roomed  house,  two  of  which  were  to  live  in,  with  the 
other  two  for  his  provisions  and  for  all  his  instruments  and  tools.  An 
eight  room  building  was  needed  for  the  kitchen  and  its  stores.  A  separate 
79.  Missive  to  Laurits  &  Jiorgen  Grubbe,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  10  March  1624. 
80.  Missive  to  Jurgen  Grubbe,  Kancelliets  BrevbOger,  19  March  1624. 
226 two  room  building  was  also  needed  for  the  storage  of  all  the  necessary 
spikes  and  treenails.  It  is  also  clear  from  this  description  that  only  the 
hull  of  the  ship  was  to  be  built,  with  no  provision  being  made  for 
facilities  for  outfitting  or  rigging  the  ship. 
When  the  site  was  excavated  in  the  1940s8'  the  foundations  of  two 
small  buildings  from  this  time  were  unearthed  within  the  fortified  walls. 
These  were  probably  used  in  connection  with  the  preparation  of  pitch 
and  tar  for  caulking  the  ships,  while  the  rest  of  the  buildings  mentioned 
above  would  have  been  located  outside  the  walls.  A  significant  amount  of 
charcoal  and  soot  was  also  unearthed  on  the  south  of  the  island  which 
would  suggest  that  the  forge  was  located  in  this  area,  well  away  from  the 
yard  itself.  By  1626  a  brewery  had  also  been  set  up. 
The  accounts  for  the  building  of  this  ship  have  survived82  along 
with  detailed  muster  lists  and  inventories  for  the  yard  itself  which  give 
an  invaluable  insight  into  its  operation.  The  number  of  men  working  on 
the  ship  varied  from  around  100  to  130.  The  largest  proportion  of  the 
workforce  consisted  of  skilled  wood  workers,  with  a  slightly  smaller  num- 
ber  of  ordinary  seamen  who  presumably  acted  as  labourers  during  the 
earlier  stages  of  construction.  The  majority  of  the  ship  carpenters  were 
hired  in  from  Germany,  the  apprentices  were  Norwegian,  while  their 
foremen  and  the  rest  of  the  personnel,  were  all  Danish. 
Early  in  1628  Sinclair  received  another  contract  to  built  two  more 
ships  at  the  shipyard83.  The  terms  of  this  contract  show  that  the 
shipyard,  although  still  state-owned,  was  now  in  effect  no  longer  state- 
run  but  had  become  a  private  operation,  with  Sinclair  having  to  supply 
------------------- 
81.  Marius  Hansen,  'Udgravningen  of  Kong  Hanses  skibsvarft  Engelsborg  paa  S1oto  i  Nakskov 
Fjord',  Handels-  og  50fartsmuseets  Aarbog,  (1948),  20-57. 
82.  Regnskaber  for  Skibsbyggeriet  paa  Slots$en  ved  Nakskov,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  Ren- 
tekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  d. 
83.  Kancelliets  Brevboger.  7  Feb  1628. 
227 all  the  labour  and  materials  himself.  This  is  confirmed  in  the  official 
records  for  these  ships,  which  in  marked  contrast  to  the  full  records  of 
the  first  ship,  consist  solely  of  accounts  of  materials  supplied  to  the  yard 
from  Bremerholm. 
The  Danish  involvement  in  the  thirty  years  war  had  by  this  time 
taken  on  a  maritime  dimension  and  the  north  German  ports  were  being 
blockaded.  The  threat  of  a  maritime  invasion  was  in  the  air  and  rather 
than  withdraw  the  whole  Danish  fleet  to  Copenhagen  it  was  decided  to  ex- 
periment  that  year  with  over-wintering  some  of  the  navy's  ships  in 
Nakskov  Fjord84.  In  total  six  ships  were  to  be  stationed  there  and 
repaired  as  necessary.  Two  of  them  needed  extensive  repairs  to  their  keel 
although  it  was  not  sure  at  first  whether  this  work  could  successfully  be 
carried  out  here85.  The  necessary  materials  for  the  refits  as  well  as  vict- 
uals  for  the  men  had  to  be  sent  from  Copenhagen,  and  there  was  nowhere 
for  the  ships'  crews  at  the  dockyard  and  so  they  had  to  be  billeted  in 
local  farms.  However,  the  logic  behind  this  experiment  was  sound  enough 
since  Nakskov,  being  much  farther  south  than  Copenhagen,  would  remain 
ice-free  for  a  little  longer,  allowing  the  ships  to  re-enter  active  service 
more  quickly,  although  the  arrangements  do  appear  to  have  been  some- 
what  haphazard.  The  threat  was  removed  when  Denmark  sued  for  peace 
the  following  year  and  the  experiment  seems  never  to  have  been  repeated. 
A  fourth  ship  was  built  between  1631-1633,  after  which  there  is  no 
further  mention  of  shipbuilding  activity  in  the  area86.  Sinclair,  who  was 
the  only  master  shipwright  to  have  worked  there,  died  in  1636  but  the 
closure  of  the  yard  was  probably  more  to  do  with  the  fact  that  after 
--- 
84. 
--------- 
Missive 
--- 
to 
---- 
Kommissarierne  paa  Lolland  og  Falster,  Kancelliets  Brevbgger,  18  October  1628. 
85.  Missive  to  Hendrik  Vind,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  19  December  1628. 
86.  Missive  to  Jost  Frederik  Pappenheim,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  12  April  1633. 
228 building  four  warships  the  useful  supply  of  timber  had  by  then  come  to 
an  end,  and  it  had  become  impractical  to  continue  operations  at  such  a 
distance  from  the  capital  and  its  ever  improving  dockyard  facilities. 
Another  factor  may  have  been  that,  although  the  yard  had  been 
purpose  built  for  the  construction  of  the  small-scale  warships  of  the 
early  16th  century,  it  was  no  longer  adequate  for  the  larger  ships  of  the 
17th  century,  and  conditions  must  have  been  very  cramped.  Although  a 
slipway  was  unearthed  within  the  walls  during  the  1940s  excavations  the 
overall  length  of  the  first  ship  was  greater  than  the  walls  themselves, 
and  the  second  contract  to  build  two  ships  simultaneously  could  not  pos- 
sibly  have  been  carried  out  solely  within  the  walls. 
The  existing  layout  did  not  really  lend  itself  to  shipbuilding  either. 
The  walls  may  have  given  plenty  of  protection  from  attacking  forces  and, 
to  a  lesser  extent,  from  the  weather,  but  they  must  have  presented 
serious  problems  when  it  came  to  materials  storage  and  handling.  There 
does  not  appear  sufficient  storage  space  within  the  walls  for  all  the 
necessary  timber,  let  alone  for  its  cutting  and  preparation.  No  doubt  this 
was  done  outside  the  walls  and  only  the  finished  timbers  brought  to  the 
slipway.  To  get  them  to  the  slipway  meant  having  to  enter  the  fortifica- 
tions  either  through  one  of  the  two  small  side  doors  or  else  taken  around 
the  end  of  the  walls  and  across  the  shore-front.  This  was  clearly  a 
highly  inefficient  operation  and  this,  together  with  the  other  factors  men- 
tioned,  makes  it  no  surprise  that  operations  did  not  continue  at  the  yard 
for  any  more  than  a  decade. 
5.3.  Glückstadt 
The  fortified  town  of  Glückstadt  was  established  on  the  river  Elbe  in 
1616.  It  was  basically  a  small  border  garrison  town,  with  a  commercial 
harbour  inside  its  fortifications.  At  first  there  was  little  reason  for  the 
229 navy  to  have  a  base  in  the  area,  but  the  decision  to  impose  tolls  on  the 
Elbe  in  1629  and  the  subsequent  blockade  by  the  Hamburg  fleet  in  1630 
meant  that  a  significant  naval  presence  was  thereafter  required87. 
The  possibilities  of  having  any  major  dockyard  facilities  were  mini- 
mal  since  the  nature  of  the  towns  fortifications  did  not  easily  lend  them- 
selves  to  any  river-front  development.  It  was,  however,  possible  for  a 
small  number  of  ships  to  over-winter  there.  The  usual  procedure  was  for 
the  summer  fleet  to  be  replaced  by  a  handful  of  seaworthy  ships  which 
needed  no  significant  repair  work,  while  the  others  returned  to 
Bremerholm  for  their  refit.  Some  ship  repair  facilities  must  have  existed 
though,  since  in  1635  a  galley  was  sent  there  to  be  repaired88,  and  two 
years  later  a  much  larger  warship  was  also  repaired,  although  the  timber 
and  workmen  did  have  to  be  procured  from  a  local  contractor89. 
Early  in  1639  a  small  warship,  which  had  by  then  been  on  the  Elbe 
for  three  years,  needed  extensive  repairs.  Rather  than  return  to 
Bremerholm  it  was  ordered  to  the  small  island  of  Rethipwel  outside 
Glückstadt,  where  it  was  careened  and  new  keel  timbers  fitted90.  It  was 
forced  to  use  its  own  tackle  and  all  the  repair  materials  had  to  be  sent 
from  Copenhagen.  This  may  have  been  the  spur  for  Christian  IV  to  order 
preliminary  work  on  what  sound  like  the  foundations  for  some  form  of 
harbour  later  that  year91,  the  plans  of  which  he  had  drawn  up  himself. 
Unfortunately  no  details  of  this  development  appear  to  exist.  A  few  years 
later  there  are  details  of  a  reberbane  being  moved  from  Copenhagen  to 
Glückstadt92,  though  presumably  it  was  just  the  machinery  which  was 
------------  ------ 
87.  A  map  of  Glückstadt  in  1628  shows  that  there  were  no  dockyard  facilities  before  this  date 
(F.  H.  Jahn,  Grundfrack  til  Christian  den  Fjerdes  krigshistoriq,  (Kmbenhavn,  1820),  endpiece). 
88.  Letter  to  rigsadmiral,  6  December  1635,  egenhandige  Brevß  III,  451. 
89.  Letter  to  Henrik  Müller,  14  December  1637,  egenhandige  Breves,  IV,  168. 
90.  Letter  to  Iver  Vind,  14  January,  1639,  egenhandige  Brevß  VIII,  136-7. 
91.  Letter  to  Henrik  Müller,  4  April  1639,  egenhandige  Brevß  IV,  223. 
92.  Letters  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  1636-40?,  and  25  February  1642,  egenhaandige  Breve,  VIII,  136  & 
161. 
230 transferred  and  not  the  building  itself.  This  would  suggest  that  the  naval 
facilities  were  being  upgraded,  but  the  improvements  could  only  have 
been  of  minor  importance  and  little  is  heard  of  Glückstadt  as  a  naval  base 
for  the  rest  of  Christian  IV's  reign. 
With  regards  to  actual  shipbuilding  the  town  was  of  negligible  im- 
portance.  There  was  no  state  run  shipyard  and  there  seems  to  have  been 
very  little  activity  by  private  contractors.  One  ship  was  built  in  1627  but 
it  was  1640  before  a  shipbuilder  was  granted  permission  to  establish  a 
proper  permanent  slipway93.  There  was,  however,  an  important  private 
shipyard  nearby  at  Itzehge  which  completed  many  ships  for  the  Danish 
navy94,  and  this  was  involved  to  some  extent  with  the  refitting  of  ships 
stationed  on  the  Elbe. 
5.4.  Small  Regional  Bases 
As  well  as  the  dockyards  at  Copenhagen,  Slotq  and  Glückstadt  there  were 
also  a  number  of  small  coastal  towns  which  kept  their  own  small  vessels 
for  coastal  defence.  The  ships  based  there  were  not  necessarily  naval 
ships  but  armed  merchantmen  known  as  borgerskibe  (civic  ships)  which 
were  run  by  consortia  of  merchants  in  return  for  tax  privileges. 
The  names  of  some  of  the  navy's  ships  show  that  they  also  were 
normally  based  in  the  regions,  such  as  Aarhus  Jagt,  Korsor  Skude, 
Marstrands  Plage  Gallej,  Ystad  Skib  and  Stavanger  Boyers  although  many 
of  these  were  just  transport  ships. 
The  only  towns  which  could  really  be  considered  as  a  true  naval 
base  were  Kolding  and  Haderslev  on  the  east  coast  of  Jutland,  which 
together  kept  a  fleet  of  four  or  five  small  vessels  in  operation.  Both 
towns  had  small  commercial  shipyards  but  there  was  no  dedicated  naval 
93.  Knud  Klem,  Skibsbyggeriet  i  Danmark  og  Hertugdommerne  1  1700-Arenen  II,  (K#benhavn,  1986), 
238-9. 
94.  See  Chapters  8  and  10. 
231 yard.  When  Christian  IV  designed  a  galley  at  Koldinghus  Castle  he  had 
the  local  shipwrights  build  a  model  of  the  ship  but  when  the  real  ship 
was  to  be  built  a  state  shipwright  was  called  in  from  Copenhagen  to  su- 
pervise  the  work%. 
Although  one  large  warship  was  built  at  Haderslev  in  1596-8,  and 
another  at  nearby  Argsund  in  160996,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that 
there  was  any  permanent  naval  shipyard  facility  in  either  place.  The  com- 
mercial  'yards  at  the  two  towns  did  however  build  a  number  of  galleys 
and  other  small  vessels  for  the  navy  such  as  jagts  and  bojerts. 
5.5.  Conclusion 
By  the  end  of  his  reign  Christian  IV  had  created  a  truly  impressive 
dockyard  infrastructure  for  his  navy.  The  port  city  he  created  at 
Copenhagen  could  boast  one  of  the  best  integrated  naval  infrastructures 
in  the  whole  of  Europe,  with  its  only  possible  rival  being  the  Venetian 
Arsenal97.  The  combined  dockyard,  arsenal,  and  victualling  store  at 
Copenhagen  enabled  ships  to  be  built,  repaired,  and  mobilised,  and  all 
their  necessary  equipment  manufactured,  all  within  the  one  area,  and  all 
under  the  direct  control  of  the  king  and  the  state  administration.  The 
descriptions  of  Cormenin  and  Monro,  although  rather  flattering,  show  that 
Copenhagen,  of  which  Fynes  Moryson98  could  say  in  1593  that  he 
'observed  no  beauty  or  magnificence',  had  under  Christian  IV  become  a 
northern  'factory  of  marvels'.  It  is  clear  that  Christian  IV  was  the  main 
-------------------- 
95.  See  Chapter  9. 
96.  See  Chapter  8. 
97.  F.  C.  Lane,  Venetian  Ships  and  Shipbuilders  of  the  Renaissance,  (Baltimore,  1934),  129-45;  R.  C. 
Davis,  Shipbuilders  of  the  Venetian  Arsenal,  (Baltimore,  1991).  10-46. 
98.  Fynes  Moryson.  An  Itinerary  of  Ten  Years  Travel,  (1617,  reprinted:  Glasgow.  1907-8),  IV,  122. 
232 driving  force  behind  the  whole  development,  and  it  is  significant  that  vir- 
tually  all  commands  relating  to  the  construction  works  came  directly  from 
his  hand99. 
There  are  two  ways  of  looking  at  these  developments.  On  the  one 
hand  Christian  IV  was  a  great  visionary  who  created  the  foundations  for 
the  city's  expansion,  the  boundaries  of  which  were  not  exceeded  for  over 
two  hundred  years.  On  the  other  hand  it  could  be  said  that  Christian  IV 
was  unrealistically  ambitious  and  created  a  city  far  larger  than  was  ac- 
tually  necessary  at  the  time,  resulting  in  much  wasted  work  and  expense. 
The  speed  with  which  the  new  fortifications  were  considered  neces- 
sary,  only  twenty  years  after  the  first  modifications,  severely  questions 
his  original  foresight.  It  is  true  that  the  first  fortifications  greatly  im- 
proved  the  existing  town.  walls  but  the  extension  of  the  town  boundary 
was  very  modest.  The  fact  that  he  was  able  to  create  a  fortified  naval 
town  whilst  leaving  the  naval  dockyard  outside  the  fortifications  also 
seems  quite  bizarre.  Had  he  had  the  sense  to  built  a  slightly  larger  wall 
the  first  time  which  enclosed  the  dockyard,  it  might  have  eliminated  the 
need  for  the  subsequent  developments.  Admittedly  this  would  have 
created  a  far  less  impressive  city  but  it  would  have  certainly  been  more 
in  keeping  with  the  city's  commercial  and  demographic  needs,  and  with 
the  state  budget.  As  it  was  the  extended  city  boundaries  were  to  serve 
the  city  adequately  well  until  the  industrial  revolution  in  the  19th  cen- 
tury  forced  any  further  expansion.  However,  Christian  IV's  ruthless,  and 
at  times  reckless,  ambitions  ensured  that  the  city  was  created  in  his  own 
extravagant  mould,  to  the  benefit  of  future  generations,  but  to  the  finan- 
cial  detriment  of  his  own. 
-------------------- 
99.  Only  the  construction  of  the  road  in  1634  is  ordered  via  the  Danske  kancelli,  all  other  in- 
structions  came  personally  from  Christian  IV. 
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The  development  of  Copenhagen  demonstrates  lucidly  Christian  IV's 
way  of  thinking.  Rather  than  waiting  for  organic  change  to  occur  he  felt 
he  could  somehow  will  his  ambitions  into  fruition  by  creating  an  impres- 
sive  physical  structure  and  hoping  this  would  automatically  bring  with  it 
the  desired  commercial  or  military  success,  without  the  introduction  of 
any  of  the  necessary  political  or  administrative  structures.  It  is  sig- 
nificant  that  the  only  section  of  his  planned  new  town  in  Copenhagen 
that  was  completed  were  the  Nyboder,  which  required  his  own  constant 
supervision  to  ensure  their  construction.  However,  despite  the  over- 
ambitious  development  of  the  city  of  Copenhagen,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  dockyard  development  was  much  needed  and  its  massive  scale  per- 
fectly  matched  the  ambitions  and  size  of  the  navy  at  that  time. 
The  one  major  deficiency  of  Copenhagen  as  a  naval  base,  though, 
was  the  lack  of  a  dry-dock.  Although  one  was  started  in  the  1630s  it  was 
not  completed  due  to  technical  and  financial  difficulties.  This  meant  that 
all  ships  had  to  be  careened  instead,  which  was  a  longer  and  much  more 
problematic  procedure.  This  deficiency  sounds  strange  from  a  British 
perspective  where  dry-docks  were  relatively  numerous,  but  from  a 
European  perspective  it  was  not  at  all  unusual.  France  did  not  have  a 
dry-dock  until  the  latter  half  of  the  17th  century,  and  both  Spain  and 
Sweden,  like  Denmark,  did  not  have  one  until  well  into  the  18th 
century'00 
In  contrast  to  the  developments  in  Copenhagen,  the  establishment  at 
Slot4  was  extremely  modest.  The  sole  purpose  for  its  foundation  was 
simply  to  exploit  the  timber  in  the  area,  without  the  expense  of  bringing 
it  all  to  Bremerholm.  This  function  was  successfully  carried  out  for 
around  ten  years  while  the  stocks  of  local  timber  remained.  It  was  never 
-------------------- 
100.  Jan  Glete,  Navies  and  Nations,  65;  Jose  P  Merino,  'Graving  Docks  in  France  and  Spain  before 
1800',  Manner's  Mirror,  71  (1985),  35-58. 
234 intended  to  be  a  permanent  dockyard,  and  the  one  experiment  at  over- 
wintering  clearly  demonstrated  that  its  remoteness  and  lack  of  facilities 
precluded  it  from  any  further  development. 
As  a  year-round  naval  base  Glückstadt  suffered  from  the  same  dif- 
ficulties  as  Slotq.  All  the  materials,  men,  and  victuals  had  to  be  supplied 
from  Copenhagen,  or  else  procured  at  a  price  from  local  contractors. 
Despite  these  disadvantages,  though,  it  is  perhaps  surprising,  given 
Christian  IV's  obvious  affection  and  ambitions  for  Glückstadt,  and  that  he 
spent  long  spells  at  Glücksborg  Palace,  that  he  did  not  do  more  for  the 
Elbe  squadron.  Financial  considerations  may  have  played  a  part,  espe- 
cially  as  the  rigsr3d  would  not  have  consented  to  expending  large  sums 
of  Danish  state  revenue  on  a  base  in  the  duchy  of  Holstein,  outside  Den- 
mark.  This  geographical  position  also  created  the  added  disadvantage  that 
it  was  in  a  defensively  precarious  position,  lying  on  the  extreme  southern 
edge  of  the  realm  on  a  more  or  less  hostile  border.  To  have  created  a 
major  naval  establishment  in  such  a  position  would  have  been  folly,  and 
Christian  IV  perhaps  let  common  sense  prevail  in  this  case  and  resisted 
any  temptation  to  lavish  extravagant  facilities  on  his  navy  in  this  area. 
Just  about  enough  was  done  to  enable  a  squadron  to  be  kept  fit  and 
ready  on  the  Elbe,  without  the  development  of  any  elaborate  or  costly 
permanent  facilities. 
It  is  surprising  that  no  naval  base  was  developed  in  Norway.  The 
island  of  Flekkerq  in  Flekkerfjord  harbour  was  frequently  used  as  a 
haven  for  naval  squadrons  during  bad  weather.  It  had  initially  been 
developed  as  a  temporary  naval  base  in  1556  to  aid  the  fight  against 
piracy  but  its  use  must  have  been  limited  since  the  blockhouse  was 
demolished  again  in  1561101.  The  first  move  to  fortify  the  island  under 
Christian  IV  came  in  1619,  and  in  1628  a  new  blockhouse  was  established. 
-------------------- 
101.  Barfod,  Christian  3.  s  flidß  112  &  157. 
235 By  1635  the  island  was  fully  fortified102,  but  no  dockyard  was  ever 
developed.  The  reason  appears  to  be  that  because  Glückstadt  was  now  es- 
tablished  as  a  naval  port  on  the  North  Sea  then  it  would  be  able  to  serve 
as  the  base  for  Norway  as  well,  as  a  letter  from  Christian  IV 
demonstrates: 
Der  skall  Ingen  y  wynther  aff  Orlog  skyben  holde  siig  op  vnder 
Norrie,  ty  dy,  som  ligger  heer,  kan  komme  saa  tylig  henad  Norrie, 
som  behoff  gprris.  l03 
In  winter  none  of  the  warships  shall  be  stationed  in  Norway,  as 
those  that  lie  here  (Glückstadt),  can  come  quickly  up  to  Norway,  as 
the  need  arises. 
The  existence  of  the  defensionskibe  fleet  also  meant  that  there  was  al- 
ways  a  force  of  local  ships  that  could  be  mobilised,  obviating  the  need 
for  a  formal  naval  dockyard. 
------------------- 
102.  Letter  to  Frederik  Urne,  19  May  1635,  egenhandige  Breve,  III,  390-1. 
103.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  25  August  1637,  egenh&ndige  Breve,  VIII,  110. 
236 6.  The  Administration  of  the  Bremerholm  Naval  Dockyard 
Having  seen  how  the  navy  and  its  dockyards  grew  at  such  a  rapid  pace 
we  should  now  turn  in  more  detail  to  see  if  and  how  the  dockyard  ad- 
ministration  developed  to  cope  with  the  navy's  growing  size.  In  this 
chapter  we  shall  investigate  how  the  naval  dockyard  operated,  who  was 
in  charge,  -what  work  was  undertaken,  who  carried  out  that  work,  and 
how  efficiently  it  all  operated. 
6.1.  General  Conditions 
The  Bremerholm  dockyard  was  the  single  largest  workplace  in  the  Danish 
realm.  In  the  1620s,  when  we  can  first  put  an  accurate  figure  on  num- 
bers,  there  was  a  permanent  workforce  of  around  700  men,  consisting  of 
around  200  skilled  craftsmen  and  apprentices  involved  in  shipbuilding, 
165  skilled  craftsmen  in  the  workshops,  100  convict  labourers,  150  seamen 
involved  with  watch  keeping  and  ship  repair  work,  plus  about  70  ancillary 
staff.  In  addition  to  these  men  came  the  seamen  who  were  stationed  at 
Bremerholm  during  the  winter  months  to  assist  with  the  refitting  of  the 
fleet.  In  the  early  1620s  the  total  number  of  seamen  retained  over  the 
winter  was  in  the  region  of  800.  Not  all  of  these  men,  of  course,  worked 
at  Bremerholm,  but  we  can  confidently  say  that  the  total  number  of  men 
working  at  the  dockyard  in  the  winter  months  was  well  in  excess  of  a 
thousand. 
The  dockyard  was  divided  into  summer  and  winter  working  condi- 
tions.  Summer  lasted  from  Shrovetide  to  Martinmas,  during  which  time  the 
hours  of  work  were  from  5  a.  m.  to  7  p.  m.,  with  a  break  between  10  a.  m. 
and  12  noon.  During  the  winter  the  hours  of  work  were  from  dawn  to 
dusk  with  the  same  two  hour  lunch  break'.  Productivity  rates  were 
-------------------- 
1"  Proviantskriver's  commission,  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  16  April  1625;  Smith's  commission,  Kancel- 
liets  Brevbpger,  26  April  1626;  and  Gate-keeper's  commission,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  26  May  1646. 
237 reduced  in  line  with  the  shorter  hours  and  additional  rations  were  allo- 
cated  for  the  men.  Although  the  hours  worked  per  man  were  less  in  the 
winter,  the  increased  number  of  men  would  ensure  that  an  equivalent  or 
greater  number  of  man-hours  were  worked.  It  was  also  common  practice 
to  hire  additional  men  on  a  temporary  basis  in  the  spring  to  ensure  that 
the  fleet  was  ready  to  sail  on  time. 
All  men  working  at  the  dockyard  were  bound  to  comply  with  the 
Holm-  og  arsenalartikler  which  detailed  the  codes  of  conduct  and  regula- 
tions  governing  all  dockyard  and  arsenal  employees.  They  were  first  for- 
mulated  in  1587  and  were  published,  in  an  expanded  form,  in  1625.  They 
dealt  principally  with  matters  of  discipline,  naval  jurisdiction  and  the  ar- 
rangements  for  watch-keeping,  both  in  the  dockyard  and  aboard  the 
ships  in  port,  but  they  also  outlined  the  responsibilities  of  certain  offi- 
cials  and  craftsmen  who  were  in  charge  of  the  dockyard's  operation2. 
These  regulations,  comprising  80  articles  in  all,  were  to  be  read  in  their 
entirety  to  the  workers  every  month.  Seamen  at  the  dockyard  were  also 
bound  to  comply  with  the  Skibsartikler  which  detailed  the  rules  and 
regulations  for  all  sea-going  personnel3. 
Unlike  in  England  the  dockyard  workers  were  not  members  of 
crafts  guilds.  Christian  IV  disliked  guilds  intensely  and  considered  that 
their  restrictive  membership  and  practices  hampered  the  development  of  a 
dynamic  and  progressive  industry,  and  prevented  foreign  craftsmen  from 
coming  to  Denmark.  In  1600  he  instructed  the  Copenhagen  town  council  to 
undertake  a  review  of  the  town's  guilds4.  Then  in  1613  he  issued  an 
edict  which  outlawed  crafts  guilds  altogether,  because  of  the  'store  us- 
kickelighed  och  motvillighed  her  udi  riget  med  handverksfolk  och  andre, 
------------------- 
2.  Holm-  og  arsenalartikler,  8  May  1625,  V.  A.  Secher,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  (K4,  benhavn, 
1887-1918),  IV,  230-56. 
3.  See  Chapter  7. 
4.  Missive  to  Copenhagen  town  council,  13  March  1600,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  III,  99-100. 
238 som  skraaerne  och  laugsret  hafver'  (great  nuisance  and  reluctance  in  this 
kingdom  which  craftsmen  and  others  who  come  under  the  guild  statutes 
and  laws)5.  This  law  was  not  a  success  and  Christian  IV  was  forced  to 
back  down  and  within  a  few  years  guilds  were  again  allowed  to  operates. 
The  state's  employees,  including  dockyard  workers,  however,  would  not 
have  been  allowed  to  organise  themselves  into  guilds. 
The  management  structure  within  the  dockyard  can  be  divided  into 
five  basic  levels.  The  senior  management  essentially  consisted  of  only  two 
men,  the  Holmens  admiral  and  the  materialskriver.  Below  them,  in  what 
would  now  be  called  the  middle  management,  were  the  clerks  and  master 
craftsmen.  Then  came  the  mestersvende  (foremen)  who  were  in  direct  con- 
trol  of  the  various  skilled  tradesmen,  and  at  the  lowest  level  were  all  the 
unskilled  labourers,  boys,  and  apprentices. 
Most  of  the  officials  and  craftsmen  working  within  the  dockyard 
received  a  commission  through  the  Danske  kancelli,  which  outlined  their 
duties  and  rates  of  pay.  These  varied  in  length  from  just  a  few  lines  for 
a  minor  craftsman  to  several  pages  of  highly  detailed  instructions  for  one 
of  the  senior  management  positions.  This  ensured  that  everyone  was 
aware  of  their  terms  of  reference  and  also  provided  a  yard-stick  by 
which  to  monitor  their  performance.  Depending  on  their  seniority  the  offi- 
cials  and  workforce  were  paid  on  an  annual,  monthly  or  daily  basis.  Some 
workers  were  paid  a  small  annual  sum  as  well  as  a  regular  monthly  pay- 
ment.  Others  were  paid  solely  on  a  piece-work  rate. 
Figure  6.1.  is  an  attempt  to  show  the  overall  dockyard  management 
structure  and,  where  possible,  the  equivalent  annual  pay  of  the  workers. 
------------------- 
5.  Order  relating  to  guilds,  19  June  1613,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Daniati  III,  408-9. 
6.  Sven  Ellehmj.  Christian  IV.  s  tidsalder  1596-1660,  (Danmarks  historie,  7).  (K4benhavn,  1964), 
223-6. 
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240 Due  to  the  availability  of  information  the  wages  during  the  1620s  have 
been  used  in  this  diagram,  but  the  wide  variations  between  certain  crafts 
would  suggest  that  they  are  not  all  entirely  accurate7.  They  are  given 
here  simply  as  a  rough  guide. 
By  drawing  up  such  a  rigid  organisational  chart  there  is  a  danger 
in  implying  a  much  more  formal  management  structure  than  there  actually 
was.  As  with  the  higher  state  administration  so  much  was  dependent  on 
personality  and  circumstance.  The  lines  of  command  were  not  strictly 
adhered  to,  and  orders  regarding  the  operation  of  the  dockyard  were 
issued  by  various  officials,  not  least  from  the  king  himself,  depending  on 
whether  certain  posts  were  filled  or  whether  the  officials  were  present  at 
any  particular  time.  " 
6.2.  Senior  Management 
6.2.1.  The  Holmens  Admiral 
The  Holmens  admiral  was  the  official  who  oversaw  the  day  to  day  running 
of  the  navy,  and  unlike  the  rigsadmiral  this  was  not  an  overtly  political 
post.  The  office  came  into  existence  during  the  reign  of  Frederik  II  as 
the  steadily  growing  importance  of  Bremerholm  brought  about  the  need 
for  a  dedicated  official  to  take  charge  of  its  operations.  The  office  holder 
was  typically  a  nobleman  who  had  already  served  as  an  officer  at  sea, 
and  as  well  as  receiving  a  salary  he  was  usually  assigned  a  len  as  part 
of  his  rewards  of  office. 
---------- 
7.  Wages 
---------- 
have  been  taken  from  the  men's  commissions  of  appointment  in  Kancelliets  Brevbgger 
and  from  the  kladekammer  regnskaber.  Unfortunately  the  two  do  not  always  tally. 
8.  The  first  Holmens  admiral  was  appointed  in  1564.  (H.  D.  Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens 
tid:  Bidrag  til  den  dansk-norske  s4magts  historie  1559-158$  (K$benhavn,  1902).  74). 
241 He  was  responsible  jointly  to  the  rigsadmiral  and  to  the  stadtholder 
or  rigshofinester.  Although  Christian  IV  was  greatly  interested  in  the 
work  of  the  Holmens  admiral  he  usually  directed  his  written  orders  to  him 
via  the  higher  state  officials  or  through  the  rentekammer  or  the  Danske 
kancelli. 
The  responsibilities  of  the  office  were  enormous.  The  job  was  not 
simply  a  matter  of  supervising  the  construction  and  repair  of  ships  at 
Bremerholm,  but  he  also  had  to  single-handedly  oversee  the  running  of 
virtually  all  aspects  of  the  navy,  including  its  harbour,  ships,  and  men, 
as  well  as  having  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  command  of  ships  at  sea. 
It  was  more  than  enough  for  one  man  and  it  is  hardly  surprising  that 
the  incumbents  of  office  were  frequently  rebuked  for  not  carrying  out 
their  duties  to  the  required  standards.  In  fact  the  expansion  of  the  navy 
under  Christian  IV  had  made  the  job  virtually  impossible. 
In  contrast  to  the  higher  state  officials  the  duties  of  the  Holmens 
admiral  were  precisely  laid  out  in  their  commissions.  These  steadily  got 
more  detailed  with  each  successive  appointment.  The  commissions  from 
Frederik  II's  time  contained  just  a  few  articles",  but  from  Godske 
Lindenov's  commission  in  161010  there  were  upwards  of  twenty  individual 
articles. 
These  commissions  show  that  the  Holmens  admiral  was  responsible 
for  everything  that  went  on  at  Bremerholm,  including  the  construction 
and  refitting  of  ships,  the  manufacture  of  all  materials  in  the  dockyard 
workshops,  and  the  discipline  of  all  seamen  and  craftsmen,  and  the 
operation  of  the  royal  transport  fleet.  His  official  duties  also  overlapped 
with  those  of  the  rigsadmiral  to  some  extent,  in  that  he  was  also  respon- 
sible  for  the  recruitment  and  examination  of  all  seamen  and  naval  officers. 
------------------- 
9.  Lavrits  Kruse's  commission  in  1578  contained  six  articles,  and  Erik  Vogns4'n's  in  1585  contained 
eight.  (Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  tic(  196  &  207). 
10.  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  23  Feb  1610. 
242 During  the  periods  that  the  office  of  rigsadmiral  was  kept  vacant  the 
Holmens  admiral  became  the  highest  naval  officer,  and  so  a  large  part  of 
his  time  was  also  spent  at  sea  commanding  the  fleet,  even  though  these 
sea-going  duties  were  not  specifically  mentioned  until  1645,  and  then  only 
in  passing". 
The-  first  Holmens  admiral  during  Christian  IV's  reign  was  Borge 
Trolle  who  took  over  the  post  in  1596.  He  came  from  a  long  line  of  ad- 
mirals  and  was  already  a  well  respected  seaman  when  he  took  up  office. 
However,  he  stayed  at  the  dockyard  for  only  three  years.  It  is  not  clear 
why  he  left  office  and  there  are  no  references  to  him  in  naval  service 
after  1599,  despite  the  fact  that  he  lived  until  1610.  He  may  have  retired 
voluntarily  but,  as  he  was  probably  still  in  his  early  forties,  this  seems 
unlikely.  From  the  start  he  was  a  committed  career  professional,  having 
gone  through  the  accepted  route  for  aspiring  noblemen  in  becoming  a 
hofjunker  after  a  period  of  foreign  study,  before  taking  up  service  at 
sea.  In  an  age  when  officials  traditionally  clung  to  their  positions  until 
promotion  or  death  it  would  have  been  unusual  for  Trolle  to  have  given 
up  his  post  voluntarily.  Although  there  is  no  definite  proof,  the  fact  that 
he  died  with  his  finances  in  disarray  would  suggest  that  there  had  been 
a  fall  from  grace  in  some  way  or  other'2. 
Whatever  the  reason  for  Trolle's  departure,  the  post  of  Holmens 
admiral  was  not  renewed  until  1610  when  the  increasing  prospect  of  war 
with  Sweden  brought  with  it  the  need  to  strengthen  the  navy's  leader- 
ship.  Godske  Lindenov  was  appointed  to  the  post  but  his  effect  at 
Bremerholm  must  have  been  minimal,  since  he  spent  most  of  his  time  at 
sea  and  died  before  the  end  of  the  war  in  1612. 
-- 
11. 
------------ 
Kancelliets 
----- 
Brevboger.  25  Jan  1645. 
12.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian.  den  Fjorde  og  hans  Mend  paa  Bremerholm,  (Kobenhavn.  1889).  68-70. 
243 Another  year  went  by  before  the  office  was  renewed  again,  but  the 
appointment  of  Sten  Villumsen  Rosenvinge  in  1613  marked  the  beginning 
of  a  more  stable  period  of  management  for  the  dockyard  where  the  Hol- 
mens  admiral  remained  in  office  for  more  than  a  few  years  and  the  ap- 
pointment  of  successors  was  carried  out  without  delay.  His  commission 
was  virtually  identical  to  that  drawn  up  for  Lindenov,  but  his  wages 
were  100  Dlr.  less,  at  500  Dlr.  per  annum13. 
Although  he  stayed  in  office  for  many  years  Sten  Villumsen  could 
hardly  be  described  as  a  model  of  administrative  competence.  He  was  fre- 
quently  in  dispute  with  his  superiors  and  his  workers,  and  came  under 
suspicion  of  impropriety  on  more  than  one  occasion.  The  most  serious 
claim  came  in  1618  when  he  was  suspended  from  duty  and  brought  before 
the  dockyard  court  on  the  following  charges: 
1.  That  he  used  the  royal  sawyers  and  timber  for  his  own  ends 
without  due  recompense  to  the  Crown. 
2.  That  he  was  remiss  in  his  duties  regarding  his  management  of 
the  workforce. 
3.  That  he  connived  with  the  ropemaker  to  produce  sub- 
standard  rope. 
Underneath,  the  Kongens  kansler  Christian  Friis  wrote  that  he  had  also 
been  asked  verbally  by  the  king  to  discuss  Sten  Villumsen's  frequent  ab- 
sences  of  three  or  four  days14.  The  verdict  of  the  court  is  not  known 
but  in  any  event  he  was  soon  reinstated. 
-------------------- 
13.  Instruks  og  bestalling  for  Sten  Villumsen,  3  September  1613,  corpus  Constitutionum  Dania, 
III,  412-7. 
14.  Instruction  to  Christian  Friis,  c.  3  Dec  1618,  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Chris- 
tian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  Brevs6  VII.  20-1. 
244 In  1625  Villumsen  called  on  Prince  Christian  (V),  in  the  absence  of 
the  king,  to  investigate  the  working  practices  of  the  master  shipwrights, 
and  in,  particular  their  private  contracting  work15.  There  was  evidently 
some  ill  feeling  here  and  the  master  shipwrights  responded  by  making  a 
confidential  report  to  the  prince  on  'shipbuilding,  the  navy,  the  ship's 
carpenters,  and  other  operations  at  Bremerholm'  which  made  mention  of 
certain  'letsindige  praktikker'  (improvident  practices)'6.  It  is  not  clear 
exactly  what  the  allegations  were,  but  Villumsen  was  called  upon  to  ac- 
count  for  them.  Nor  is  it  known  what,  if  any,  action  was  taken,  although 
the  fact  that  the  prince  had  to  intervene  shortly  afterwards  to  break  up 
further  disputes  between  the  two  parties  would  suggest  that  the  affair 
was  not  satisfactorily  resolved17. 
Sten  Villumsen  was  given  permission  to  leave  his  office  in  1630. 
Again  the  reason  for  his  departure  is  unclear  but  it  would  be  unfair  to 
suggest  that  he  had  been  forced  from  office.  He  had  recently  been  as- 
signed  a  len  in  Norway  and  it  would  not  be  unreasonable  to  assume  that 
he  had  perhaps  had  enough  of  the  wrangling  at  Bremerholm  and  decided 
to  move  to  Norway  to  manage  his  estate.  Indeed  one  of  the  conditions  of 
his  being  'allowed  to  go  was  that  he  was  to  supervise  the  ironworks  in 
Norway.  As  a  lensmand  he  still  continued  to  have  connections  with  the 
navy  by,  for  example,  supplying  timber  and  inspecting  Norwegian  ships 
which  had  been  offered  for  royal  service. 
His  successor  was  Erik  Ottesen  Orning  who  likewise  had  a  con- 
troversial  period  in  office.  For  the  first  few  years  he  is  mainly  heard  of 
in  relation  to  the  command  of  sea  voyages  and  the  operation  of  the  royal 
cargo  fleet  in  bringing  supplies  to  Bremerholm.  The  first  signs  of  dis- 
----------------- 
15.  Missive  to  Sten  Villumsen,  Kancelliets  Brevbbger,  21  May  1625. 
16.  Missive  to  Axel  Arenfeldt  &  Mogens  Kaas,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  15  May  1625. 
17.  Missives  to  Sten  Villumsen,  David  Balfour  and  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  12  July 
1625. 
245 satisfaction  appear  in  1639  when  the  king  noted  that  his  captains  had 
been  complaining  about  the  lack  of  preparation  of  their  ships  which  was 
'vdn  thuiffuel  aff  Admiralens  Nachlessighed,  som  nu  vyl  corrigeris' 
(without  doubt  through  the  admiral's  dereliction,  which  will  now  be 
corrected)18.  In  July  1641  Christian  IV  himself  experienced  the  poor  state 
of  the  ships  under  Ottesen's  charge.  He  reported  in  an  obvious  state  of 
rage  that19  : 
...  befandt  Ieg  Skiibet  sa  lack,  at  man  ded  med  stor  NDd 
kunde  holde,  at  ded  icke  saanck,  Och  ded  aff  mangel  at  pumperne 
bade  uar  uferdige  saoch  forroden,  at  dii  stod  inted  at  hiielpe, 
fgrend  gud  i  hymmelen  ued  En  uynd  hiialp  oss  ind  pa  Bergen  waag. 
Dentyd  man  besluttede  siig  at  Erfahre,  huor  leckiid  waar,  da 
befandtis  leckiid  at  uerre  ymellom  Staunen  och  galliion  kneyt, 
huilcken  mangel  der  formenis  dennom  pa  holmen  lenge  at  haffue 
uerrit  bekendt. 
Kabyssen  uar  Icke  allene  Ilde  med  Leer  och  Saaldt  foruarit, 
Mens  ochsa  inted  med  kobber,  som  brugeligdt  Er,  foruarit,  Saat  Ieg 
Om  Natten  y  min  skiiorte  motte  op  och  Teske  branden  y  kgckenit 
...  I  found  the  ship  so  leaky  that  it  was  only  with  great 
diligence  that  the  ship  was  prevented  from  sinking,  and  that  be- 
cause  of  a  lack  of  pumps,  which  were  unfinished  and  in  such  a  bad 
state  of  repair  that  they  were  useless,  it  was  only  God  in  heaven 
who  helped  us  with  a  favourable  wind  into  Bergen. 
--- 
18. 
------- 
letter 
---- 
to 
------ 
Corfit=  Ulfeldt.  20  Dec  1639,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  272. 
19.  Letter  to  Sten  Beck  &  Hans  Ulrik  Gyldenliove,  13  July  1641,  egenhandige  Breve,  V,  99. 
246 Afterwards  it  was  decided  to  establish  where  the  leak  was, 
which  was  found  between  the  stem  and  the  figure-head,  the  condi- 
tion  of  which  must  for  a  long  time  have  been  known  to  those  at 
Bremerholm. 
The  galley  stove  was  not  only  badly  maintained  with  clay  and 
salt,  but  also  had  no  copper  fit  for  use,  so  that  I  had  to  go  in  the 
night  in  my  night-shirt  to  dowse  the  fire  in  the  galley. 
He  went  on  to  note  that  the  ship's  skipper  claimed  that  Erik  Ot- 
tesen  neither  listened  to,  nor  understood,  their  complaints  and  that  he 
would  always  assign  to  him  the  worst  of  the  seamen  at  his  disposal.  The 
king  had  been  under  the  impression  that  his  seamen  were  well  trained 
and  was  horrified  to  find  that  only  a  fraction  of  those  on  board  could 
read  a  compass  or  were  able  to  handle  an  oar  properly-20. 
Erik  Ottesen  was  immediately  suspended  from  duty  until  he 
apologised  and  could  demonstrate  that  the  claims  against  him  could  never 
be  repeated.  The  king  was  still  not  sure  whether  he  had  been  reinstated 
by  January  1642  when  he  referred  to  'Erick  Ottesspn  eller  den  som  kom- 
mer  y  hans  sted'  (Erik  Ottesen  or  whoever  is  coming  in  his  place)21.  He 
did  keep  his  job,  however,  only  to  come  into  conflict  with  the  king  again 
later  that  year  and  be  threatened  once  more  with  dismissal22. 
His  conduct  as  a  commander  at  sea  also  came  into  question  during 
the  Torstenssonkrig  but  he  still  clung  to  his  post  until  his  death  in 
February  1645.  He  would  not  have  held  on  to  it  for  much  longer  though, 
because  negotiations  had  already  begun  with  his  successor  in  January 
20.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  21  July  1641.  egenhrndige  Brevet  V.  106. 
21.  Letter  to  rentemestren4  18  Jan  1642.  egenhrndige  Breve,  V.  166. 
22.  Letter  to  Jurgen  Vind.  31  Oct  1642.  egenh.  ndige  Breve,  V,  260. 
247 that  year.  Even  his  death  could  not  prevent  further  disgrace,  because 
when  the  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  embezzlement  scandal  broke  he  was  clearly  impli- 
cated  in  the  whole  affair23. 
Kristoffer  Lindenov,  son  of  Godske  Lindenov,  took  over  the  post  in 
1645.  He  appears  to  have  been  fairly  reliable  as  Holmens  admiral  during 
the  rest  of  Christian  IV's  reign,  although  his  additional  appointment  in 
1647  as  oberstlOjtnant  (lieutenant  colonel)  in  the  army  must  have  impinged 
on  his  ability  to  carry  out  his  naval  duties.  His  task,  however,  was  made 
much  easier  with  the  appointment  first  of  a  rigs-viceadmiral  in  1645,  then 
a  Holmens  viceadmiral  in  1652,  and  ultimately  the  new  admiralty  ad- 
ministration  of  1655  shared  the  burden  of  his  responsibilities.  Like  many 
of  his  predecessors,  though,  he  left  office  in  disgrace  in  1657.  Although 
the  exact  reason  is  unclear,  there  was  a  suggestion  that  he  had  been  in- 
volved  in  the  embezzlement  of  seamen's  wages24. 
6.2.2.  The  Materialskriver 
Working  in  conjunction  with  the  Holmens  admiral  was  the  materialskriver 
(clerk  of  -materials),  who  was  responsible  for  the  supply  of  all  materials 
needed  to  build  and  maintain  the  ships.  As  such  he  acted  as  the  senior 
manager  of  the  various  dockyard  workshops,  supervising  their  supply  of 
raw  materials  and  regulating  the  quantity  and  quality  of  their  output. 
This  post  was  almost  on  a  par  with  the  Holmens  admiral,  and  both 
men  were  required  to  work  in  close  co-operation.  Indeed  some  of  the 
points  relating  to  the  supply  of  materials  in  the  commissions  of  the  two 
posts  are  virtually  identical.  The  materialskriver  operated  with  a  great 
deal  of  autonomy  with  regard  to  the  materials  produced  within  the  dock- 
yard,  but  any  additional  materials  that  had  to  be  procured  from  private 
23.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  M&no  78-9;  See  also  Chapter  3. 
24.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Frederik  den  Tredjes  somagt.  dot  dansk-norske  smvarns  historie  1648-1674 
(K$benhavn,  1896).  104. 
248 merchants  or  contractors  had  to  be  ratified  and  countersigned  by  the 
Holmens  admiral.  This,  together  with  the  fact  that  his  wages  were  a  little 
lower  than  the  Holmens  admirals,  at  450  Kdlr.,  indicate  that  he  was  in  a 
slightly  junior  position.  However,  he  was  still  very  much  a  senior 
manager,  and  held  authority  over  all  the  other  dockyard  clerks25. 
He  was  to  keep  a  register  of  all  materials  supplied  to  Bremerholm 
and  make  a  yearly  inventory  of  all  naval  stores.  A  record  was  kept  of  all 
materials  that  were  issued  to  each  ship,  and  the  inventories  of  all  the 
ships'  skippers  were  checked  to  ensure  that  they  tallied  with  the 
materials  issued.  In  order  that  the  warships  remained  well  equipped  and 
to  save  costs,  new  materials  were  issued  only  after  the  same  weight  of 
old  material  was  returned.  The  old  materials  were  then  re-used  in  the 
royal  transport  ships.  To  regulate  this  system  separate  account  books 
were  kept  for  the  issue  of  new  and  old  materials,  and  for  the  return  of 
materials  from  the  ships26. 
The  materialskriver  had  three  or  four  assistant  clerks  and  book- 
keepers.  In  addition  there  was  also  a  ttmmerskriver  (timber  clerk),  who 
was  responsible  for  checking,  measuring  and  keeping  accounts  of  all  tim- 
ber  coming  to  the  dockyard.  This  was  very  much  a  junior  post,  earning 
only  60  Kdlr.  27,  but  it  did  warrant  its  own  underskrivera.  The  timber 
accounts  consisted  simply  of  a  register  of  incoming  timber  and  a  rudimen- 
tary  record  of  timber  issued  on  a  day  to  day  basis  to  the  different 
workshops  and  craftsmen29. 
25.  Gotfried  Mikkelsen's  commission,  Kancelliets  Brevb$ger,  22  December  1630. 
26.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655,16-27.  Bremerholmens  materials  kriverregnskaber  1593-1650. 
27.  Commission  for  Jacob  Jensen,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  22  Dec  1630. 
28.  Commission  for  Povel  Mortensen,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  11  Dec  1619. 
29.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fror  1655,28-29.  Bremerholmens  T$mmerregnskaber  1594-1658. 
249 In  1635  this  post  was  amalgamated  with  that  of  materialskriver,  who 
was  in  turn  granted  an  additional  underskriver.  In  effect  the 
materialskriver  took  on  the  responsibility  while  the  new  underskriver 
carried  out  the  same  work,  at  the  same  rate  of  pay,  as  the  previous 
tommerskriver0.  The  accounts  for  timber  also  continued  to  be  kept 
separate  from  the  other  materials. 
6.3.  The  Dockyard  Workforce 
The  function  of  the  dockyard  was  split  between  the  construction  of  new 
ships  and  the  maintenance  of  existing  ships.  Ship  repair  constituted  much 
the  largest  activity  since  each  of  the  twenty  to  thirty  warships,  as  well 
as  the  countless  transport  ships,  had  to  be  kept  seaworthy  on  an  annual 
basis.  This  work  was  mostly  seasonal,  with  the  majority  of  work  being 
carried  out  while  the  fleet  was  laid  up  for  the  winter,  in  preparation  for 
the  following  year's  sailings.  The  work  on  new  construction  was  much 
more  constant  all  year  round,  although  at  most  only  two  or  three  ships 
would  be  being  built  at  any  one  time. 
Although  ship  repair  was  the  largest  activity  in  terms  of  manpower, 
it  is  easier  to  look  at  the  organisation  of  ship  construction  first,  since 
much  of  the  workforce  and  the  materials  they  produced  were  also  used  in 
ship  repair. 
6.3.1.  Ship  Construction 
Ship  construction  can  basically  be  divided  into  two  different  elements: 
the  construction  of  the  hull;  and  its  outfit  with  all  the  necessary  equip- 
ment  needed  for  it  to  be-able  to  put  to  sea. 
--  -  ------------  - 
30.  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  3  Sept  1635. 
250 In  overall  control  of  both  aspects  was  the  skibsbygmester  (master 
shipwright)  who  designed  the  ship  and  supervised  the  workforce.  There 
were  also  junior  shipwrights  that  were  designated  as  underskibsbyg- 
mester  or  simply  skibsbygger  (shipwright).  The  distinction  between  the 
master  shipwrights  and  the  ordinary  shipwrights  is  unclear  but  it  would 
appear  that  the  higher  rank  was  a  recognition  of  ability  and  seniority 
and  naturally  carried  with  it  a  much  higher  wage.  Their  actual  duties 
regarding  shipbuilding  appear  to  vary  very  little. 
Unlike  many  posts  within  the  Danish  state  system  the  appointment 
of  shipwrights  appears  to  have  been  dependent  primarily  upon  skill.  It 
was  common  for  the  shipwrights  to  be  engaged  first  as  private  contrac- 
tors,  building  a  number  of  naval  ships,  so  that  their  skills  could  be 
judged  prior  to  their  being  engaged  as  full-time  servants  of  the  Crown. 
Robert  Petersen,  David  Balfour  and  Klaus  Jansen  all  followed  this  route. 
Promotion  from  within  the  dockyard  was  also  possible,  as  was  the  case 
with  Svend  Andersen,  who  moved  from  being  a  senior  shipcarpenter  to 
become  underskibsbygmester  and  eventually  master  shipwright. 
The  number  of  master  shipwrights  engaged  as  permanent  employees 
was  very  small.  Shipwrights  were  really  only  needed  to  supervise  the 
construction  of  new  ships  as  the  skilled  shipcarpenters  could  carry  out 
most  of  the  routine  ship  repair  work.  Since  many  of  the  navy's  ships 
were  built  in  the  provinces,  the  number  of  shipwrights  actually  working 
at  Bremerholm  could  be  very  small  indeed. 
It  was  stipulated,  however,  that  a  master  shipwright  should  be 
present  at  Bremerholm  at  all  times  to  supervise  the  work  of  the  craftsmen 
and  to  ensure  that  good  timber  was  always  used31.  As  a  means  of  ensur- 
ing  the  shipwright's  diligence  the  cost  of  any  mistakes  caused  by  the 
negligence  of  his  men  would  be  deducted  from  his  wages.  The  master 
----------------- 
31.  Commission  for  Robert  Petersen,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  2  November  1604. 
251 shipwrights  were  also  expected  to  train  12  Imredrenge  (apprentices)  in  a 
four  year  course  of  ship's  carpentry,  the  best  of  whom  were  to  be  fur- 
ther  instructed  in  the  art  of  shipwrightry.  They  were  granted  extra  ra- 
tions  for  this  work  and  were  paid  4  Kdlr.  for  each  apprentice  who  com- 
pleted  their  course. 
These  conditions  were  reiterated  in  the  Holm-  og  arsenalartikler  of 
1625,  which  contained  only  five  articles  dealing  directly  with  the 
shipwrights'  work.  These  can  be  summarised  as  follows33: 
37.  The  master  shipwrights  should  always  be  at  their  post 
and  supervise  the  tommermmnd  at  all  times.  If  any  work  by  the 
shipwright  or  his  tOmmermmnd  needs  to  be  re-worked  a  second  time 
then  each  ought  to  be  brought  to  justice. 
38.  The  master  shipwrights  shall,  along  with  the  Holmens 
admiral,  sign  for  all  materials  brought  into  the  dockyard  for  their 
use,  and  be  responsible  for  their  sparing  use.  If  any  material  is 
found  to  be  faulty  they  will  be  brought  to  justice,  and  they  must 
immediately  inform  the  Holmens  admiral  of  any  deficiencies. 
39.  The  master  shipwright  has  absolute  command  over  all 
carpenters,  sawyers,  auger-men,  and  apprentices  which  he  uses 
daily.  Under  threat  of  the  highest  punishment,  he  must  not  use 
them  for  his  own  work,  as  the  Crown's  work  has  priority. 
40.  No  ship's  carpenter  shall  be  employed  unless  the 
master  shipwright  is  satisfied  that  they  are  competent.  The  master 
shipwright  is  to  keep  a  register  of  all  carpenters  and  their 
abilities. 
-------------------- 
32.  Missives  to  rentemestrenß  Kancelliets  BrevbOger,  6  May  1625  and  27  May  1637. 
33.  Holm-  og  arsenalartikler.  243-4. 
252 41.  Any  old  iron  removed  form  a  ship  must  immediately  be 
passed  on  to  the  materialskriver. 
This  last  article  was  further  expanded  on  in  the  Holmens  admiraPs  com- 
mission,  which  stated  that: 
10.  Whenever  any  ship  is  built  or  rebuilt  the  Holmens  ad- 
miral  and  the  shipwright  are  to  specify  the  type,  size,  and  quantity 
of  each  spike,  and  where  they  are  to  be  used  on  the  ship.  When 
the  ship  is  being  planked  the  number  of  spikes  used  on  each  and 
every  strake  is  to  be  noted,  until  the  ship  is  planked  inside  and 
out.  Likewise  for  wales,  knees  and  spikes  used  for  every  row  of 
deck  planking  from  stem  to  stern. 
11.  When  a  ship  is  being  re-timbered  the  Holmens  admiral 
together  with  the  shipwright  is  to  ensure  that  all  iron  spikes  and 
bolts  which  are  removed  from  the  old  timber  are  carefully  looked 
after  and  a  note  made  of  where  they  were  previously  used  on  the 
ship  so  that  they  can  be  re-used.  When  a  new  ship  is  being  built 
every  iron  spike  and  bolt  is  to  be  weighed  and  measured  and 
signed  for  by  both  the  Holmens  admiral  and  the  shipwright  and  a 
note  made  of  where  it  was  positioned  in  the  ship.  This  is  to  ensure 
that  when  the  ship  reaches  the  end  of  its  life  they  can  be  salvaged 
and  so  that  it  is  known  how  many  to  expect  from  those  charged 
with  its  demolition.  " 
--------------------  - 
34.  Erik  Ottesen's  commission,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  28  Oct  1630. 
253 The  actual  work  of  building  the  ships  was  carried  out  by  the 
skibstpmmermxnd  (shipcarpenters).  They  were  supervised  by  around  five 
mestersvende  for  tDmmerma'ndene  (foreman  journeyman  carpenters).  Some- 
times  the  building  of  smaller  vessels  such  as  barges  and  galleys  would  be 
entrusted  solely  to  a  mestersvend  rather  than  to  a  fully  qualified 
shipwright.  Occasional  mention  is  also  made  of  a  baadebygger  (boat 
builder)35  but  this  was  not  a  formal  designation  and  probably  referred  to 
a  mestersvend  currently  occupied  in  the  building  of  a  boat. 
The  skibstpmmermmnd  were  paid  a  day-rate  which  varied  according 
to  their  ability.  According  to  an  ordinance  of  1625  there  were  four  dif- 
ferent  grades,  the  highest  being  paid  28  skilling,  the  others  24,20  and 
16,  respectively36,  which  approximates  roughly  to  between  50  and  90  Kdlr. 
per  annum37.  There  were  twenty  carpenters  in  each  grade. 
Working  in  tandem  with  the  skibsttmmermmnd  were  the  savskmre 
(sawyers)  who  cut  the  timber  to  the  correct  size  and  shape,  and  the 
borere  and  bolteslagere.  The  borere  (auger-men)  were  described  as  'det 
Slags  Handvaerks  Folk,  hvis  Arbeyde  det  er  ved  Skibs  Bygning  at  boere 
alle  Hulle  til  Bolterne  og  Navlerne'  (the  type  of  craftsmen  whose  work  it 
is  in  shipbuilding  to  drill  all  the  holes  for  bolts  and  nails),  and  the  bol- 
teslagere  as  the  'samme  Slags  Arbeydere  som  Boererne,  hvilke  efter  at  de 
haver  boeret  Hullerne  driver  ogsaa  Bolterne  og  Navlerne  ind'  (same  type 
of  worker  as  the  borere,  who  after  they  have  drilled  the  holes,  also  drive 
in  the  bolts  and  nails)38.  The  savskwre  and  bolteslagere  were  paid  12 
-------------------- 
35.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fmr  1655,30.  Store  Smedje  Regnskaber,  1819. 
36.  Missive  to  rentemestrenß  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  6  May  1625. 
37.  Calculated  at  230  days  at  full  pay  and  70  days  at  half  pay. 
38.  Georg  Albrecht  Koefoed,  Dansk  Spe  Ord-Bog:  Forsog  til  en  Dansk  55e  Ord-Bog  med  Beskrivelse 
paa  hver  Ord  og  deres  Benavning  i  det  Frandske  og  Engelske  Sprog,  (Kranborg,  1993). 
254 skilling  per  day  (40  Kdlr.  p.  a.  )  while  the  borere  were  paid  10  skilling  (35 
Kdlr.  p.  a.  ).  The  sawyers  were  previously  also  paid  a  piece-work  rate,  with 
a  pair  of  sawyers  earning  1  skilling  for  every  4  alen  (2.5m)  cutN,  but 
there  is  no  mention  of  this  in  the  1625  ordinance.  Also  mentioned  in  the 
accounts  were  a  schruemager  (screw  maker)40  who  presumably  fashioned 
the  wooden  spikes  and  treenails,  and  a  pompborer  (pump  borer)41,  who, 
rather  surprisingly  for  what  must  have  been  a  fairly  skilled  job,  earned 
just  10  Kdlr.  per  annum. 
The  manufacture  of  the  masts  and  upper  works  of  the  ships  was  a 
specialist  trade  carried  out  by  the  mersmager  (top  maker),  who  held  a 
relatively  high  position  among  the  shipcarpenters. 
The  K1a'dekammer  accounts  provide  valuable  information  on  the 
number  of  men  employed  in  the  various  wood-working  trades,  the  number 
of  days  that  they  worked,  and  the  wages  they  were  paid.  They  show  that 
the  wage  structure  was  much  more  complicated  than  the  1625  ordinance, 
with  men  being  paid  from  28  skilling  down  to  9  skilling  per  day  at  one 
skilling  intervals.  In  the  winter  months  the  men  were  paid  only  half  their 
normal  day-rate.  Table  6.1.  shows  the  number  of  men  in  each  grade  in 
the  spring  of  1641. 
------------------- 
39.  Schlegel  (ed.  ),  'Kort  Overslag  paa  alt  Rigens  Indtagt  og  Udgift,  som  er  nu  giort  og  tilsam- 
mendragen  den  24  Decembris  Anno  1602',  Samlung  zur  Danischen  Geschichte.  1  Bd.  1  stk.  (1773), 
23-113;  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  24  December  1598. 
40.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  f$r  1655,15.  Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  Regnskab  1646/47. 
41.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Klaedekammer  Regnskaber,  Udgift  1621/22. 
255 Day  Rate  (sk.  )  Total  No.  of  Men  Total  at  Bremerholm 
28  33  27 
27  11  6 
26  12  6 
25  7  2 
24  11  8 
23  4  2 
22  11  6 
21  6  5 
20  13  8 
19  9  5 
18  5  1 
17  16  10 
16  13  5 
15  20  11 
14  39  19 
13  7  3 
12  23  10 
11  9  4 
10  11  5 
9  1  0 
Table  6.1.  Wage  Structure  of  Wood-working  Craftsmen 
Source  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekanuaer  Udgift  Conto  U,  K18dekanmier  Regnskaber,  Udgift  164O/41p. 
The  accounts  included  all  crown  employees,  wherever  they  were 
stationed.  No  clear  distinction  was  made  between  the  Bremerholm 
workforce  and  those  men  working  in  the  provinces,  apart  from  the  name 
of  the  town  being  added  to  the  end  of  the  men's  names.  This  is  fine  if 
the  entry  is  listed  as,  for  example,  'Mads  Pedersen  Malmge',  but  some 
doubt  arises  with  names  such  as  'Hans  Kolding'  or  'Anders  Ebbeltoft'.  As 
far  as  possible  all  those  men  working  in  the  provinces  have  been  iden- 
tified,  with  the  remainder  assumed  to  have  been  working  at  Bremerholm. 
Some  of  the  provincial  workers  may  have  been  among  those  called  to 
Copenhagen  every  spring43,  but  there  is  no  way  of  determining  this. 
-------------------- 
42.  In  these  accounts  all  woodworking  craftsmen  are  grouped  together  and  no  distinction  is  made 
between  the  different  trades. 
43.  See  later. 
256 The  accounting  year  for  these  trades  was  divided  into  three,  be- 
tween  Candlemas  -(2  February),  St.  Hans'  Day  (21  June),  and  All  Saints' 
Day  (1  November).  The  number  of  men  employed  during  each  period 
varied  slightly,  but  not  perhaps  as  much  as  might  be  expected.  However, 
not  all  the  men  employed  worked  at  the  dockyard  every  day.  Table  6.2. 
shows  the  seasonal  variation  in  workforce  for  1640/41.  To  even  out  the 
variations  in'  the  number  of  days  worked  the  total  man-days  worked  is 
given,  and  the  equivalent  workforce  if  all  men  had  worked  full-time. 
Total  Workforce  Bremerholm  Workforce 
Men  Man-days  F  Equivalent  Men  Man-days  F  Equivalent 
2/2/1640  -  20/6/1640  261  26,900  237  143  14,600  128 
21/6/1640  -  31/10/1640  271  28,700  254  127  13,600  120 
1/11/1610  -1/2/1641  275  19,100  257  135  9,400  127 
Table  6.2.  Seasonal  Variation  of  Wood-working  Craftsmen 
Source  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekan  mer  Udgift  Conto  La.,  K1  *kammer  Regnskaber,  Udgift  1640/41. 
The  last  thing  needed  to  make  a  ship  watertight  was  to  seal  the 
joints  by  caulking  them  with  oakum  and  tar.  In  England  this  was  recog- 
nised  as  a  separate  trade  but  this  was  not  the  case  in  Denmark,  with 
the  task  being  carried  out  by  the  skibstgmmerma'nd.  There  was  not  even 
a  separate  term  for  the  process,  with  orders  given  simply  to  'dicta  och 
drifve'  (tighten  and  seal)44  the  ships.  In  fact  the  recognition  of  caulking 
as  a  separate  trade  occurred  very  late  in  Denmark.  A  late  18th  century 
encyclopaedia  of  sea  terms45  still  finds  it  necessary  to  state,  under  the 
entry  for  Kalfaterene  (caulkers): 
-------------------- 
44.  Forordning  om  skibsh$vedsmandene....  October  1627,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  IV,  375. 
45.  Koefoed,  Dansk  Soo  Ord-Bog. 
257 ýý" 
de  Folk  som  bruges  til  at  digte  et  Skib,  i  Engeland  og  Frankerig 
ere  disse  en  Forskiellig  Stand  eller  Slags  of  Skibs  Tgmmermaend. 
Those  men  who  are  used  to  tighten  a  ship,  in  England  and  France 
these  are  a  separate  trade  or  type  of  ship  carpenter. 
The  fitting  out  of  the  ships  was  carried  out  by  a  number  of  other 
skilled  craftsmen.  The  fine  woodwork  on  the  ships,  such  as  the  outfit  of 
the  officers'  quarters,  was  carried  out  by  the  snedklere  (joiners)  who 
earned  78  Kdlr.  46.  In  the  1620s  there  were  two  of  these  craftsmen,  but 
by  the  1640s  there  was  only  one,  although  he  was  assisted  by  four 
snedklersvende47.  The  more  intricate  woodwork  on  the  figure-heads  and 
stern  carvings  was  also  frequently  done  by  the  court  wood  carvers. 
The  glass  for  the  ships  was  manufactured  by  the  glarmester 
(master  glazier)  and  his  svend,  who  earned  30  and  12  Kdlr.  respectively48 
.  It  would  be  reasonable,  though,  to  assume  that  the  majority  of  their 
work  was  concerned  more  with  the  royal  palaces  than  with  ships. 
The  ships  carvings  and  other  decorations  were  painted  by  the 
skibsmaler  (ship  painter)  or  Holmens  maler  who  did  not  have  a  permanent 
commission  but  was  only  called  in  when  needed  and  paid  on  a  piece-work 
rate49.  In  fact  the  decoration  of  ships  was  often  done  by  the  court 
painters  who,  rather  than  painting  a  canvas,  would  be  directed  to  paint 
designs,  figures  and  scenes  on  the  king's  warships50. 
-------------------- 
46.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Klsdekammer  Regnskaber,  Udgift  1621/22. 
47.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  f4)r  1655,14.  Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  Regnskab  1643/44. 
48.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Klmdekammer  Regnskaber,  Udgift  1640/41. 
49.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Mang  391-2. 
50.  Niels  Probst,  'Villum  Hornbolt,  Hoffets  og  Holmens  Maler',  Marinehistorisk  Tidsskriff,  (4/1994), 
93-104. 
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As  a  ship  neared  completion  a  skipper  would  be  appointed  to  it, 
who  would  work  in  conjunction  with  the  master  shipwright  to  ensure  that 
the  ship  was  rigged  and  outfitted  in  the  way  that  he  preferred.  A  small 
number  of  seamen  were  also  usually  allocated  to  a  ship  at  this  stage  to 
assist  with  the  rigging  and  other  outfitting  tasks. 
6.3.2.  The  Dockyard  Workshops 
The  ironwork,  rigging  and  other  outfit  materials  were  manufactured  in 
the  various  workshops  situated  in  the  dockyard.  Each  had  its  own 
specialist  personnel  and  management  structure. 
The  largest  of  the  workshops  was  the  forge  where  all  the  anchors, 
spikes  and  other  metal  fittings  were  manufactured.  The  management  was 
carried  out  jointly  by  the  skriver  i  den  Store  Smedje  (clerk  of  the  Great 
Forge)  and  the  oversmed  or  mestersmed  (master  smith). 
The  skriver  i  den  Store  Smedje  not  only  kept  the  accounts  of  the 
forge  but  he  also  acted  as  its  general  manager.  He  was  in  charge  of 
procuring  the  raw  and  scrap  iron,  and  all  the  coal  needed  to  fire  the 
forges.  All  ironwork  which  was  issued  by  the  forge  was  measured, 
weighed  and  its  intended  destination  recorded  in  his  accounts51. 
The  forge  was  accounted  for  separately  and  had  its  own  heading  in 
the  rentemesterregnskaber  accounts.  The  smiths  were  paid  according  to  a 
piecework  and  hourly-rate  agreement,  the  precise'details  of  which  are 
unknown.  The  skriver  therefore  had  to  keep  an  accurate  register  of  all 
employees  and  the  amount  and  type  of  work  carried  out.  These  accounts 
were  then  submitted  to  the  rentekammer  and  a  lump  sum  issued  to  him  to 
distribute  the  wages  to  the  individual  workers. 
-------------------- 
51.  Rigsarkiv,  S$etaten  For  1655,30.  Bremerholmens  Store  Smedje  Regnskab  1618-1621. 
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responsible  for  keeping  a  record  of  the  muster  lists  for  the  dockyard  and 
for  supervising  the  supply  of  food  to  all  the  men  at  Bremerholm.  This  was 
most  likely  just  a  temporary  measure  since  the  post  of  proviantskriver 
was  vacant  at  the  time  and  not,  as  Lind  assertsm,  an  integral  part  of  the 
job.  The  amount  of  work  did  steadily  increase  though,  and  his  one  assis- 
tant  in  161854  was  joined  by  another  three  by  1624. 
The  organisation  of  craftsmen  in  the  forge  was  similar  to  that  of 
the  shipwrights,  the  highest  level  of  craftsmen  being  the  mestersmede  who 
supervised  the  design  of  the  ironwork  and  controlled  the  working  of  the 
forge.  The  work  of  the  individual  blacksmiths  was  supervised  by  the 
mestersmedesvende  (foreman  journeyman  smiths).  The  journeyman  smiths 
were  then  classified  into  two  kinds,  grovsmedesvende  and  klejnsmedes- 
vende,  who  carried  out  the  rough  and  the  fine  work  respectively. 
The  skriver  i  den  store  smedjds  wages  totalled  116  Kdlr.  in  1618, 
rising  to  150  Kdlr.  in  1624,  and  the  mestersmed  earned  200  Kdlr.  In  the 
budget  estimate  of  1630  it  stated  that  18  mestersvende  received  2  Kdlr., 
and  80  smiths  11  Kdlr.  a  week  in  wages  and  victuals,  equivalent  to  ap- 
proximately  100  and  75  Kdlr.  per  annum. 
The  second  largest  workshop  was  the  rope-walk,  which  manufac- 
tured  all  the  rope  and  cable  needed  for  the  ships.  The  craftsman  in 
charge  was  known  as  the  rebslager  paa  Bremerholm  (rope-spinner  at 
Bremerholm)  and  was  responsible  for  assessing  the  quality  of  all  hemp 
coming  into  the  dockyard,  and  for  the  spinning  of  all  cordage  at 
-------------------- 
52.  Commission  for  Anders  Haar,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  11  March  1624. 
53.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Mena  343-5. 
54.  Commission  for  Knud  Vorm,  Kancelliets  Brevb0ger,  29  April  1618. 
55.  Commission  for  Andreas  Bentsvinger,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  27  April  1626. 
56.  'Overslag  paa  hele  Rigets  Indtsgt  og  Udgift  16301,  Budstikken,  60,  (Christiania.  1824),  473-82. 
260 Bremerholm.  He  kept  accounts  in  conjunction  with  the  materialskriver, 
who  was  his  immediate  supervisor.  From  1626  his  wages  were  based 
largely  on  piece-work,  earning  9  Marks  for  every  skippund  (160  kg)  of 
rough  cable,  9  Kdlr.  for  rope,  and  18  Kdlr.  for  twine57. 
When  raw  hemp  and  flax  came  into  the  dockyard  it  would  first  be 
cleaned  and  worked  at  the  dockyard  hemp-mill,  under  the  supervision  of 
the  hampebanker  (hemp  beater),  who  was  paid  40  Kdlr.  per  annum58. 
Specific  quantities  of  hemp  were  stipulated  for  each  workman  and  boy  to 
clean  in  the  summer  and  winter,  with  the  amount  of  wastage  also  strictly 
regulated. 
The  cleaned  hemp  would  then  be  passed  on  to  the  rebslager  or  the 
mestersvend  paa  Reberbanen  (foreman  of  the  rope-walk)  who  would  su- 
pervise  the  spinning  of  it  into  the  desired  form.  The  completed  rope  was 
then  transferred  to  the  drying  room  where  it  would  lay  for  fourteen  days 
before  being  tarred,  if  necessary.  The  workers  at  the  rope-walk  consisted 
of  around  14  svende  who  spun  the  rope59,  and  a  begsyder  (pitch  boiler) 
and  tjmresyder  (tar  boiler)  who  presumably  would  have  heated  the  pitch 
and  tar  to  treat  itGO. 
At  the  Sejlhus  .  sails  and  other  cloth  outfit  were  manufactured.  Cloth 
probably  was  not  actually  woven  here  since  most  of  the  woven  cloth  came 
from  the  tugthus,  the  len,  or  from  private  merchants.  The  sejllaegger  (sail 
maker)  was  the  master  craftsman  responsible  for  manufacturing  the  sails 
and  had  an  assistant  mestersvend.  The  work-force  consisted  of  around  20 
svende  and  15  boys6l. 
-------------------- 
57.  Commission  for  Hans  Teigler,  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  11  March  1626,  Commission  for  Niels 
Pedersen,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  3  July  1634. 
58.  Commission  for  Hendrik  Meyer,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  14  January  1625;  Commission  for  Jens 
Madsen,  Kancelliets  BrevbOger  25  October  1635. 
59.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  f*r  1655,14.  Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  Regnskab  1643/44;  15. 
Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  Regnskab  1646/47. 
60.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  La.,  Klaedekammer  Regnskaber,  Udgift  1621/22. 
261 In  1627  Herman  Lygtemager  received  a  commission  as  sejllvgger  og 
kompasmager  and  became  responsible  for  the  manufacture  and  repair  of 
compasses,  hour  glasses  and  lights  as  well  as  sails62.  Quite  how  these 
seemingly  unrelated  activities  became  linked  is  unknown  but  the  practice 
was  continued  after  his  death  in  1654.  His  wages,  at  200  Kdlr.,  were  more 
than  double  that  of  an  ordinary  sejllmgger. 
Also  working  in  the  Sejlhus  was  the  skrvdder  paa  Bremerholm 
(tailor)  who  manufactured  all  the  flags,  bulwark  and  top  decorations,  and 
other  fancy  work  which  may  have  been  required  for  the  navy.  He  was 
paid  solely  on  a  piece  work  rate  and  received  his  orders  directly  from 
the  Holmens  admirals  . 
The  smallest  workshop  at  Bremerholm  was  the  block-house  where 
around  five  or  six  blokkedrejere  (block  turners)  made  all  the  blocks, 
dead-eyes  and  similar  fittings.  Like  the  other  workshops  it  was  jointly 
supervised  by  the  materialskriver  and  the  Holmens  admiral.  It  is  unclear 
whether  there  existed  a  master  block  turner,  but  it  is  likely  that  the 
senior  craftsman  in  this  area  was  simply  one  of  the  mestersvende  for 
tommerma'ndene.  In  1630  it  was  stipulated  that  each  blokkedrejer  was  to 
make  20  blocks  or  their  equivalent  in  block-sheaves,  pump-shoes  and 
similar  items,  every  week  during  the  summer,  and  16  in  the  winter.  The 
wages  seem  to  have  been  relatively  low,  at  just  30  Kdlr.  per  year  in  the 
1620s  for  a  senior  blokkedrejer,  although  by  the  1650s  this  figure  had 
risen  to  200  Kdlr.  65. 
------------------- 
61.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  f$r  1655,14.  Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  Regnskab  1643/44;  15. 
Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  Regnskab  1646/47. 
62.  Commission  for  Herman  Lygtemager,  Kancelliets  Brevbq'ger,  October  1627. 
63.  Commission  for  .  7orgen  Rassmussen,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  23  November  1619. 
64.  Materials  k  river's  commission,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  22  December  1630. 
65.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  M.  rnd,  382. 
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6.3.3.  Ship  Repair  and  Maintenance 
The  fitting  out  of  new  ships  with  sails  and  rigging,  and  the  repair  of  ex- 
isting  ships  was  carried  out  by  their  crews  under  the  supervision  of  the 
ships'  own  skippers.  With  so  many  ships  needing  repair  on  an  annual 
basis  it  became  necessary  to  have  one  person  to  co-ordinate  the  work  on 
all  the  ships.  This  was  originally  an  informal  position  but  in  1626  the 
first  formal  overskipper  was  appointed66. 
The  overskipper  had  responsibility  for  all  repair  work  which  did 
not  come  under  the  shipwright's  remit  and  was  in  charge  of  all  naval 
personnel  present  at  Bremerholm.  Every  morning  all  seamen  at  the  dock- 
yard  were  mustered  by  the  overskipper  and  each  man  assigned  to  work 
on  a  particular  ship  or  in  one  of  the  dockyard  workshops.  He  naturally 
worked  in  close  co-operation  with  the  Holmens  admiral  and  any  equipment 
requested  by  individual  skippers  had  to  be  approved  and  signed  for  by 
both  men.  The  overskipper's  wages  started  at  150  Kdlr.  but  steadily  rose 
to  200  Kdlr.  in  163367,  and  400  Kdlr.  in  163968,  putting  the  post  briefly 
on  a  par  with  the  master  shipwrights.  When  Rasmus  Thyggesen  took  over 
the  post  early  in  1640  his  salary  was  set  at  only  200  Kdlr.  88,  but  this 
was  increased  to  350  Kdlr.  in  16487°. 
The  repair  work  on  the  hulls  was  carried  out  by  the 
skibstpmmermxnd.  As  well  as  those  men  employed  all  year  round  there 
were  also  a  large  number  of  men  who  were  hired  on  a  temporary  basis  in 
66.  Commission  for  Rasmus  S$frensen  Samsing.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  19  July  1626. 
67.  Kancelliets  BrevbOger,  8  October  1633. 
68.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  12  July  1639. 
69.  Commission  for  Rasmus  Thyggesen,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  22  May  1640. 
70.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  M&nd  330-1. 
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the  spring,  when  work  on  refitting  ships  was  at  its  height.  At  first  this 
was  an  ad  hoc  arrangement  that  was  used  during  wartime  or  for  special 
circumstances. 
In  1617  this  practice  was  formalised  in  a  missive  sent  to  a  total  of 
36  lensmmnd  ordering  them  to  send  as  many  shipcarpenters  as  possible  to 
Bremerholm  for  two  months,  from  March,  every  year72.  This  policy  ini- 
tially  had  only  limited  success,  with  only  11  men  arriving  in  the  first 
year73.  The  following  year  59  men  arrived  but  a  further  79  failed  to  turn 
up74.  However,  as  registers  were  gradually  made  of  all  ttmmermmnd  it  be- 
came  more  difficult  for  men  to  evade  this  order75,  but  problems  still  per- 
sisted  in  getting  enough  men  to  comply,  and  Christian  IV  repeatedly  had 
to  request  his  lensmmnd  to  provide  the  necessary  men  throughout  his 
reign76. 
One  aspect  of  the  repair  of  a  ship's  hull  was  to  clean  it  of  marine 
growth  by  careening  the  ship.  This  was  a  skilled  and  delicate  operation 
which  could  easily  damage  the  ship  and  injure  men,  and  could  even  lead 
to  the  loss  of  the  ship  altogether.  There  was  a  dedicated  official  who  was 
responsible  for  this  task,  known  as  the  brademester  (slip  master),  who 
was  the  highest  paid  of  the  foreman  carpenters  and  was  also  known  as 
the  Overste  mestersvend  for  ttmmermmndene  (senior  foreman  journeyman 
carpenter).  He  earned  651  Kdlr.  per  annumn.  His  job  entailed  emptying 
--  -  -----  -  --  -- 
71.  Jurgen  H.  Barfod,  Christian  3.  s  tlidß  (K$benhavn,  1995).  60-1  &  265;  Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik 
den  andens  tid  9,48,75. 
72.  Missive  to  lensma'nd  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  17  February  1617. 
73.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  20  February  1617. 
74.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  30  April  and  13  November  1618. 
75.  Knud  Klem,  'Christian  4.09  Bremerholm.  Handels-  og  S4,  fartsmuseets  drbog.  (1977).  84-8. 
76.  Missives  to  lensma'nd.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  20  June  1623;  6  February  1624;  10  January  1632; 
and  11  February  1633. 
77.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Klsdekammer  Regnskaber,  Udgift  1640/41. 
264 the  ship  of  all  movable  material,  hauling  it  over  to  one  side  using  a  sys- 
tem  of  blocks  and  tackle,  and  then  ensuring  that  the  ship  returned  to  a 
stable  upright  position  at  the  end  of  the  manoeuvre. 
The  total  number  of  men  employed  in  repairing  the  ships  varied 
from  a  couple  of  hundred  in  the  summer  months  to  two  or  three  thousand 
in  the  winter. 
6.3.4.  '  The  Ancillary  Workforce 
To  keep  the  operation  of  the  dockyard  running  smoothly  and  to  ensure 
that  the  workers  were  fit  and  healthy  required  a  variety  of  ancillary 
workers.  Although  they  carried  out  vital  tasks  they  were  secondary  in 
importance  to  the  main  workforce  and  may  be  dealt  with  fairly  briefly 
here78. 
Each  of  the  three  entrances  to  the  dockyard  was  controlled  by  a 
portner  og  vmgter  (gate-keeper  and  watchman)  who  held  responsibility 
for  opening  and  closing  the  gates  and  making  sure  that  no-one  entered 
or  left  without  authorisation,  and  to  ensure  that  no  materials  were  stolen. 
The  portnere  were  paid  68  Kdlr.  per  annum  and  were  assisted  by  three 
vagter  (sentries)  who  each  earned  a  total  of  54  Kdlr.  per  annum".  A 
watch  was  also  kept  aboard  ships  that  were  laid  up  a  the  dockyard  and  a 
watch  was  maintained  on  these  by  a  day  and  a  night  watch.  In  1620/21 
there  was  a  day  watch  of  20  and  a  night  watch  of  25.  By  1630  the  total 
number  of  seamen  on  watchkeeping  duties  had  risen  to  14480. 
All  goods  entering  or  leaving  the  dockyard,  and  all  materials  issued 
to  the  ships,  were  assessed  by  the  overvejer,  vrager,  tolder  og  maaler 
(chief  weigher,  assessor  and  measurer)  who  worked  under  the  supervision 
-------------------- 
78.  Unless  otherwise  stated  the  information  in  this  section  comes  from  Lind.  Kong  Kristian  og 
hans  mend 
79.  Commission  for  Peder  Lauritzen,  Kanceniets  Brevbmger,  26  May  1646. 
80.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Kladekammer  regnskaber,  1620/21  &  1630/31. 
265 of  the  proviantskriver  and  the  materialskriver.  His  assistant,  the  under- 
vejer,  was  responsible  for  keeping  the  books  as  well  as  the  actual 
measuring.  The  importance  of  the  post  is  reflected  in  the  relatively  high 
salary  of  150  Kdlr.  for  the  overvejer81.  The  undervejer  received  half  of 
this  and  there  was  also  a  boy  helper  who  received  4  Kdlr.  a  month82. 
The  kitchen  was  run  by  the  cook  and  his  assistant,  the 
ka'ldersvend.  These  are  the  only  men  ever  mentioned  in  connection  with 
the  kitchen  in  the  accounts  but  the  quantity  of  food  required  to  feed  the 
hundreds  of  workers  was  vast  and,  although  the  food  was  principally 
boiled  meat,  salt  fish  and  bread,  it  is  inconceivable  that  just  two  men 
could  prepare  and  serve  it  all.  In  1580  the  kitchen  had  a  staff  of  ten83 
and  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  this  figure  increased  as  the  dockyard 
expanded  during  Christian  IV's  reign.  Jon  Olafsson  describes  one  of  his 
acquaintances  in  1616  as  the  'ypperste  Kaeldermester  paa  Bremerholm' 
(highest  cellar  master  at  Bremerholm)84,  which  would  suggest  that  there 
was  certainly  more  than  one  kxldersvend.  There  is  also  mention  of  a 
fischeblpder  (fish  soaker)  in  the  accounts85. 
The  cook  and  his  assistants  came  under  the  proviantskriver's 
direct  control,  as  did  all  ship-borne  cooks.  The  number  of  men  who  were 
allowed  to  receive  meals  and  those  allowed  a  beer  ration  was  agreed 
every  week  with  the  Holmens  admiral  and  any  additional  men  who  re- 
quired  rations  had  to  be  separately  accounted  for.  Strict  guidelines  were 
-------------------- 
81.  Commission  for  Laurits  Nielsen,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  9  May  1634. 
82.  Commission  for  Hans  Christensen,  Kancelliets  BrevL4ger,  30  May  1625. 
83.  Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  tic(  201-2. 
84.  Memorier  og  Breve,  I,  Islanderen  Jon  Olafssons  oplevelser  som  bossekytte  under  Christian  IV, 
(K40benhavn,  1966),  25. 
85.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655,28.  Bremerholms  T4,  mmerregnskaber  1601/02. 
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issued  as  to  how  much  food  was  to  be  issued.  For  instance  a  barrel  of 
headless  cod  was  sufficient  for  336  meals,  a  barrel  of  grain  1408,  a  barrel 
of  butter  3332,  and  so  on.  These  numbers  varied  from  time  to  time  but 
no  indication  is  ever  given  as  to  quite  how  the  figures  were  calculated. 
The  administration  of  the  dockyard  hospital,  which  from  1628  was 
located  outside  the  dockyard  itself,  was  carried  out  by  the  forstander  i 
sygehuset  (hospital  manager).  A  cook  and  km1dersvend  prepared  the 
patients'  food  and  two  women  were  employed  as  cleaners.  The  treatment 
was  undertaken  by  the  bartska'r  (barber  surgeon),  who  also  attended  to 
patients  at  the  arsenal,  provianthus  and  the  tugthus.  In  1636  a  profes- 
sional  physician,  or  medicus,  was  also  engaged  who  was  intended  to  su- 
pervise  the  barber  surgeons,  but  he  stayed  in  the  post  for  less  than  a 
year.  Another  physician  was  appointed  in  1644,  and  in  1646  he  became  the 
physician  for  both  the  navy  and  the  tugthus,  with  a  salary  of  400  Kdlr.  87 
The  spiritual  needs  of  the  workforce  were  administered  by  the 
Bremerholms  sogneprvst  (Bremerholm  parish  priest).  This  post  came  into 
being  when  the  old  forge  was  converted  into  the  Holmens  Kirke  in  1619. 
He  also  assumed  the  role  of  dean  to  the  sea-going  chaplains  in  the  navy. 
His  staff  at  the  church  expanded  as  the  navy  grew,  and  by  the  end  of 
Christian  IV's  reign  there  were  two  curates  and  two  vergers.  The  curates 
led  the  services  inside  the  dockyard  for  those  working  on  Sundays  and 
holy  days  and  also  acted  as  teachers  for  the  boys  at  the  dockyard.  When 
the  old  hospital  was  converted  into  a  school  in  1628  a  full  time 
skolemester  (schoolmaster)  was  appointed  as  a  member  of  the  church 
staff.  He  was  to  teach  a  class  of  twelve  boys  an  18  month  course  in  the 
basics  of  the  three  'R's  and  the  catechism. 
- 
86. 
----------- 
Missive  to 
----- 
Sten  Villumsen,  Kancelliets  BrevbOger,  27  April  1624. 
87.  Commission  for  Niels  Wichmand,  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  26  May  1646. 
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The  instruction  of  boys  in  the  arts  of  seamanship  and  navigation 
was  carried  out  by  the  1wrer  i  navigation  (navigation  teacher).  This  post 
was  loosely  attached  to  the  church  school  and  was  held  initially  by  an 
Englishman,  and  then  by  a  Dutchman.  Strangely  the  post  was  left  vacant 
from  1624  until  1647.  The  instructor  was  paid  as  an  ordinary  skipper  and 
was  expected  to  put  to  sea  as  such  if  the  need  arose88. 
There  were  two  naval  courts  of  law  at  this  time.  The  first,  the 
equivalent  of  the  English  High  Court  of  Admiralty,  met  at  the  Castle  and 
was  presided  over  by  the  rigsadmiral,  rigskansler  and  other  members  of 
the  state  administration.  This  met  infrequently  and  heard  non  criminal 
cases  relating  to  maritime  law,  and  the  settlement  of  disputes  concerning 
prize  money  and  maritime  tolls.  The  second  was  essentially  a  court-martial 
and  dealt  with  more  mundane  matters  such  as  theft  and  indiscipline.  This 
was  presided  over  by  the  Holmens  admiral  and  its  members  were  called 
from  serving  naval  officers89.  These  courts  had  no  dedicated  personnel 
until  1646,  when  a  fiskal  paa  Bremerholm,  TOjhuset  og  Flaaden  (fiscal  of 
Bremerholm,  the  arsenal  and  the  navy)  was  appointed  to  oversee  matters. 
He  was  to  ensure  that  'alt  gAr  rigtigt  til  pA  Bremerholm,  i  t4jhuset  og  pA 
flAden  efter  gmldende  bestemmelser'  (all  is  kept  in  order  at  Bremerholm, 
the  arsenal  and  the  navy  after  the  current  provisions)90.  He  was  not 
paid  a  regular  salary  but  received  a  quarter  of  all  goods  confiscated  and 
fines  imposed.  There  were  also  two  Holmens  profos  (naval  provosts)  who 
kept  discipline  among  the  workforce. 
The  last  documented  ancillary  official  at  Bremerholm  is  the 
vindskriver,  who  was  paid  64  Kdlr.  a  year  to  keep  a  record  of  the  wind 
direction  by  day  and  night.  This  post  was  established  in  the  1620s  after 
-  ------  -  ---  -  ----- 
88.  Commission  for  Bagge  Wandell,  Kancelliets  Brevbq,  ger,  16  June  1647. 
89.  F.  S.  Grove-Stephensen,  'Marinens  jurisdiktionsforhold  for  1660',  Marinehistorisk  tidsskrift, 
(2/1964).  19-31. 
90.  Commission  for  Peder  Knudsen,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  16  March  1646. 
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an  ordinance  was  issued  that  required  the  Holmens  admiral  to  keep  a 
register  of  wind  to  try  and  prevent  ships  from  coming  to  grief  through 
unpredictable  weather91. 
In  addition  to  all  these  men  there  would  have  been  a  variety  of 
other  workers  such  as  storemen,  carters,  and  stable  hands  who  looked 
after  the  horses  which  were  needed  to  shift  heavy  materials  and  the  oxen 
which  drove  the  forges.  A  mpgspreder  (muck  spreader)  is  mentioned  in 
158092  and  no  doubt  this  task  carried  on  into  Christian  IV's  time. 
In  total  it  is  estimated  that  there  would  have  been  in  the  region  of 
about  70  ancillary  staff,  excluding  the  seamen  on  watchkeeping  duties. 
6.3.5.  Prisoners  'in  Bremerholm's  Iron' 
The  last  type  of  worker  that  was  found  at  the  dockyard  were  the  so 
called  fanger  i  Bremerholms  jern  (prisoners  in  Bremerholm's  iron).  The 
practice  of  using  prisoners  in  the  royal  dockyard  dates  from  as  early  as 
1566  when  vagrants  were  rounded  up  and  sent  to  work  there93.  This 
practice  was  formalised  in  1573  when  all  lensmxnd  and  market  towns  were 
instructed  to  send  as  many  vagrants,,  gypsies,  beggars  and  thieves  as 
possible  to  Copenhagen94.  Gradually  it  became  standard  practice  that  all 
persistent  offenders  who  had  been  sentenced  to  death  instead  had  their 
sentences  commuted  to  a  life's  hard  labour  at  Bremerholm.  Any  further 
misdemeanour  by  them  would  result  in  their  original  sentence  being 
carried  out  at  the  dockyard  gallows95. 
91.  Forordning  om  orden  med  de  krigsskibe,  6  February  1621,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania.  III, 
627-8. 
92.  Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  114  201. 
93.  Fr.  Stuckenberg,  'I  Bremerholms  jern',  Historisk  tidsskrif4  (1892),  670. 
94.  Missive  til  Lensmsndene  og  Kmbsta?  derne,  13  August  1576,  corpus  Constitutionum  Dania  III, 
20. 
95.  Missives  to  1ensma'nd  24  March  1601  and  18  May  1620,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania  III,  139  & 
617. 
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Criminals  could  be  sentenced  to  a  period  of  punishment  in 
Bremerholm's  iron  of  anywhere  between  one  and  twenty  years  depending 
on  the  nature  of  their  crime.  Christian  IV  himself  sometimes  decided  on 
the  duration  of  these  prisoners'  punishments96.  As  a  particularly  harsh 
punishment  for  Crown  servants  who  had  committed  a  crime  against  the 
state,  they  were  sentenced  to  be  fettered  together  with  one  of  the  most 
disreputable  prisoners  at  Bremerholm97.  Swedish  prisoners  of  war  could 
also  find  themselves  clapped  in  iron  at  the  dockyard98.  The  practice  of 
condemning  vagrants  to  a  life  of  hard  labour  also  continued  well  into 
Christian  IV's  reign98,  and  an  ordinance  on  begging  from  1636  stated  that 
beggars  should  'fares  til  Bremerholm,  der  at  arbejde  i  jern  eller  i  lmnke, 
eller  pA  yore  jagter  og  galejer'  (be  sent  to  Bremerholm,  there  to  work  in 
iron  or  in  chains,  or  on  our  jagts  and  galleys)'°°.  It  was  further 
enshrined  in  law  that  anyone  found  unemployed  and  refusing  to  work  was 
to  be  sent  to  work  in  irons101. 
As  the  term  suggests,  all  prisoners  were  bound  in  iron  fetters.  One 
observer  noted  that  'ulydige  og  skalkagtige  mennesker  og  l4sgaengere  ar- 
bejde  her  med  laenker  og  jern  om  benene,  livet,  og  halsen'  (disobedient 
and  roguish  men  and  vagrants  work  here  with  chains  and  iron  on  their 
legs,  waist  and  neck)102,  and  depending  on  the  nature  of  their  work  they 
were  also  sometimes  fettered  together.  Jon  Olafsson  provides  an  interest- 
ing  description  of  being  put  into  'Bremerholm's  iron': 
-------------------- 
96.  Details  of  prisoners,  October  1622  and  22  October  1623,  egenhandige  Breve,  I,  249-63  &  335- 
48. 
97.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  21  February  1641,  egenhandige  Breve,  V,  22. 
98.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  28  June  1644,  egenhandige  Breve,  V,  480. 
99.  Four  vagrants  sent  to  Bremerholm,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  6  April  1634. 
100.  Stuckenberg,  'I  Bremerholms  fern',  669. 
101.  Reces  1643,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania;  V.  317. 
102.  Stuckenberg,  'I  Bremerholms  jern',  669. 
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Thereupon  Grabow  bade  the  Provost  conduct  me  to  the  Island  (i.  e. 
Bremerholm)  to  Master  Anders,  who  was  the  King's  chief  smith,  and 
ordered  him  to  fasten  an  iron  ring  round  my  neck,  outside  my 
clothes,  as  was  done  with  several  persons.  On  it,  at  the  nape  of  my 
neck,  there  was  a  thin  iron  ring,  on  which  hung  a  bell  of  such 
dimensions  that  a  man  with  large  hands  could  conceal  it  inside 
them'03. 
The  total  number  of  prisoners  at  any  one  time  is  hard  to  judge. 
Table  6.3.  shows,  from  the  few  surviving  records  available,  the  numbers 
of  prisoners  that  were  sentenced: 
Year  No.  of  Men  Sentenced 
1621  53 
1622  77 
1623,  48 
1624  36 
1625  36 
1626  14 
Table  6.3.  Men  Sentenced  to  Work  'in  Bremerholm's  Iron' 
Source  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fir  1655,7.  Fortegnelser  over  fanger,  1621-1626. 
These  figures  do  not  show  the  total  number  of  prisoners  but  simply 
the  new  ones  arriving  each  year.  Of  these  a  fair  proportion  either  died 
or  escaped.  The  1642  budget  estimate'04  gives  a  total  of  154  prisoners, 
but  by  1646  their  number  was  estimated  at  only  100105.  They  were 
-------------------- 
103.  Bertha  S.  Phillpotts  (Ed.  ),  The  Life  of  Jon  Olafsson,  Vol.  I,  (Hakluyt  Society,  Series  II,  Vol. 
LIII,  1923),  188. 
104.  Chr.  Bruun  (ed.  ),  'Kort  Overslag  over  Rigens  Indtagt  og  Udgift  1642',  Danske  Samlinger,  6 
(1870-71),  325-47.  See  Chapter  3. 
105.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B186,  Oluf  Daas  Optegnelsesbog,  f.  39-40. 
271 originally  housed  in  Copenhagen  Castle  but  by  1620  a  new  prison  had  to 
be  erected  within  the  dockyard  to  cope  with  the  growing  number  of 
prisoners.  This  was  further  enlarged  in  1640106,  suggesting  that  the  num- 
ber  of  prisoners  steadily  increased  throughout  the  reign. 
They  were  guarded  by  six  fangefogeder  (prison  warders)107  but 
these  were  prone  to  corruption,  and  a  payment  of  only  2  Daler  could 
secure  the  release  of  a  prisoner'. 
The  prisoners  were  put  to  a  variety  of  work  in  the  dockyard, 
mainly  in  the  forge  or  the  rope-walk,  where  they  carried  out  the  heavy 
and  dirty  work  such  as  operating  the  'traedemallet'  (tread-wheel)'°9, 
shifting  materials  and  tarring  cables.  They  were  also  used  to  man  the 
oars  of  the  galleys  at  sea.  They  were  not,  however,  restricted  only  to 
working  at  the  dockyard  and  were  frequently  sent  to  carry  out  labouring 
work  at  Frederiksborg  castle,  the  Crown  gardens110,  and  the  arsenal. 
6.4.  The  Effectiveness  of  the  Dockyard  Administration 
Having  outlined  in  detail  the  workings  of  the  dockyard  administration  we 
should  now  ask  how  effectively  it  operated,  both  in  terms  of  the  work 
that  was  carried  out  and  the  way  in  which  it  was  managed. 
Despite  the  number  of  dockyard  officials  the  king  himself  remained 
the  key  to  the  dockyard's  effective  operation.  He  was  closely  involved  in 
all  aspects  of  its  running,  and  dictated  orders  relating  to  all  manner  of 
-------------------- 
106.  See  Chapter  5. 
107.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  f$r  1655,14.  Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  Regnskab  1643/44. 
108.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  11  December  1638. 
109.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fmr  1655,7.  Fortegnelser  over  fanger,  1621. 
110.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fir  1655,7.  Fortegnelser  over  fanger,  1623. 
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activities,  from  the  appointment  of  senior  officials  and  the  building  of 
new  ships  to  petty  matters  such  as  the  fitting  of  a  new  bowspritlll  or 
the  baking  of  breadt12. 
The  king's  role  in  the  decade  from  1600,  when  there  was  neither 
rigsadmiral  nor  Holmens  admiral,  was  especially  important.  Although  there 
was  a  stadtholder,  Lind113  maintains  that  Christian  IV  himself  took  on  the 
responsibility  for  running  Bremerholm,  probably  with  the  help  of  one  of 
the  skippers.  There  is  undoubtedly  some  truth  in  this.  However,  the  idea 
that  he  could  have  seen  to  the  day  to  day  management  of  what  was  a 
huge  task,  even  for  someone  who  had  no  other  duties,  is  clearly 
ludicrous.  The  notion  that  'Kongen  kom  sely  dagligen  paa  Holmen,  opmaalte 
og  udvalgte  selv  det  Tpmmer,  som  skulde  bruges,  eftersaae  Arbeidet,  og 
reviderede  Regnskaberne'  (the  king  himself  came  daily  to  Bremerholm, 
measured  and  selected  the  timber  that  should  be  used  himself,  oversaw 
the  work,  and  audited  the  accounts)114  is  nothing  but  sheer  fantasy. 
The  precise  details  of  how  the  dockyard  was  managed  during  this 
period  is  unclear.  Unfortunately  the  king's  letters  from  this  time  are 
sparse  and  there  is  not  one  which  mentions  naval  matters.  Even  in  the 
protocols  of  the  Danske  Kancelli  there  are  very  few  references  to  the 
dockyard  in  this  period,  and  these  are  directed  primarily  to  individual 
naval  officers  or  lensma'nd  and  mainly  concern  the  supply  of  materials.  It 
can  only  be  assumed  that  for  ten  years  the  royal  dockyard  'muddled 
through'  under  the  watchful  eyes  and  verbal  instructions  of  the  king  and 
his  stadtholder.  Most  likely  the  master  shipwrights  dealt  with  matters 
---- 
111. 
-------- 
Letter 
--- 
to 
----- 
Breide  Rantzau,  June/July  1610,  egenhandige  Brevet  I,  33-4. 
112.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  27  June  1642,  egenhandige  Brevq  VIII,  193-4. 
113.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Mand,  25-31. 
114.  W.  Graah,  Udkast  til  Danmarks  S4ekrigshistorie  (Kmbenhavn,  1818),  85-6;  H.  C.  Bering  Lisberg 
further  asserted  that  Christian  IV  was  the  first  to  arrive  at  the  dockyard  gates  every  day 
(Christian  IV,  (Kpbenhavn,  1890-91),  II,  115). 
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dealt  with  the  supervision  of  the  seamen,  with  the  materialskriver 
overseeing  the  finances  of  both.  Things  could  not  continue  like  this  for 
ever,  though,  and  changes  were  inevitable. 
The  1620s  mark  a  critical  point  in  the  dockyard's  administration.  As 
it  became  steadily  more  sophisticated,  with  the  creation  of  new  docks  and 
workshops,  strict  new  guidelines  had  to  be  established  for  working  prac- 
tices  within  the  dockyard.  With  the  threat  posed  by  the  Thirty  Years  War 
the  administrative  structure  also  needed  to  be  tightened  up  if  it  was  to 
operate  effectively  in  the  king's  absence.  The  publication  of  the  Holm-  og 
arsenalartikler  in  1625  established  a  formal  code  of  conduct  for  the 
workforce,  commissions  of  appointment  were  also  drawn  up  for  the  first 
time  for  many  of  the  officials  and  craftsmen,  and  several  new  posts,  such 
as  the  overskipper,  were  created. 
This  may  have  been  at  the  instigation  of  Christian  IV  who  knew 
that  the  organisation  must  be  tightened  up  if  he  was  not  going  to  be 
present  to  oversee  matters,  but  it  may  simply  have  been  that  without 
Christian  IV's  direct  supervision  the  dockyard  fell  into  a  state  of  disar- 
ray  which  had  to  be  rectified  by  introducing  tighter  controls.  In  any 
case  the  strengthening  of  the  administration  was  achieved  essentially  by 
formalising  the  existing  structure  and  not  through  any  radical  change. 
The  changes  were  made  very  much  at  a  lower  level  and  the  senior 
management  of  the  dockyard  remained  virtually  unchanged. 
It  was  in  the  senior  management,  however,  that  the  problems  really 
existed.  The  key  naval  appointment  was  the  Holmens  admiral.  As  we  have 
seen  he  was  personally  bound  to  undertake  an  almost  impossible  number 
of  tasks  without  being  entirely  sure  who  he  was  ultimately  responsible  to, 
and  was  without  any  adequate  support  from  subordinate  'line  managers'. 
Christian  IV's  indignation  at  the  poor  performance  of  his  Holmens  ad- 
miraler  is  justified  in  some  ways,  but  he  must  take  some  of  the  blame 
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himself  for  putting  them  in  such  an  untenable  situation  in  the  first  place. 
It  is  hardly  fair  to  expect  that  one  official  should  take  sole  responsibility 
for  overseeing  the  work  in  the  dockyards  whilst  at  the  same  time  being 
continually  ordered  to  sea  as  a  military  commander.  To  be  really  effective 
the  post  required  a  truly  extraordinary  man,  but  experience  showed  that 
Christian  IV's  choices  all  proved  to  be  decidedly  ordinary. 
It  is  interesting  to  speculate  why  Christian  IV  did  not  do  more  to 
improve  the  management  of  Bremerholm.  His  distrust  of  delegation  no 
doubt  played  a  part,  but  his  knowledge  of  the  English  dockyards  may 
also  have  been  an  influence.  Christian  IV  had  visited  the  English  dock- 
yards  in  person  in  1606  and  1614,  and  in  1627  an  envoy  was  sent  to 
review  English  practices115.  The  English  navy  and  naval  dockyard  ad- 
ministration  were  at  this  time  at  a  low  ebb  and  the  placing  of  the  naval 
administration  in  the  hands  of  a  commission  in  1618  did  little  to  improve 
matters.  As  a  model  of  reform  it  was  hardly  likely  to  persuade  Christian 
IV  to  depart  from  the  system  which  had  served  him  reasonably  well  until 
then. 
Christian  IV  did  take  a  less  active  role  in  the  dockyard's  ad- 
ministration  for  several  years  after  Corfitz  Ulfeldt  was  appointed,  but  he 
still  kept  a  close  eye  on  what  was  going  on  and  was  able  to  state  that 
'Ieg  kender  ded  selskab  uel  paa  Bremmerholmen'  (I  know  the  situation 
well  at  Bremerholm)11e.  After  Ulfeldt's  mismanagement  was  exposed  he 
once  more  took  over  direct  command'"7. 
In  fact  the  existing  organisation  had  a  lot  going  for  it.  The  lower 
levels  of  management  by  the  clerks  and  master  craftsmen  operated 
reasonably  efficiently,  and  the  Holm-  og  arsenalartikler  and  the  highly 
------------------- 
115.  Michael  Oppenheim,  A  History  of  the  Administration  of  the  Royal  Navy  1509-1667I  (London 
1896),  297. 
116.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  4  December  1638,  egenhandige  Breve,  VIII,  130. 
117.  See  Chapter  3. 
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were  far  in  advance  of  anything  known  in  the  English  dockyards  at  that 
time.  Although  there  was  no  guarantee  that  everyone  would  uphold 
everything  contained  in  their  commission,  at  least  they  should  all  have 
known  their  precise  role  within  the  dockyard. 
The  centralisation  of  the  navy  and  the  dockyard  in  Copenhagen 
also  created  a  much  more  efficient  organisation  than  was  possible  in 
England.  In  England  there  were  four  separate  dockyards  but  none  had 
its  own  rope-walk,  sail  works  or  arsenal.  This  made  them  dependent  on 
imports,  especially  of  timber  and  cordage,  and  on  private  contractors, 
who  boosted  their  own  profits  by  supplying  poor  materials  and  short 
measures.  In  Denmark  virtually  everything  required  for  the  fitting  out  of 
ships  was  manufactured  by  state  employees  in  the  one  central  dockyard, 
eliminating  the  need  for  duplication  and  significantly  reducing  the  oppor- 
tunities  for  corruption. 
Another  significant  advantage  that  the  Danish  naval  administration 
had  over  the  English  system  was  that  all  employees  were  paid  at  least  a 
living  wage,  and  in  some  cases  a  very  handsome  wage  indeed,  which  was 
regularly  reviewed  and  increased  according  to  the  official's  seniority  and 
responsibility.  In  England,  wages  had  failed  to  keep  pace  with  inflation, 
tempting  officials  and  workers  into  abusing  the  system  to  supplement 
their  meagre  official  income.  Although  corruption  could  not  be  eliminated 
altogether  in  Denmark,  the  level  of  wages  did  drastically  reduce  the  need 
for  corruption. 
However,  what  had  been  an  adequate  naval  administration  during 
the  early  years  of  Christian  IV  gradually  became  inadequate  as  the  size 
of  the  navy  rapidly  expanded.  Even  though  the  work-load  had  more  than 
doubled  the  dockyard  administration  remained  essentially  the  same  as  it 
had  been  at  the  start  of  his  reign.  Christian  IV  failed  to  recognise  that 
impressive  ships  and  dockyards  were  not  enough.  Equally  as  important 
276 was  an  efficient  administration  that  enabled  it  to  be  deployed  effectively. 
However,  it  must  be  said  that  the  primary  purpose  of  the  naval  dockyard 
was  to  enable  the  navy  to  put  to  sea  every  year,  and  in  this  regard  it 
undoubtedly  succeeded,  although  the  way  in  which  this  was  achieved  was 
inefficient,  outmoded  and  no  longer  suited  to  the  large  navy  created  by 
Christian  IV.  It  is  not  surprising  then  that  efforts  were  made  soon  after 
his  death  to  re-organise  the  dockyard's  administration,  resulting  in  the 
admiralty  college  of  1655. 
This  10  man  body  consisted  of  the  rigsadmiral,  a  rentemester,  the 
Holmens  admiral,  the  Holmens  viceadmiral,  three  captains  with  respon- 
sibility  for  victualling,  shipbuilding  and  repair,  and  materials  provision,  a 
secretary,  and  two  admiralitetsrAd  (admiralty  councillors)  concerned  with 
commercial  matterst18.  This  was  not  the  ultimate  solution  to  the 
problem,  and  several  changes  were  made  in  subsequent  years,  but  at 
least  a  formal  structure  had  been  devised  which  reduced  the  burden  of 
responsibility  on  the  Holmens  admiral  and  clearly  delegated  the  working 
of  the  dockyard  administration  into  several  specific  areas. 
-------------------- 
118.  Instruks  for  admiralitetskollegiet  pa  Bremerholm,  29  August  1655,  and  Forordning  om  for- 
delingen  of  opsynet  pa  Bremerholm,  8  June  1656,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania%  V.  192-3  &  281-2. 
277 7.  The  Organisation  of  the  Seagoing  Navy 
As  with  the  administration  of  the  dockyard,  there  had  to  be  some  kind  of 
organisational  system  in  place  if  the  navy  was  to  function  effectively  at 
sea.  Rules  of  discipline  had  to  be  encoded  and  a  recognised  command 
structure  had  to  be  in  place  aboard  every  ship.  In  addition  effective 
lines  of  command  and  a  means  of  communication  had  to  be  established 
when  ships  sailed  together  in  squadron. 
7.1.  Organisation  Aboard  Ship 
7.1.1.  Naval  Discipline 
Naval  discipline  was  governed  by  the  Skibsartikler  (ships  articles).  Ver- 
sions  of  these  regulations  had  existed  since  the  early  16th  century  and 
were  issued,  with  minor  alterations,  to  every  ship  before  it  set  sail,  but 
it  was  not  until  1625  that  they  were  standardised  and  published.  The 
published  version  was  based  on  articles  drawn  up  in  1582,  but  were 
greatly  expanded,  both  in  terms  of  detail  and  in  the  number  of  articles. 
All  officers  and  men  who  boarded  the  king's  ships  were  to  swear  an  oath 
of  allegiance  to  the  king  and  the  ship,  and  were  bound  to  uphold  these 
skibsartikler. 
'  They  were  published  at  the  same  time  as  the  Holm-  og 
arsenalartikler2,  and  similarly  outline  the  codes  of  conduct  and  the  dis- 
ciplinary  procedures,  but,  the  skibsartikler  related  specifically  to  life 
aboard  ship.  There  were  a  total  of  100  articles,  divided  into  11  sections: 
religious  observance;  allegiances;  justice  and  maltreatment;  avoiding  coas- 
-------------------- 
1.  Skibsartikler,  8  May  1625,  V.  A.  Secher,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  (Kmbenhavn,  1887-1918), 
IV,  256-87,  F.  S.  Grove-Stephensen,  'Marine  jurisdiktionsforhold  ftr  1660'.  Marinehistorisk 
tidsskrift  (2/1984).  19-20. 
2.  See  Chapter  6. 
278 tal  hazards;  watchkeeping;  signalling;  fighting  conduct;  ammunition;  prize 
goods;  victualling;  and  quartering  and  sickness.  Some  were  directed 
specifically  to  certain  members  of  the  crew  and  others  were  more  general 
in  nature,  varying  from  highly  serious  ones  governing  the  safety  of  the 
ship  and  the  punishments  for  mutiny  and  murder,  as  well  as  more  petty 
ones  such  as  prohibitions  against  complaining  to  the  cook  or  throwing 
food  overboard,  both  of  which  carried  the  punishment  of  keel-hauling.  In 
order  that  the  men  could  forget  neither  their  allegiance  nor  the  heavy 
punishments  for  indiscipline  the  skibsartikler  were  to  be  read  in  full  to 
the  crew  every  month  or  two,  depending  on  the  need. 
7.1.2.  The  Senior  Officers 
Every  warship  carried  at  least  one  overofficer  (senior  officer).  The  most 
senior  officer  commonly  serving  on  a  ship  was  the  kaptejn  (captain).  His 
role  was  essentially  symbolic,  representing  and  maintaining  the  authority 
of  the  king  at  sea.  He  was  responsible  for  carrying  out  the  instructions 
contained  in  the  ship's  sea  pass,  and  in  battle  situations  he  would  be 
called  upon  for  tactical  decisions,  but  for  the  most  part  he  had  little  to 
do  with  the  actual  running  of  the  ship  apart  from  being  in  charge  of 
discipline.  This  was  similar  to  the  situation  in  England  where  only 
'Gentleman  Officers'  had  the  social  status  and  code  of  ethics  that  enabled 
them  to  command  in  war. 
All  captains  received  a  commission  through  the  Danske  Kancelli  and 
their  ability  first  had  to  be  attested  by  the  rigsadmiral,  but  this  by  no 
means  meant  that  every  captain  was  a  competent  seaman.  In  fact  a  com- 
mission  could  be  gained  with  very  little  sea  experience  and,  as  has  been 
seen3,  the  rigsadmiral  was  not  always  the  most  able  person  to  examine 
competent  seamanship.  Many  of  the  officers  were  in  fact  little  more  than 
-------------------- 
3.  See  Chapter  2. 
279 courtiers  whose  military  obligations  took  them  to  sea  rather  than  to  the 
battlefield.  There  were  some  officers,  though,  who  saw  a  career  in  the 
navy  and  started  as  adelsburse  (noble  pages),  serving  aboard  ship  as 
volunteers  to  learn  seamanship4,  much  as  the  English  midshipmen  of  a 
later  age  did. 
In  contrast  to  army  captains,  who  received  a  commission  that 
specifically  stated  their  position  in  the  army,  naval  captains  were  usually 
appointed  as  'Kaptejn  til  Lands  og  til  Vands'  (captain  on  land  and  at 
sea)5.  This  apparently  confirms  that  officers  were  not  necessarily 
specialists  in  naval  affairs,  but  this  rather  confusing  terminology  may 
simply  have  meant  that  naval  captains  were  also  expected  to  serve  at 
Bremerholm  when  not  actually  at  sea.  A  typical  commission  reads  as  fol- 
lows: 
Bestalling'  for  Sgfren  Harboe  som  Skibskaptejn  og  ellers  med 
Tjeneste  til  Lands  og  til  Vands,  hvor  Kongen  befaler,  med  en  aarlig 
lqn  of  300  Kurantdlr.  og  en  Hofklmdning  for  sig  selvanden  fra  Bestil- 
lingsdagen  af,  at  udrede  of  Rentemestrenee. 
Commission  for  Sgfren  Harboe  as  ship's  captain,  and  otherwise  for 
service  on  land  and  sea,  where  the  king  commands,  with  an  annual 
pay  of  300  Kdlr.  and  a  suit  of  courtly  robes  for  himself  from  the 
day  of  commission,  to  be  paid  by  the  rentemestre. 
-------------------- 
4.  R.  Steen  Steensen,  'S*vmrnets  Officerskole',  in  Steensen  (ed.  ),  Fladen  gennem  475  Ar, 
(K$benhavn,  1961),  428. 
5.  Jens  Vognsen's  commission,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  23  February  1625. 
6.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  5  February  1628. 
280 The  lpjtnant  (lieutenant)7  was  junior  to  the  captain  and  on  larger 
ships  one  or  more  of  them  would  serve  under  him,  depending  on  the  size 
of  ship.  They  were  also  frequently  given  command  of  smaller  ships.  Unlike 
captains,  the  lieutenants'  commissions  were  specifically  related  to  service 
at  sea,  using  the  terminology  of  'lgjtnant  til  skibs'  (ship's  lieutenant)8. 
Compared  to  many  state  employees,  the  senior  officers'  commissions 
were  very  concise,  but  at  the  same  time  totally  imprecise.  They  simply 
bound  themselves  to  serve  at  the  king's  discretion  and  by  1645  it  was 
realised  that  these  obligations  were  so  vague  and  open  to  abuse  that  new 
regulations  needed  to  be  introduced.  An  ordinance  summed  up  the  situa- 
tion  thus: 
Eftersom  vi  befinder,  at  yore  sgecapiteiner  oc  leutenanter  liden  eller 
ingen  opsict  hafver  med  vores  flode  eller  med  deris  underofficerer 
udi  vores  skib,  al  tid  forevendendis, 
-  at  enhver  selfver  til  sit  bpr  at 
svare,  hvorofver  al  ting  gemenlig  stander  udi  disordre,  end  dog  vi 
fornemmeligen  derfore  hafver  capiteiner  oc  leutenanter  udi  vores 
tieniste. 
Since  we  find  that  our  sea  captains  and  lieutenants  take  little  or 
no  supervision  of  our  navy,  or  of  their  junior  officers  in  our 
ships,  as  they  are  expected,  each  ought  to  answer  for  himself  for 
what  reasons  everything  usually  stands  in  disorder,  even  though 
we  specifically  have  captains  and  lieutenants  in  our  service  for  this 
purpose9. 
------------------- 
7.  The  class  of  lieutenant  seems  to  have  been  formally  introduced  in  1578  although  they  were 
mentioned  when  the  admiralty  guild  was  formed  in  1558.  H.  O.  Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  an- 
dens  tid:  Bidrag  til  den  dansk-norske  sOmagts  historie  1559-158$  (Kmbenhavn,  1902),  194;  JOrgen 
H.  Barfod,  Christian  3.  s  f13de4  (K$benhavn,  1995),  125. 
8.  Commission  for  Frants  v.  Stenwinckel.  Kancelliets  Brevbbger,  10  April  1631. 
9.  Ordinans  for  skibskaptejnernes  forhold,  10  May  1645,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  IV,  455-8. 
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outlined  to  try  and  remedy  this  situation.  It  was  stipulated  that  captains 
and  lieutenants  should  be  familiar  with  all  aspects  of  the  running  of  a 
ship  and  were  to  oversee  everything  aboard  their  ship  and  ensure  that 
everything  concerning  it  and  its  men  was  as  it  should  be.  They  were  to 
take  ultimate  responsibility  for  the  ship's  safety  and  ensure  that  the  hull 
was  correctly  ballasted  and  kept  watertight;  that  the  rigging  was  cor- 
rectly  rigged  and  all  running  gear  was  kept  greased;  and  that  the  cannon 
were  kept  in  good  order  and  ready  for  use.  They  were  to  sail  the  correct 
course,  as  instructed,  and  only  use  those  harbours  that  were  suitable  for 
their  ship.  They  also  held  responsibility  for  law  and  order  among  the 
crew  and  'were  to  ensure  that  all  victuals  were  of  the  correct  standard 
and  measure.  In  addition  all  captains  and  lieutenants  were  to  meet  at 
Bremerholm  every  spring  so  that  their  precise  duties  for  the  coming  year 
could  be  assigned  by  the  Holmens  admiral. 
It  is  significant  that  these  regulations  were  introduced  in  the  af- 
termath  of  the  navy's  poor  record  in  the  Torstenssonkrig,  during  which 
Christian  IV  complained  that  his  officers  were  incompetent  and  were  put- 
ting  the  state's  sea-power  at  risk'O.  The  effects  of  the  new  regulations, 
however,  were  not  immediately  felt  and  the  incompetence  shown  by  Ove 
Giedde  as  rigsadmiral  in  wrecking  his  flagship's  did  not  prove  a  good 
role  model  for  his  officers.  The  new  regulations  were  really  of  little  use 
unless  effective  training  was  provided  for  the  education  of  officers.  Even 
when  the  new  navigation  school  was  established  in  1647  it  was  aimed  at 
------------------- 
10.  Letters  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  14  &  28  July  1644,  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Chris- 
tian  den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  Breve.  V.  484-5  &  487-9. 
11.  See  Chapter  2. 
282 teaching  those  boys  intending  to  become  junior  officers  rather  than  cap- 
tains  and  lieutenants,  so  it  is  little  wonder  that  the  majority  of  senior  of- 
ficers  in  Christian  IV's  navy  were  of  such  a  poor  standard. 
There  were  also  a  number  of  other  ranks  of  overofficer  in  the 
navy.  Apart  from  the  rigsadmiral  and  the  Holmens  admiral,  there  was  no 
permanent  rank  of  admiral.  An  admiral  was  simply  a  captain  who  was 
placed  in  charge  of  a  squadron  of  ships,  and  who  still  retained  the  rank 
of  captain  aboard  his  own  ship.  Officers  who  w  ere  of  noble  birth  were 
sometimes  referred  to  as  skibsherremmnd  (ship's  lords)12,  and  if  the  king 
or  rigsadmiral  put  to  sea,  their  ship's  captain  was  usually  referred  to  as 
the.,  flagkaptejn  (flag  captain).  To  simplify  all  these  distinctions  the  of- 
ficer  in  command  of  a  ship,  whatever  his  actual  rank,  was  frequently 
referred  to  as  simply  the  skibshovedsman  (ship's  leader). 
As  a  .  ship  usually  carried  a  complement  of  soldiers  as  well  as 
seamen,  -  specific  officers  were  appointed  to  supervise  them.  The  kaptejn 
over  soldatterne  (captain  of  soldiers)  was  the  most  senior,  and  there 
could  also  be  a  lOjtnant  til  lands  (lieutenant  of  land  troops)  aboard  the 
ship.  In  the  event  of  there  being  no  captain  then  the  most  senior 
lieutenant  was  termed  the  kaptejnlOjtnant  (lieutenant-captain)13.  These  of- 
ficers  had  no  responsibility  for  the  running  of  the  ship  and  were  simply 
responsible  for  the  command  of  the  sea-going  soldiers. 
Despite  Christian  IV's  distrust  of  guilds,  the  officers  had  their  own 
admiralitetslav  (admiralty  guild).  This  was  established  in  1558  but  little  is 
known  of  its  history.  The  guild  had  a  set  of  rules  and  regulations 
governing  the  conduct  of  its  brethren,  but  the  only  references  relating 
to  it  concern  the  provision  of  alcohol,  suggesting  that  its  main  purpose 
was  that  of  a  drinking  club.  It  was  traditionally  presented  two  barrels  of 
-------------------- 
12.  During  Christian  IV's  reign  27%  of  all  officers  were  of  noble  birth.  (H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian 
og  hans  mind  paa  Bremerholm  (K$benhavn,  1889),  132.  ) 
13.  Skibsartikler,  280. 
283 beer  by  Copenhagen  Castle  at  Christmas,  and  in  1642  it  requested  the 
waiving  of  excise  on  a  last  of  beer.  In  that  year  its  members  numbered 
300,  consisting  not  only  of  ships'  captains  and  lieutenants  but  also  skip- 
pers  and  other  junior  officers14.  There  was  also  a  skipperlav  (skippers 
guild)  for  commercial  seamen,  to  which  some  naval  officers  also 
belonged15. 
7.1.3.  The  Junior  Officers 
The  underofficere  (junior  officers)  were  equivalent  to  the  English  warrant 
and  petty  officers.  The  most  important  of  these  was  the  skipper,  who  was 
in  absolute  control  of  the  running  of  the  ship  and  was  responsible  for  its 
good  repair  and  seaworthiness.  A  skipper  could  also  occasionally  be  put 
in  command  of  smaller  warships  and  was  generally  the  highest  rank 
aboard  the  royal  transport  ships. 
The  skipper's  duties  were  well  established  by  tradition,  but  by 
1625  it  was  noted  that: 
vi  dagligen  forfarer  stor  uskickelighed  paa  vor  flode,  skibe  oc  Holm 
at  begaais  of  aarsag,  at  skipperne  deris  anbetroede  bestilling  enten 
icke  flittig  nok  hafver  efterkommit  eller  oc  den  egentlig  icke  i  alt 
forstan  di  tl6. 
---------------- 
14.  Letter  from  Admiralitetslav,  27  November  1642,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  8160,  Indlsg  til 
registre  og  tegnelser..... 
15.  Lind.  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  tic(  187  &  242;  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Frederik  den  Tredjes 
s4magt  det  dansk-norske  spva'rns  historie  1648-1674  (K4benhavn,  1896),  16-7. 
16.  Instruks  for  skipperne  i  kongens  tjaneste,  29  April  1625,  corpus  Constitutionum  Dania  IV, 
217-26. 
284 we  daily  experience  great  incompetence  in  our  navy,  ships  and 
dockyard  due  to  the  fact  that  the  skippers  either  do  not  comply 
with  their  pledged  commission  diligently  enough  or  they  really  do 
not  fully  understand  it. 
A  formal  commission  was  then  drawn  up  to  clarify  the  skipper's 
responsibilities  in  an  effort  to  improve  matters.  This  stated  that  he  was 
to  be  responsible  for  all  of  the  ship's  equipment  and  was  to  keep  an  in- 
ventory  of  everything  that  belonged  to  the  ship,  from  anchor  cables 
down  to  nails  and  bolts.  In  addition  a  register  was  also  to  be  kept  of 
everything  issued  annually  from  the  dockyard,  such  as  flags,  compasses 
and  lights.  He  was  also  responsible  for  preserving  the  soundness  of  the 
ship's  timbers  by  keeping  everything  clean  and  the  ship  well  ballasted. 
Skippers  were  to  supervise  the  quartering  of  men  to  ensure  that 
the  less  experienced  could  learn  from  their  shipmates  and  also  to  super- 
vise  the  intake  and  distribution  of  victuals.  They  were  also  expected  to 
be  present  when  buoys  were  laid  so  that  they  could  learn  the  shipping 
lanes,  and  were  also  to  sail  at  least  once  every  two  or  three  years  into 
the  eastern  Baltic  so  that  they  could  operate  there  in  times  of  emergency 
without  a  pilot. 
The  skipper's  commission  therefore  overlapped  to  a  large  extent 
with  the  captain's,  but  while  the  captain  merely  took  on  the  responsibility 
for  certain  provisions,  the  skipper,  it  seems,  directly  supervised  the 
work. 
Alongside  the  skipper  sailed  the  styrmand  (steersman)  who 
navigated  the  ship.  These  were  also  used  as  pilots  and  were  specially 
recruited  from  all  areas  of  Denmark-Norway  to  ensure  that  the  fleet  could 
navigate  safely  through  any  of  the  home  waters.  The  styrmand  was  as- 
sisted  by  the  kvartermestre  (quartermasters),  who  were  promoted  from 
the  rank  of  seaman  to  physically  steer  the  ship. 
285 The  skibsskriver  (purser)  was  responsible  for  keeping  a  muster 
roll  of  all  men  aboard  the  ship,  and  the  amount  of  wages  and  victuals 
issued  to  them.  Any  cargo  that  was  carried  was  inventoried  by  him  and 
he  also  kept  a  log  of  any  disciplinary  actions  that  were  needed  during 
the  voyage.  If  there  was  no  chaplain  aboard  the  ship  then  the  purser 
was  to  read  the  gospels  to  the  men  in  his  stead'7.  The  skibsskriver  was 
assisted  by  the  skibmmnd  (holdsmen)  who  were  responsible  for  the 
stowage  of  all  materials  in  the  hold  of  a  ship. 
Whilst  the  skipper,  with  the  assistance  of  the  hojbidsmand 
(boatswain),  supervised  the  seamen,  the  arkelimester  (master  gunner), 
sometimes  also  referred  to  as  the  konstabel  (constable),  supervised  the 
gunners.  In  conjunction  with  the  ship's  captain,  he  kept  an  inventory  of 
all  cannon  and  small  arms  aboard  the  ship,  and  was  responsible  for  issu- 
ing  powder  and  ammunition1e. 
The  ship's  'captain  was  ultimately  responsible  for  discipline  aboard 
ship,  but  the  skibsprofos  (naval  provost)  and  his  svende  actually  policed 
the  men  and  dealt  out  any  punishments. 
7.1.4.  The  Men 
There  were  three  classes  of  men  aboard  a  ship:  seamen;  gunners;  and 
soldiers.  Each  had  their  own  distinct  function,  although  there  was  some 
element  of  overlap  in  their  duties. 
Bädsmmnd  (seamen)  were  those  men  who  carried  out  all  tasks  to  do 
with  the  running  of  the  ship,  such  as  hauling  cables  and  setting  sails.  As 
soon  as  they  went  aboard  a  ship  they  were  divided  into  starboard  and 
larboard  watches.  Each  watch  was  then  further  divided  into  messes  of 
five,  six  or  eight  men.  Within  each  mess  there  were  always  to  be  a  num- 
--- 
17. 
------- 
Lind, 
---------- 
Kong  Kristian  og  hans  mang  356-7;  Skibsartikler,  257. 
18.  Holm-  og  arsenalartikler,  8  May  1625,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  IV,  249. 
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arts  of  seamanship.  The  most  senior  seaman  in  the  mess  was  called  the 
rodemester  (mess  master)'9. 
Bpsseskytter  (gunners)  were  those  men  who  operated  the  ship's 
cannon.  They  actually  came  under  the  direct  command  of  the  arsenal 
rather  than  the  dockyard,  and  were  expected  to  serve  on  land  as  well  as 
at  sea20.  Not  all  gunners,  therefore,  were  necessarily  expert  in  naval 
gunnery,  but  in  1629  Christian  IV  attempted  to  rectify  this  and  issued 
details  for  the  drill  for  seagoing  gunners21: 
1.  Dennom  skall  uyssis  paa  ded  skiib,  som  nu  leggiss  ind  udi 
haffnen  ved  tpyhussid,  At  wyske  och  laade  Stq,  ckerne 
2.  At  rette  et  Stocke,  naar  et  skyb  ligger  ret,  eller  naar  ded 
heller.  4 
`3.  At  recke  Stmckerne  ind  och  gerre  dem  faast,  som  dy  bGr  at 
uerre  vdi  Sgen. 
4.  At  lucke  porten  och  foruarre  dem  udi  en  Seegang. 
5.  At  uyske  och  laade  med  et  taagell,  som  dertill  giordt  er. 
6.  At  taage  lod  och  krud  ý  aff  et  stgcke. 
1.  They  are  to  be  taught  in  the  ship  which  now  lies  in  the 
t(pjhus  harbour,  to  sponge  and  load  the  guns. 
2.  To  elevate  a  gun,  when  the  ship  is  upright  or  when  it  heels. 
3.  To  run  the  guns  in  and  make  them  fast,  as  they  ought  to  be 
at  sea. 
4.  To  close  the  ports  and  protect  them  against  a  rough  sea. 
-------------------- 
19.  Skibsartikler,  260-1. 
20.  Holm-  og  arsenalartikler.  254. 
21.  Letter  to  Hertug  Frederik,  Hertug  Ulrik  and  Thomas  Nold,  24  January  1629,  egenhzndige 
Breve,  II,  174. 
287 5.  To  sponge  and  load  them  with  a  rope,  which  is  used  for  the 
purpose. 
6.  To  take  the  ball  and  powder  out  of  a  gun. 
The  ratio  of  gunners  to  seamen  was  at  first  not  great  as  the  can- 
non,  once  run  out,  stayed  out  and  were  loaded  from  outboard.  This 
changed  in  the  1640s  as  inboard  loading  was  introduced,  and  greater 
numbers  of  men  were  needed  to  haul  the  guns  in  and  out  for  every 
shot22. 
Soldatter  (soldiers)  similarly  were  not  specifically  trained  to  fight 
at  sea.  They  were  simply  a  section  of  the  army  who  were  assigned  to 
duty  aboard  the  king's  ships,  rather  than  his  forts  or  battlefields23. 
They  were  not  entered  in  the  navy's  books  and  were  paid  through  the 
army's  own  administration.  In  battle  they  fought  with  small  arms  and  were 
the  main  force  when  enemy  ships  were  boarded. 
The  gunners  and  soldiers  were  known  collectively  as  krigsfolk  (war 
men)  and  in  times  of  war  they  received  their  orders  directly  from  their 
own  senior  and  junior  officers,  such  as  sergeants  and  corporals.  However, 
when  they  were  not  engaged  in  either  battle  drills  or  actual  fighting, 
they  were  expected  to  assist  the  seamen  in  the  less  skilled  aspects  of 
running  the  ship,  such  as  scrubbing  the  decks  and  manning  the  pumps, 
and  were  directed  by  the  ship's  officers24. 
------  -  ----------- 
22.  Preben  Holck.  'Outboard  Loading',  Mariner's  mirror,  17  (1931),  282-3. 
23.  Missive  to  Falcke  Lykke,  Kancelliets  Orevboger,  9  March  1637. 
24.  Skibsartikler.  261. 
288 Although  the  work  of  the  different  classes  of  men  were  specialised 
the  boundaries  between  them  was  still  fairly  flexible.  Seamen  were  some- 
times  temporarily  designated  as  gunners25,  and  if  there  were  not  enough 
seamen  to  man  the  ships  then  gunners  could  be  used  instead26.  All  men, 
whether  they  were  seamen,  gunners  or  soldiers  were  also  expected  to 
participate  as  watch  keepers. 
7.1.5..  The  Total  Ship's  Complement 
In  addition  to  those  men  already  described  there  were  a  number  of  other 
junior  officers  and  men  aboard  a  ship  such  as  junior  officers'  mates, 
surgeons  and  cooks,  as  well  as  craftsmen  such  as  carpenters  and  sail 
makers,  who  kept  the  ship  in  good  repair  whilst  at  sea. 
Table  7.1.  shows  as  near  a  complete  list  of  crew  members  as  pos- 
sible,  with  their  pay  and  the  ideal  number  of  men  aboard  the  three  main 
classes  of  warship27.  Some  designations  that  are  mentioned  from  time  to 
time  are  imprecise,  for  instance  the  naval  provost's  svende,  watch  keepers 
and  rodemestre  were  probably  just  seamen  and  soldiers  who  were  ap- 
pointed  to  these  particular  duties  for  the  duration  of  the  voyage,  and 
were  not  really  a  formal  rank.  For  the  sake  of  clarity  these  have  been 
omitted  from  the  table. 
In  addition  to  the  crew  members  listed  here,  the  king  also  carried 
a  retinue  of  around  40  servants,  cooks,  and  medics,  for  himself  and  his 
mistress  when  he  set  sail,  in  one  of  the  larger  ships28. 
--- 
25. 
----------- 
Rigsarkiv, 
----- 
Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Kladekammer  regnskaber,  1626/274  f.  194. 
26.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  25  January  1643.  egenhmndige  Brevq  V,  291-2. 
27.  Letter  to  rentemestr4  March  1633,  egenha3ndige  Breve`  III,  95-6. 
28.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  7  January  1644,  egenhandige  Breve,  V,  433-5. 
289 Rank  Englsh  equivalent  wages  k  of  Men 
(Kdlr.  )  Capital  ship  Battleship  Small  Warship 
Overofficere  Senior  Officers 
Kaptejn  Captain  200-400  1  1  0 
l$jtnant  lieutenant  150-200  2  1  0 
Kaptejn  over  soldatterne  ?  1(?  )  1(?  )  0(?  ) 
L$jtnant  tl  lands  ?  1(?  )  0(?  )  1(?  ) 
Underofficere  Junior  Officers 
Skipper  Master  30-100  1  1  1 
Underskipper  Master's  Mate  40  2  1  1 
Styrmand  Pilot  24-300  4  2  1 
H  jbkdsmand  Boatswain  34-38  1  1  1 
HOjbSdsmands  Mat  Boatswain's  Mate  20-25  3  1  1 
Arkelimester  Master  Gunner  24  1  1  1 
Arkelimesters  Mat  Gunner's  Mate  ?  1  1  1 
Skibmand  Holdsman  34-38  4  2  2 
Skibmands  Mat  Holdsman's  Mate  20-25  4  2  2 
Trompeter;  Trumpeter  24  3  1  0 
Skibsskriver  Purser  34-38  1  1  1 
Bartskarer  Surgeon  12-15  1  1  1 
Bartskzredreng  Surgeon's  Boy  ?  1  0  0 
Skibsprast  Chaplin  100-130  1  0  0 
Skibspratedreng  Chaplain's  Boy  ?  1  0  0 
Skits  Profos  Naval  Provost  23-28  1(?  )  1(?  )  0(?  ) 
Kvartermester  Quartermaster  60-120  4  2  2 
(Wand  Men 
Bidsnand  Seaman  12-15  130  60  30 
B$sseskytter  Gunner  36-84  30  15  8 
Soldater  Soldier  ?  100  40  30 
Tpnmermand  Carpenter  60-72  4  2  1 
Sejlla!  gger  Sailmaker  17-23  2  1  0 
B  fdker  Cooper  17-23  1  1  0 
Kok  Cook  15  1  1  1 
Kildersvend  Steward  15  1  1  0 
Trommeslager  Drummer  12  1  1  1 
Pmkkerdreng  Ship's  Boys  9  8(?  )  6(?  )  0(?  ) 
TOTAL  312  146  85 
Trumpeters  could  be  substituted  by  pipers  or  shawm  players. 
Table  7.1.  The  Ship's  Complement 
Sources:  Skibsartikler,  8  May  1625,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  IV,  257-81;  Missive  to  rentemes"  Kanceniets  Brevb  ger,  19  February  162 
letter  to  rentemestrr  March  1633,  egenhandige  Breve  III,  95.6;  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Konto  I.  a.,  Kladekammer  regnskaber, 
290 It  is  not  easy  to  establish  exactly  which  ranks  held  precedence 
over  others  aboard  the  ship.  The  crew's  wages  listed  in  Table  7.1.  give 
some  indication  of  the  seniority  of  ranks  aboard  the  ship,  but  the  rules 
for  the  distribution  of  prize  money  provide  further  evidence.  Table  7.2. 
shows  the  number  of  shares  that  each  man  was  entitled  to. 
Rank  Prize  Share 
Ships  Captain:  12 
Captain  of  soldiers:  11 
Lieutenant-Captain:  10 
Lieutenant  til  sos  9 
Lieutenant  til  lands  8 
Skippers,  sergeants, 
&  underskippere:  7 
Styrmmnd,  arkelimester  & 
hojbadsmmnd:  6 
Pursers,  holdsmen  & 
quartermasters:  5 
Rodemestre,  corporals, 
gunners,  naval  provosts, 
adelsburs,  cooks,  stewards  & 
the  most  experienced  seamen:  4 
Soldiers  &  ordinary  seamen:  3 
Ship's  boys:  11  or  2 
-  Table'7.2.  Prize  Shares  for  Crew  Members 
Source:  Skibsartikler,  8  May  1625,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Danis  IV,  280. 
We  also  know  that  the  chaplains  and  the  barber-surgeons  were  to  mess 
with  the  skipper,  while  the  styrmmnd  and  trumpeters  were  to  mess  with 
the  hOjbadsmxnc  . 
----------------- 
29.  Missive  to  Sten  Villumsen,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  11  September  1623. 
291 It  is  therefore  possible  to  construct  a  conjectural  organisation 
chart  for  a  ship's  command  structure.  The  structure  shown  in  Figure  7.1. 
shows  just  one  interpretation  for  one  of  the  larger  ships,  and  may  well 
be  incorrect  in  certain  minor  details.  As  with  the  dockyard  management 
chart  there  is  a  danger  of  implying  a  greater  degree  of  formal  organisa- 
tion  than  was  actually  the  case.  However,  it  is  given  here  simply  in  an 
attempt  to  show  how  the  different  crew  members  interrelated  in  broad 
terms,  and  ought  not  to  be  taken  as  a  definitive  ship-board  organisational 
structure. 
7.2.  Naval  Recruitment 
The  conscription  and  recruitment  of  seamen  was  a  vital  element  in 
the  organisation  of  the  sea-going  navy  and  virtually  every  year  Christian 
IV  issued  orders  for  men  to  be  raised.  The  numbers  recruited  ranged 
from  just  a  few  dozen  in  the  early  years  to  many  hundreds  from  the 
1620s  onwards.  In  times  of  conflict  the  figure  could  rise  to  as  high  as 
140030.  Table  7.3.  shows  the  number  of  bidsmxnd  who  were  to  be 
recruited,  as  noted  in  the  protocols  of  the  Danske  Kancelli  and  in  Chris- 
tian  IV's  letters. 
Although  orders  for  the  recruitment  of  seamen  were  not  recorded 
every  year,  it  must  be  assumed  that  men  were  recruited  in  all  the  inter- 
vening  years  as  well,  since  large  numbers  continued  to  be  discharged 
every  year  after  their  regulation  period  of  service,  initially  set  at  five 
years31. 
------------------ 
30.  Open  letter,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  2  January  1628;  and  Letter  to  rentemestre,  13  February 
1635,  egenha'ndige  Breve,  III,  333-4. 
31.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  12  December  1620,12  December  1621,24  January  1626,  &7  February 
1627. 
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293 Year  No.  of  Men  to  be  Recruited  Year  No.  of  Men 
1596  Unspecified  number  1628  1400 
1601  46  1629  376 
1606  875  1630  411 
1609  As  many  as  possible  1631  403 
1610  199  1632  10 
1612  As  many  as  possible  1633  50 
1613  As  many  as  possible  1635  1400 
1616  As  many  as  possible  1639  330 
1618  411  1640  400 
1619  As  many  as  possible  1642  300 
1622  400  1644  540 
1624  856  1645  650 
1627  160 
Table  7.3.  Recruitment  of  Seamen 
Sources;  Kancemets  Brevb  ger  egenhandige  Breve  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania 
The  men  were  recruited  predominantly  from  the  len,  with  each 
lensmand  being  asked  to  provide  a  prescribed  number  of  men.  They  were 
restricted  in  the  types  of  men  they  supplied  and  the  following  were  ex- 
empt:  those  who  had  a  wife  and  children;  only  sons  working  for  their 
mothers;  farmers  who  were  listed  as  soldiers;  those  who  owned  their  own, 
or  part  of  a  ship;  town  dwellers  with  steady  occupations;  those  already  in 
service  in  the  Spanish  Company's  ships;  and  all  those  who  had  royal  ex- 
emptions.  Naturally  experienced  seamen  were  preferred  although  only  one 
man  was  to  be  taken  from  each  merchant  ship  if  possible,  and  only  in 
severe  circumstances  were  fishermen  to  be  taken32. 
The  harbour  towns  were  also  expected  to  supply  an  annual  quota  of 
seamen,  but  from  1631  the  payment  of  the  badsmandshvervningskat 
(recruitment  of  seamen  tax)  exempted  them  from  this  obligation33. 
--- 
32. 
--------- 
Missives 
---- 
to 
---- 
lensmand  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  5  and  25  Feb  1624. 
33.  Missive  to  lensmand  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  31  January  1631.  See  also  Chapter  3. 
294 Although  Denmark  did  not  employ  the  press  gang,  as  in  England,  to 
fill  her  ships,  the  men  taken  from  the  len  and  coastal  towns  were  still 
essentially  pressed  men.  Impressment  in  England  had  its  origin  in 
medieval  feudal  service,  and  this  was  precisely  the  situation  in  Denmark- 
Norway,  with  the  local  lords  and  burgomasters  required  to  provide  their 
master  with  a  certain  quota  of  men  in  return  for  their  own  privileges. 
Not  all  seamen  of  course  were  forced  into  the  navy  and  there  must 
have  been  a  fair  number  of  volunteers,  although  it  would  be  impossible  to 
determine  the  proportion  of  pressed  men  to  volunteers.  In  some  years 
captains  were  sent  out  to  recruit  seamen  in  addition  to  those  supplied 
from  the  len.  It  was  not  possible  to  give  specific  numbers  of  men  to  be 
recruited  so  the  captains  were  simply  instructed  to  raise  as  many  men  as 
possible4.  Sometimes  the  lensma?  nd  were  also  asked  to  assist  the  captains 
with  their  recruiting,  although  this  must  have  impinged  on  their  own 
ability  to  supply  their  required  quota. 
As  the  navy  could  only  sail  during..  the  summer  months  there  was  a 
problem  about  what  to  do  with  all  the  seamen  and  gunners  that  were  in 
the  king's  service  when  they  were  not  at  sea.  The  traditional  solution 
was  to  station  men  in  towns  all  over  the  realm,  in  what  was  known  as 
borgeleje  (town  billeting),  where  they  were  given  free  lodging  and  vict- 
uals,  or  a  cash  equivalent.  There  was  naturally  a  tendency  for  men  to  try 
and  escape  their  duty,  and  in  an  effort  to  avoid  desertion  weekly 
musters  were  held  in  each  town  and  their  week's  food  money  was  paid 
out  only  at  that  time35. 
------------------- 
34.  For  example  in  1616  three  captains  were  sent  out  in  January  to  recruit  as  many  seamen  as 
possible,  who  were  then  to  muster  at  Copenhagen  by  Easter.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  9  January 
1616. 
35.  Open  letter  to  towns,  6  April  1581,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Danis  III,  206-8;  Open  letter  to 
town  burgomsters,  24  October  1587,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  III,  481-4;  Open  letter  to 
baadsma'nd  and  bbsseskytter,  24  October  1587,  Corpus  Canstitutionum  Dania;  III,  484-5. 
295 This  arrangement  was  far  from  satisfactory  and  the  system  was 
open  to  corruption.  Desertion  remained  a  serious  problem  and  some  men 
who  were  on  the  seamen's  register  never  actually  turned  up  for  duty  at 
Bremerholm  during  their  entire  lives.  In  1616  it  was  therefore  stipulated 
that  once  men  had  been  recruited  to  the  navy  they  must  remain  in  con- 
stant  service  for  a  period  of  five  years  before  being  allowed  to  return 
home-36.  From  this  time  the  majority  of  men  who  did  not  remain  aboard 
their  ships  in  the  winter  months  were  either  housed  in  barracks  at 
Bremerholm  or  were  billeted  in  Copenhagen  or  the  surrounding  area. 
Table  7.4.  shows  the  total  number  of  officers  and  men  serving  in 
the  navy  during  the  summer  months.  The  seasonal  nature  of  the  navy's 
operations  meant  that  a  large  number  of  seamen  were  taken  on  tem- 
porarily  for  the  summer  months  only.  These  men  were  paid  monthly  and 
were  known  as  mänedstjenene  (monthly  servants).  In  winter  the  number 
of,  seamen  was  reduced  to  only  about  60%  of  these  figures.  It  is  not 
known  what  the  temporary  seamen  did  during  the  winter  months,  or 
whether  the  same  men  were  recruited  year  after  year.  Gunners  were 
retained  all  year  round  and  returned  to  the  arsenal  for  service  during 
the  winter. 
The  massive  increase  in  the  number  of  seamen  between  1620  and 
1630  highlights  the  rapid  development  of  the  navy  during  the  later 
stages  of  the  Kejserkrig.  This  increase  was  achieved  not  only  by  the 
recruitment  drives  shown  in  Table  7.3.  but  also  by  increasing  the  stan- 
dard  length  of  service  from  five  to  eight  years37.  The  peak  years  came 
during  the  Torstenssonkrig  when  nearly  5000  officers  and  men  were 
engaged38. 
------------------ 
36.  Open  letter  on  bädsma:  nd  and  bosseskytter,  4  July  1616,  corpus  Constitutionum  Dania;  III, 
481-3. 
37.  Kancelliets  Brevbogerr,  24  January  1626. 
38.  Lind,  Kong  Frederik  den  Tredjes  s*magt  3. 
296 1620  1630  1640 
Captains  &  lieutenants  22  36  62 
Skippers  50  78  88 
S  tyrmmn  d  54  59  80 
Junior  officers,  mates, 
&  other  special  ranks  84  407  610 
Surgeons  10  3  27 
Trumpeters  8  10  19 
Arkelimestre  &  gunners  289  448  580 
Badsma'nd  761  2343  2460 
Ships'  boys  100  115  170 
-------------------------- 
Total 
-------------------------- 
------------ 
1378 
------------ 
------------ 
3499 
------------ 
-------------- 
4096 
-------------- 
Table  7.4.  Total  Number  of  Officers  &  Men  (Summer  Months) 
Sources;  %gsarkiv,  Rentekanmer  Udgift  Conto  La.,  Kiadekammer  regnskaber,  1620/21;  1630/31;  1640/41. 
The  number  of  men  fell  again  in  the  late  1640s  after  the  fleet  was 
decimated,  and  when  Christian  IV  called  for  the  number  of  men  to  be 
reduced  as  a  cost  cutting  measure3g.  Even  before  the  war,  though,  he 
was  calling  for  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  officers40.  By  1648  the  total 
number  of  men  had  been  reduced  to  only  around  160041. 
There  does  not  seem  to  have  been  any  real  problem  in  obtaining 
the  necessary  number  of  men  to  serve  in  the  navy.  Apart  from  under- 
standable  problems  experienced  during  wartime  there  are  very  few 
references  to  difficulties  in  recruiting  seamen  in  the  protocols  of  the 
Danske  Kancelli  or  in  the  king's  letters.  If  a  tax  was  able  to  be  intro- 
--- 
39. 
-------- 
Letter 
--- 
to 
------ 
Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  8  January  1648,  egenhandige  Breve,  VIII.  408-9. 
40.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  19  May  1642,  egenhandige  Breve,  VIII,  174-5. 
41.  Lind,  Kong  Frederik  den  Tredjes  sqwnagj.  23. 
297 duced  as  an  alternative  to  coastal  towns  supplying  men  then  it  would 
tend  to  suggest  that  enough  seamen  were  readily  recruited  from  the  len. 
The  fact  that  the  period  of  service  was  limited  to  only  five  or  eight 
years42,  as  opposed  to  the  indefinite  service  practised  in  England,  and 
because  men  could  expect  regular  food  and  wages,  must  have  made  serv- 
ice  in  the  Danish  navy  a  much  less  daunting  proposition.  Frederik  II 
made  sure  that  his  seamen  were  better  fed,  clothed  and  paid  than  any 
previous  monarch43,  and  Christian  IV  continued  this  policy.  Even  when 
state  funds  were  low  in  the  1630s  and  1640s,  and  doubts  were  raised 
over  the  ability  to  pay  the  men,  Christian  IV's  benevolence  towards  his 
seamen  ensured  that  the  money  was  usually  found  from  somewhere.  Three 
hospitals  were  also  founded  in  1616  by  Christian  IV  for  invalid  seamen  at 
Roskilde,  Slagelse  and  Helsinggr44.  It  was  not  until  the  severe  penury  of 
Frederik  III's  reign  that  seamen  found  themselves  being  paid  short  wages 
and  issued  with  insufficient  clothes  and  rations. 
If  difficulties  were  encountered,  particularly  during  wartime,  then 
men  were  recruited  from  England,  Scotland,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands. 
Seamen  of  all  nationalities  sailing  through  the  Sound  were  also  pressed 
into  service  for  a  limited  time. 
7.3.  The  Organisation  of  the  Fleet  at  Sea 
When  the  navy  put  to  sea  there  had  to  be  a  recognised  line  of  command 
between  the  different  ships.  The-organisation  of  the  fleet  and  its  division 
into  squadrons  was  personally  controlled  by  Christian  IV  who,  every 
spring,  would  issue  an  instruction  detailing  which  ships  should  be 
mobilised  and  where  they  should  sail45. 
--------------  -  ---- 
42.  Men  could  be  re-conscripted,  though,  in  times  of  war.  (Open  letter  on  seamen  and  gunners,  4 
July  1616.  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania,  III,  481-3). 
43.  Lind,  Fra  kong  Frederik  den  andens  tia,  229. 
44.  Open  letter  on  seamen  and  gunners,  4  July  1616,  Corpus  Constitutionum  Dania%  III,  481-2. 
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pass)  from  the  Danske  Kancelli  detailing  his  orders  and  where  he  was  to 
sail.  Depending  on  the  nature  of  the  mission,  the  ships  either  sailed  in- 
dividually  or  in  squadrons,  and  in  the  event  of  war  the  fleet  as  a  whole 
could  sail  together.  When  a  squadron  of  ships  was  formed  it  was  com- 
manded  by  the  most  senior  captain  who  then  took  on  the  title  of  admiral. 
Larger  squadrons  would  also  have  an  underadmiral. 
When  the  entire  fleet  went  into  action  it  would  be  divided  typically 
into  four  separate  squadrons.  The  first  led  by  the  generaladmiral  and  his 
underadmiral,  the  second  by  the  vicegeneraladmiral  and  the  viceunde  rad- 
miral.  The,  third  and  fourth  were  each  led  by  its  own  kvartaladmiral  and 
underadmiral.  Each  squadron  sailed  in  formation.  At  the  head  came  the 
first  admiral-ship,  this  was  followed  by  two  smaller  ships  sailing  line 
abreast,  forming  a  triangul  ar  shape.  This  was  then  followed  by  the 
second  admiral-ship  and  two  smaller  ships  in  another  triangle  formation 
and  then  following  up  in  the  rear  were  all  the  supporting  small  ships  and 
galleys47. 
This  type  of  formation  was  unwieldy,  particularly  in  confined  areas 
or  heavy  seas,  but  had  gained  acceptance  through  years  of  usage48.  It 
was  in  fact  impossible  to  maintain  after  the  initial  attack  and  any  battle 
would  soon  degenerate  into  a  confused  melee.  This  is  what  happened 
during  the  the  attack  against  the  Hamburg  fleet  in  1630.  Initially  a  rigid 
formation  was  tried  but  Christian  IV  quickly  realised  that  the  Elbe  was 
-------------------- 
45.  For  example:  Fleet  list  March/April  1628?,  egenha?  ndige  Breve,  VII,  45-8,  and  letters  to  Claus 
Daa,  6  December  1635  &  31  March  1640,  egenhandige  Breve;  III,  451-4  &  IV,  321-2. 
46.  For  example:  Spas  for  Hendrik  Vind  aboard  Rytteren,  Kancelliets  Brevbl'ger,  1  May  1626. 
47.  Finn  Askgaard,  Christian  IV,  Rigets  vabnede  Arm,  (K4obenhavn,  1968).  64-7. 
48.  Niels  Probst.  'Nordisk  s4taktik  1  1500-  og  1600-tallet  -  og  slaget  i  KPge  Bugt  den  1.  juli  1677', 
Marinehistorisk  tidsskrifi  (4/1992),  3-23. 
299 hardly  the  place  for  fancy  manoeuvres  and  his  plan  of  attack  was  altered 
so  that  each  ship  was  instead  detailed  to  attack  a  specific  Hamburg 
ship49.  This  approach  proved  much  more  effective  and  the  battle  was 
quickly  settled.  However,  it  did  not  prevent  similar  intricate  formations 
being  tried  again  in  164050  and  during  the  Torstenssonkrig61,  again  with 
rather  dubious  success. 
These  manoeuvres  make  more  sense  when  we  look  at  naval  strategy 
of  the  time,  which  was  constrained  by  the  practice  of  loading  cannon  from 
outboard.  The  English  and  Dutch  also  used  small  squadrons  of  ships  to 
sail  by  their  enemy  and  discharge  their  guns  one  at  a  time  before  retir- 
ing  to  reload.  It  was  not  until  the  mid  to  late  17th  century  that  Denmark, 
in  line  with  the  other  European  navies,  adopted  the  full  broadside  attack 
and  the  standard  line-ahead  battle  formation52. 
Communication  between  ships  was  effected  using  a  system  of  signal 
flags,  cannon  shots  and  lanterns.  During  the  Northern  Seven  Years  War 
the  admiral  Herluf  Trolle  outlined  his  own  codes  which  covered  basic  sig- 
nals  such  as  a,  cannon  shot  to  indicate  that  the  admiral's  ship  was  getting 
under  way  or  anchoring53.  Such  signals  were  fairly  simple  and  most 
likely,  used  time  and  again,  but  they  were  not  formally  adopted  as  stan- 
dard.  Even  when  the  skibsartikler  were  published  in  1625  only  one  article 
was  devoted  to  signalling  and  this  stated  simply  that  the  admiral  should 
have  his  captains  aboard  before  sailing  to  detail  the  particular  signals 
------------------- 
49.  Battle  plans,  24  Aug  1630,  egenh.  ndige  Breve,  II,  282-4. 
50.  Battle  plan,  7  May  1640,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV.  333-6. 
51.  Chr.  Bruun,  Slaget  paa  Kolberger  Heide  den  1  juli  1644,  (Koenhavn,  1879). 
52.  Brian  Lavery,  'The  Revolution  in  Naval  Tactics',  in  Martine  Acerra.  Jose  Merino  and  Jean 
Meyer  (eds.  ):  Les  Martins  de  guerre  europeeennes,  XVIIe-XVIIIe  siecles,  (Paris,  1985),  167-72. 
53.  earfod,  Christian  3.  s  fJJde,  177. 
300 that  he  would  useM.  This  was  similar  to  the  situation  in  England,  but  at 
least  there  some  signals  had  become  standardised. 
7.4.  The  Effectiveness  of  the  Seagoing  Navy's  Administration 
Having  looked  in  detail  at  the  organisation  both  of  individual  ships 
and  of  naval  squadrons,  we  ought  now  to  assess  just  how  effectively  it 
worked  at  sea. 
The  strict  disciplinary  measures  outlined  in  the  skibsartikler  en- 
sured  that  there  were  no  serious  problems  in  maintaining  order  among 
the  men.  They  were  also  well  fed  and  paid,  and  although  there  were 
problems  from  timet  to  time  in  finding  the  necessary  finance,  there  was 
never  any  danger  of  large  scale  mutiny  or  other  disruption  aboard  the 
navy's  ships. 
The  organisation  of  the  men  and  their  supervision  by  the  junior 
officers  seems  to  have  worked  fairly  effectively,  and  there  was  never  any 
serious  question  raised  over  the  efficiency  of  the  crew5s.  Although  formal 
training  in  seamanship  still  left  much  to  be  desired  the  policy  of  recruit- 
ing  and  conscripting,  men  experienced  in  the  maritime  trades,  and  the 
division  into  messes,  so  that  inexperienced  men  could  learn  from  their 
mess-mates,  meant  that  there  was  a  .  fairly  high  level  of  competence  among 
seamen.  The  move  away  from  the  borgeleje  system  to  billeting  men  at 
Bremerholm  also  provided  a  more  professional  crew,  and  one  which  could 
be  mobilised  effectively. 
------------------ 
54.  Skibsartikler.  271. 
55.  W.  G.  Perrin  (ed.  ),  Boteler's  Dialogues,  Navy  Records  Society,  LXV  (1929),  281-6. 
56.  When  Christian  IV  complained  in  1641  that  only  40  out  of  200  seamen  aboard  Store  Sophie 
could  understand  a  compass  he  was  being  a  little  unfair.  It  was  hardly  necessary  for  ordinary 
seamen  to  be  versed  in  navigation  to  haul  on  ropes,  set  sails,  etc.  (Letter  to  Sten  Beck  &  Hans 
Ulrik  Gyldenloove,  13  July  1641,  egenhandige  Breve,  V,  98-100). 
301 As  with  so  many  aspects  of  Christian  IV's  government,  though,  the 
problems  with  the  navy  were  most  apparent  at  the  top  end  of  the  com- 
mand  chain.  Senior  naval  officers  received  little  or  no  training  and  had 
to  rely  to  a  large  extent  on  the  skill  of  their  junior  officers.  The  senior 
officers'  commissions  were  so  vague  as  to  be  almost  worthless,  and  the 
fact  that  many  of  the  officers  were  courtiers,  using  the  navy  as  a  means 
of  advancement  in  the  court  meant  that  their  commitment  to  the  navy  as 
a  profession  must  come  into  doubt.  A  few  well  trained  captains  filtered 
through  the  adelsburs  system,  but  this  method  of  taking  on  aspiring 
young  noblemen  as  volunteers  was  so  irregular  that  it  had  little  real 
impact57.  Even  when  the  senior  officers'  commissions  were  rewritten  in 
1645,  little  attempt  was  made  to  educate  officers  in  the  arts  of  seaman- 
ship,  and  the  majority  of  them  remained  entirely  dependent  on  their 
junior  officers  when  it  came  to  actually  sailing  the  ships. 
The  lack  of  any  permanent  posts  of  admiral,  or  indeed  of  any  type 
of  formal  career  advancement  among  officers,  would  also  have  had  its  ef- 
fect  on  professionalism  in  the  .  navy.  With  the  rigsadmiral  being  such  a 
political  appointment  there  was  little  respect  for  him  as  a  seaman  in  most 
cases.  The  majority  of  men  that  Christian  IV  appointed  to  this  post  were 
of  decidedly  moderate  skill.  There  were  only  two  rigsadmiraler  who  could 
really  have  been  described  as  professional  navy  men,  but  ironically  these 
two  proved  to  be  the  shortest  serving  of  them  all.  This  situation,  al- 
though  convenient  for  the  king  in  maintaining  his  own  personal  control  of 
the  navy,  did  not  help  to  provide  any  kind  of  effective  leadership  for  it 
in  his  absence. 
This  lax  and  somewhat  unprofessional  style  of  command  has  its 
roots  in  the  time  when  naval  battles  consisted  simply  of  boarding  an 
enemy  ship  and  engaging  in  hand-to-hand  combat,  similar  to  a  land  battle 
------------------ 
57.  This  system  was  outwardly  similar  to  the  English  Midshipman  programme  instituted  by  Pepys 
in  1686,  but  it  had  none  of  the  rigorous  training  and  promotion  associated  with  the  English  sys- 
tem. 
302 but  fought  at  sea.  However,  by  the  time  of  Christian  IV  it  was  no  longer 
adequate  to  send  the  navy  into  battle  commanded  by  men  who  had  little 
knowledge  or  experience  of  naval  warfare. 
The  formation  of  naval  strategy  and  battle  tactics  in  Denmark  lay 
very  much  in  the  hands  of  Christian  IV  and  he  dictated  the  formations  to 
be  used  and  the  plans  of  battle  to  be  employed.  However,  this  meant  that 
his  subordinate  officers  were  inexperienced  and  untrained  in  tactical  mat- 
ters.  When  the  king  was  not  present  at  the  scene  of  battle  his  senior  of- 
ficers  were  therefore  unable  to  effectively  take  his  place. 
Of  the  major  naval  battles  fought  during  his  reign  Christian  IV  was 
present  at  two,  the  attack  against  the  Hamburg  fleet  in  1630  and  the 
battle  of  Kolberger  Heide  in  July  1644.  In  the  first  he  achieved  victory, 
but  only  after  a  protracted  campaign  in  which  he  had  to  abandon  his  ini- 
tial  tactics,  and  the  second  was  indecisive,  although  the  Danish  fleet  did 
gain  the  upper  hand.  In  the  other  battles  his  captains  achieved  a  limited 
victory  in  the  battle  of  Listerdyb  in  May  1644  against  a  much  inferior 
opposition,  and  suffered  a  crushing  defeat  at  Femern  Baelt  in  October 
1644. 
This  defeat  was  precipitated  by  two  factors.  Firstly  the  inability  of 
the  Danish  captains  to-effectively  blockade  the  Swedes  in  Kiel  fjord,  after 
the  king  had  left  the  fleet,  allowed  the  Swedes  to  join  up  with  the  Dutch 
fleet.  Secondly  Christian  IV  made  the  fatal  strategic  error  of  dividing  his 
fleet  in  three  to  search  for  the  escaped  Swedish  navy.  This  meant  that 
when  one  of  the  squadrons  did  eventually  find  the  Swedish-Dutch  fleet 
the  captains  faced  overwhelming  odds  and  defeat  was  inevitable. 
Christian  IV  was  quick  to  lay  the  blame  for  the  navy's  defeat  on 
the  poor  performance  of  his  officers,  but  he  must  also  share  some  of  the 
blame,  not  only  for  his  poor  strategic  decision,  but  also  for  not  recognis- 
ing  the  need  to  train  his  officers  more  effectively.  The  absence  of  any 
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ganisation  of  naval  manoeuvres,  which  was  also  not  helped  by  the  fact 
that  signalling  codes  had  to  be  newly  established  before  every  voyage. 
The  question  of  naval  officers'  competence  is  curious.  It  was  not  as 
if  the  problem  had  not  been  previously  identified,  since  throughout 
Frederik  II's  reign  ships'  captains  had  been  regularly  criticised  for  their 
incompetence58.  The  noble  skibsjunkere  and  skibsherremmnd  were  con- 
sidered  among  the  worst  and,  although  they  played  a  lesser  role  in 
Christian  IV's  navy,  there  was  little  attempt  to  improve  matters  by  hiring 
skilled  men  or  training  those  already  in  service.  A  few  skilled  English 
and  Dutch  officers  were  hired  by  Christian  IV,  but  they  had  little  real 
impact  on  the  navy  as  a  whole.  It  was  not  until  1663,  when  the  Dutchman 
Curt  Adeler  Sivertsen  was  hired  as  Generaladmiral,  that  a  conscious  deci- 
sion  was  made  to  bring  in  highly  skilled  officers  from  overseas  to  lead 
by  example.  A  formal  officer's  training  school  was  not  established  until 
1701. 
In  conclusion  then,  it  can  be  said  that  the  ships  were  reasonably 
well  organised  and  disciplined,  and  when  they  sailed  alone,  the  poor 
standard  of  senior  officers  was  not  a  major  problem.  However,  when  it 
came  to  large  squadrons,  the  deficiency  in  officer  training  and  the  lack 
of  any  permanent  command  structure  or  formal  signalling  code,  sig- 
nificantly  reduced  the  effectiveness  of  the  navy  at  sea. 
How  does  this  situation  compare  to  other  countries? 
In  terms  of  manning  the  fleet  and  the  organisation  aboard  ship 
Denmark  compares  very  favourably  indeed.  The  Danish  semi-feudal  method 
of  manning  the  navy  was  far  from  perfect  but  it  was  much  better  than 
the  situation  in  England.  In  theory  English  crews  were  to  be  recruited 
every  year  to  provide  the  necessary  manning  for  that  year's  sailing,  and 
-------------------- 
58.  Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  tic(  43,100,220  &  227. 
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practice  though  the  conditions  on  the  king's  ships  were  so  poor  that  few 
men  were  willing  to  join  voluntarily  and  the  dreaded  press  gangs  had  to 
be  used  to  fill  the  ships.  Once  on  board  the  crew  could  then  find  them- 
selves  captive  for  many  years,  simply  because  there  were  no  funds  to 
pay  them  off. 
Although  the  physical  conditions  aboard  ship  would  have  been  little 
different  in  the  two  navies,  the  terms  of  employment  were  significantly 
better  in  Denmark.  The  seamen  were  paid  a  more  attractive  wage,  which 
was  also  much  more  likely  to  be  paid  than  in  England,  where  promissary 
'tickets'  were  frequently  issued  instead.  The  period  of  service  was  limited 
to  just  five  or  eight  years,  instead  of  the  indefinite  service  practised  in 
England  where  a  man  could  be  repeatedly  pressed  into  service  until  the 
age  of  60.  Denmark  also  took  much  greater  care  of  sick  and  injured 
seamen,  with  three  naval  hospitals  operating  in  Christian  'IV's  reign.  In 
England  there  was  only  the  inadequate  'Chatham  Chest'  which  issued 
charitable  funds  to  incapacitated  seamen.  A  dedicated  English  naval 
hospital  was  not  opened  until  the  end  of  the  17th  century59. 
In  terms  of  the  professionalism  of  the  crew  Denmark  was  also  supe- 
rior  to  England.  The  skibsartikler,  which  governed  discipline  and  working 
practises,  was  much  more  advanced  than  anything  known  in  England, 
where  the  medieval  'Black  Book  of  Admiralty'  still  governed  discipline. 
The  first  'Articles  of  War',  which  appeared  in  1653  were  designed  specifi- 
cally  to  counter  the  unprofessional  conduct  of  naval  officers  during  the 
First  Anglo-Dutch  War,  and  had  little,  initially,  to  do  with  the  discipline 
of  crew  members60.  The  practice  of  maintaining  a  core  of  seamen  was  also 
significantly  more  advanced  than  England  where  a  formal  continuous  serv- 
--- 
59. 
------  ---------- 
Christopher  Lloyd,  The  British  Seaman  1200-1860:  A  Social  Survey,  (London,  1970),  87-9. 
60.  N.  A.  M.  Rodger,  Articles  of  War,  (Havant,  1982),  7-11. 
305 ice  was  not  introduced  until  the  end  of  the  17th  century6l. 
Naval  manning  was  also  a  problem  for  Sweden  in  the  early  17th 
century.  Before  1635  the  men  were  conscripted  using  a  levy  system  on 
the  coastal  towns  and  were  maintained  in  a  similar  way  to  the  Danish 
borgeleje  system.  Gustav  Adolf's  military  success  made  recruitment  for 
the  army  much  more  popular  than  the  navy,  which  hampered  efforts  to 
recruit  sufficient  seamen62.  In  1635  though,  the  ständigt  bätsmanshill 
system  was  introduced  which  created  a  standing  reserve  of  men  who  were 
to  assemble  every  year  at  the  dockyard  in  Stockholm.  Every  coastal 
parish  was  to  supply  a  quota  of  men  and  these  were  organised  into 
regional  companies  and  regiments.  In  times  of  war  the  quotas  could  be 
doubled63.  Thus  a  formal  structure  was  put  in  place  which  enabled  the 
navy  to  be  manned  much  more.  effectively  than  in  Denmark. 
Sweden  also  had  its  own  Sjoartiklar  which  were  broadly  similar  to 
Denmark's,  although  much  less  extensive.  They  developed  in  a  similar  way 
to  Denmark's,  being  first  issued  as  specific  instructions  for  a  particular 
voyage,  but  later  being  issued  as  general  instructions.  The  Swedish  ar- 
ticles  were  issued  slightly  later  than  in  Denmark,  appearing  first  in  1570 
and  updated  in  1644,  but  there  was  little  significant  difference  between 
the  content  of  the  disciplinary  codes  of  the  two  Scandinavian  navies. 
The  Dutch  navy  depended  solely  on  its  captains  to  recruit  enough 
seamen  to  sail  in  their  ships.  There  were  very  few  men  who  could  be 
termed  as  professional  'naval'  seamen  since  the  crews  were  recruited  on 
the  labour  market  in  the  spring  for  that  year's  sailing  and  paid  off  once 
the  ships  returned  to  port.  With  the  maritime  trades  so  predominant  in 
------------------- 
61.  Lloyd,  The  British  Seaman,  115. 
62.  Michael  Roberts,  Gustavus  Adolphus,  (London,  1958),  II,  296-9. 
63.  Svenska  Flottans  Historie,  (Malm*,  1942),  I,  337-40. 
306 the  Netherlands  there  was  little  problem  in  finding  the  necessary  men,  al- 
though  an  embargo  could  be  placed  on  merchant  sailings  until  the  naval 
requirements  had  been  meth. 
It  therefore  seems  that  of  the  northern  European  royal  navies  Den- 
mark  had  fewest  problems  in  manning  the  fleet  in  the  early  17th  century, 
although  Sweden  developed  a  more  effective  system  in  the  late  1630s.  The 
methods  of  naval  conscription  at  this  time  were  basically  feudal  and  with 
Danish  society  still  essentially  organised  along  feudal  lines  there  was  con- 
sequently  less  resistance  to  the  practice.  Better  terms  of  employment  also 
improved  the  prospects  of  voluntary  recruitment  to  the  navy  and  reduced 
the  risks  of  desertion. 
With  regard  to  the  lack  of  professionalism  of  senior  officers, 
though,  Denmark  was  not  alone.  In  England,  France,  Sweden  and  Spain, 
where  the  royal  courts  and  the  navies  were  also  closely  interlinked, 
privilege  and  patronage  'often  played  a  greater  part  than  competence  when 
it  came  to  the  appointment  of  officers. 
This  was  different  in  the  Netherlands  where  professional  naval  cap- 
tains  and  admirals  were  kept  in  permanent  employ  by  the  admiralties  of 
the  maritime  provinces  and  the  constant  state  of  warfare  between  the 
United  Provinces  and  Spain  meant  that  Dutch  captains  built  up  a  far 
greater  experience  of  naval  tactics  than  their  Scandinavian  counterparts. 
The  professionalism  of  Swedish  naval  officers  and  their  tactical 
abilities  were  little  better  than  the  Danes.  In  the  Battle  of  Kolberger 
Heide  in  1644  they  still  based  their  tactics  on  boarding  the  Danish  enemy. 
Swedish  naval  tactics  were  therefore  no  better  than  her  adversary's,  and 
neither  side  could  claim  victory  in  this  encounter.  Although  the  imbalance 
------------------- 
64.  Jaap  Bruijn  &  Els  van  Eyck  van  Heslinga,  'Seamen's  Employment  in  the  Netherlands  (c.  1600- 
c.  1800)',  Mariner's  Mirror,  70  (1984),  7-20. 
307 of  the  fleets  in  the  Battle  of  Femern  Belt  made  the  outcome  almost  in- 
evitable,  it  is  still  significant  that  the  Swedes  achieved  their  success  with 
the  help  of  their  Dutch  allies. 
Christian  IV  can  therefore  take  some  credit  in  the  way  that  his 
navy  was  manned  and  the  way  that  his  crews  were  organised.  As  we  have 
seen  many  times  before,  though,  Christian  IV  was  not  a  great  innovator 
in  administrative  matters  and  it  was  the  very  fact  that  Danish  society 
remained  essentially  feudal  that  allowed  the  navy  to  be  manned  effec- 
tively.  He  cannot  take  much  credit  for  the  professionalism  of  his  officers, 
but  neither  should  he  be  seen  as  particularly  backward,  since  similar 
problems  existed  in  all  of  the  other  royal  navies  of  Europe. 
In  terms  of  naval  tactics,  though,  he  can  be  best  described  as  a 
little  naive.  He  did  have  some  successes  and  perhaps  with  a  little  more 
luck,  a  lot  more  patience,  and  a  little  less  ego,  he  would  have  achieved 
greater  success  at  sea.  The  main  problem  was  that  the  effective  command 
of  the  navy  depended  too  much  on  his  own  personal  leadership.  When  he 
was  unable  to  give  that  leadership  his  subordinate  officers  were  not  suf- 
ficiently  qualified  either  to  carry  out  his  instructions  effectively  or  to 
act  on  their  own  initiative. 
The  organisation  of  the  sailing  navy  therefore  reflects  what  we 
have  seen  already  in  Christian  IV's  administration  of  government  and  of 
the  dockyard.  His  inability  to  delegate  meant  that  there  was  no  effective 
command  structure  to  organise  things  in  his  absence,  and  too  much  at- 
tention  was  paid  to  small  details  while  more  fundamental  issues  were  ig- 
nored. 
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309 B.  Scottish  Master  Shipwrights  in  the  Danish  Navy 
8.1.  The  Introduction  of  Foreign  Master  Shipwrights  to  Denmark 
Danish  native  shipbuilding  talent  in  the  16th  and  17th  centuries  was  rela- 
tively  poor  beyond  the  building  of  small  coastal  and  fishing  vessels.  The 
dominance  of  at  first  the  Hanse  merchants  and  then  the  English  and 
Dutch  in  the  Baltic  meant  that  there  was  no  great  commercial  impetus  to 
develop  Danish  shipbuilding.  Danish  merchants  could  quite  easily  secure  a 
passage  on  any  number  of  the  ships  passing  through  the  Sound,  so  why 
should  they  go  to  the  expense,  and  added  risk,  of  building  and  operating 
their  own  ships?  As  Fynes  Moryson  explained  in  1593: 
their  marchants  use  not  to  Export  or  fostre  Comodityes  by  any  long 
Navigation  into  forrayne  parts,  because  the  Shipps  of  all  nations 
passing  the  Sounde  supply  their  wants,  and  export  their  dryed  fish 
and  like  Comodityes  they  can  spare.  So  the  marchants  haue  no 
strength  of  well  armed  shipping'. 
Therefore  when  the  Danish  state  navy  began  to  be  formed  at  the 
beginning  of  the  16th  century  it  was  recognised  that  either  warships 
would  have  to  be  purchased  from  abroad,  or  else  expert  foreign 
shipwrights  would  need  to  be  recruited  to  build  them  in  Denmark. 
The  purchase  of  ships  was  problematic  since  ships  were  not  always 
readily  available  when  needed,  and  the  quality  of  materials  and  workman- 
ship  could  not  be  properly  monitored  if  ships  were  built  in  foreign  lands. 
The  purchase  of  warships  from  competing  foreign  powers  could  also 
create  serious  diplomatic  problems.  By  relying  on  purchased  ships  the 
-------------------- 
1.  Fynes  Moryson,  The  fourth  Part  of  an  itinerary:  Of  the  Comonwealth  of  Denmarke,  Booke  II, 
Chap.  II.,  Library  of  Corpus  Christi  College,  Oxford.  MS.  C.  C.  C.  94,  f.  242-3. 
310 composition  of  the  navy  would  also  necessarily  be  somewhat  random, 
depending  on  what  types  of  ship  could  be  secured.  The  problem  of 
availability  could  be  alleviated  to  some  extent  by  seizing  prize  ships,  but 
the  problems  of  quality  and  maintaining  the  desired  composition  of  the 
navy  remained,  and  the  diplomatic  consequences  could  easily  outweigh 
any  advantage. 
The  answer  had  to  be  the  recruitment  of  expert  master  shipwrights 
from  abroad.  Little  is  known  of  the  master  shipwrights  working  for  the 
Danish  crown  in  the  early  16th  century  apart  from  their  names.  The  first, 
responsible  for  building  the  very  large  Maria  in  1511,  was  at  first  called 
Mester  Johan  but  later  Mester  Hanse,  suggesting  perhaps  that  he  was  a 
German,  probably  from  one  of  the  Hanse  towns,  whose  name  Johan  became 
Danicised  to  Hans.  We  know  definitely  however  that  Dutch  shipwrights 
were  hired  in  1538  and  that  the  Dutch-sounding  Henrik  Kolterman  was 
working  in  the  1540s  and  1550s3. 
By  the  reign  of  Frederik  II  the  practise  of  hiring  in  master 
shipwrights  from  abroad  had  become  standard  practise.  In  the  1560s  two 
Dutch  shipwrights,  Frederik  Bauch  and  Cornelius  Skibbygger,  were 
employed,  and  in  1568  three  French  shipwrights  were  hired  to  build  gal- 
leys  in  Norway4.  However,  it  was  British  shipwrights  who  were  to  be  most 
favoured  from  the  1570s  onwards. 
2.  Jurgen  H.  Barfod,  FMdens  fmdse4  (K$benhavn,  1990),  197-8. 
3.  Jgrgen  H.  Barfod,  Christian  3.  s  f1Adß  (K$benhavn,  1995),  64  &  128. 
4.  H.  D.  Lind.  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  tid:  Bidrag  til  den  dansk-norske  s4magts  historie 
1559-1584  (K4kbenhavn,  1902),  9.109  &  141;  Bartod.  Christian  3.  s  flide,  187  &  264;  Thomas  Hauge. 
'Galeier  i  den  dansk-norske  marine',  (Norsk)  Tidsskrift  for  Smvasen,  69  (1954),  352. 
311 An  English  shipwright  was  sought  as  early  as  15585  but  it  seems 
that  the  first  to  actually  be  employed  was  Hugo  Beda.  He  first  received  a 
commission  as  'SkibstcDmmermand  og  Bygmester'  (shipcarpenter  and  master 
shipwright)  in  15706  and  received  a  further  commission  in  1573  in  which 
he  was  granted  a  rent-free  property  in  Norway  in  addition  to  his  300  Dlr. 
annual  wages7.  We  know  that  he  was  English  because  in  1582  payment  was 
granted  to  'Hugo  Bedow,  vor  Skibsbygger,  og  nogle  andre  Engelske'  (Hugo 
Beda,  our  shipwright,  and  some  other  Englishmen)8.  We  also  know  that 
Beda's  assistant,  Hans  Madsen,  was  English  from  Fynes  Moryson,  who 
stated  in  1593  that  'the  Chiefe  Shipwright  who  then  built  the  Kings 
Shipps  was  an  Englishman  named  Matson'9. 
Madsen  received  a  commission  in  1573  as  a  mestersvend,  and 
worked  alongside  Beda  in  Norway,  building  new  vessels  and  rebuilding 
existing  ships'o.  After  the  demise  of  Bedal'  he  moved  permanently  to 
Copenhagen  and  received  a  commission  as  Bremerholm's  shipwright  in 
159212,  in  which  he  was  ordered  to  build  both  large  and  small  ships,  in 
return  for  an  annual  wage  of  150  Dlr.  plus  victuals  to  the  same  value. 
5.  Barfod.  Christian  3.  s  flAdß  119. 
6.  Lind.  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  tia4  142. 
7.  Beda's  commission,  25  September  1573,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli.  B54,  Sjmllandske  Registre, 
1572-78,  f.  65. 
B.  Receipt  for  Erik  Brockenhus,  20  May  1582,  Norske  rigsregistranter,  II,  466. 
9.  Moryson.  The  fourth  Part  of  an  Itinerary.  f.  242-3. 
10.  Madsen's  commission,  25  September  1573,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B54,  Sjsllandske 
Registre,  1572-78,  f.  65.;  Open  letters,  4  August  1575,  Norske  rigsregistranter,  II,  162-3. 
11.  He  is  last  heard  of  in  1591.  Letter  to  Axel  Gyldenstjerne,  13  October  1591.  Norske 
rigsregistranter,  III2216. 
12.  Madsen's  commission,  13  January  1592,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B54,  Sjallandske  Registre, 
1588-96,  f.  234-5. 
312 Although  these  English  shipwrights  were  well  respected  for  their 
craft  in  Denmark  they  were  not  so  well  regarded  by  their  own 
countrymen.  In  1582  an  English  merchant  complaining  about  the  Sound 
tolls  stated  that  the  king  of  Denmark  'has  English  shipwrights  that  build 
him  goodly  ships  and  galleys,  after  the  English  mould  and  fashion'13.  He 
further  stated  that  the  king's  agent  in  London,  John  Foxall,  had  no  dif- 
ficulties  in  supplying  him  with  'shipwrights  nor  any  other  persons,  as 
masters,  mariners,  or  captains  and  men  for  his  wa(rships)114.  In  1590,  the 
English  ambassador  also  formally  complained  to  the  Danish  king  that  he 
was  'intizing  awaye  her  Majesty's  servants  and  ship-wrights  to  fashion 
your  navie  after  the  same  moulds'15. 
It  seems  that  the  English  shipwrights  were  particularly  respected 
for  their  ability  to  build  ships  using  the  carvel*  method.  When  Frederik  II 
ordered  a  ship  from  Beda  in  1573  he  explicitly  stated  that  it  should  be 
built  with  'Kraueyle  Vaerk'  (carve]  work)16,  and  he  later  stated  that,  for 
the  better  defence  of  the  realm,  al  l  -ships  over  a  certain  size  should  now 
be  constructed  using  this  method'7.  Carvel  build  ing  of  the  larger  Danish 
warships  had  become  standard  by  the  mid  16th  century,  but  Beda  built 
13.  Thomas  North,  mariner,  to  Walsingham,  24  April  1582,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Foreign), 
1581-82.649. 
14.  The  surviving  correspondence  concerning  Foxall  does  not  mention  shipwrights,  but  does  men- 
tion  the  supply  of  warships,  guns,  gunners  and  seamen:  Frederik  II  to  John  Foxall,  16  February 
1566,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Foreign)  1566-68,18;  Frederik  II  to  John  Foxall,  23  Oct  1573, 
Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Foreign),  1572-74,431;  Letter  form  John  Foxall.  May  1570,  and  list  of 
cannon  supplied,  March  1571,  William  Dunn  Macray,  'Report  on  the  Archives  of  Denmark',  45th 
Annual  Report  of  the  Deputy  Keeper  of  the  Public  Records,  (1883).  Appendix  II,  24  &  48; 
Frederik  II  to  Queen  Elizabeth,  17  February  1567,22  October  1573,  &8  July  1574,  William  Dunn 
Macray,  'Second  Report  on  the  Archives  of  Denmark',  46th  Annual  Report  of  the  Deputy  Keeper 
of  the  Public  Records,  (1884),  Appendix  II,  22,24  &  25;  Foxall  to  Gyldenstern,  10  December  1565, 
18  March  1566,29  September  1566,23  October  1566  &  18  December  1566,  Macray,  'Second  Report'. 
40-1. 
15.  Edward  A.  Bond  (ed.  ),  The  Travels  of  Sir  Jerome  Horsey,  Hakluyt  Society,  Ist  series,  XX 
(1856),  243-4. 
16.  Letter  to  Beda,  11  November  1573,  Norske  rigsregistranter,  11,76. 
17.  Letters  to  Paul  Hvitfeldt.  22  February  1676,  Norske  rigsregistranter,  II,  180-3. 
313 most  of  his  ships  in  Norway,  where  this  technique  was  still  novel. 
Curiously  though,  evidence  from  a  wreck  of  one  of  Madsen's  ships, 
Gideon,  suggests  that  it  may  have  been  built  using  a  double-skinned 
clinker  technique1s. 
The  fact  that  foreign  shipwrights  were  employed,  however,  did  not 
mean  that  there  were  no  Danish  shipwrights.  The  foreign  shipwrights 
were  expected  to  pass  on  their  craft  to  the  Danes  and  in  Frederik  II's 
time  the  two  most  accomplished  Danish  master  shipwrights  were  Mester 
Bertel19  and  Mester  Hans  Katlin20.  Another  Dane,  Johan  Worm,  was  ap- 
pointed  as  Madsen's  assistant  in,  159221.  Although  Hans  Katlin  was  put  in 
charge  of  shipbuilding  at  Bremerholm  in  1574,  the  Danish  shipwrights 
tended  to  be  of  lesser  importance,  with  Beda  and  Madsen  apparently 
building  the  larger  ships. 
Christian  IV  continued  this  tradition  of  employing  foreign 
shipwrights,  but  he  at  first  favoured  Scottish  shipwrights.  As  during 
Frederik  II's  reign  these  men  became  the  principal  master  shipwrights  in 
the  navy,  while  the  few  Danish  shipwrights  who  were  also  employed  were 
used  in  a  lesser  capacity. 
18.  Niels  Probst.  'The  Introduction  of  Flush-Planked  Skin  in  Northern  Europe  -  and  the  Elsinore 
Wreck',  in  C.  Westerdahl  (ed.  ),  Crossroads  in  Ancient  Shipbuilding  (Oxford.  1994),  143-52. 
19.  M.  Bertel  was  working  at  least  from  1560,  was  elected  to  the  Danske  Kompagni  in  1576.  and 
was  still  in  service  in  1582.  Lind,  Fra  Kong  Frederik  den  andens  114  185;  K$benhavns  Stadsarkiv, 
Privatarkiver  I,  Det  danske  kompagnis  Broderbog.  I,  p.  27.;  Letter  to  Christoller  Valkendorf,  Kan- 
celliets  Brevbmger.  1  October  1582. 
20.  Katlin's  commission,  28  June  1574,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  854,  Sjallandske  Registre,  1572- 
78,  f.  121. 
21.  Worm's  commission,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  15  June  1592. 
314 8.2.  The  Scottish  Master  Shipwrights 
8.2.1.  Robert  Petersen 
The  first  of  the  Scottish  shipwrights  to  be  employed  by  Christian  IV  was 
Robert  Petersen  (originally  Paterson?  ),  who  remains  somewhat  of  a  mys- 
terious  person.  Nothing  is  known  of  his  life  prior  to  his  work  for  the 
Danish  crown,  and  very  few  details  exist  of  his  career  in  Denmark. 
He  is  first  mentioned  in  1596  when  instructions  were  issued  to  the 
Holmens  admiral  to: 
handler  medt  then  skodtzsche  skiffbygeren  att  hand  nu  strax 
begiffuer  sig  till  forschreffne  wortt  slot  Hadersleffhus  och 
therßammestedtz  Bygger  och  opßetter  forschreffne  schibn 
deal  with  the  Scottish  shipwright  to  immediately  go  to  our 
aforementioned  castle  Haderslevhus  and  there  build  and  fit  out  the 
aforementioned  ship. 
Petersen  built  this  ship,  the  44  gun  Viktor,  as  a  private  contractor, 
employing  his  own  workforce.  It  was  completed  in  the  spring  of  1598  and 
in  June  Petersen  was  awarded  an  additional  170  Dlr.  for  his  work23. 
The  Viktor  was  a  fairly  large  ship  and  was  used  as  Christian  IV's 
flagship  on  his  voyage  to  the  North  Cape  in  1599.  In  spite  of  the  caulk- 
ing  of  the  cannon  ports  being  so  bad  that  the  ship  was  in  danger  of 
sinking  at  one  stage24,  the  ship  was  considered  to  be  a  good  sailer,  and 
it  was  stated  that: 
------------------ 
22.  Missive  to  B$rge  Trolle,  25  September  1595,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli.  B57  Sjallandske  Teg- 
nelse,  XIX,  f.  5. 
23.  Missive  to  Hofinester,  Kancelliets  Brevbrpger,  18  January  1598;  Missives  to  B#rge  Trolle,  Kancel- 
liets  Brevboger,  7  December  1597,10  February  and  16  June  1598. 
24.  Hans  Madsen  had  to  carry  out  some  remedial  work  on  the  ship's  return  to  Bremerholm 
(Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655.28,  Bremerholms  Tpmmerregnskaber,  1599/1600). 
III Viktor  var  saa  vel  beseilet,  at  dersom  vi  brugte  nogen  mere  seil, 
kunde  ingen  of  de  andre  folge  os  fqr  de  fik  omlastet25 
Viktor  was  so  well  fitted  with  sails  that,  when  we  put  on  some  more 
sail,  none  of  the  others  could  follow  us  until  they  were  unloaded. 
Despite  this  ship  being  so  well  regarded  Petersen  appears  to  have 
received  no  further  contracts.  In  fact  nothing  else  is  heard  of  him  until 
he  was  taken  on  as  a  royal  master  shipwright  on  12  June  1604.  Hans 
Madsen  disappears  from  the  records  at  around  this  time26,  and  as 
Petersen's  wages  were  identical  to  Madsen's  it  seems  likely  that  he  was 
taken  on  -as  his  replacement.  His  commission27  stated  that: 
Mester  Robbert  Peittersspn 
...  wor  Skibbpgger  ...  skulle  stedtze  were 
thill  stede  paa  Bremerholm  her  for  wortt  slott  Kigbenhaffn,  dersam- 
mestedz  att  ware  paa  wor  skibe  denne  er  att  bggge  och  hielpe  naar 
behoff  giores.  Vdi  huilcken  hans  tieniste  hand  haffuer  loffuitt  thill 
sagt  och  seg  forplict  troligen  fliteligen  och  well  att  wilde  lade 
bruge,  Och  att  hand  jdelig  och  altid  skull  were  hoeß  tpmmemend  paa 
Holmen,  dersammenstedz  grandgiffuerlig  att  haffue  agt  och  thillsiun, 
att  Wort  arbede  wdi  Ingen  maade  bliffuer  forsommit. 
-------------------- 
25.  J.  H.  Schlegel  (ed.  ),  'Kong  Christian  den  Fierdes  Reise  omkring  de  Norske  kyster  indtil  den 
Russiske  Graendse,  17  April  -  13  Juli  1599.  beskreven  ved  Jonas  Carisius,  kongelig  sekretsr', 
Samluny  zur  Danischen  Geschichte...,  I.  Bd.  4  Stk.  (1773),  43-90. 
26.  Madsen  last  appears  in  the  timber  accounts  for  1602/03.  (Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655, 
28,  Bremerholms  Tmmmerregnskaber). 
27.  Petersen's  Commission,  2  November  1604.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli  854.  Sjallandske  Registre, 
14,1596-1604,  f.  492-3. 
316 Master  Robert  Petersen  ...  our  shipwright  ...  shall  remain  per- 
manently  in  place  at  Bremerholm,  here  by  our  castle  at  Copenhagen, 
to  supervise  our  ships  that  are  built  there  and  help  when  the  need 
arises.  In  which  service  he  has  promised  to  commit  himself  faith- 
fully,  and  diligently  however  he  is  used,  and  that  he  shall  at  all 
times  be  with  the  carpenters  at  Bremerholm,  and  to  have  direct  su- 
pervision  there  so  that  our  work  is  in  no  way  neglected. 
For  wages  he  received  150  Dlr.  plus  20  Dlr.  for  firewood,  and  free 
accommodation.  He  has  also  awarded  the  following  victuals:  2  skippund 
(320  kg)  of  rye;  2  skippund  of  barley;  2  oxen;  I  barrel  of  butter;  1  bar- 
rel  of  herring,  1  barrel  of  salt  fish;  4  woger  (71.6  Kg)  dried  cod;  1  barrel 
of  peas;  and  1  barrel  of  grain.  In  addition  to  the  20  Dlr.  for  firewood  he 
was  also  allowed  to  dispose  of  any  'spaane  och  andett  wbrugeligt  thpmmer' 
(chippings  or  other  useless  timber),  similar  to  the  way  English 
shipwrights  were  also  allowed  to  keep  the  so-called  'chippings'. 
Despite  being  engaged  as  master  shipwright  Petersen  mysteriously 
disappears  from  the  records.  No  reference  can  be  found  of  him  in  either 
the  dockyard  or  rentekammer  accounts  or  in  the  Danske  kancelli  records. 
The  reason  for  his  disappearance  is  not  known.  He  may  have  returned  to 
Scotland,  but  no  reference  can  be  found  to  him  in  any  Scottish  records; 
he  may  have  fallen  into  disrepute,  in  which  case  there  would  surely  have 
been  some  mention  of  him  in  the  state  records;  or  he  may  simply  have 
died  shortly  after  his  appointment,  which  would  appear  to  be  the  most 
likely  answer. 
317 8.2.2.  David  Balfour 
At  the  time  that  Petersen  was  building  the  Viktor  the  Holmens  admiral 
was  instructed  to  'handle  med  en  skotsk  Skibstpmmermand  om  Bygningen 
og  Opswtningen  of  en  Gallej'  (deal  with  a  Scottish  shipcarpenter  for  the 
building  and  fitting  out  of  a  galley)28.  This  Scottish  shipwright  was  David 
Balfour  who  was  later  to  become  one  of  the  most  important  of  Denmark's 
master  shipwrights.  Unlike  Petersen,  we  know  a  great  deal  of  his  early 
life  from  a  nobility  patent,  or  'birthbrief',  drawn  up  by  Charles  I  in 
162929. 
He  was  born  in  1574,  the  son  of  David  Balfour  of  Shanwel30  and 
Joanna  Balfour  of  the  house  of  Orwel.  He  was  therefore  of  the  lower 
nobility,  but  was  related  to  the  high  noble  house  of  the  Balfours  of 
Burleigh31.  He  lost  his  father  at  the  age  of  two  and  after  puberty  (ex 
ephwbis)  travelled  abroad  on  his  own  to  study  mathematics  before  return- 
ing  to  Scotland32  to  live  in  St.  Andrews.  Unfortunately,  like  Petersen,  we 
do  not  know  how  B  alfour  then  ended  up  in  Denmark. 
His  first  contract  for  the  Danish  crown  was  for  the  galley  that  he 
built  beside  Copenhagen  Castle  in  1597.  This  large  galley  measured  40 
alen  long  (22m),  had  24  oars  on  either  side  and  was  fitted  with  an  'Orloff' 
mast  and  a  bowsprit.  The  ship  was  to  be  delivered  complete  in  every 
way,  for  which  Balfour  received  200  Dlr.  for  his  own  and  his  carpenters' 
wages33. 
-------------------- 
28.  Missive  to  B$rge  Trolle,  Kancelliets  Brevbqiger,  1  July  1597. 
29.  Rigsarkiv,  Privatarkiver,  Kronologisk  Rk.  5/11/1629. 
30.  Shanwell  House  in  the  parish  of  Orwell,  Kinross-shire. 
31.  He  was  the  great-great  grandson  of  Michael  Balfour  of  Burleigh. 
32.  E  patrio  solo  ad  externas  oras,  non  discurrendi  studio,  Sed  animi  bonis  artibus  excolendi  ad- 
fectu,  Secunda  fama  et  integris  moribus  migrasse  Tandem  cum  in  Mathesi  profectum  non  temnen- 
dum  fecisset. 
33.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1597/98,  f.  444-6. 
318 This  ship,  for  which  we  do  not  have  a  name,  must  have  been  well 
received  as  later  the  same  year  Balfour  was  awarded  another  contract  to 
build  one  of  two  new  30  oar  galleys  to  be  built  in  Blekinge34.  Then  in 
1599  he  got  his  first  big  contract  to  build  a  'store  Orlouffs  Skibff'  (large 
warship). 
Work  on  the  ship,  again  using  Balfour's  own  workforce,  was  begun 
at  Bremerholm  early  in  1600.  He  received  his  first  payment  of  500  Dlr.  in 
April  1600  and  payments  of  around  100  Dlr.  were  thereafter  made  nearly 
every  month,  until  the  vessel's  completion  in  August  1601.  In  total  Balfour 
. 
received  2300  Dlr.  plus  5171  Dlr.  worth  of  victuals  for  this  ship. 
This  ship,  called  Argo,  with  a  keel  length  of  541  alen  (30m)  and 
carrying  54  cannon,  was  the  largest  warship  to  have  been  built  for  the 
Danish  navy  since  the  St.  Olaf  of  1573  and  was  immediately  used  by 
Christian  IV  as  his  new  flagship. 
This  ship  was  so  well  received  that  Balfour  was  immediately  taken 
on  as  a  royal  master  shipwright  and  hoftiener  (court  servant)  with  wages 
of  400  Dlr.  He  then  worked  at  Bremerholm  and  in  the  timber  accounts 
he  was  given  timber  for  'det  Nye  skib  som  schal  opßettis'  (the  new  ship 
which  shall  be  set  up),  i.  e.  the  small  Trosi  which  was  completed  by  the 
summer  of  160237. 
-------------------- 
34.  Missive  to  Berge  Trolle,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  4  December  1597;  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemester- 
regnskaber,  1597/98,  f.  446. 
35.  Payments  to  Balfour,  12  April,  12  June,  1&  24  July,  30  August,  27  September,  31  October,  & 
8  November  1600.  and  28  March,  10  April,  19  &  29  June,  4,15  &  24  August  1601.  Rigsarkiv,  Ren- 
temesterregnskaber,  1600/01,  f.  441-3.;  and  1601/02,  f.  602-5. 
36.  In  fact  this  seems  to  have  been  more  of  a  retainer  than  a  formal  wage  because  payments 
began  on  8  August  1601  when  Argo  was  completed,  and  ended  on  14  June  1602  when  Tre  kroner 
was  under  way.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1601/02,  f.  771-2;  and  1602/03,  f.  808-9. 
37.  Timber  issued  to  Balfour  in  May,  November  &  December  1601,  and  March  &  June  1602 
(Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655,28,  Bremerholms  T$mmerregnskaber,  1601/02  &  1602/03). 
319 He  did  not  stay  at  Bremerholm  for  long,  however,  because  in  March 
1602  he  was  awarded  another  contract  to  build  a  ship  in  Flensburg  'paa 
hanns  eigenn  kost  och  med  sitt  eigett  folck'  (at  his  own  expense  and  with 
his  own  men)  which  was  to  be  'paa  sin  stor  lighed  som  Konn:  Ma:  dett 
nye  Orloug  Schiff  Argo,....,  eller  nogit  mindre'  (of  the  same  size  as  H.  M.  's 
new  warship  Argo,  or  slightly  smaller)38. 
For  this  new  ship  Balfour  was  to  receive  3000  Dlr.  plus  a  half  last 
each  of  rye  and  barley  and  a  barrel  of  butter.  The  king  was  to  supply 
all  timber,  iron  and  other  materials  for  the  ship's  construction  as  well  as 
a  pair  of  sawyers  and  20  labourers. 
The  ship  was  begun  in  July  1602  and  was  nearing  -completion  by 
January  160439.  However,  far  from  being  slightly  smaller  than  Argo,  the 
new  ship,  Tre  kroner,  was  substantially  larger.  Its  keel,  admittedly,  was 
only  slightly  larger  at  56  alen  (31  m),  but  it  was  much  ý  broader  and 
carried  an  extra  deck,  making  it  capable  of  carrying  a  total  of  80  cannon. 
This  larger  size  may  be  the  reason  that  Balfour  requested  a  fur- 
ther  payment  of  220  Dlr.  for  his  work  on  the  ship,  which  Christian  IV 
refused  to  concede.  However,  despite  this,  the  king  seems  to  have  been 
well  satisfied  with  his  new  flagship  and  stated  that  he  wanted  to  use  Bal- 
four  again  and  would  negotiate  with  him  upon  completion  of  his  present 
work40. 
The  Tre  kroner  was  ready  to  sail  to  Copenhagen  in  August41,  and 
Balfour's  next  contract  duly  came  in  December  1604  for  a  ship  to  be  built 
------------------ 
38.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber.  1601/02,  f.  604-5. 
39.  A  mersmager  at  Bremerholm  was  issued  timber  to  construct  the  topworks  in  January  1604 
(Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655,28,  Bremerholms  TOmmerregnskaber,  1603/04). 
40.  Missive  to  David  Balfour,  Kancelliets  Orevbipger,  29  January  1604. 
41.  Missive  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  Kancelliets  ©revbmger,  10  August  1604. 
320 in  Norway.  This  new  ship  was  to  have  a  keel  length  of  40  alen  (22m)  with 
an  orlop  deck,  upper  deck  and  forecastle.  It  was  to  carry  three  'rows'  of 
cannon  on  the  foredeck42.  For  this  ship  Balfour  was  to  be  paid  1500  Dlr. 
and  a  last  of  barley,  with  which  he  was  to  hire  his  own  men.  All  the  tim- 
ber,  ironwork,  blocks  and  rigging  were  to  be  supplied  by  the  Akershus 
1ensmand'  ,  although  it  was  quickly  found  that  the  Norwegian  treenails 
were  useless  and  Dutch  ones  had  to  be  ordered  instead". 
Unfortunately  the  name  of  this  ship  is  not  known,  but  the  size  of 
it  suggests  that  it  could  well  have  been  the  Sanct  Anna  Precise  details  of 
its  dimensions  -are  not  known  but  we  do  know  that  it  carried  30  cannon 
and  280  men,  which  is  about  right  for  the  size  of  the  Norwegian  ship. 
Also  Sanct  Anna  entered  service  in  160845,  which  is  reasonable  if  we  al- 
low  two  or  three  years  for  it  to  be  built. 
In  between  the  building  of  these  large  ships  Balfour  also  found  time 
to  construct  a  number  of  small  vessels  such  as  the  St.  Peter  and 
Penitens,  -both  completed  by'  1603,  which  were  probably  small  pinnaces, 
and  the  six  gun  Makarel  completed  in  160746. 
In  1607  Balfour  was  once  again  taken  'on  as  a  royal  master 
shipwright.  No  commission  for  his  appointment  exists  but  in  the  rentekam- 
mer  accounts  it  is  noted  that  'Konn:  Maietts:  haffuer  Naadigst  bestillet 
och  antagen  Dawid  Ballfuhr,  vdj  Hans  Maietts:  Tienneste  for  enn  Schiffs 
-------------------- 
42.  i.  e.  probably  three  cannon  on  either  side. 
43.  Open  letter  to  David  Balfour.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  20  December  1604;  Missives  to  J$rgen 
Friis,  21  &  24  December  1604,  Norske  rigsregistranter,  III,  94-5. 
44.  Missive  to  Jurgen  Friis,  7  May  1605,  Norske  rigsregisteranter,  III,  110. 
45.  Christian  IV  noted  that  it  set  sail  on  19  July  1608  (J.  H.  Schlegel  (ed.  ),  'Kong  Christian  IV  Al- 
manak  for  Aaret  1608',  Samlung  zur  Danischen  Geschichte...,  2  Bd.  3  stk.  (1775),  59-84. 
46.  Rigsarkiv,  F&stningsregnskaber,  IV,  c.  1-2.,  K$benhavns  tgjhusregnskaber,  1602-04;  1607/08; 
321 Biugmester'  (His  Majesty  has  graciously  employed  and  engaged  David  Bal- 
four  in  his  majesty's  service  as  a  master  shipwright)47.  His  wages  were 
set  at  400  Dlr.,  to  be  effective  from  20  October  1607. 
Again  he  did  not  stay  long  at  Bremerholm,  as  by  1609  he  had  com- 
pleted  another  ship,  Justitia,  at  Ar4psund48,  near  Haderselv  in  Schleswig, 
which  Christian  IV  stated  had  been  built  using  'uoriss  Skouiis  udi 
holsten'  (our  woods  in  "Holstein)49.  Balfour  therefore  must  have  left 
Bremerholm  more  or  less  immediately  after  receiving  his  commission.  He 
also  built  the  24  gun  Krokodillen  around  this  time  but  where  this  ship 
was  built  is  not  known. 
In  March  1610  Balfour  was  contracted  to  build  another  large  ship, 
this  time  at  "  Itzehge,  in  Holstein.  This  ship,  later  called  Recompens, 
proved  to  be  a  very  problematic  contract  for  Balfour50.  When  he  first 
took  on  the  work  -  he  was  warned  by  Christian  IV  not  to  build  the  ship 
bigger  than  had  been  agreed51,  and  again  a  few  months  later  was  in- 
structed  not  to  vary  the  measurements  from  those  'previously  agreed52. 
We  know  from  a  Swedish  report  on  the  fleet  the  Recompens  was  'Uti  all 
ting  Likt  Argo'  (in  all  respects  like  Argo)w,  and  knowing  that  the  last 
time  that  Balfour  was  requested  to  build  a  ship  the  same  size  as  Argo  he 
-------------------- 
47.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1607/8,  f.  678. 
48.  Ole  Mortensmn,  Rena'ssancens  fartojer,  sejlads  og  sofart  i  Danmark  1550-104  (Rudk4,  bing,  1995), 
204. 
49.  Letter  to  rigsrda,  12  April  1633,  C.  F.  "  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den 
Fjerdes  egenhandige  Brev4  III,  102. 
50.  I  am  indebted  to  Niels  Probst  of  the  Orlogsmuseum,  Copenhagen.  for  his  help  in  identifying 
and  interpreting  some  of  the  German  documents  associated  with  the  construction  of  this  vessel. 
51.  Letter  to  Gert  Rantzau,  10  March  1610,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA  A32,  VII  1608-10,  Registrede  koncepter 
til  indlandische  Registratur. 
52.  Letter  to  Balfour,  1  June  1610,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA  A32. 
53.  Swedish  ship  list  of  1633  in  Riksarkivet,  quoted  in  Niels  Probst,  'Nordeuropaisk  span- 
teopslagning  i  1500-  og  1600-tallet'.  Maritim  Kontak4  16  (1993),  13. 
322 produced  the  much  larger  Tre  kroner,  the  king  was  obviously  determined 
to  have  his  instructions  adhered  to  this  time.  He  also  received  specific 
instructions  concerning  the  design  of  the  ship's  rudder54. 
In  1611  Balfour  wrote  to  the  Tyske  kancelli  to  request  further  pay- 
ment  for  'dei  Grossen  Schiff  zu  Itzehoe'  (the  large  ship  at  Itzehoe)-%. 
The  Tyske  kancelli,  however,  decided  that  no  payment  was  to  be  ad- 
vanced  before  an  inspection  of  the  ship  had  been  made,  no  doubt  to  en- 
sure  that  the  ship  was  indeed  being  built  to  the  agreed  design56. 
Balfour  had  also  been  asked  to  build,  a  small  ship  beside  the 
Recompens  around  this  time  but  he  was  unable  to  proceed  with  it  until  he 
knew  what  type  of  ship  it  should  be.  In  his  request  to  the  Tyske  kancelli 
he  asked  whether  it  should  be  'ein  Engelsche  katze'  (an  English  ketch) 
or  'mit  ein  spigel  wie  ein  Pinnas'  (with  a  square  stern  like  a  pinnace). 
Their  reply  was  that  Christian  IV  had  himself  decided  that  it  should  be 
like  an  English  ketch57. 
By  March  1612  the  larger  ship  was  advanced  far  enough  for  a  Cap- 
tain  to  be  appointed58  and  the  man  chosen  was  the  inexperienced  Claus 
Weinkauff,  who  had  received  his  commission  only  the  previous  year58. 
This  created  problems  for  Balfour  as,  being  a  military  commander,  the 
captain  took  command  of  the  ship  over  the  shipwright,  who  was  simply  a 
'Privat  Person'.  By  May  news  of  the  'freundtlich  nicht  verhalten' 
-------------------- 
54.  Letter  to  Baltzer  von  Ahlefeldt,  27  December  1610,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA  A32. 
55.  Letter  to  Tobia  Lautterbach,  Secretary  of  the  Tyske  kancellt  25  February  1611,  with  margin 
notes  (9  March  1611),  and  a  draught  reply.  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA  A145,  Ater  vedr.  skibsbyggerne 
David  Balfour  og  Peter  Michelsen. 
56.  The  contract  no  longer  exists  but  a  summary  of  ironwork  issued  shows  that  at  total  of  304 
Skippund  (48.6  tonnes)  was  issued,  at  a  value  of  5,045  Dlr,  between  1610  and  1612.  Rigsarkiv, 
Danske  kancelli,  0164,  IX,  pk.  06,  lag  17. 
57.  There  was  another  small  2  gun  ship  named  Engelske  Kittze  in  the  navy  at  this  time. 
58.  Muster  book  of  Claus  Weinkof  16  March  -1  Sept  1612,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA  A145. 
59.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  den  Fjerde  og  hans  Mand  paa  Bremerholm,  (Kltbenhavn,  1889),  193. 
323 (unfriendly  behaviour)  between  Balfour  and  the  Captain  had  reached 
Copenhagen,  where  concern  was  expressed  that  'darmfit  dem  Schiffe  nicht 
kom  schade'  (the  ship  does  not  thereby  become  harmed)60. 
By  July  Christian  IV  was  urging  the  ship's  speedy  completion81, 
but  the  apparently  worsening  dispute  between  Balfour  and  Weinkauff  was 
causing  increasing  concern,  and  'M.  Balfour  Schiffbauer,  sich  grossen 
muderwillent  und  fecttch  gegen  dem  von  Kon:  Ma:  aufs  neue  Schiff  veror- 
derten  Capitain'  (Master  shipwright  Balfour's  great  maliciousness  and 
querulousness  towards  the  Captain  that  H.  M.  has  appointed  to  the  new 
ship),  was  threatening  the  final  completion  of  the  shipm. 
Despite  this  dispute  the  ship  was  finally  completed  and  ready  to 
sail  on  4  August.  However,  the  fears  surrounding  the  safety  of  the  ship 
came  alarmingly  true  as  the  ship  foundered  in  the  river  on  its  way  out 
to  sea  and  was  nearly  lost. 
There  was  naturally  an'  inquiry  into  the  incident  and,  although  the 
exact  nature  of  the  accusations  are  unknown,  Balfour's  defence  submis- 
sion  has  survived63.  This  is  written  in  a  rather  idiosyncratic  and  confus- 
ing  German,  which  does  not  help  to  make  his  case  at  all  clear.  However,  it 
implies  that  Weinkauff  was  blaming  Balfour  for  the  construction  of  the 
ship,  while  Balfour  in  turn  argued  that  he  had  built  and  prepared  the 
ship  properly  and  that  it  was  Weinkauff's  poor  seamanship  which  had 
caused  the  accident. 
-------------------- 
60.  Letter  to  Baltzer  von  Ahlefeldt.  28  May  1612,  Rigsarkiv,  TKUA,  Alm.  del  124,  f.  173a. 
61.  Letters  to  Baltzer  von  Ahlefeldt  4&  12  July  1612;  and  David  Balfour  &  Claus  Weinkauff,  4 
July  1612,  Rigsarkiv,  TKUA,  Alm.  del  124,  f.  195a.,  f.  196,  &  205a. 
62.  Letters  to  Baltzer  von  Ahlefeldt.  16  &  27  July  1612.  Rigsarkiv.  TKUA.  Alm.  del  124,  f.  209a  & 
f.  211  b. 
63.  Letter  to  Christian  IV,  undated,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA  A145. 
324 He  stated  that  as  the  ship  travelled  towards  Suie  it  ran  aground  on 
a  sandbank.  Water  then  leaked  in,  coming  up  to  the  scuppers,  and  the 
ship  was  prevented  from  capsizing  only  by  securing  an  anchor  on  land 
and  attaching  it  to  the  mast.  As  the  tide  began  to  fall  the  ship  came  fur- 
ther  round  on  the  bank  and  began  to  fall  over  on  its  side.  As  this  hap- 
pened  the  ship's  boat  was  caught  fast  by  a  cable.  This  was  ordered  to  be 
cut  free,  but  when  this  was  done  the  ship  fell  even  further  over. 
He  then  went  on  to  state  that  from  these  observations  no  blame 
could  be  apportioned  to  him  as  he  had  provided  'ein  fertich  wolvor- 
wartern  gut  richtiges  Schiff  das  an  kein  feill  odder  mangell'  (a  completed, 
well-constructed?,  good  correct  ship  which  had  neither  mistakes  nor 
deficiencies). 
However,  despite  this  argument,  Balfour  was  imprisoned  in  Drag- 
sholm  Castle  sometime  'around  the  end  of  1612.  The  precise  reason'  for  his 
imprisonment  is  not  actually  known,  but  it  is  more-  than  likely  that  it  was 
because  of  the  trouble  experienced  with  Recompens. 
Dragsholm  Castle  was  -where  noblemen  who  had  committed  some 
heinous  crime  against  the  state  tended  to  be  incarcerated64.  Recompens 
was  built  during  the  Kalmar  War  and  Christian  IV's  urgency  in  wanting 
the  ship  completed  suggests  that  he  may  have  wanted  to  use  it  in  the 
campaign  against  Stockholm  in  the  autumn  of  1612.  If  the  grounding  of 
the  ship  was  considered  Balfour's  fault  then  it  may  well  have  been  con- 
strued  as  treason65. 
-------------------- 
64.  It  was  here  that  the  Earl  of  Bothwell  was  imprisoned.  A.  G.  Hass$  (ed.  ).  Danske  Slotte  og  Her- 
regaarde,  (Kobenhavn,  1944),  561-78. 
65.  It  may  be  significant  that  Weinkauff  never  commanded  another  ship  after  this  incident.  Lind, 
Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Manch  193. 
325 Whatever  the  grounds  for  Balfour's  imprisonment  his  kinship  with 
the  Balfours  of  Burleigh  proved  to  be  invaluable,  and  his  release  was 
secured  only  after  the  personal  intervention  of  James  I/VI66.  His  petition 
to  Christian  IV  reads  as  follows: 
Most  serene  Prince  relative,  in-law,  brother  and  dearest  companion; 
Since  certain  of  our  servants  from  the  Balfor  family,  who  neither 
originate  in  an  obscure  place  nor  are  to  be  despised  by  us  in  any 
way  (because  of  their  generous  service,  which  we  use  daily),  have 
indicated  that  a  certain  Scot  and  skilled  shipwright,  David  Balfor 
has  by  now  been  held  in  prison  at  the  command  of  Your  Serene 
Highness  for  three  years  or  thereabouts  (whereby  not  only  has  he 
been  almost  killed  by  the  sadness  and  squalor  of  the  long  imprison- 
ment  but  also  his  wife  and  infant  children  have  been  reduced  to 
almost  extreme  poverty),  and  since  they  have  petitioned  as  sup- 
plicants  that  we  send  a  letter  to  Your  Serene  Highness  and-that  we 
ask  you  to  free  the  above-mentioned  David  from  Prison;  we  think, 
even  though  we  feel  that  the  offences  of  no  one  should  be  excused, 
that  something  should  nevertheless  be  conceded  to  their  prayers, 
because  several  men  are,  boldly  declaring  that  the  above-mentioned 
David  was  falsely  accused  before  Your  Serene  Highness  because  of 
the  false  accusations  of  his  enemies  rather  than  because  of  any 
deed  of  his  own.  And  so  we  ask  of  Your  Serene  Highness  that  if  a 
charge  of  a  more  serious  nature  can  be  brought  against  the  above- 
mentioned  David,  you  will  take  the  trouble  to  inform  us  of  it.  But  if 
it  is  insignificant  and  not  worthy  of  troubling  your  ears,  we  assert 
on  behalf  of  our  friendship  (or  rather  our  fraternity)  that 
whatever  his  crime  is,  you  should  not  refuse  to  pardon  him  for 
-  -----  ------------ 
66.  Letter  from  James  I  to  Christian  IV,  30  September  1615,  (Ronald  L.  Meldrum  (ed.  ).  The  Letters 
of  King  James  I  to  King  Christian  IV  1603-1625  (Hassocks,  1976)). 
326 that  and  restore  him  to  his  previous  freedom  by  this  request  of 
ours.  And  we  do  not  doubt  but  that  he  himself  mindful  of  such 
great  kindness,  will  struggle  with  all  his  strength  to  obliterate  the 
blemish  of  any  prior  offence  (but  only  if  there  is  any)  through 
faith  and  diligence  (if  only  Your  Serene  Highness  will  use  his  serv- 
ice  in  the  future). 
Although  the  petition  is  dated  September  1615  the  order  for 
Balfour's  release  was  not  issued  until  13  June  1616,  when  he  was  ordered 
to  return  immediately  to  Copenhagen87.  He  must  have  been  exonerated  or 
pardoned  for  his  crime  since,  as  James  I/VI  had  suggested,  Balfour  was 
once  again  employed  by  Christian  IV.  However,  before  building  any  new 
ships  he  was  first  sent  on  a  mission  to  Jutland  to  search  for  suitable 
shipbuilding  timber68. 
Balfour  must  have  proved  his  worth  as  on  2  July  1617  he  was  once 
again  given  a  commission  as  a  royal  master  shipwright  with  wages,  as 
before,  of  400  Dlr.  However,  he  was  now  no  longer  the  most  senior 
shipwright  since  Daniel  Sinclair  was  also  given  an-identical  commission  on 
the  same  day8g.  It  also  seems  as  though  Balfour  was  serving  a  kind  of 
probationary  period  because  at  first  he  built  only  small  vessels,  and  it 
was  many  years  before  he  was  entrusted  with  the  building  of  another 
ship  of  any  size. 
In  March  1618  Christian  IV  wrote  in  his  diary  'sendt  jeg  1000  D1.  til 
Jens  Sparre  som  M.  David  skulde  have'  (I  sent  1000  Dlr.  to  Jens  Sparre 
which  Master  David  should  have)70,  but  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  what 
-------------------- 
67.  Missive  to  Olluf  Rossensparre,  13  June  1616,0.  Nielsen  (ed.  ).  Kmbenhavns  diplomatarium, 
(K$benhavn,  1874).  V,  25. 
68.  Instructions  for  Mester  Davet  Balfut,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  3  November  1616. 
69.  Rigsarkiv,  Oanske  Kancelli,  B54.  Sjallands  Registre  1613-19,  f.  267-8. 
70.  Rasmus  Nyerup  (ed.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Dagbmger  for  Aarene  1618,1619,16M,  1625, 
1635  udgivne  efter  Originalerne.  (K$benhavn,  1825).  15. 
327 this  payment  might  have  been  for.  It  may  have  been  for  the  building  of  a 
ship  but  since  Jens  Sparre  was  at  the  time  in  Hammershus  in  the  south 
of  Sjaelland  it  is  more  likely  to  have  been  connected  with  the  felling  of 
timber. 
By  1620  Balfour  was  back  working  at  Bremerholm.  The  Great  Forge 
accounts  show  that  he  was  issued  with  spikes  and  nails  to  use  for  a  'Nye 
Sckrabbe,  thill  holmens  behouff'  (new  'scrubber'  for  use  at  Bremerholm). 
This  was  most  likely  a  barge  used  in  'scrubbing'  the  bottoms  of  ships 
when  they  were  being  careened,  since  later  in  the  accounts  Balfour  was 
again  issued  with  material  for  use  on  'skibene  och  Bend  Nye  Pramb'  (the 
ships  and  the  new  barge).  The  accounts  show  that  Balfour  continued 
working  at  Bremerholm  until  at  least  the  end  of  1621  but  he  was  not 
responsible  for  the  building  of  any  new  ships  since  the  amount  of 
material  issued  to  him  was  not  great  and  was  simply  intended  'till  schiffs 
behouf  her  paa  holmen'  (for  use  on  ships  here-at  Bremerholm)». 
In  1620  two  merchants  in  Flensburg  were  given  the  contract  to 
build  a  ship  for  the  navy.  Their  contract  stated  that  the  ship  should  be 
supplied  with  a'  ship's  boat,  the  specification  for  which  was  drawn  up  by 
BalfourM.  It  is  clear  from  this  that  Christian  IV  did  not  yet  trust  Balfour 
to  build  any  sizeable  vessels  for  the  navy  and  it  must  have  been  a 
humiliation  for  Balfour  not  only  to  not  be-given  the  contract,  but  that  he 
was  thought  competent  only  to  design  the  ship's  boat.  Two  years  later 
Balfour  did  obtain  a  contract  to  build  a  ship,  but  this  was  only  a  small 
jagt  for  which  he  received  just  150  D1r.  73 
71.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655,30.  Store  Smedjes  Regnskaber,  21  &  29  February  and  6 
March  1620,27  April  and  6  September  1621. 
72.  Open  letter,  Kancelliets  BrevbOger,  25  February  1620. 
73.  Rigsarkiv.  Rentemesterregnskaber  1622/23,78,  f.  195.  See  also  Chapter  3. 
328 It  was  not  until  1623  that  Balfour  received  his  next  major 
contract74.  This  was  for  a  small  shallow-draught  22  gun  ship  with  a  keel 
length  of  40  alen  (25.1m),  later  called  Hummeren.  The  ship  was  to  be  built 
at  Bremerholm  but  using  Balfour's  own  workforce.  All  materials  were  sup- 
plied  by  the'  dockyard  and  the  dockyard's  personnel  were  to  be  used  to 
launch  the  ship,  but  all  other  costs  were  to  be  met  by  Balfour.  The  con- 
tract  stated  that  the  ship  was  to  be  completed  by  August  1624  and  that 
Balfour  was-  to  be  paid  3500  Rdlr.  in'  four  instalments.  However,  the  ship 
was,  not  launched  until  October  1624  and  the  final  payment  for  completion 
of  the  ship  was  not  made  until  May  162575. 
Whilst  building  Hummeren  Balfour  also  constructed  another  smaller 
ship  called  Postillionen,  with  a  keel  length  of  33  alen  (20.1m).  He  did  not 
receive  a  contract  to  -build  this  ship  indicating  that  it  was  built  in  his 
position  as  royal  master  shipwright  and  using  the  dockyard's  own  labour. 
With  these  two  ships  Balfour  seems  to  have  redeemed  his  reputa- 
tion.  The  design  of  both  ships  proved  extremely  successful76  and  many 
copies  of  both  vessels  were  made  in  'subsequent  years.  Already  in 
January  1625  Balfour  was  awarded  a  contract  to  build  two  more  ships 
identical  to  Postillionen.  Like  Hummeren  these  ships  were  to  be  built  at 
Bremerholm  but  using  Balfour's  own  workforce.  For  each  ship  he  was  to 
receive  9000  Dlr.,  again  paid  in  four  instalments,  the  last  of  which  was  to 
be  paid  upon  completion  of  the  ships  by  July  that  year.  Again  the 
ships  were  delivered  late,  with  the  last  instalments  for  the  ships 
Saalhunden  and  Flyvende  fisk  being  made  in  January  162678. 
74.  Contract  with  David  Balfour,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  2  October  1623.  A  draft  of  this  contract 
can  be  found  in  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  B164,  IX,  pk.  06,  laeg  17. 
75.  Payments  to  Balfour  8  October  1623,17  June,  25  September  &  30  October  1624  and  12  May 
1625,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1623/24,  f.  84;  1624/25,  f.  96,  and  1/5/1625  -  31/12/1625, 
f.  52. 
76.  The  design  of  Hummeren  will  be  fully  discussed  in  Chapter  11. 
77.  Open  letter,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger.  25  January  1625. 
329 With  this  new  found  trust  Balfour  was  able  to  set  up  his  own 
private  shipyard  in  Christianshavn.  He  first  purchased  a  plot  of  land  at 
Christianshavn  in  1624,  which  included  access  to  a  'haffn  udi  stranden' 
(harbour  on  the  beach)19.  Shortly  afterwards  he  also  acquired  an  addi- 
tional  plot  beside  it  from  his  father-in-law,  Johan  de  Willem.  This  com- 
bined  plot,  measuring  96  by  96  alen  (60  x  60m),  lay  at  the  extreme  edge 
of  the  new  town's  development  and  beside  an  area  of  land  that  had  not 
yet  been  developed  as  planned80.  Balfour,  not  content  with  this  double 
plot,  also  piled  in  an  area  of  this  land  to  create  his  new  shipyard81. 
This  area  has  recently  been  excavated  to  reveal  two  slipways  and  a 
careening  dock  created  by  sinking  two  small  ships.  The  ships  date  from 
the  late  16th  century  and  the  dock  was  therefore  probably  created  as 
part  of  Balfour's  shipyard,  when  the  ships  had  reached  the  end  of  a  20- 
30  year  life-span82. 
Nothing  is  known  of  the  actual  organisation  of  this  shipyard  but  we 
know  that  Balfour  was  in  dispute  with  some  Dutch  carpenters  in  162583 
so  it  is  likely  that,  as  Danish  shipcarpenters  were  in  short  supply,  he 
employed  Dutchmen  instead84.  Some  men  from  Bremerholm  were  also  used 
78.  Payments  to  David  Balfour  29  June,  30  July,  17  August  3  15  October  1825,  and  10  January 
1626,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1/5/1625  -  31/12/1825.  f.  52.;  and  1/1/1626  -  1/5/1626 
(Udgift).  f.  46. 
79.  Open  letter,  11  February  1624,  K4benhavns  diplomatariumi,  V,  762-3.  The  harbour  was  known 
as  Grionnegkrdshavn. 
80.  Meausurements  of  Balfours  plot,  undated,  8  February  1624,  and  25  July  1634,  Rigsarkiv, 
Danske  kancelli  8160.  Indlaeg  til  registre  og  tegnelser...;  Mogens  Lebech,  Gamle  skibe  -  gamle  huse, 
(K$benhavn,  1959),  20-5. 
81.  Letter'  to  Christian  Friis,  Jmrgen  Urne,  Tage  Thott  &  Christoffer  Ulfeldt,  4  May  1635, 
K(benhavns  diplomatarium,  VI,  166-7. 
82.  Henrik  B.  Frederickson,  'Varft  og  anlaeg  ved  Gr$nnegArds  Havn',  Middelalderarkmologisk 
Nyhedsbrev,  October  1996.  I  am  indebted  to  the  author  for  providing  an  advance  copy  of  this 
article. 
83.  Missive  to  Sten  Villumsen  and  Mogens  Kaas,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  7  November  1625. 
84.  Balfour's  connection  with  Johan  de  Villem  lends  further  weight  to  this  premise  as  de  Villem 
frequently  supplied  men  and  materials  to  Denmark  from  the  Netherlands. 
330 from  time  to  time,  such  as  the  apprentices  that  were  there  in  1625,  but 
any  wages  or  victuals  given  to  them  by  the  state  were  deducted  from 
Balfour's  contract85. 
The  first  contract  to  build  a  ship  for  the  navy  at  this  new 
shipyard  came  in  1625.  The  actual  contract  does  not  exist  and  nothing  is 
known  of  the  design  of  the  ship.  It  was  first  referred  to  as  simply  'eett 
nytt  Schiff'  (a  new  ship),  but  when  it  entered  service  it  was  called  the 
'ny  pram'  (new  barge).  This  barge,  for  which  Balfour  received  a  payment 
of  3200  Edlr.  86,  was  eventually  given  the  name  skieldtusen87. 
Two  small  ships  were  also  built  at  Christianshavn  in  1626.  The  first 
was  initially  referred  to  as  the  'Paa  Amager  Ny  Skib'  (new  ship  at 
Amager)88,  but  later  called  Haren.  The  other  was  probably  Mynden89. 
These  ships  were  of  a  similar  size  to  Postillionen  and  may  well  have  been 
additional  copies  of  that  vessel90.  By  September  1626  Balfour  was  ex- 
periencing  financial  difficulties  and  the  rentekammer  was  instructed  to 
advance  him  some  money  to  complete  the  work  on  these  two  ships9l. 
----------------- 
85.190  Rdlr.  worth  of  victuals  supplied  to  the  laredrenge  from  the  Proviantskriver  were 
deducted  from  Balfours  contract.  Rigsarkiv.  Rentemesterregnskaber  1/5/1625  -  31/12/1625,  f.  53. 
86.  Payments  to  Balfour  25  December  1625,4  March  &  17  April  1626,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemester- 
regnskaber,  1/5/1625  -  31/12/1625.  f.  53,  and  1/1/1626  -  1/5/1626,  f.  46. 
87.  Not  until  1628  was  its  name  recorded  in  the  materials  accounts.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for 
1655,30.  Bremerholms  Materialskriver  regnskaber,  1628/29. 
88.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fmr  1655,18.  Bremerholms  materialregnskaber,  Udgift  1626/27. 
89.  No  contract  survives  for  these  ships  but  we  do  know  that  the  contract  was  for  two  ships 
and  that  Mynden  was  built  by  Balfour  at  this  time. 
90.  Postillionen,  Flyvende  Fisk,  Sarlhunden,  Haren  and  Mynden  all  carried  a  complement  of  50 
men.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  f$r  1655,13.  Bremerholms  Proviantskriver  regnskaber,  1627/28. 
91.  Letter  to  Christopper  Urne,  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  24  September  1626. 
331 Although  Balfour  now  had  his  own  private  shipyard  he  was  also 
still  very  much  involved  at  Bremerholm.  In  May  1625  he  and  Daniel 
Sinclair  were  each  ordered  to  begin  instructing  12  apprentices  in  a  four 
year  course  in  ships  carpentry,  with  the  best  pupils  going  on  to  learn 
the  art  of  shipwrightry92.  Also  in  1625  both  shipwrights  made  a  report  on 
shipbuilding  practices  at  Bremerholm  which  brought  them  into  dispute 
with  the  Holmens  admiral  Sten  Villumsen93. 
The  dispute  probably  arose  from  problems  associated  with  the  prac- 
tice  of  Balfour  building  ships  at  Bremerholm  as  a  private  contractor,  as 
well  as  from  disagreements  over  the  newly  published  Holm-  og  arsenal- 
artikler.  Balfour  and  Sinclair's  commissions  of  1617,  unlike  previous 
shipwrights'  commissions,  simply  stated  that  they  should  be  faithful  and 
diligent  in  their  work  and  not  do  anything  which  anyone  could  complain 
about.  The  precise  details  of  what  they  were  to  do  were  not  outlined,  nor 
was  it  stated  that  they  should  at  all  times  be  present  at  Bremerholm.  This 
obviously  gave  them  a  certain  amount  of  freedom  in  their  working  prac- 
tices,  which  the  new  regulations  detailed  in  the  Holm-  og  arsenalartikler 
threatened. 
It  was  Sten  Villumsen  who  originally  made  a  complaint  over  the 
work  of  the  shipwrights,  and  requested  them  to  make  a  report  on  ship- 
building  practices  at  Bremerholm94.  However,  this  report,  submitted  to  the 
Danske  kancelli,  proved  highly  controversial,  and  claims  that  there  were 
certain  'letsindige  praktikker'  (improvident  practices)  which  were  in- 
jurious  to  the  state  prompted  an  immediate  secret  inquiry95. 
------------------- 
92.  Missive  to  rentemestrenq  Kancelliets  Brevbgyer,  6  May  1625. 
93.  See  Chapter  6. 
94.  Missive  to  Sten  Villumsen,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  21  May  1625. 
95.  The  report  has  not  survived  but  some  indication  of  its  contents  is  contained  in  a  missive  to 
Axel  Arenfeldt  &  Mogens  Kaas,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  15  May  1625. 
332 Although  the  report  was  not  entirely  favourable  to  Villumsen,  Prince 
Christian  (V)  in  the  end  agreed  with  him  that  it  would  be  to  the  king's 
advantage  if  the  shipwrights  held  complete  authority  over  the  work  of  the 
shipcarpenters,  auger-men,  sawyers  and  apprentices  and  were  to  oversee 
these  men  at  all  times96. 
Understandably  Balfour  was  concerned.  How  was  he  to  fulfil  his 
private  contracts  if  he  was  supposed  to  be  always  with  the  king's  men? 
The  dispute  dragged  on  and  Prince  Christian  (V)  was  again  forced  to  in- 
tervene  to  tell  both  parties  to  conduct  themselves  properly  and  to  carry 
out  their  duties  as  instructed.  If  there  were  any  further  complaints  they 
were  to  take  the  matter  up  with  the  king  on  his  return  to  Copenhagen97. 
Some  compromise  must  have  been  reached,  though,  as  nothing  further  is 
heard  of  the  dispute. 
In  1626  Balfour  was  given,  for  the  first  time  since  the  Recompens 
affair,  a  contract  to  built  a  large  warship.  The  contract  no  longer  exists 
but  we  know  that  the  ship,  Oldenborg  was  capable  of  carrying  42  cannon 
on  two  decks98.  The  first  reference  to  the  ship  comes  in  April  1626  when 
the  king  ordered  that  as  payment  for  'det  store  skib'  (the  large  ship)  he 
could  receive  a  keel,  and  other  large  ship's  timbers99.  Further  payments, 
in  cash,  totalling  6544  Edlr.  were  also  made  from  the  rentekammer400.  The 
------------------ 
96.  This  was  stipulated  in  article  39  of  the  Hohn-  og  arsenalartikler  issued  on  8  May  1625. 
97.  Missives  to  Sten  Villumsen,  David  Balfour  and  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  12  July 
1625. 
98.  Letter  to  rentemestrene,  March  1633,  egenhwndige  Breve,  III,  95. 
99.  Missive  to  Stalder  Kaas,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  15  April  1626.  Further  timbers  were  delivered 
to  Balfour  from  Scania  (Missive  to  Christopher  Urne,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  2  May  1626).  This 
shows  that,  in  contrast  to  his  contracts  built  at  Bremerholm,  Balfour  was  to  supply  the  timber  as 
well  as  the  manpower  for  contracts  placed  at  his  Christianshavn  shipyard. 
100.  Payments  to  Balfour,  16  August  1626,28  August  1627.30  April  1628.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemester- 
regnskaber,  1626/27  (Udgift)  f.  97,1/5/1627  -  1/9/1627  (Udgift)  f.  79,1/9/1627  -  1/5/1628 
(Udgift),  f.  128.  The  payments  of  installments  is  incomplete  and  further  payments  must  have  come 
from  Kongens  eget  Kammer. 
333 Oldenborg  was  completed  by  the  beginning  of  1628  and  made  a  favourable 
impression  on  Christian  IV  who  stated  that  it  was  'Ett  aff  myne  beste  Or- 
loff  skiibe'  (one  of  my  best  warships)'°l. 
After  Oldenborg  was  completed  Balfour  was  sent  to  western 
Sjmlland  to  survey  woods  for  suitable  shipbuilding  timbers102.  On  his 
return  he  received  a  contract  to  build  two  ships  that  were  identical  to 
Hummeren  except  that  they  were  to  have  an  increased  keel  length  of  42 
alen  (26.3m).  This  was  Balfour's  biggest  single  contract,  worth  14,000 
Rdlr.,  for  which  he  was  to  supply  the  two  ships  complete  in  every  way 
apart  from  the  figure-head  and  stern  carvings'03.  The  contract  did  not 
get  off  `to  a  very  good  start,  however,  as  his  wood  supplier  in  Scania  let 
him  down  and  he  was  in  danger  of  having  to  stop  work.  The  lensmand 
had  to  intervene  to  ask  the  local  farmers  to  assist  with  the  transport  of 
the  timber  to  Halmstad,  from  whence  Balfour  could  then  ship  it  to  Chris- 
tianshavn.  The  cost  of  this  work  was  subsequently  to  be  deducted  from 
Balfour's  contract104.  The  first  of  the  ships,  3  Lover,  was  completed  by 
1630  and  the  second,  2  Lover,  the  following  year. 
Later  in  1631  Balfour  was  sent  to  Norway  to  assist  with  the  comple- 
tion  of  a  warship  which  had  been  begun  in  Trondheim  len  by  contractors, 
but  which  they  could  not  complete'05.  No  warships  are  known  to  have 
been  completed  in  Norway  at  this  time  but  Oluf  Parsberg,  the  Trondheim 
lensmand,  was  discussing  the  building  a  defensionskib  in  1630  and  one, 
-------------------- 
101.  Letter  to  Peder  Vibe,  28  August  1642,  egenhandige  Breves  V.  246. 
102.  Missives  to  Sten  Villumsen  and  Ernst  Normand,  Kancelliets  Brevb$ger,  19  October  1628. 
103.  Accord  with  David  Balfour,  Kancelliets  BrevbOger,  26  November  1628. 
104.  Missive  to  Erik  Rosenkrantz,  Kance)liets  Brevbmger,  14  February  1628. 
105.  Letter  to  Oluf  Parsberg,  28  June  1631,  Norske  rigsregistranter,  VI,  328. 
334 called  Den  norske  Love,  is  recorded  in  Trondheim  harbour  in  1633106.  It 
therefore  seems  likely  that  this  was  the  vessel  that  Balfour  had  assisted 
with  the  construction  of. 
Balfour  also  built  another  ship  in  Copenhagen,  on  his  own  account, 
in  1632.  This  was  considered  as  a  suitable  defensionskib  and  it  was 
recommended  that  it  be  purchased  by  anyone  in  Norway  who  desired  a 
ship  for  this  purpose107.  The  following  year  Jens  Bielke  was  instructed  to 
negotiate-with  Balfour  for  the  supply  of  this  vessel'08,  the  name  of  which 
remains  unknown.  This  raises  an  important  point.  After  the  completion  of 
2  Lover  and  3  Lover  Balfour  received  no  further  naval  contracts.  His 
Christianshavn  shipyard  therefore  had  to  rely  on  the  building  of  ships 
for  private  clients.  However,  the  defensionskib  of  1632  was  built  'on  spec' 
without  a  client,  implying  that  perhaps  trade  was  not  as  good  as  it  might 
have  been. 
Why  did  Balfour  not  receive  any  more  contracts  to  build  naval 
ships  after  the  apparent  success  of  0ldenborg,  2  Lover  and  3  LOver?  109 
One  possible  reason  is  that  he  became  embroiled  in  a  dispute  with 
Copenhagen's  town  council  over  the  extent  and  ownership  of 
Gronneglydshavn,  where  his  shipyard  was  situated110.  This  dispute  essen- 
tially  concerned  the  right  of  Christianshavn  inhabitants  to  levy  tolls  and 
led,  ultimately,  to  the  establishment  of  Christianshavn  as  a  separate  town 
-------------------- 
106.  Olav  Bergersen,  Fra  Henrik  Bielke  til  Iver  Huitfeldt  (Oslo,  1953),  37. 
107.  Letter  to  Christopher  Urne,  17  November  1632,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VI,  437. 
108.  Letter  to  Christopher  Urne,  20  July  1633,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VI,  574. 
109.  At  least  three  copies  of  this  variant  of  the  Hummeren  design  were  ordered  from  other 
builders  between  1631  and  1639. 
110.  Missive  to  Christian  Friis  &  Frans  Rantzau,  25  February  1632,  KKbenhavns  dip)omatariun;  VI1127. 
335 with  its  own  council  and  privileges  in  16391".  The  initial  dispute  over 
Gr4pnnegArdshavn,  though,  was  not  settled  until  after  his  death. 
Balfour  was  also  by  now  becoming  rather  old  and  the  bigger  ship- 
building  contracts  were  increasingly  being  given  more  to  Daniel  Sinclair 
than  to  Balfour.  He  still  maintained  his  role  as  master  shipwright  at 
Bremerholm,  though,  until  his  death  in  1634.  His  widow  received  his  last 
wages  which  were  'Berrignidt  fra  paasche  dag  Anno  1633,  Och  till  Aars 
dagen  Anno  1634  da  hand  wid  dipden  er  affgangenn'  (calculated  from 
Easter  day  1633  to  the  same  day  1634  when  he  died)12.  Lind  gives  his 
date  of  death  as  12  March  and  his  burial  as  19  March  1634113. 
By  the  time  of  his  death  Balfour  had  made  a  significant  impact  on 
the  Danish  navy,  building  at  least  25  naval  vessels  of  all  sizes,  shown  in 
Table  8.1.  He  must  have  possessed  a  precocious  talent,  with  his  first  con- 
tract  coming  at  the  age  of  just  23,  and  he  was  entrusted  with  the  build- 
ing  of  the  massive  Argo  and  Tre  kroner  before  he  had  reached  30. 
With  such  a  talent  his  future  should  have  been  assured  but  the 
dispute  over  Recompens  cost  him  dearly.  Not  only  was  he  imprisoned  but 
he  also  lost  the  confidence  of  Christian  IV.  After  his  release  he  had  to 
prove  his  worth  once  again  by  working  at  Bremerholm  building  small 
craft  and  surveying  timber,  without  any  of  the  lucrative  private  con- 
tracts.  Slowly,  though,  he  managed  to  win  back  the  confidence  of  his 
master,  and  with  Hummeren  he  was  able  to  demonstrate  his  prodigious 
talent  once  more.  However,  he  never  quite  regained  his  former  position  as 
Christian  IV's  favoured  shipwright. 
111.  Lebech.  Gamle  huse  -  gamle  skibe,  22-7. 
112.  Rigsarkiv.  Rentekammer,  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Kladekammer  regnskaber,  1633/34,  f.  28. 
113.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  Mang  370. 
336 Balfour  was  not  always  an  easy  man  to  get  along  with  and  was  in- 
volved  in  numerous  disputes.  We  have  seen  that  in  1611  he  was  in  dis- 
pute  over  Recompens,  in  1625  his  report  on  shipbuilding  practices  at 
Bremerholm  ending  in  an  acrimonious  dispute  with  the  Holmens  admiral, 
and  the  establishment  of  his  shipyard  at  Grq)nnegärdshavn  brought  him 
into  conflict  with  the  civic  authorities  in  1632. 
Name  Type  Date  Built  Where  Built  Length  Breadth  Cannon 
not  known  Galley  1597  Slotsholmen  40  ?  ? 
not  known  Galley  1598  Norway  ?  ?  ? 
Argo  Large  Warship  1599-1601  Blekinge  56.5  17.5  54 
Trost  Sod  Warship  1601-02  Bremerholm  ?  ?  ? 
Si  Peter  Pinnace  ?  1603  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Penit  ns  Pinnace  ?  1603  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Tre  kroner  large  Warship  1602-04  Flensborg  56  22  80 
Makarel  Small  Warship  1607  ?  ?  ?  6 
Sanct  Anna  Medium  Warship  1604-01  Norway  40  ?  31 
Justitia  Large  Warship  1607-09  Itzehoe  ?  ?  44 
Krokodi%n  Medium  Warship  1609  ?  ?  ?  24 
Juppiter  Small  Warship  1610  ?  ?  ?  ? 
not  known  English  Ketch  1611  Itzehoe  ?  ?  ? 
Reeanpens  Large  Warship  1610-12  Itzehoe  50?  ?  54 
not  known  Scrubber  Barge  1620  Bremerholm  ?  ?  0 
not  known  jagt  1622  Bremerholm  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Hummergin  Medium  Warship  1623-25  Bremerholm  40  13  22 
Postillionen  Small  Warship  1624  Bremerholm  33  9  16 
Flyvende  fisk  Small  Warship  1625-26  Bremerholm  33  9  16 
Sehhunden  Small  Warship  1625-26  Bremerholm  33  9  16? 
Skieidtusen  Barge  1625  Christianshavn  ?  ?  9 
Karen  Small  Warship  1äl6  Christianshavn  33  9  17 
Mynden  Small  Warship  1626  Christianshavn  ?  33?  9?  18 
Oldenburg  Large  Warship  1626-28  Christianshavn  51  15  42 
3  Lover  Medium  Warship  1628-30  Christianshavn  42  13  32 
2  Lover  Medium  Warship  1628-31  Christianshavn  42  13  32 
Den  norske  love?  Defensionskib  1631  Norway  ?  ?  ? 
not  known  Defensionskib  1632  Christianshavn  ?  ?  ? 
Table  8.1  Ships  Built  by  David  Balfour 
Principal  sources:  Xanceliets  Brev$oger,  Norske  rigregistranter,  Rentemesterregnskaber. 
However,  it  was  not  only  officialdom  with  which  he  came  into  con- 
flict.  In  1628  the  Copenhagen  magistrates  were  informed  that  he  had  for  a 
long  time  been  in  dispute  with  a  woman  in  Copenhagen  by  the  name  of 
337 Lisbet  Bertels.  This  argument  was  over  money,  with  Balfour  involved  in  a 
'stor  penge  spilde  och  vn4dige  vdgifft'  (great  gamble  and  unnecessary 
outlay).  It  was  obviously  a  very  serious  matter  since  the  government  felt 
the  need  to  intervene  because  'voris  dagligen  arbeide  end  ochsaa  er  blef- 
fuen  der  offuer  forspmmet'  (our  daily  work  has  as  a  result  been 
neglected)114,  but  the  outcome  of  this  dispute  is  unknown. 
In  1634  Balfour  was  also  involved  in  another  dispute,  this  time  with 
the  merchant  Richard  Hawiis  (or  Rikard  Hanyes)  who  had  purchased  the 
ship  Crocodillen  from  him.  Hawiis  complained  that  Balfour  had  failed  to 
deliver  the  ship  at  the  promised  time  and  that  the  deal  was  now  void115. 
Details  of  this  dispute  arise  shortly  after  Balfour's  death  and  it  may  be 
that  this  was  the  reason  for  the  ship  not  being  completed  on  time,  in 
which  case  Balfour  could  hardly  be  to  blame.  Hawiis,  however,  still  con- 
tinued  his  claim  against  Balfour's  widow  long  after  Balfour's  deathtte. 
Despite  all  his  difficulties  Balfour  managed  to  preserve  his  social 
standing  -as  a  foreign  noblemen.  By  purchasing  a  plot  in  Christianshavn 
he  was  in  celebrated  company  and  counted  many  noblemen  and  rigsrAd 
members  as  neighbours,  including  stadtholder  Frans  Rantzau,  rigsmarsk 
Jens  Juel,  rigsadmiral  Claus  Daa  and  Holmens  admiral  Sten  Villumsen.  In 
1629  his  social  status  was  further  reinforced  with  the  receipt  of  an  offi- 
cial  nobility  patent  from  Charles  I. 
According  to  Danish  common  law  a  foreigner  becomes  a  naturalised 
Danish  citizen  upon  marriage  to  someone  of  the  same  standing"7.  Balfour 
114.  Missive  to  Copenhagen  town  council,  6  September  1628,  KKbenhavns  diplomatorium,  VI,  106. 
115.  Missive  to  Erik  Ottesen,  Kancelliets  Brevbvpger,  29  June  1634. 
116.  Letter  to  Floris  Reinertsen  et  al,  7  November  1635,  Kobenhavn  diplomatarium,  178. 
117.  Thomas  Riis,  Should  Auld  Acquaintance  be  forgot.  Scottish-Danish  relations  c.  1450-1707, 
(Odense,  1986),  I.  106. 
338 married  three  times,  although  none  of  his  wives  were  of  the  nobility. 
Balfour's  nobility  patent  may  therefore  have  been  in  some  way  connected 
with  an  application  for  status  as  a  Danish  lord. 
Little  is  known  of  Balfour's  first  two  wives,  Agnete  Dunchesia  and 
Maria  Escyllaea  (Eskilsdatter),  but  his  third,  Johanne  Villums,  was  the 
daughter  of  the  Dutchman  Johan  de  Villem,  one  of  the  richest  merchants 
in  Copenhagen,  who  made  his  fortune  in  supplying  arms  to  the  state  and 
was  involved  in  the  Greenland  whale  fisheries  and  the  Danish  East  India 
Company'18.  In  total  Balfour  fathered  16  children,  including  Agnete  born 
in  1620  and  Elisabeth  in  1623119,  but  all  of  them  apparently  died  before 
him. 
As  well  as  his  high  social  standing  he  also  seems  to  have  been  held 
in  high  regard  in  intellectual  circles.  In  the  1630s  he  owned  a  property 
beside  Copenhagen  University'20  and  his  funeral  eulogy  was  given  by  the 
university's  professor  of  metaphysics121.  The  scientist,  theologian,  his- 
torian  and  Court  astronomer  Niels  Heldvad  also  wrote  the  following 
dedication  to  him  in  one  of  his  many  volumes'22: 
Erlig,  Velbyrdig,  Edel  oc  konstrig  Mand  Mester  David  Balfowr, 
kongl:  May:  Offuerste  Skibsarkelie  Bygmester,  Min  besynderlig  gode 
Ven. 
------------------ 
118.  Steffen  Heiberg,  'Johan  de  Villem',  Dansk  biografisk  leksikon,  (K4benhavn,  1984),  15,547-8. 
119.  Landsarkivet  for  Sjaelland,  LA  1-21-1,  Bremerholms  Kirkes  dabs-  og  trolovelsesprotokol. 
1617-39,145  &  159. 
120.  It  is  not  known  when  he  purchased  this  site  but  details  of  purchases  of  land  abutting  his 
property  are  known  from  July  1631  and  March  1634.  H.  U.  Ramsing,  Kmbenhavns  Ejendomme  1377- 
1728.  (Kmbenhavn,  1943).  III.  88;  Det  kongelige  Bibliotek,  Gl.  kgl.  Saml.  Nr.  727  fol.,  II. 
121.  He  was  given  4  Rdlr.  for  this  service.  'Udtog  of  D.  Jacob  Matthisens  Tegnebog',  Danske 
Magazin,  1  Bd.  (1745),  218-9. 
122.  Niels  Heldvad,  (Nicolao  Heldwadero),  Onomat-etymologicon  de  Originibvs  nominum  ..., 
(K$benhavn,  1630). 
339 Eder  min  kiere  M.  David  haffuer  ieg  ville  dedicere  oc 
tilskriffue  denne  lille  Tractat  efftersom  J  er  fqd  oc  baaren  aff  yp- 
perlig  Adels  Stamme  oc  herkomst  vdi  Skotland,  huilcket  aff  eders 
Gebortsbreff  nocksomelig  staar  at  bevise  som  den  mectige  kong 
Carolus,  Magn&  Britannia',  Francis'  &  Hibernia  Rex,  sub  Sigillo 
aurco  giffuer  eder  vidnisbyrd. 
Huad  oc  eders  bedrpfft  oc  konst  er  anlanget  vil  ieg  intet  om- 
tale,  efftersom  Gierningen  priser  oc  berommer  Mesteren,  &  vino  ven- 
dibili  non  opus  est  suspensa  hedera,  som  man  pleyer  at  sige.  ... 
Dereffter  i  ocsaa  Welbyr:  David  Balfowr  effter  Kongelige  May: 
Christiani  4  befalning  oc  bekostning  opbygt  mange  adskillige  store 
Skibe,  blandt  huilcke  ere  hq)yligen  at  ber4mme  det  Skib  som  kaldis 
de  3.  Kroner,  desligeste  Recompens,  Argo,  Justitia,  S.  Anna, 
Poenitentz,  Makaril,  Jupiter,  S.  Peder,  Trost,  den  lang  Galley,  noch 
en  Galley,  Hummer,  Postilion,  Saalhunden,  Fluende  Fisk,  Haren,  Mun- 
den,  Oldenborg,  Prammen  som  kaldis  Skeltudzen,  oc  mange  flere, 
med  ocsaa  de  2.  store  Skibe  som  nu  staae  paa  stappelen,  Eder  tu 
en  besynderlig  sere  oc  berommelse  paa  eders  konst  oc  dueligheds 
vegn.  Oc  haffue  icke  vaeret  en  wduelig  Adels  Mand:  EXALTAT  VIR- 
TUS  NOBILITAT  GENUS. 
Honourable,  well-born,  noble  and  skilful  man  Master  David  Balfour, 
H.  M.  's  greatest  warship  builder,  my  particular  good  friend. 
To  you  my  dear  Master  David  I  want  to  dedicate  and  ascribe 
this  little  tract,  since  you  are  born  and  raised  of  the  highest  noble 
origin  and  lineage  in  Scotland,  which  by  your  nobility  patent123 
under  the  seal  of  the  mighty  king  Charles  of  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Ireland,  clearly  shows  and  gives  witness  to. 
------------------ 
123.  The  patent  was  published  in  full  a  the  end  of  the  dedication. 
340 What  your  achievements  and  art  amounts  to  I  will  say  nothing 
of,  since  the  works  praise  and  bring  fame  to  the  master,  and  'wine 
to  sell,  not  labour,  is  hanging  in  the  vines',  as  one  used  to  say.  ... 
Thereafter,  you,  noble  David  Balfour  have  after  His  Majesty  Chris- 
tian  IV's  instructions  and  cost  built  many  diverse  large  ships, 
among  which  is  the  highly  praised  ship  called  Tre  kroner,  as  well 
as  Recompens,  Argo,  Justitia,  St.  Anna,  Ppnitens,  Makarel,  Jupiter, 
St.  Peter,  Trost  the  long  galley,  another  galley,  Hummeren,  Postil- 
lion,  Smlhunden,  Flyvende  Fisk,  Haren,  Mynden,  Oldenborg,  the 
barge  called  Skieldtusen,  and  many  more,  also  with  the  two  large 
ships  which  now  stand  on  the  stocks124,  you  have  a  particular 
honour  and  fame  on  account  of  your  art  and  ability.  And  have  not 
been  an  incompetent  nobleman:  Exalt  the  virtue  of  noble  birth. 
With  such  an  effusive  dedication  from  one  of  the  county's  leading 
scientists  and  intellectuals  it  is  clear  that  Balfour's  skill  was  held  in  very 
high  esteem.  By  the  1630s  Balfour  had  therefore  totally  recovered  from 
the  ignominy  of  imprisonment  and  had  regained  both  his  social  standing 
and  the  king's  faith  in  his  technical  abilities.  Despite  the  Recompens  inci- 
dent  and  its  consequences,  Balfour's  career  was  certainly  illustrious  by 
any  standards,  and  he  can  rightly  be  considered  as  one  of  the  principal 
shipwrights  of  early  17th  century  Europe. 
124.2  Lover  and  3  Lover 
341 8.2.3.  Daniel  Sinclair 
Whilst  David  Balfour  was  in  prison  in  Dragsholm  Castle  another  noble 
Scottish  shipwright,  Daniel  Sinclair,  appeared  in  Denmark.  Nothing  is 
known  of  his  early  life  but  it  seems  that  he  initially  operated  as  a 
private  shipbuilding  contractor,  as  the  following  minute  of  the  English 
East  India  Company  from  1614  shows: 
Mr  Governor  Mr  Deputie  and  some  others  of  the  Company  hauing 
had  confirence  2  or  3  seuerall  tymes  with  a  Scottishe  Lord  about 
his  exposition  for  the  building  of  a  shipp  in  Sueuia125  or  Den- 
marcke  of  500  tonns  as  substantial)  as  the  dragon,  acquainted  this 
courte  with  some  of  the  conditions,  that  hee  demandeth  £6  per 
tunne  without  Sheathing,  masting  &  caryuing,  and  soe  many  other 
exceptions  as  that  they  doe  find  yt  will  make  the  chardge  farre 
greater  than  to  build  in  Ireland,  beside  the  hazard  of  buildinge 
with  greene  tymber,  and  out  of  their  sight:  whereas  they  finde  by 
experience.  that  many  faults  are  made,  when  they  have  their  Eye 
still  on  them,  And  therefore  rightlie  weighinge  the  sundrye  incon- 
venyences  that  doe  depend  thereupon,  they  would  not  yield  to  give 
above  £3  per  tunne,  and  desyred  Mr  Deputy  to  retourne  their  saide 
resolution  unto  his  Lordshipp'26. 
------------------ 
125.  The  latin  term  for  northern  Germany,  i.  e.  probably  Holstein. 
126.  Court  Minutes  of  the  East  India  Co.  16  August  1614,  Court  Minute  Book  Vol.  III,  British 
Library,  BL  OIOC  B/5,196-7. 
342 This  'Scottish  Lord'  could  only  be  Sinclair  since  Balfour  was  at  that 
time  imprisoned  in  Dragsholm  Castle  and  it  would  be  a  remarkable  coin- 
cidence  if  there  was  yet  another  Scottish  nobleman  shipwright  in  Denmark 
at  that  time. 
Although  Sinclair  was  unsuccessful  in  this  instance,  he  must  have 
been  fairy  well  established  by  then  as  in  the  same  year  he  was  admitted 
to  the  brotherhood  of  the  most  distinguished  guild  of  Copenhagen,  the 
Danske  kompagni  (Danish  Company),  as  a  'schiffbpger'  (shipbuilder)127.  He 
must  therefore  already  have  been  resident  in  Denmark  for  some  time  to 
have  achieved  this  social  rank. 
Entry  to  the  Danske  kompagni  was  often,  though  not  exclusively, 
gained  through  royal  service,  but  there  are  no  records  which  link 
Sinclair  to  the  Danish  navy  at  this  time.  The  earliest  we  can  date  his 
connection  with  the  navy  is  1617,  when  he  received  a  formal  commission 
as  royal  master  shipwright  at  the  same  time  as  Balfour'28.  It  is  a  little 
strange,  though,  that  he  was  taken  on  at  the  same  high  rate  of  pay  (400 
Rdlr.  )  as  Balfour,  who  had  already  shown  his  ability  as  a  builder  of  war- 
ships,  so  perhaps  Sinclair  had  been  involved  in  some  capacity  prior  to 
his  formal  engagement  in  1617.  Unfortunately  no  dockyard  accounts  exist 
for  this  period  which  would  help  to  shed  light  on  the  matter12g.  His 
ability  as  a  shipwright  in  1617  certainly  could  not  have  been  doubted. 
------------------- 
127.  K$benhavns  Stadsarkiv,  Privatarkiver  I.  Det  danske  kompagnis  Broderbog.  I.  p.  64. 
128.  Sinclair's  commission,  2  July  1617.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B54.  Sjallands  Registre  1613- 
19,  f.  267-8. 
129.  He  has  been  speculatively  linked  with  the  building  of  Patentia,  which  was  launched  from 
Bremerholm  in  1616.  However,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  he  could  have  built  such  a  large  vessel 
as  a  private  contractor  without  some  reference  appearing  in  the  rentekammer  accounts  or  in  the 
protocols  of  the  Danske  kancelli. 
343 At  first  Sinclair  worked  at  Bremerholm,  although  we  do  not  know  on 
what  ships  he  worked.  At  the  beginning  of  1619,  though,  he  was  sent  to 
KorsDr  to  select  timber  to  build  a  small  transport  skOjtet30.  This  timber 
was  then  sent  to  Bremerholm,  where  the  ship  was  built. 
Then  in  January  1620  Sinclair  received  his  first  contract  to  built  a 
ship131.  The  ship  was  to  measure  300  lasts,  without  guns  and  ammunition, 
and  was  to  be  built  at  'Bakulzshaffuen'  in  Blekinge,  'paa  sin  eigen 
bekostning  och  med  hans  eiget  folck'  (at  his  own  cost  and  with  his  own 
men).  In  return  Sinclair  was  granted  14,300  Kdlr.,  to  be  paid  in  four 
instalments132.  Most  of  this  was  paid  through  the  rentekammer,  although 
in  1620  Christian  IV  gave  him  500  Rdlr.  from  the  Kongens  eget  Kammer-133. 
The  ship,  the  36  gun  Rode  Love,  was  completed  by  1622,  but  Sinclair  was 
still  complaining  that  he  had  not  been  fully  paid  two  years  later134. 
David  Balfour  was  then  instructed  to  investigate  the  claim»,  with  the 
result  ý  that  in  February  1625  Sinclair  received  a  further  511  Kdlr.  from 
the  rentekammer436. 
After  Rode  Love  was  completed  Sinclair  returned  to  Bremerholm 
where  he  was  involved  in  shipbuilding  work  of  some  kind137,  although 
130.  Missive  to  Ebbe  Munk,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  22  January  1619,  Missives  to  Hans  Staffensen, 
Axel  Urne  &  Mogens  Pax,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  13  March  1619. 
131.  Missive  to  Tage  Thott,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  14  February  1620. 
132.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1619/20,  f.  133-5. 
133.  Payment  to  Sinclair  18  October  1620,  Nyerup  (ed.  ).  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Dagb$ger,  102. 
134.  It  was  probably  Rode  Love  Sinclair  was  demanding  payment  for  in  an  undated  letter  to  the 
king.  Rigsarkiv.  Danske  Kancelli,  8160,  (1616-36). 
135.  Missive  to  Hendrik  Vind  &  Jens  Munk,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  31  October  1624. 
138.  Missive  to  rentemestrene,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  23  February  1625;  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemester- 
regnskaber,  1624/25.  f.  96. 
137.  Jens  Munk  received  a  payment  on  his  behalf  on  26  April  1623  for  the  delivery  of  oak  planks 
and  other  ships  timbers  for  'hand  Ma:  Skiffs  biugnings  behouff'  (his  majesty's  shipbuilding's 
requirements).  Rigsarkiv.  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1622/23,  f.  195-6. 
344 the  precise  nature  of  this  work  is  unknown.  He  did  not  stay  there  for 
long,  though,  as  at  the  end  of  1623  he  was  ordered  to  Lolland  to  organise 
the  felling  of  large  amounts  of  timber'38.  Some  of  this  was  for  general 
use  at  Bremerholm,  and  some  was  to  make  oars  for  a  galley  which  was 
being  built'39,  but  the  majority  of  it  was  to  be  used  to  build  a  new  large 
ship.  Rather  than  transport  all  this  timber  to  Bremerholm  it  was  decided 
that  it  should  be  built  somewhere  in  Lolland140.  Christian  IV  suggested 
that  King  Hans'  old  dockyard  on  the  small  island  of  Slotq  in  Nakskov 
Fjord  might  be  a  suitable  site  for  the  building  of  the  ship14l  and  sent 
Holmens  admiral  Sten  Villumsen  to  investigate142. 
This  site  was  indeed  deemed  suitable  and  preparations  were  made 
to  build  all  the  necessary  buildings'",  and  shipcarpenters  were  hired 
from  the  surrounding  area"  as  well  as  from  northern  Germany'45. 
Whilst  the  shipyard  was  being  constructed  preparations  were  also 
put  under  way  for  the  building  of  the  ship.  Sinclair  had  to  draw  up  a 
detailed  estimate  of  the  timber  required,  with  details  of  the  length  and 
breadth  of  all  timbers  above  and  below  the  gun  ports,  and  for  the  outer 
planking  and  decks,  as  well  as  the  type  and  number  of  spikes  required 
for  each  area  of  the  hull''. 
138.  Missives  to  Laurits  Grubbe  and  Jprgen  Grubbe,  Kancelliets  Brevtoger,  19  November  1623. 
139.  Memorial  for  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevbtpger,  31  January  1624. 
140.  Missive  to  Jurgen  Grubbe,  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  31  January  1624. 
141.  Missive  to  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  17  February  1624. 
142.  Missive  to  Laurits  Grubbe  and  Jurgen  Grubbe,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  10  March  1624. 
143.  Missive  to  JOrgen  Grubbe,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  19  March  1624.  See  Chapter  5  for  a  descrip- 
tion  of  the  physical  layout  of  the  dockyard. 
144.  Missive  to  Axel  Urne,  Kancelliets  Brevb$ger,  27  May  1624. 
145.  Instructions  for  Jens  Munk,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger.  3  February  1624. 
146.  Missive  to  Axel  Urne,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  27  May  1624. 
345 Within  a  few  weeks  of  work  beginning,  however,  Sinclair  and  his 
men  were  ordered  to  go  to  Bremerholm,  where  the  king  wished  them  to 
carry  out  a  certain  piece  of  work147.  This  was  at  the  same  time  as  the 
negotiations  with  Sweden  at  Knmrpd  were  occurring,  and  it  may  well  have 
been  the  proposed  naval  mobilisation  that  Sinclair  was  to  help  with'48.  In 
any  event  the  anticipated  mobilisation  did  not  occur  and  Sinclair  returned 
to  his  new  ship  at  Slotp. 
The  ship,  the  54  gun  Store  Sophia  was  the  largest  built  since  Tre 
kroner  of  1604.  It  was  completed  by  1627  and  served  as  the  navy's  prin- 
cipal  flagship  in  the  1630s.  When  Charles  Ogier'48  saw  the  vessel  in  1635 
he  was  certainly  impressed  and  gave  the  following  description: 
Praetorium  Legatus  ascendit,  non  scala,  sed  gradibus  in 
cochleam  factis,  quales  in  domibus  sunt:  rectius  castrum,  auf  op- 
pidum  diceres,  tam  vasta  illa  est,  quinquginta  nimirum  &  amplius 
passum  longitudine:  quinquaginta  tormenta  bellica:  tres  fori,  supe- 
rior  quidem  qui  aeri  expositus  est:  Secundus  in  quo  viginti  tor- 
menta.  Tercius  in  quo  cetera.  Tresque  illi  fori  nitidi,  &  tersi,  at 
que  omnibus  impedimentis  liberi.  In  inferioribus  supellex  ac  penus 
omnis  resposita.  In  puppe  quator  sibi  superimpositas  diaetas  siue 
cubicula  numeraui,  superius  Nauclerorum,  secundum  Nauarchi,  ter- 
tium  Regis  siue  Admiralii,  in  quo  sex  lecti,  tres  hinc  inde. 
Quarta  deinde  inferior  diaeta,  armamentarium  est,  vbi  omnis 
generis  arma,  enses,  bombardae,  circuli  ignei,  granata,  lanceae  igneae, 
caeteraque  instrumenta  maleficia,  quas  nefarius  ac  sacer  hominum 
furor  adinuenit.  Quas  '  omnia  nobis  sigillatim  explicata  sunt. 
-------------------- 
147.  Missive  to  Axel  Urne,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  7  June  1624. 
148.  See  Chapter  I. 
149.  Charles  Ogier,  Ephemerides,  Sive  Iter  Danicum,.. 
9  (Paris,  1656),  59-60. 
346 Praecipuum  malum  duo  viri  simul  expansis  brachiis  complecti  vix 
poteramus.  Funis  Anchorarius  manuum  mearum  complexu  contineri 
non  poterat:  carinae  latera  tres,  &  quator  pedes  crassa  erant. 
The  ambassador  went  up  into  the  admiral's  ship  not  by  a  ladder 
but  by  steps  built  into  the  hull,  of  the  sort  found  in  a  house,  so 
great  is  it  that  it  can  rightly  be  called  a  castle  or  a  town,  it  is 
surely  50  paces  or  more  in  length  and  has  50  cannon.  It  has  three 
decks,  the  uppermost  of  which  is  open  to  the  elements,  on  the 
second  are  20  cannon,  and  on  the  third  are  the  rest.  These  three 
splendid  decks  are  free  from  any  obstruction.  In  the  hold  all  kinds 
of  supplies  and  victuals  are  stowed.  In  the  poop  are  four  compart- 
ments  or  cabins  on  top  of  each  other.  The  uppermost  is  for  the 
skipper,  the  second  for  the  captain,  and  the  third,  in  which  there 
are  six  beds,  three  on  either  side,  is  for  the  king  or  admiral.  In 
the  fourth  and  last  compartment  is  the  magazine,  in  which  all  types 
of  guns,  swords,  bombs,  fire-balls,  grenades,  fire-lances,  and 
various  other  instruments  of  war,  which  wicked  and  pious  men  have 
invented  in  a  rage.  All  of  which  we  were  shown,  piece  by  piece. 
The  main  mast  can  scarcely  be  encircled  by  two  men  with  out- 
stretched  arms.  My  hands  were  not  able  to  encircle  the  anchor 
cable.  The  ship's  sides  are  three  or  four  feet  thick'50. 
During  the  building  of  Store  Sophia  Sinclair  was  accused  of  selling 
the  tops  of  trees  for  his  own  advantage151.  Sinclair  naturally  denied 
these  allegations  and  wrote  a  finely  scripted  deposition  in  his  defence  to 
-------------------- 
150.  This  translation  is  based  to  a  large  extent  on  J.  H.  Schlegels  German  translation,  published 
in  Samlung  zur  Danischen  Geschichte,  (1773). 
151.  Missive  to  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevl*ger,  14  November  1625. 
347 the  Kongens  Kansler,  Christian  Friis'52.  This  document  not  only  provides 
some  interesting  details  about  the  work  of  a  state  shipwright  in  the  fell- 
ing  of  trees,  but  also  gives  some  useful  clues  to  Sinclair's  character. 
After  a  long  formal  introduction  he  detailed  all  the  felling  activities 
he  had  been  involved  in  over  the  last  year,  and  accounts  for  the  use  and 
whereabouts  of  all  the  tree-tops  and  branches  of  these  trees. 
The  previous  winter  he  had  felled  653  oaks  in  Jprgen  Grubbe's  es- 
tate,  but  because  of  the  great  amount  of  work  involved  only  the  trunks 
of  600  were  immediately  transported.  When  he  returned  the  following 
spring  he  found  that  Grubbe's  factor  had  authorised  the  sale  of  the 
branches  and  some  of  the  remaining  trees  to  local  farmers  for  firewood. 
That  same  winter  he  also  cut  200  oaks  in  Anne  Wittrup's  estate,  the 
branches  of  which  were  suitable  only  for  firewood.  He  also  felled  a  large 
number  of  trees  in  the  woods  of  Maribo  Kloster.  Those  suitable  for  ship- 
building  were  used  by  Sinclair,  the  remainder  were  given  over  to  the 
factor  there. 
In  Nielstrup's  woods  he  felled  300  oaks  which  were  taken  to  a 
public  '  harbour  to  be  shipped  to  Copenhagen.  Maribo's  burgomaster  was 
sold  the  unsuitable  tops  and  branches  as  firewood,  but  he  felt  he 
received  a  poor  bargain  and  accused  Sinclair  of  selling  some  of  this  wood 
to  his  own  advantage.  Sinclair  in  turn  claimed  that  because  the  wood  was 
taken  to  a  public  harbour  much  of  the  timber  was  cut  up  and  stolen  by 
the  seamen  and  farmers  who  used  the  harbour. 
Of  the  trees  in  the  Crown's  woods  he  stated  that  80  to  100  were 
felled  in  Hallsted  Klosters  len,  the  tops  and  branches  of  which  were  given 
to  the  lensmand  for  use  as  firewood  in  the  len. 
------------------ 
152.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli,  8160,29/1/1626. 
348 Thus  far  Sinclair  had  related  the  facts  coolly  and  soberly  but,  to 
reinforce  his  innocence,  he  becomes  more  emotional  and  relates  a  touching 
tale  about  how  one  day  he  was  travelling  through  the  Crown's  woods  in 
bad  weather  and  came  across  a  house,  the  good  people  of  which  lit  him  a 
fire  to  warm  himself  by.  In  return  for  this  he  had  the  factor  reimburse 
them  with  the  top  of  one  of  the  felled  crown  trees.  This,  claimed  Sinclair, 
was  the  one  and  only  tree-top  that  he  used  and  that: 
Derssom  der  kannd  befindes  Wiedere  ennd  dennd  eene  Thoep  Jeg 
endtenn  haffuer  saalld  eller  bortgiffuen  Thaapper  aff  Treeren  eller 
tpemer  der  kannd  vere  foed  eller  allenn  langtt,  endten  her  eller  an- 
denstedtz  ieg  ehr  vdschichett  aff  hanns  Mayts.  Will  ieg  derfoer 
gioreen  stande  till  Rette,  ssaa  hoyt  min  hoyt  Oeffrighed  kand  vere 
begierendis. 
If  there  can  be  found  more  than  this  one  top  and  that  I  have 
either  sold  or  given  away  the  tops  of  the  trees  or  timber  that  was 
a  foot  or  an  ell  long,  either  here  or  elsewhere,  where  I  have  been 
sent  by  H.  M.,  I  shall  give  a  full  account  of  it,  as  far  as  my  master 
may  desire  me  to. 
He  then  goes  on  to  state,  in  rather  hurt  tones,  that: 
Gunstige  herr  Candtzler  ieg  bliffuer  saa  h4yeligen  andgiffuen  for 
min  hoye  Oeffrighed  for  dett  Jegh  alldrig  weed  aff  eller  Thennchte. 
Lige  saa  dere  ieg  bgeghde  dennd  R4ede  Upeffue  vdj  Bleginnde,  bleff 
ieg  tidt  och  offte  andgiffuen  som  daag  befanndtes  anderledis. 
349 Gracious  Lord  Chancellor  I  have  been  denounced  before  my  supe- 
rior  for  things  I  do  not  know  of  and  never  thought  of,  similar  to 
when  I  built  the  Rode  Love  in  Blekinge  when  I  was  frequently 
denounced  for  that  which  however  was  found  otherwise'53. 
From  this  we  can  see  that  Sinclair  was  a  very  proud  man  with  a 
great  sense  of  his  own  importance,  and  is  clearly  upset  about  the  allega- 
tions  brought  against  him.  The  superb  penmanship  and  the  clearly  argued 
defence  in  this  document  also  bear  witness  to  a  highly  skilled  and  edu- 
cated  '  man.  In  contrast  to  Balfour's  rather  garbled  defence  of  the  Recom- 
pens  affair,  this  was  an  erudite  piece  of  work,  and  certainly  seems  to 
have  helped  Sinclair's  case,  as  no  more  is  heard  of  the  allegations. 
Shortly  after  the  Store  Sophia  was  completed  Sinclair  was  given  a 
further  contract  to  build  two  more  ships  at  the  Slotp  yard.  These  were  to 
be  exact  copies  of  Balfour's  Hummeren,  and  were  to  be  completed  by 
Whitsun  16291M.  However  unlike  the  Store  Sophia  these  two  ships  were  to 
be  built  using  Sinclair's  own  labour  force  and  he  was  to  pay  for  all 
materials  used,  except  for  the  ironwork  and  the  masts  which  the  state 
would  supply.  For  this  work  Sinclair  was  to  receive  14,000  Rdlr.,  paid  in 
four  instalments,  but  with  the  value  of  any  timber  supplied  from  Lolland 
deducted  from  this  sum. 
While  these  ships  were  under  construction  in  1628  the  combined 
Danish-Swedish  navy  carried  out  their  relief  of  Stralsundl55.  In  the  af- 
termath  of  this  operation  it  was  decided  to  over-winter  six  of  the  Danish 
warships  at  SlotcP,  where  Sinclair  was  to  supervise  any  necessary  repairs, 
including  careening,  caulking  and  light  timber  workl56. 
-------------------- 
153.  These  allegations,  the  details  of  which  are  unknown,  may  explain  why  the  payment  for  this 
vessel  was  delayed  for  so  long. 
154.  Accord  with  Daniel  Sinclair.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  7  February  1628. 
155.  See  Chapter  1. 
156.  Missive  to  Commissioners  in  Lolland  and  Falster,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  18  October  1628. 
350 Not  surprisingly  the  work  on  the  two  new  ships  was  hindered  to 
some  extent.  An  official  was  sent  to  Slot4  in  1629  to  make  sure  that  the 
two,  ships  were  being  built  according  to  the  contract157,  which 
presumably  they  were,  since  no  complaints  were  recorded.  The  ships, 
though,  were  delivered  late,  the  first,  Kronet  fisk  entered  active  service 
in  1630,  while  the  second,  Lammet,  was  not  read  y  until  the  following 
year158,  with  the  final  payment  being  made  on  4  May  1631159. 
That  same  day  Sinclair  also  received  the  first  instalment  for  the 
construction  of  another  ship  at  Slotq.  This  large  ship  was  to  have  a  keel 
length,  of  501  alen  (31.7m)160,  had  three  decks  and  carried  44  cannon. 
Again  this  ship  was  to  be  built  by  Sinclair  operating  as  a  private  con- 
tractor  with  the  state  supplying  just  the  ironwork,  masts  and  stern 
decorations.  All  other  materials  and  labour  costs  were  to  be  met  by 
Sinclair.  The  contract  was  worth  9,500  Rdlr.,  again  paid  in  four  instal- 
ments  and  with  the  value  of  any  timber  supplied  from  Lolland  deducted 
from  this  sum.  The  ship  was  to  be  delivered  by  Whitsun  1632. 
This  was  a  rather  hopeful  delivery  date,  though,  especially  as 
Sinclair  was  expected  to  build  another  ship  in  Norway  a  month  after 
receiving  this  contract.  The  new  ship  was  to  be  built  for  Christoffer  Gjme, 
the  Nedenaes  lensmand,  who  operated  as  a  shipbuilding  contractor161.  The 
cost  of  the  ship  was  to  be  set  against  Gj4e's  len  revenues  so  the  contract 
for  the  building  of  the  ship  was  made  with  Gj4e  and  not  Sinclair.  In  the 
-------------------- 
157.  Missive  to  Staller  Kaas.  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  17  February  1629. 
158.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fir  1655,21.  Bremerholmens  materials  krivers  regnskab,  1629/30  and 
1630/31. 
159.  Payments  to  Sinclair,  23  April  1628,18  February  1629,10  August  1630,  &4  May  1631,  Rig- 
sarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1/9/1627  -  1/5/1628,  Udgift.  f.  128;  1628/29.  Udgift,  f.  162.;  1630/31, 
Udgift,  f.  179;  1630/31  Udgift,  f.  163-4. 
160.  Contract  with  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevbbger,  13  March  1631. 
161.  See  Chapter  10. 
351 contract,  though,  Gjge  was  instructed  to  negotiate  with  Sinclair  who  was 
to  build  the  ship.  The  new  ship  was  to  be  the  same  size  as  Balfour's  Tre 
Lover  and  to  be  ready  by  August  1632162.  The  identification  of  this  ship 
cannot  be  made  with  any  certainty.  Of  the  new  ships  which  appeared  in 
the  materials  lists  for  1632  and  1633  none  appears  very  likely.  The  ship 
must  have  been  finished  by  April  1633,  though,  as  a  further  contract  was 
concluded  with  Gj4e  to  build  another  ship  using  a  different  shipwright'63. 
Whilst  this  ship  was  under  construction  work  on  the  ship  at  Slotm 
continued  only  slowly,  and  Sinclair  received  no  payments  from  the  ren- 
tekammer  for  it  between  May  1631  and  January  1633.  However,  by  the 
Spring  of  1633  it  was  ready  to  be  launched,  when  it  was  given  the  name 
Norske  LOve184.  Work  continued  on  the  ship  at  Slotq  until  the  end  of 
1634165,  but  Sinclair's  final  payment  for  completion  of  the  ship  was  not 
made  until  July  1635166,  by  which  time  he  was  back  at  Bremerholm 
repairing  other  shipsl67. 
When  he  returned  to  Copenhagen  in  1635  Sinclair  may  also  have 
taken  over  Balfour's  private  yard  at  Christianshavn.  However,  any  in- 
volvement  could  only  have  been  short-lived  as  he  was  ordered  to  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  ships  in  GrgnnegArdshavn  until  the  dispute  over 
tolls  and  boundaries  had  been  resolved'68.  In  any  case  he  would  have 
162.  Accord  with  Christoffer  Gj$e,  Kancelliets  Brevb®ger,  23  March  1631. 
163.  Contract  with  Christoffer  Gj$e,  25  April  1633,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VI,  535-6. 
164.  Missive  to  Jost  Frederik  Pappenheim,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  12  April  1633. 
165.  Rigsarkiv.  Rentekammer,  Udgift  Conto  I.  d.,  Regnskaber  for  skibsbyggeriet  paa  Slots$en  ved 
Nakskov,  C.  4.  Material  Regnskab,  Norske  L$we  1/3/1631  -  1/11/1634. 
166.  Payments  to  Sinclair,  4  May  1631,30  January  1633,17  February  1034,29  April  1635  &  17 
July  1635,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemester  regnskaber,  1630/31  Udgift,  f.  163-4;  1632/33  Udgift,  f.  197; 
1633/34  Udgift,  f.  140;  1634/35,  f.  224;  1635/36,  f.  186. 
167.  Letter  to  Claus  Daa,  22  January  1635.  egenhandige  Breve  III3327. 
168.  Missive  to  Erik  Ottesen,  Kancelliets  Brevbgger,  27  August  1635. 
352 had  little  time  to  carry  out  any  work  there  as  at  the  end  of  1635  he  was 
again  out  inspecting  timber  for  use  either  in  shipbuilding  or  for  the 
planned  new  dock  at  Bremerholm'09,  and  at  the  beginning  of  1636  he  was 
involved  in  the  building  a  new  jagt  in  Kolding'7°. 
This  appears  to  be  last  ship  that  Sinclair  built  as  he  died  on  7  Oc- 
tober  1636  and  was  buried  in  Nicolaj  Kirke  four  days  later.  He  left  behind 
a  wife,  Else  Villumsdatter,  Balfour's  step-daughter,  whom  he  married  in 
1624,  and  at  least  three  children,  one  of  whom  was  called  Anne'».  Table 
8.2.  details  all  the  ships  known  to  have  been  built  by  Sinclair. 
Name  Type  Date  Built  Where  Built  length  Breadth  Cannon 
Not  known  Transport  S4jte  1619  Bremerholm  ?  ?  - 
RRde  Love  Medium  Warship  1510-71  Blekinge  ?  ?  36 
Store  Sophia  Large  Warship  1624-27  S1ot$  53  15  54 
Kronet  Fisk  Medium  Warship  1628-30  Slot$  40  13  32 
Lammet  Medium  Warship  1628-31  Slot$  40  13  32 
Not  known  Medium  Warship  1631-33  Norway  42  13  ? 
Norske  Love  Medium  Warship  1631-35  Slot$  501  15  44 
Not  known  Jagt  1636  Kolding  ?  ?  ? 
Table  8.2.  Ships  Built  by  Daniel  Sinclair 
Principal  sources:  Kancelliets  Brevbdger,  Norske  Rigs-registrranter,  Rentemesterregnskaber. 
Sinclair  built  far  fewer  ships  than  Balfour  but  his  contribution  to 
the  Danish  navy  was  still  significant  since  the  ships  he  built  were  almost 
exclusively  medium  and  large  sized  warships.  However,  only  three  of 
these  ships,  Rode  Love,  Store  Sophia  and  Norske  Love,  were  built  to  his 
own  design,  and  unlike  Balfour  his  designs  were  not  used  as  models  for 
additional  ships.  Sinclair  was  undoubtedly  a  highly  skilled  shipwright  but 
-------------------- 
169.  Instructions  to  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  22  September  1635. 
170.  missive  to  Ernst  Normand,  Kancelliets  Brevbpger,  13  March  1636. 
171.  Landsarkivet  for  Sjslland,  LA  1-21-1,  Bremerholms  Kirkes  dAbs-  og  trolovelsesprotokol, 
1617-39,42  &  206;  0.  Nielsen,  'Uddrag  of  St.  Nicolaj  Kirkes  Begravelsesprotokol',  Personalhistorisk 
tidsskrift.  1  rk.  Bd.  1  (1880),  198. 
353 he  does  not  appear  to  have  possessed  Balfour's  brilliant  talent.  Balfour's 
disfavour  after  his  imprisonment  therefore  proved  an  important  factor  in 
enabling  Sinclair  to  take  on  the  role  as  the  builder  of  large  warships. 
Although  probably  not  as  talented  a  shipwright  as  Balfour,  Sinclair 
seems  to  have  enjoyed  an  even  higher  social  standing.  He  was  a  member 
of  the  prestigious  Danske  kompagni  guild  and  he  owned  property  in 
Christianshavn  from  the  new  town's  inception  in  1617172. 
At  the  end  of  1619  there  also  appears  an  interesting  transaction  in 
Christian  IV's  diary.  On  4  September  the  king  advanced  Sinclair  10  Dlr. 
from  his  own  purse,  which  Sinclair  then  returned  on  11  December173. 
This  sum  is  a  paltry  amount  in  terms  of  shipbuilding  and  must  therefore 
surely  have  been  lent  for  some  personal  reason,  suggesting  a  close  con- 
nection  between  the  king  and  his  shipwright. 
The  reason  for  Sinclair's  high  social  standing  may  be  that  he  was 
in  fact  a  second  generation  Scot.  When  Robert  Monro  was  passing  through 
Lolland  in  1628  he  met  Sinclair  and  referred  to  him  as  'a  worthy 
gentleman  begotten  of  Scots  Ancestors'174.  Although  he  said  that  he 
'speakes  the  Scottish  tongue,  and  is  very  courteous  of  all  his  countrimen 
which  come  thither'  he  was  also  equally  accomplished  in  Danish,  as  the 
tree-tops  document  testifies.  However,  the  accusations  brought  against 
him  during  the  building  of  Rode  Love  and  Store  Sophia  may  be  evidence 
of  resentment  at  a  foreigner  taking  such  a  high  post. 
------------------ 
172.  He  reserved  two  plots,  one  of  which,  however,  was  not  developed,  being  on  the  site  of  what 
became  Balfour's  shipyard.  Plan  of  Christianshavn,  7  December  1617,  Det  kongelige  bibliotek  bil- 
ledsamling.  (Published  in  Joakim  Skovgaard.  A  King's  Architecture:  Christian  IV  and  his  buildings, 
(London,  1973).  108). 
173.  Nyerup  (ed.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Dagb.  pger,  68  &  78. 
174.  Robert  Monro,  Monro  His  Expedition  with  the  worthy  Scots  Regiment  (called  Mac-Keyes  Regi- 
ment)  levied  in  August  162E  (London,  1637),  I.  42. 
354 Unfortunately  we  have  no  firm  details  which  would  help  to  shed 
light  on  his  ancestry.  Sinclair's  seal  consisted  of  a  simple  escutcheon 
with  a  cross  (Figure  8.1).  This  design  could  be  linked  with  either  the 
Ravenscraig  or  Hermandston  branch  of  the  Lords  Sinclair175,  but  the  lack 
of  any  further  adornment  of  his  arms  would  suggest  that  if  indeed  he 
was  of  this  lineage  he  was  a  fairly  lowly  member  of  it.  There  were  a  num- 
ber  of  other  Sinclairs  (or  Sinklars)  in  Denmark  at  this  time,  including 
rigsräd  member  Anders  Sinklar  (Andrew  Sinclair)  of  Ravenscraig,  but 
there  is  no  evidence  to  link  Daniel  Sinclair  to  any  of  them. 
As  well  as  having  a  high  social  status  Sinclair  must  also  have  been 
a  man  of  considerable  independent  means  since,  although  the  payment  of 
his  wages  was  extremely  irregular,  there  is  no  record  of  any  complaint. 
In  1623  he  received  his  whole  years  wages  in  salt,  in  1624  he  received  2 
years  and  4  months  of  wages  that  had  been  unpaid  since  1620,  in  1633  he 
received  some  of  his  wages  in  cloth,  and  on  his  death  in  1636  his  widow 
received  31  years  and  eight  days  of  pay  which  had  gone  unpaid  since 
1633176. 
------------------- 
175.  R.  W.  Saint-Clair,  The  Saint-Clairs  of  the  Isles,  (Auckland,  NZ,  1896).  523-5. 
176.  Rigsarkiv.  Rentekammer,  Udgift  Conto  I.  a..  Klaedekammer  regnskaber.  1622/23;  1624/25; 
1632/33;  1636/37. 
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Fig.  8.1.  a.  David  Balfour's  Seal 
Source  Letter  to  Tobia  Lautterbach,  25  February  1611,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA  A14  Ater  vedr.  skibsbyggerne  David  Balfour  Dg  Peter  Michelsen. 
Fig.  8.1.  b.  Daniel  Sinclair's  Seal 
Source:  Receipt  for  Payment,  17  August  1629,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kanceli,  B713,  III,  Litra  S. 
Figure  8.1.  Seals  of  Balfour  and  Sinclair 
356 8.3.  Why  Scottish  Shipwrights? 
The  reason  that  Christian  IV  used  Scottish  shipwrights  is  not  really  that 
peculiar.  He  came  to  the  throne  at  a  time  when  there  was  a  great 
flourishing  of  relations  between  Scotland  and  Denmark,  arising  principally 
from  the  marriage  of  James  VI  and  Princess  Anne  in  1589.  The  1590s  saw 
many  diplomatic  exchanges  between  the  two  countries,  and  religious, 
educational,  and  trading  links  were  also  particularly  strong  at  this 
timen. 
Although  Frederik  II  had  used  English  shipwrights,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  significant  number  of  Scots  served  as  skippers  and  officers  in 
the  Danish  navy.  Relations  with  England  at  this  time  were  particularly 
strained,  arising  from  numerous  disputes  over  fishing  and  trading  rights. 
If  relations  with  Scotland  were  so  much  friendlier,  and  the  Scots  had 
proved  to  be  competent  seamen,  why  then  should  Christian  IV  not  look  to 
Scotland  for  his  shipwrights? 
A  more  interesting  question  is  how  these  Scottish  shipwrights  were 
in  a  position  to  build  these  great  warships  in  Denmark.  Scotland  had  no 
permanent  navy,  and  there  was  no  great  tradition  of  warship  building  in 
the  country.  James  IV  did  establish  a  Scottish  state  navy  in  the  late  15th 
and  early  16th  centuries  but  he  had  to  rely  mainly  on  French  ship- 
builders  for  their  expertise178.  Some  Scots  certainly  learnt  from  this  ex- 
-------------------- 
177.  Relations  between  Scotland  and  Denmark  at  this  time  have  been  thoroughly  investigated. 
Some  of_  the  most  important  literature  is  as  follows:  Harald  Ilsge,  'Gesantskaber  som  kulturformid- 
lende  faktor.  Forbindelser  mellem  Danmark  og  England-Skotland  1570-1607',  Historisk  Tidsskrift; 
11  Rk.  IV  (1960-2);  James  Dow,  'Skotter  in  Sixteenth-Century  Scania',  Scottish  Historical  Review, 
44  (1965),  34-51.;  Thorkild  Lyby  Christensen,  'Scoto-Danish  relations  in  the  sixteenth  century', 
Scottish  Historical  Review,  48  (1969),  80-97.;  and  'Scots  in  Denmark  in  the  sixteenth  century', 
Scottish  Historical  Review,  49  (1970),  125-45.;  Allan  T$nnesen,  Helsingmrs  udenlandske  borgere  og 
indbyggere  ca  1550-1600,  (Ringe,  1985),  20-108.;  David  Stevenson,  Scotland's  Last  Royal  Wedding: 
James  VI  and  Anne  of  Denmark,  (Edinburgh,  1996);  and  above  all  Thomas  Riis's  remarkable  sur- 
vey  Should  Auld  Acquaintance  be  forgot:  Scottish-Danish  relations  c.  1450-1707,  (Odense,  1986). 
178.  James  Grant  (ed.  ),  The  Old  Scots  Navy  From  1689  to  1710,  Navy  Records  Society,  XLIV 
(1912).  x-xvi;  Norman  Macdougall,  'The  Greatest  Scheip  that  ewer  Saillit  in  Ingland  or  France: 
James  IV's  Great  Michael',  in  N.  Macdougall  (ed.  ),  Scotland  and  War,  (Edinburgh,  1991). 
357 perience,  and  one,  Robert  Barton,  who  assisted  James  IV  in  shipbuilding 
matters,  even  served  as  an  officer  in  the  Danish  navy  for  a  time  in  the 
1510s,  although  not  apparently  as  a  shipwright'79. 
However,  all  this  was  long  before  Christian  IV's  time,  by  which  time 
the  Scottish  navy  had  long  since  been  sold  off,  and  any  warship-building 
skills  had  long  died  out.  Scotland  relied  solely  on  hiring  armed  mer- 
chantmen  for  her  naval  requirements,  even  on  such  occasions  as  when 
James  VI  sailed  to  Denmark  to  wed  Anna.  This  does,  however,  show  that 
there  was  a  strong  tradition  of  merchant  shipbuilding,  and  that  the  ships 
must  have  been  of  some  considerable  size  if  they  were  considered 
suitable  for  such  'a  task160. 
Scottish  merchant  shipbuilders  were  not  unknown  in  Denmark- 
Norway  either,  even  though  it  was  illegal  for  them  to  export  ships.  The 
Norwegian  Christopher  Dall  was  fined  in  1604  for  letting  'nogle  skotter' 
(some  Scots)18'  build  ships  on  his  grounds182,  and  in  1605  two  small 
ships  were  confiscated  from  Richard  Waddell  and  James  Clark  who  had 
built  them  illegally  in  Lister  7en'83.  In  1606  James  I/VI  petitioned  on  be- 
half  of  another  two  Scots,  Richard  Wood  and  William  Duncan,  both  of  whom 
had  built  ships  in  Norway  which  were  confiscated  as  soon  as  they  were 
ready  for  sealM. 
------------------- 
179.  Riis,  Should  Auld  Acquaintance  be  forgot  I,  106. 
180.  Some  Scottish  privateers  even  served  on  the  Danish  side  in  the  Northern  Seven  Years  War. 
(Bartod,  Christian  3.  s  fidde,  166). 
181.  These  Scots  were  probably  Andrew  Forret  and  David  Lermond,  whom  James  I/VI  petitioned 
on  behalf  of  in  1605.  Letter  from  James  I  to  Christian  IV,  26  January  1605,  The  Letters  of  King 
James  I  to  King  Christian  IV  1603-162& 
182.  Letter  to  Laurits  Kruse  24  July  1604,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  III,  79. 
183.  Letter  to  Styring  Boel,  3  August  1605,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  III,  123. 
184.  Letters  from  James  I  to  Christian  IV1  3  March  and  4  April  1606,  The  Letters  of  King  James  I 
to  King  Christian  IV  1603-1625 
358 All  of  these  cases  occur  after  the  arrival  of  Petersen  and  Balfour, 
but  would  suggest  that  the  practice  of  Scottish  shipwrights  building  ships 
in  Denmark-Norway  was  not  uncommon.  It  is  therefore  not  entirely 
surprising  that  Scottish  shipwrights  should  be  chosen  to  build  the  Danish 
navy's  ships. 
However,  although  the  Scots  were  clearly  talented  merchant 
shipwrights  this  would  not  equip  them  to  be  builders  of  large  warships. 
We  know  that  Balfour  went  'abroad'  to  study  mathematics,  but  judging  by 
his  ship  designs  he  probably  learnt  his  shipbuilding  skills  in  England'85. 
Where  the  other  shipwrights  learnt  their  trade,  though,  is  not  known.  It 
was  not  just  in  Denmark  that  Scottish  master  shipwrights  appear  at  this 
time  either,  as  in  Sweden  Jakob  Clerck  (James  Clark)l86  built  a  number 
of  ships  in  the  1600s,  and  in  Poland  James  Murray  built  Sigismund's  war 
fleet  in  the  1620s187.  That  these  Scots  were  able  to  build  such  large  war- 
ships  is  an  enigma,  and  the  subject  of  early  modern  Scottish  shipbuilding 
clearly  deserves  much  greater  attention188. 
The  skills  of  these  Scottish  shipwrights  were  certainly  very  well- 
regarded  and  in  1602  Christian  IV  wrote  to  James  VI  asking  him  to  send 
some  more  'fabros  lignarios,  qui  navibus  struendis  eruditam'  (carpenters 
who  are  skilled  in  the  art  of  shipbuilding)189,  although  it  appears  than 
none  were  actually  sent. 
-------------------- 
185.  See  Chapter  11.  for  a  discussion  of  Balfour's  design  techniques. 
186.  Possibly  the  same  James  Clark  whose  ship  was  confiscated  in  Norway  in  1605,  or  possibly 
Richard  Clark,  an  Admiral  in  the  Swedish  navy  1606-1625.  Jonas  Berg  &  Bo  Lagercrantz,  Scots  in 
Sweden,  (Stockholm,  1962),  52. 
187.  Michael  Roberts,  Gustavus  Adolphus:  A  History  of  Sweden  1611-1632,  II,  (London,  1958), 
281-2. 
188.  Other  than  the  interest  shown  in  James  IV's  navy  little  has  been  published  on  the  subject 
apart  from  Grant's  sketchy  introduction  to  The  Old  Scots  Navy  From  1689  to  1710  in  1912. 
189.  Letter  to  James  VI,  9  March  1602,  Rigsarkiv,  TKUA  Alm.  del  1  No-9:  Latina  1600-15,  p.  23. 
359 Another  interesting  question  is  that  if  Balfour  and  Sinclair  had 
managed  to  achieve  such  dominance  in  naval  shipbuilding  why  did  they 
not  go  on  to  establish  a  shipbuilding  dynasty  in  the  same  way  as  the 
Petts  did  on  the  Thames?  Shipbuilding  was  traditionally  a  protected  skill, 
passed  from  father  to  son.  The  two  men  were  related  by  marriage  and 
both  had  many  children,  so  it  would  seem  only  natural  that  they  would 
have  wished  to  perpetuate  for  their  families  their  privileged  positions  as 
shipbuilders  to  the  Danish  navy. 
Balfour  did  actually  have  a  son,  Henry,  who  wished  to  learn  the  art 
of  shipbuilding,  but  it  seems  that  he  preferred  to  train  under  Phineas 
Pett  in  London  than  under  his  own  father'90.  He  also  had  a  step-son, 
Willum  Haffuersack,  who  worked  for  him  in  transporting  timber'91,  but 
not  in  actual  shipbuilding. 
The  influence  of  Scottish  shipbuilding  in  the  Danish  navy  therefore 
died  out  as  suddenly  as  it  had  begun.  In  the  40  years  between  the  ar- 
rival  of  Petersen  and  the  death  of  Sinclair  the  Scotsmen's  contribution  to 
the  Danish  navy  was  remarkable.  Virtually  all  the  large-scale  ships  of  the 
was 
navy  were  built  by  them,  as  well  as  numerous  smaller  vessels.  All  thisLat 
a  time  when  Scotland  did  not  have  a  warship  building  tradition  and 
English  and  Dutch  shipwrights  were  considered  to  be  the  greatest  in  the 
world. 
-------------------- 
190.  Letter  to  English  Lord  High  Admiral,  25  November  1616,  Rigsarkiv,  TKUA  Alm.  del  1  No.  10: 
Latina  1616-31,  f.  15-16. 
191.  Letter  from  Balfour  to  Christian  IV,  concerning  his  step-son's  ship,  carrying  timber  for 
royal  shipbuilding  requirements,  which  had  been  siezed  by  the  customs  official  in  Danzig,  7 
January  1631,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B160;  Pass  for  Willum  Hafversack  to  collect  timber  from 
Pommerania,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  10  April  1631. 
360 9.  Royal  Master  Shipwrights  After  the  Scots 
During  the  period  that  Balfour  and  Sinclair  were  employed  there  were  few 
other  shipwrights  in  state  service.  Peter  Madsen  (Hans  Madsen's  son?  ')  is 
listed  in  1607/08  as  the  sole  master  shipwright  in  the  kL  dekammer 
accounts2,  but  with  wages  of  just  100  Dlr.  he  could  not  have  been  of  any 
great  importance.  Details  of  his  short  career  are  scant  but  he  seems  to 
have  been  involved  mainly  with  the  construction  of  small  boats  at 
Bremerholm.  By  1613  he  was  admitted  to  hospital  and  nothing  further  is 
heard  of  him3. 
The  only  other  state  shipwright  of  any  significance  to  serve  at  the 
same  time  as  Balfour  and  Sinclair  was  Klaus  Jansen.  He  originally  lived  in 
Oslo4,  but  in  May  1608  he  was  granted  permission  to  settle  in  Copenhagen 
and  practice  his  craft,  despite  complaints  from  the  carpenters'  and 
shipwrights'  guilds  that  he  was  not  a  members.  This  indicates  that  he  was 
a  private  shipbuilder  and  not  a  state  employee,  since  membership  of  a 
guild  would  not  have  precluded  him  from  working  in  the  royal  dockyard. 
The  king  had  attested  to  Jansen's  abilities  when  he  moved  to 
Copenhagen  and  in  October  1609  he  was  given  the  contract  to  rebuild  the 
large  52  gun  ship  Josaphat  of  1589  at  Bremerholm,  as  a  private  contrac- 
tor.  This  rebuilding  consisted  of  fitting  the  ship  with  a  new  skin,  wales, 
forecastle,  figure-head,  rudder  and  masts.  This  was  quite  a  considerable 
-------------------- 
1.  Although  patronymics  were  used  in  Denmark  Madsen  was  English  and  it  is  possible  that  his 
surname  was  also  carried  by  his  son. 
2.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Klaedekammer  regnskaber,  1607/08,  f.  74. 
3.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  den  Fjerde  og  hans  ma'nd  paa  Bremerholm,  (Copenhagen,  1889),  371; 
Missive  to  Helsing$r  Hospital,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  27  May  1613. 
4.  The  Norwegian  stadtholder  recieved  a  letter  concerning  a  dispute  between  Jansen  and  the  Oslo 
town  council  in  1609,  Norske  Rigs-registeranter,  IV,  331. 
5.  Open  letter,  Kancelliets  Brevbipger,  21  May  1608. 
361 job  as  essentially  only  the  framing  and  internal  structure  of  the  vessel 
was  kept,  and  it  kept  Jansen  busy  until  the  end  of  1611.  He  was  initially 
granted  1000  Dlr.  for  this  work  but  he  actually  received  a  little  mores. 
When  work  on  the  Josaphat  was  completed  Jansen  was  sent  to  Kold- 
ing  to  inspect  a  model  of  a  galley  that  Christian  IV  had  designed,  and 
the  timber  that  had  been  gathered  to  construct  the  actual  ship7.  In  Oc- 
tober  1611  he  was  awarded  the  contract  to  build  this  galley  in  Kolding  for 
which  he  was  to  receive  1200  Dlr.  plus  50  barrels  each  of  malt  and  rye 
and  three  barrels  of  buttere. 
This  was  not  a  very  successful  contract  for  Jansen,  though,  as 
after  the  ship  was  launched  in  April  1612  the  Kolding  lensmand  wrote  to 
the  Kongens  kansler  to  say  that  the  the  ship  was  'omueldt  paa  siden  och 
ligger  nu  lobben  fuld  aff  wand'  (overturned  on  its  side  and  now  lies  run- 
ning  full  of  water)".  -  This  does  not  say  much  for  either  Christian  IV's 
design  or  for  Jansen's  ability  as  a  shipwright.  However,  the  ship  was 
rescued.  and  was-ready  to  sail  again  by  June1°. 
There  is  no  record  of  Jansen  ever  having  been  given  a  formal  com- 
mission  as  a  royal  shipwright,  but  in  1617  he  was  referred  to  as  'vor 
skibbygger'  (our  shipwright),  suggesting  that  he  was  actually  a  shipwright 
in  royal  service".  It  was  certainly  not  unusual,  though,  for  shipwrights 
to  work  for  a  time  before  actually  being  issued  with  a  formal  commission. 
---------  --------- 
6.  Jansen's  Contract  12  October,  1609  and  "payments  15  November,  16  December  1609,21  January, 
24  February,  25  March,  7  May.  17  June  1610,15  March,  16  April,  28  September  1611,  and  30  April 
1612,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1609/10,  f406-9,1610/11,  f.  458;  and  1611/12,  f.  528.  A  total 
of  1234  Dlr.  was  paid. 
7.  Missive  to  Casper  Markdanner,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  28  September  1611.  See  also  Chapter  11. 
8.  Missive  to  Casper  Markdanner,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  18  October  1611. 
9.  Letter  from  Casper  Markdanner,  17  April  1612,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B160,  Indlsg  til 
registre  og  tegnelser.... 
10.  Missive  to  Casper  Markdanner,  Kancelliets  Brevbq,  ger,  29  May  1612. 
11.  Letter  to  Envold  Kruse,  15  April  1617,  Norske  Rigs-registeranter,  IV,  624-5. 
362 Although  no  records  exist  to  confirm  it,  it  is  possible  that  Jansen 
was  the  shipwright  at  Bremerholm  whilst  Balfour  was  imprisoned.  This 
thesis  is  corroborated  to  some  extent  by  the  fact  that  shortly  after  Jan- 
sen  went  to  Norway  in  1617  Balfour  and  Sinclair  received  their  commis- 
sions  as  royal  master  shipwrights12,  but  the  evidence  is  purely  cir- 
cumstantial. 
In  Norway  Jansen  was  involved  in  the  rebuilding  of  the  32  gun 
Raphael  of  1582.  This  was  to  be  rebuilt  in  Tunsberg  len,  and  work  was 
completed  on  it  by  162013.  However,  this  is  the  last  that  we  hear  of  Jan- 
sen  who  either  died  or  else  was  totally  eclipsed  thereafter  by  Balfour  and 
Sinclair. 
During  the  1620s  and  early  1630s  Balfour  and  Sinclair  were  really 
the  only  shipwrights  of  any  consequence,  so  when  they  died  within  21 
years  of  each  other  it  left  a  huge  vacuum  in  Danish  naval  shipbuilding.  It 
was  initially  filled  by  the  Danes  Svend  Andersen  and  Johan  Brandt,  who 
were  promoted  from  the  junior  ranks. 
9.1.  Svend  Andersen 
Svend  Andersen  started  his  career  simply  as  a  shipcarpenter.  He 
originally  came  from  Bahus  in  Norway,  but  was  working  at  Bremerholm 
from  at  least  161914,  and  by  1621  he  had  been  promoted  to  mestersvend 
for  ttmmermmndene15.  He  gained  further  promotion  when  he  went  to  Slotp 
to  assist  Sinclair  in  the  building  of  Store  Sophia  when  he  was  referred 
to  as  an  underskibsbygmester  (junior  master  shipwright). 
12.  See  Chapter  8. 
13.  H.  O.  Lind,  'Om  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Orlogsflaade',  Tidskrift  for  SOvasen,  (Copenhagen, 
1890),  443. 
14.  List  of  carpenters  working  at  Bremerholm  14-21  November  1619.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli, 
8164.  Diverse,  IX,  1aeg  18,  pk.  07. 
15.  His  wages  were  501  Dlr.  Rigsarkivet,  Rentekammer,  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Klmdekammer 
regnskaber,  1621/22,  f39. 
363 Despite  this  rise  through  the  ranks  Andersen  was  far  from  being  a 
model  employee,  and  for  some  unknown  reason  in  April  1626  he  was 
clapped  in  irons  at  SlotcD'g.  The  case  was  brought  before  Prince  Christian 
(V)  at  Bremerholm  some  months  later17,  when  the  case  against  him  was 
upheld.  Andersen  then  remained  'in  Bremerholm's  iron'  until  November 
1627  when  he  was  set  free  on  condition  that  he  leave  the  country  but  not 
enter  any  foreign  service. 
Strangely  though,  he  was  granted  his  previous  wage  once  more  and 
an  open  letter  was  issued  stating  that  the  case  against  him  was  not  to 
tarnish  his  good  name  and  honour's.  Not  long  after  this  case  we  find  An- 
dersen  back  at  Bremerholm,  and  in  the  Klmdekammer  accounts  for  1629/30 
he  is  referred  to  as  a  skibbiuger  (shipwright)  receiving  200  Kdlr.  in 
wages19.  In  1631  he  received  a  formal  commission  as  'Schibbygmester' 
(master  shipwright),  effective  from  Michaelmas  1629,  with  his  wages  con- 
firmed  at  200  Kdl  r.  20 
It  is  likely  that  Andersen  spent  these  years  at  Bremerholm,  while 
Sinclair  was  occupied  at  Slot4  and  Balfour  was  building  the  2  Lover  and  3 
Lover  at  Christianshavn.  However,  sometime  around  1632  he  went  to  Nor- 
way  to  build  a  warship  for  Christoffer  GjOe21.  This  ship  was  nearly 
finished  by  the  summer  of  1633,  and  was  given  the  name  Delmenhorst. 
------------------- 
16.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer  Udgift  Conto  I.  d.,  Regnskaber  for  skibsbyggeriet  paa  Slotsoen  ved 
Nakskov,  8.3.  Muster  books  of  personnel. 
17.  Missive  to  Stalder  Kaas,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  15  August  1626. 
18.  Open  Letter,  Kancelliets  Brevbipger,  24  November  1627. 
19.  Rigsarkivet.  Rentekammer  Udgift  Konto  I.  a.,  Kia'dekammer  regnskaber.  1629/30. 
20.  Andersen's  commission,  25  January  1631,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli  B54.  Sjaellandske  Registre 
18,  f.  549-50. 
21.  See  Chapter  10  for  further  details  of  ships  built  by  Andersen  for  Gj$e. 
22.  Letter  to  Palle  Rosenkrands,  19  June  1633,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VI,  552. 
364 Before  this  ship  was  complete  though,  Andersen  had  already  started  on 
another  ship  for  Gjce.  This  was  a  copy  of  Balfour's  3  Lover,  which  was  to 
be  completed  by  August  163423,  and  was  probably  the  Sorte  Rytter. 
Andersen  remained  in  Norway  at  least  until  October  1634,  when  he 
was  ordered  to  survey  two  ships  at  Christiania24,  and  it  is  likely  that  he 
was  also  the  shipwright  for  another  ship  contracted  to  Gj(pe  in  1635.  No 
details  are  known  of  this  ship  but  it  may  well  have  been  the  small  16 
gun  Snarensvend,  which  first  entered  active  service  in  1637. 
In  1637,  though,  Andersen  was  back  at  Bremerholm  and  was  given  a 
new  commission  as  master  shipwright.  His  wages  were  now  increased  to 
400  Kdlr.  25,  '  and  it  is  clear  that  he  was  seen  as  the  inheritor  of  Balfour 
and  '  Sinclair's  position  as  the  leading  naval  shipwright. 
However,  Andersen  was  not  nearly  in  the  same  class  as  the  two 
Scotsmen.  Both  Delmenhorst  and  Sorte  Rytter  turned  out  to  vary  greatly 
from  the  specified  dimensions26  and  Delmenhorst  required  modification 
after  it  had  been  delivered.  After  receiving  his  new  commission  the  only 
vessels  that  Andersen  is  mentioned  in  connection  with  were  small  ships 
and  boats27. 
His  contract  stated  that  he  should  carry  out  his  duties  'huor  och 
naar  dett  hannom  bliffuer  befalett'  (wherever  and  whenever  he  is 
ordered),  but  appears  to  have  acted  simply  as  the  staff  shipwright  at 
Bremerholm.  This  no  doubt  acted  against  him  since  at  this  time  very  few 
---------  ---------- 
23.  Contract  with  Cristopher  Gj$e,  25  April  1633,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VI,  535-6. 
24.  Letter  to  Steen  Villumsen  and  Sigvard  Gabrielsen,  4  October  1634,  Norske  Rigs-registranter, 
VI,  696. 
25.  Svend  Andersen's  Commission  22  May  1637,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  654,  Sjallandske 
Registre  1632-37,  f.  504-5. 
26.  Letter  from  Gj$e,  undated  but  listed  under  c.  1639-44,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  6160,  Indlag 
til  registre  og  koncepter. 
27.  Letters  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  '  17  September  1639,  '  4  February  1643,  &4  January  1648,  C4  Breve, 
IV,  260,  V,  294-5,  &  VIII,  406-7. 
365 of  the  navy's  ships  were  being  built  at  Bremerholm,  but  were  increasingly 
being  built  elsewhere  under  private  contract.  As  the  senior  shipwright  at 
Bremerholm  he  did  build  the  two  large  barges  designed  by  Christian  IV 
in  164028  which  were  given  the  rather  unimaginative  names  Ferste  Pram 
(First  Barge)  and  Anden  Pram  (Second  Barge)-29.  As  well  as  undertaking 
shipbuilding  and  repair  work  at  Bremerholm  Andersen  was  also  used  to 
survey  woods  for  suitable  ships  timbers,  and  in  1646  he  conducted  one 
such  survey  in  Allerup  woods  in  Scania30. 
Andersen's  new  contract  also  stated  that  he  was  to  teach  a  certain 
number  of  apprentices  and  a  missive  a  few  days  afterwards  confirmed 
that  he  was  to  teach  12  apprentices  in  a  four  year  course  of  ships  car- 
pentry,  with  the  best  of  these  being  further  instructed  in  the  art  of 
shipwrightry31.  This  instruction  was  identical  to  Balfour  and  Sinclair's 
instructions  of  1625,  and  Andersen  was  similarly  to  receive  extra  victuals 
and  4  Rdlr.  for  every  ship  carpenter  who  completed  his  course. 
Although  Andersen  was  undoubtedly  a  reasonably  skilled  shipwright, 
it  could  not  be  said  that  he  had  made  any  great  impact  on  Danish  naval 
shipbuilding.  By  the  time  of  his  death  in  164832,  he  had  built  at  most 
only  three  ships  of  any  size,  and  at  least  one  of  these  was  a  copy  of  one 
of  Balfour's  ships. 
-------------------- 
28.  Letters  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  22  November  1640,23  January  1641,  &8  February  1641,  C4  Breve, 
IV,  421,  &  V.  11  &  17.  A  plan  of  these  barges  exists  in  the  Rigsarkiv:  S4etatens  Kort  og  Tegning 
samling,  Des.  E.  -  nr.  '  1.  See  "  also  -  Chapter  11. 
29.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  fir  1655,14.  Bremerholms  Proviantskrivers  regnskab,  1642/43. 
30.  Andersen's  report  of  survey,  14  November  1646,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  kancelli.  B179e;  Missive  to 
rentemestrene,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  27  November  1646. 
31.  Missive  to  Rentemestren4  Kancefliets  Brevbmger,  27  May  1637. 
32.  The  remainder  of  his  wages  were  paid  to  his  surviving  relatives  on  12  October  1648.  Rig- 
sarkiv,  Rentekammer,  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Kladekammer  regnskaber,  1647/48,  f.  61. 
366 9.2.  Johan  Brandt 
Like  Svend  Andersen,  Johan  Brandt  was  promoted  from  the  ranks  of  the 
mestersvende  for  tommermmndene.  He  must  have  been  a  reasonably  ex- 
perienced  shipbuilder  before  he  arrived  at  Bremerholm  on  24  March 
163633,  though,  since  he  was  immediately  involved  in  the  construction  of 
the  small  6  gun  Jomfru  Svenden  and  the  6  gun  galley  Lindern'  . 
His  work  on  these  vessels  must  have  impressed  his  masters  as  on 
29  August  1636,  Brandt  was  engaged  as  a  shipwright  with  wages  of  200 
Kdlr.  35  The  following  year  he  received  a  new  commission,  shortly  after, 
and  identical  to  Andersen's  commission,  with  his  wages  now  set  at  400 
Kdlr.,  and  with  the  same  requirement  to  teach  apprentices36. 
One  of  his  first  jobs  as  a  master  shipwright  was  to  survey  the 
ship  timber  left  after  the  death  of  the  private  contractor  Peter  Michelsen, 
at  his  shipyard  at  Itzehoe  in  Holstein37.  In  1638,  though,  he  was  sent  to 
Norway  to  build  a  ship  for  Gjge.  This  was  a  relatively  large  ship  with  a 
keel  length  of  471  alen  (29.8m)  and  was  to  be  completed  by  Whitsun 
164038.  The  ship  was  almost  certainly  the  new  46  gun  Tre  LOver-v,  which 
was  considerably  bigger  than  Balfour's  ship  of  the  same  name,  which  had 
been  lost  in  1637. 
33.  Rigsarkiv.  Rentekammer,  Udgift  Conto  I.  a.,  Klmdekammer  regnskaber.  1636/37,  f.  51. 
34.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655.24.  Materialskriver  regnskaber  1635/36. 
35.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B54,  Sja:  llandske  Registre  1632-37,  f.  430-1. 
36.  Johan  Brandt's  Commission  26  May  1637,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  654,  Sja:  llandske  Registre 
1632-37,  f.  504-5. 
37.  Letter  to  Henrik  Müller,  14  December  1637,  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ).  Kong  Christian 
den  Fjerdes  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  168.  See  also  Chapter  10. 
38.  Contract  with  Christoffer  Gj0e,  22  August  1638,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VII,  427-8. 
39.  The  new  Tre  Lover  was  mentioned  as  having  been  supplied  by  Gj$e,  and  as  all  the  other 
ships  he  supplied  were  exactly  the  same  size  as  Balfour's  Tre  Lover,  this  must  have  been  the 
ship  that  Brandt  built.  The  new  Tre  Lover  appears  in  the  materials  accounts  from  1639/40. 
367 A  further  contract  was  given  to  Gjme  in  1639  for  another  vessel, 
this  time  exactly  the  same  size  as  Balfour's  Tre  Lover,  for  which  Brandt 
was  again  to  be  the  shipwright.  This  new  ship  was  to  be  completed  by 
Whitsun  164140.  Although  the  name  of  this  ship  is  not  known  for  certain 
it  is  likely  that  it  was  the  Fenix  This  ship  carried  the  same  number  of 
cannon  as  Tre  Lover,  is  known  to  have  been  built  in  Norway,  and  entered 
service  in  164241. 
Another  vessel  was  built  by  Brandt  in  Norway  in  1643,  referred  to 
in  the  materials  accounts  as  'Det  mindske  ny  schib  i  Norge'  (the  smallest 
new  ship  in  Norway),  and  was  at  first  given  the  name  Papegofen  but 
when  it  entered  active  service  in  1644  it  had  changed  to  Stormarn42.  In 
fact  the  ship  was  not  that  small,  carrying  32  guns,  and  may  well  have 
been  yet  another  copy  of  Balfour's  Tre  Lover. 
After  building  this  ship  Brandt  probably  returned  to  Bremerholm 
and  he  continues  to  appear  in  the  K1&dekammer  accounts  until  164843,  al- 
though  he  is  not  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  construction  of  any 
specific  ships  during  this  time.  Like  Andersen,  Brandt  was  no  doubt  a 
competent  shipwright  but  apart  from  the  three  warships  he  built  in  Nor- 
way  he  did  not  have  much  of  an  opportunity  to  demonstrate  his  skills. 
-------------- 
40.  Contract  with  Christoffer  Gjme,  8  June  1839,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VII,  579-80. 
41.  The  length  of  Fenix  given  in  1653  in  connection  with  the  Dutch  alliance,  is  noted  as  57;  alen 
between  stem  and  stern,  which  is  easliy  commensurate  with  a  keel  lenght  of  42  alen.  (Preben 
Hoick,  'Flaadelister  omkring  Krigsaarene  1644-45',  Tidskrift  for  S.  vasen,  114  (1943),  560. 
42.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655,26.  Materialskriver  regnskaber,  1643/44;  1644/45. 
43.  His  last  payment  was  made  on  3  May  1648.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer,  Udgift  Conto  I.  a., 
Kla:  dekammer  regnskaber  1647/48,  f.  61. 
368 9.3.  James  Robbins  and  Son 
Although  Andersen  and  Brandt  were  clearly  competent  shipwrights  they 
were  obviously  not  seen  by  Christian  IV  as  fitting  replacements  for  the 
talents  of  Balfour  and  Sinclair.  In  1641  he  wrote  to  Charles  I  requesting 
'from  the  land  that  gives  birth  to  an  abundance  of  powerful  shipwrights' 
one  such  expert  craftsman  'to  alleviate  the  penury  of  our  country'". 
Even  though  James  I/VI  had  prohibited  any  English  shipwright  from 
seeking  employment  abroad45  and  Charles  I  himself  had  reiterated  this 
and,  ordered  all  shipwrights  and  shipcarpenters  to  immediately  return  to 
England46,  he  wrote  back  to  his  uncle  on  5  August  saying  that  he 
agreeably  conceded  to  a  craftsman  experienced  in  shipbuilding  and 
belonging  to  the  court  being  sent47.  Christian  IV's  family  connections  ob- 
viously  paid  dividends  as  the  shipwright,  James  Robbins,  actually  began 
work  in  Denmark  on  30  July48,  before  Charles  I's  reply  was  even  sent. 
Robbins  started  his,  career  as  a  seagoing  ship's  carpenter,  and  by 
1626  he  was  being  recommended  for  promotion  from  the  Garland  to  the 
larger  Triumpf4.  He  gained  further  promotion  and  by  1635  he  held  the 
post  of  -H.  M.  purveyor  of  timber  in  Hampshire50. 
44.  Laboramo  inopia  eorum  artificum,  qui  navium  fabricandarum  pertia  valent,  Stem  vero  V:  ram 
eorum  affluentissimam  esse  novimus,  Eapropter  Amanter  ab  Eadem  petimus,  ut  ex  sua  abundantia 
nostra"  hac  in  parte  penurim  succurrere  et  aliquem  ejus  artificij  probe  gnarum  et  in  eo  expertueº 
ad  nos  transmittere  velit  Letter  to  Charles  I,  13  April  1641.  Rigsarkiv,  TKUA  Alm.  Del.  I,  Latina 
1632-51,  No.  11,  p182-3. 
45.  A  Proclamation  for  better  furnishing  the  Navy  and  Shipping  of  the  Realme  with  able  and 
skilfull  Mariners,  6  August  1622,  Rymer's  FoederA  17,399. 
46.  A  Proclamation  requiring  all  Seafaring  Men,  Ship  Wrights,  Ship-Carpenters,  &c.,  being  the 
king's  Subjects,  and  in  the  Service  of  any  Foreign  Prince,  to  return  home  within  a  time  limited, 
5  May  1634.  Rymer's  Foedera,  19,549-50. 
47.  lubenter  concessimus,  vt  peritus  in  fabricandis  navibus  axtifex  cum  vesto  Aulico  transiret. 
Letter  to  Christian  IV,  5  August  1641,  Rigsakiv,  TKUA,  Speciel  del,  England.  I.  A.  3. 
48.  His  commission  of  12  March  1642  was  made  effective  from  30  July  1641.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske 
Kancelli,  B54,  Sja'llanske  Registre,  1641-48,  f.  109. 
49.  Wm  Burrel  to  Nicholas,  12  &  14.  August  1626,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Domestic),  1625-26, 
402. 
50.  Officers  of  Navy  to  Lords  of  Admiralty,  31  March  1635,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Domestic), 
1634-35,606. 
369 This  was  to  prove  a  troublesome  post  for  Robbins,  though,  and  in 
1637  he  was  first  contradicted  by  the  master  shipwright  of  Portsmouth 
over  the  cost  of  repairing  a  ships,  and  then  became  involved  in  two 
lengthy  disputes  over  the  supply  of  timber. 
Robert  Rigge,  a  timber  supplier  in  Fareham,  was  considered  to  be 
obstructing  the  delivery  of  1000  loads  of  timber  that  he  had  been  con- 
tracted  to  supply  to  the  royal  dockyards.  Robbins  therefore  requested 
that  the  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  take  action  against  Rigge52,  who  was  ar- 
rested  and  his  payments  frozen.  Rigge  in  turn  complained  that  Robbins 
had  acted  incorrectly  and  that  he  had  been  falsely  arrested53.  The  case 
was  heard  in  the  assize  court  in  Hampshire,  and  was  found  in  Rigge's 
favourM. 
In  the  other  case  the  Justices  of  the  Peace  for  Wiltshire  had  been 
requested  to  take  directions  from  Robbins  in  1636  for  the  supply  of  500 
loads  of  timber.  When  they  failed  to  act  accordingly  Robbins  petitioned 
against  them  and  the  case  was  heard  in  the  Privy  Council.  In  this  in- 
stance,  though,  the  court  found  in  Robbins'  favour°. 
Robbins  route  to  becoming  a  master  shipwright  was  so  far  fairly 
conventional57.  However,  the  Thames  master  shipwrights  held  a  virtual 
strangle-hold  over  naval  shipbuilding  and  until  1637  it  was  they  who  took 
--  - 
51. 
------ 
Officers  of 
--- 
Navy  to  Nicholas,  6  March  1637,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Domestic),  1636-37,485. 
52.  Robbins  to  Kendrick  Edisbury,  26  Jun  e  1637,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Domestic),  1637,251. 
53.  Petition  of  Robert  Rigge,  8  July  1637,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Domestic),  1637,295. 
54.  Certificate  of  J.  P.  s  of  Hampshire,  13  October  1637,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Domestic),  1637, 
474. 
55.  Council  to  J.  P.  s  of  Wiltshire,  22  May  1637,  Calendar  of  State  Papers  (Domestic),  1637,137-8. 
56.  Privy  Coun  cil  to  Lord  Chief  Justice  Finch,  31  May  1631,  Privy  Council  Registers,  (Facsimile), 
(London,  1967),  III,  f.  117..  J.  P.  s  of  Hart$hire  to  Lord  Chief  Justice  Finch,  31  May  1638,  Calendar 
of  State  Papers  (Domestic),  1637-38,480. 
57.  He  was  by  no  means  the  first  ship's  carpenter  to  achieve  the  rank,  (C.  Knight.  "'Carpenter" 
Master  Shipwrights'.  Mariner's  Mirror,  18  (1932),  411-22),  and  a  term  as  purveyor  of  ships  timber 
was  not  unknown  among  master  shipwrights. 
370 turns  in  presiding  over  the  increasingly  important  Portsmouth  dockyard. 
From  January  1638  one  of  the  master  shipwrights  was  ordered  to  reside 
there  permanently58,  which  effectively  blocked  any  hopes  Robbins  may 
have  had  in  gaining  promotion  there. 
With  his  role  as  purveyor  of  timber  proving  so  troublesome,  and 
with  his  chances  of  promotion  apparently  dashed,  it  was  little  wonder 
that  Robbins  agreed  to  serve  Christian  IV  .  Robbins  was  also  a  logical 
choice  for  Charles  I  if  he  did  not  want  to  lose  one  of  his  better,  more 
experienced  shipwrights.  There  must  be  some  doubt,  though,  about 
whether  Robbins  was  indeed  such  a  skilled  shipwright  as  Charles  I  had 
implied. 
Robbins  undoubtedly  made  the  correct  decision,  for  when  he 
received  his  commission  from  Christian  IV  on  12  March  1642  he  was 
awarded  an  extremely  generous  wage  of  960  Rdlr.  This  sum  is  truly 
remarkable  for  someone  who  was  essentially  an  untried  and  untested 
craftsman.  It  was  more  than  double  what  any  previous  shipwright  had 
earned  and  only  six  other  government  employees  received  a  higher  wage 
than  Robbins6g. 
Apart  from  the  wages,  Robbins'  commission6°  was  essentially  the 
same  as  Andersen  and  Brandt's  commissions  of  1637.  In  it  he  agreed  to 
provide  diligent  and  true  service  as  a  shipwright,  wherever  and  whenever 
he  was  commanded,  and  to  teach  a  certain  number  of  apprentices  every 
year. 
One  of  the  first  tasks  that  we  know  Robbins  was  charged  with  was 
the  rebuilding  of  Trefoldighed.  This  ship  had  been  built  at  Neustadt  by 
the  contractors  Berns  &  Marselis61,  but  when  the  ship  was  delivered  in 
------------------- 
58.  Michael  Oppenheim,  A  History  of  the  Administration  of  the  Royal  Navy  1509-1660,  (1896, 
London),  296-7. 
59.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1641/42. 
60.  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B54,  Sjsllanske  Registre,  1641-48,  f.  109 
61.  See  Chapter  10. 
371 1642  Christian  IV  found  that  it  had  not  been  built  according  to  the 
agreed  model.  The  ship  was  to  be  careened  so  that  its  keel  length  could 
be  measured  and  the  king  ordered  that: 
skall  den  Engelske  biggemeister  Riffue  den  fortyning  deraff,  som 
nu  derpa  Er,  Och  gcrre  skiibiit  Epther  Skabelunen,  som  Ieg  dertil 
ordnit  haffuer 
the  English  shipwright  shall  tear  off  the  top-timbers  as  they  now 
stand,  and  make  the  ship  according  to  the  model  as  I  ordered.  e2 
He  was  later  given  further  orders  to  alter  the  shape  of  the  fore-  and 
after-castles,  and  to  enlarge  the  gun  ports63. 
Once  this  work  was  completed  Robbins  probably  assisted  with  the 
general  work  at  Bremerholm64,  including  the  mobilisation  of  the  fleet  in 
1644,  which  required  further  alterations  to  Tr-efoldigheoi.  Then  in  1645 
he  was  ordered  to  Norway  to  construct  a  ship  at  Christiania  using  Han- 
nibal  Sehested's  timber66.  This  ship  was  to  be  'af  saadan  Stprrelse, 
Styrke  og  Facon,  at  det  kan  passere  for  et  ret  Hoved-  Orlog-  Kongeskib' 
(of  such  a  size,  strength  and  design  that  it  can  pass  for  a  true  royal 
prestige  warship)67.  This  it  undoubtedly  was,  with  a  length  of  701  alen 
62.  Letters  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  8  June  1642,  egenha'ndige  Breve,  VIII,  183-5. 
63.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt?,  18  July  1642,  egenhandige  Breve,  VIII,  201. 
64.  He  received  regular  payments  from  the  rentekammer  from  his  engagement  until  April  1645.  Rig- 
sarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1642/43;  1643/44;  1644/45. 
65.  Letters  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  7  January  1644,  egenhandige  Breve,  V.  432-4. 
66.  Letter  to  Hannibal  Sehested,  11  May  1645,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VIII,  365.  See  also  Chap- 
ter  10. 
67.  Letter  December  1645,  Chr.  Lange  (ed.  ),  'Stadtholder  Hannibal  Sehesteds  Copiebog  for  Aaret 
1645',  Samlinger  til  det  Norske  Folks  Sprog  og  Historie,  V  (1838),  449. 
372 (44.3m)  between  the  stem  and  stern  posts  and  capable  of  carrying  60 
guns.  When  it  was  completed  in  the  summer  of  1647  it  was  named  Hannibal 
in  Sehested's  honour. 
Whilst  building  this  ship  Robbins'  son,  James  Robbins  Jr.,  also 
worked  as  his  assistant68,  and  once  the  ship  was  completed  he  was 
rewarded  with  a  commission  as  an  underskibbygger  (junior  shipwright), 
with  an  annual  wage  of  300  Rdlr.  eg 
After  the  completion  of  Hannibal  in  1647  the  Robbins  were  ordered 
to  build  a  further  two  large  ships  at  Christiania  by  Hannibal  Sehested. 
The  100  gun  Sofie  Amalie,  was  the  biggest  ship  yet  built  for  the  Danish 
navy,  and  the  91  gun  Prins  Christian  was  beaten  in  size  only  by  the  96 
gun  Frederik  of  16497°.  These  were  not  '  completed  until  1651,  well  after 
the  death  of  Christian  IV,  so  the  only  new  ship  that  the  Robbins'  can  be 
said  to  have  contributed  to  Christian  IV's  navy  was  the  Hannibal. 
James  Robbins  Jr.  went  on  to  build  the  58  gun  ship  Lindormen  in 
Lübeck  in  1652,  but  required  his  father  to  assist  with  its  launch7l.  He 
received  a  commission  as  a  master  shipwright  in  his  own  right  in  1654, 
with  wages  of  600  Rdlr.  72,  and  thereafter  worked  at  Bremerholm,  building 
the  65  gun  Tre  Lover  in  1656.  For  some  reason,  though,  he  was  dis- 
charged  from  naval  service,  on  good  terms,  only  four  years  later  in 
165873,  and  he  died  sometime  before  166174. 
68.  He  had  also  worked  alongside  his  father  at  Bremerholm  before  1645.  Open  letter,  22  March 
1652,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  IX,  406. 
69.  James  Robbins  Jr.  's  commission,  9  June  1647,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B54,  Sja&llanske 
Registre  1641-48,  f.  670. 
70.  See  Chapter  10. 
71.  Letter  from  James  Robbins,  n.  d.,  (dated  as  received  1653),  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B160. 
72.  James  Robbins  Jr.  's  commission,  13  November  1654,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B54,  Sjsllanske 
Registre,  f.  577-8. 
73.  James  Robbins  Jr.  's  discharge,  3  May  1658,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  8150,  Kopibog  for  Be- 
stallinger  1657-60,  f.  168. 
74.  His  father  received  his  outstanding  wages  on  his  behalf  on  20  July  1661.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekam- 
mer,  216.209,  Afregninger,  III,  118,  Litra  R. 
373 James  Robbins  Sr.  remained  in  naval  service  after  his  son,  carrying 
out  various  duties  at  Bremerholm75  until  around  1661,  when  he  was 
described  as  'Kong:  Ma:  fgrige  Skibs  Bygmester'  (H.  M.  's  previous  master 
shipwright)76.  The  marriage  of  his  daughter  to  the  son  of  the  Admiralty 
councillor  Cornelius  Kruse  in  166377  may  have  worked  in  his  favour, 
though,  as  he  is  mentioned  that  year  as  again  working  at  Bremerholm. 
However,  the  Dutch  admiral  Cort  Adeler  was  appointed  to  the  post  of 
Generaladmiral  in  the  Danish  navy  in  1663,  and  he  naturally  favoured 
Dutch  shipbuilding  methods  over  English  and  hired  two  Dutch  master 
shipwrights.  Robbins  naturally  did  not  agree  with  this  trend  and  conse- 
quently  became  marginalised  by  the  new  naval  administration. 
With  many  thousands  of  rigsdaler  also  owing  to  him  from  the  Danish 
state,  Robbins  was  strongly  tempted  by  an  offer  from  the  Swedish  rik- 
sadmiral  to  move  to  Landskronam.  Nothing  came  of  this  offer  in  the  end, 
but  in  1667  he  was  described  as  having  been  cashiered  from  Bremerholm 
two  years  previously"g,  so  perhaps  news  of  his  apparent  disloyalty  had 
become  known. 
He  remained  in  Copenhagen  though80,  and  in  1668  he  was  once 
again  taken  into  naval  service,  but  paid  only  a  per  diem  rate  of  1  Rdlr. 
for  work  'hos  de  smaa  Fartpj'  (with  the  small  vessels)81.  However,  during 
75.  Letter  to  Bertel  Marske,  15  November  1659,0.  Nielson  (ed.  ),  Kobenhavns  diplomatarium, 
(Kapbenhavn,  1874).  V.  676-7. 
76.  Account  of  James  Robbins'  outstanding  wages,  20  July  1661,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentekammer,  216.209, 
Afregninger,  III,  118,  Litra  R. 
77.  Thomas  Riis,  Should  Auld  Acquaintance  be  forgot:  Scottish-Danish  relations  c.  1450-1707, 
(Odense,  1986).  II,  227-8. 
78.  Axel  Liljefalk,  'Bidrag  til  Flaadens  Historie  i  Tiden  mellem  Freden  til  Kmbenhavn  og  den 
skaanske  Krigs  Udbrud',  Tidsskrift  for  SOvasen,  (1912),  408-9. 
79.  P.  W.  Becker,  Samlinger  til  Danmarks  Historie  under  Kong  Frederik  den  Tredies  Regiering, 
(K4pbenhavn,  1847).  II,  197. 
80.  He  was  still  resident  in  Copenhagen  in  1666.  Kpbenhavns  diplomatariun?,  VI,  647. 
81.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Frederik  den  Tredjes  Somagt:  Det  dansk-norske  smvwrns  historie  1646-167a 
(Koben  havn.  1896).  310. 
374 the  Scanian  War  (1675-79)  the  Dutch  style  Danish  ships  proved  to  be  far 
inferior  to  the  Swedish  ships  built  in  the  English  style.  With  Cort  Adeler 
now  dead,  the  Danish  admiral  Niels  Juel  favoured  a  return  to  English 
style  ships,  and  in  1679  Robbins  was  once  again  granted  a  commission  as 
a  master  shipwright.  His  wages  this  time  were  just  250  Rdlr.,  but  this  was 
undoubtedly  an  improvement  on  the  per  diem  rate  he  had  previously  been 
getting82.  He  immediately  began  building  the  Norske  Love  at  Bremerholm, 
but  he  died  on  26  March  1680,  with  the  ship  still  incomplete°. 
9.4.  A  Changing  Role? 
We  have  seen  that  the  royal  master  shipwrights  taken  on  after  the  deaths 
of  Balfour  and  Sinclair  were  nowhere  nearly  as  prolific  as  the  Scots.  In 
the  12  years  or  so  after  their  deaths  we  can  identify  only  four  ships  of 
any  size84  that  were  built  by  the  three  master  shipwrights  who  took 
their  place.  The  role  of  the  royal  master  shipwrights  therefore  appears  to 
have  changed. 
With  the  growing  financial  crisis  in  the  1630s  and  1640s  fewer  ships 
were  being  built  directly  using  government  funds.  The  trend  was  very 
much  towards  the  use  of  private  contractors  and  using  the  Norwegian  len 
resources  at  source.  The  four  ships  built  by  Brandt  and  Robbins  between 
1638  and  1647  were  significantly  all  built  in  Norway,  with  at  least  three 
of  them  for  Norwegian  lensmxnd,  who  were  to  supply  the  ships  in  part 
payment  of  their  len  revenues.  The  master  shipwrights  work  at 
Bremerholm  now  consisted  principally  of  ship  repair  and  rebuilding  work 
as  well  as  the  construction  of  smaller  vessels,  such  as  the  two  barges 
-------------------- 
82.  Rigsarkiv,  S$etaten,  Sogholden  kontoret,  Hovedbog  over  udbetalinger  til  smetatens  betjente 
1676-80,  I,  f.  19. 
83.  Niels  Probst,  'Nordeuropaisk  spanteopslagning  1  1500-  og  1600-tallet',  Maritim  Kontakt  16 
(1993).  27-8. 
84.  Brandt's  Tre  Lover,  Fenix?,  and  Stormarn,  and  Robbins'  Hannibal 
375 built  by  Andersen  in  1640/41.  When  the  investigation  in  Corfitz  Ulfeldt's 
embezzlement  was  being  made  it  was  stated,  with  probably  just  a  little 
over-exaggeration,  that  not  one  ship  was  built  at  Bremerholm  between 
1642  and  164885. 
During  Balfour  and  Sinclair's  time  the  royal  shipwrights  were  in- 
creasingly  used  as  contractors  themselves  for  the  construction  of  the 
navy's  larger  ships.  However,  from  the  mid  1630s  there  was  a  greater  em- 
phasis  on  using  private  contractors  outside  the  state  system,  and  the 
royal  shipwrights'  role  therefore  became  less  important.  Rather  than  being 
central  to  the  navy's  construction  activity  they  instead  acted  more  as 
'consultants'  to  the  lensmmnd  in  Norway,  and  consequently  became  much 
more  peripheral  to  the  state's  shipbuilding  needs.  The  increasing  roles  of 
the  private  contractors  and  the  Norwegian  lensmmnd  are  therefore  dis- 
cussed  in  the  following  chapter. 
------------------- 
85.  H.  O.  Lind,  'Underslab  paa  Bremerholm  under  Korfits  Ulfeldts  Finansstyrelse',  Historisk 
tidsskrift,  6  Rk.  V  bd.  (1895),  372-3. 
376 10.  Ships  Built  Under  Contract  or  Acquired  by  Other  Means 
10.1.  Private  Contractors 
For  the  purposes  of  this  chapter  a  private  shipbuilding  contractor  is  un- 
derstood  to  mean  an  individual  or  firm,  outside  of  the  state  system,  that 
built  ships  at  their  own  shipyard,  to  a  specific  design  and  contract 
issued  either  personally  from  Christian  IV  or  from  the  Danish  state. 
We  have  seen  in  previous  chapters  that  many  of  the  royal 
shipwrights  built  ships  under  private  contract.  However,  these  men  could 
not  really  be  considered  as  true  private  contractors.  They  may  have 
received  contracts  for  some  of  the  ships  they  built  but  they  still 
operated  very  much  within  the  state  system.  Their  wages  were  paid  by 
the  state  and  many  of  the  ships  built  under  contract  were  actually  built 
in  the  'navy's  own  dockyards  at  Bremerholm  and  Sloto,  using  timber  sup- 
plied  by  the  state. 
When  Balfour  first  started  building  ships  for  the  Danish  navy  he 
acted  as  a  private  contractor,  but  he  built  these  ships  at  state-owned 
sites,  not  at  his  own  shipyard.  When  he  did  open  a  shipyard  at  Chris- 
tianshavn  in  1624  he  still  retained  his  commission  as  a  royal  shipwright 
and  therefore  could  still  not  be  considered  as  a  private  contractor  in  the 
true  sense. 
There  were  other  shipbuilding  contractors,  though,  working  solely 
in  the  private  sector,  that  were  used  by  Christian  IV. 
10.1.1.  Peter  Michelsen 
The  principal  private  shipbuilding  contractor  in  Christian  IV's  earlier 
years  was  the  Dutchman  Peter  Michelsen.  He  first  appears  on  the  scene  in 
December  1613,  just  after  Balfour  had  been  imprisoned  for  the  Recompens 
377 affair.  It  seems  likely  therefore  that  Michelsen  was  used  initially  as  a  re- 
placement  for  Balfour,  especially  as  he  also  took  on  the  Itzehge  yard  that 
Balfour  had  used. 
His  first  contract  was  for  a  medium  sized  warship  that  was  to 
have  a  keel  length  of  45  wasser  alen  (24.8m)'.  This  contract  was  far  more 
detailed  than  any  previous  shipbuilding  contract  and  was  initially  drawn 
up  by  Christian  IV  himself,  although  it  was  altered  slightly  before  being 
issued  to  Michelsen2.  Balfour's  contracts  had  simply  detailed  a  few  basic 
dimensions,  the  completion  date  and  the  contract  price.  In  contrast 
Michelsen's  contract  was  a  highly  detailed  affair  with,  in  addition  to  the 
principal  dimensions  of  the  hull,  specifications  for  the  arrangement  of  the 
decks  and  the  dimensions  of  the  structural  timbers.  In  Christian  IV's  ini- 
tial  draft  the  dimensions  of  all  the  rigging  and  types  of  sail  were  also 
specified,  but  these  were  omitted  in  the  final  contract. 
There  must-  have  been  a  reason  for  such  a  detailed  contract  to 
have  been  drawn  up  at  this  stage.  Possibly  the  difficulties  experienced 
with  Balfour,  with  Tre  kroner  being  built  too  large  and  Recompens  foun- 
dering  before  even  reaching  the  sea,  had  alerted  the  king  to  the  neces- 
sity  of  stipulating  much  more  precisely  the  dimensions  of  the  ship.  Also 
the  fact  that  Michelsen  was  an  untried  shipwright  probably  also  played  a 
part,  especially  as  being  a  Dutchman,  Michelsen's  method  of  shipbuilding 
would  have  been  markedly  different  to  what  Christian  IV  had  been  used 
to  with  his  English  and  Scottish  shipwrights. 
------  -------- 
1.  Many  shipbuilding 
----- 
measurements  before  around  1617  were  in  Wasser  alen  (0.55m)  Niels  Probst, 
'Wasser-alen:  et  hidtil  overset  lsngdemll  fra  Christian  IV's  tid',  Historisk  tidsskrift,  92  (1992), 
288-300. 
2.  Contract  with  Mich  elsen,  14  December  1613;  an  additional  rough  copy  20  December  and  the 
final  contract  of  28  December  1613,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A12,  Registrerede  koncepter  til  Patenter  II, 
1611-14.  The  contract  of  14  December  is  published  in  C.  F.  Bricka  &  J.  A.  Fredericia  (eds.  ),  Kong 
Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhmndige  Breve,  I,  77-81;  and  the  contracts  of  14  and  28  December  are 
published  in  English  translation  in  P.  Holck,  'Danish  Shipbuilding  in  1613',  Mariner's  Mirror,  18 
(1932),  81-6. 
378 This  concern  over  the  new  ship  is  reflected  by  the  fact  that  Chris- 
tian  IV  went  to  inspect  it  at  Itzehge  just  a  few  months  later.  What  he 
found  though  was  that,  despite  the  detailed  nature  of  the  contract,  the 
ship  was  being  built  slightly  larger  than  stipulated.  The  length  between 
the  stem  and  sternposts  was  found  to  have  been  653/4  alen  (36.2m)  rather 
than  the  62  alen  (34.1m)  it  should  have  measured,  and  the  breadth  was 
also  about  one  alen  (0.6m)  larger3. 
Despite  these  differences  in  dimension  the  ship,  Fidess  turned  out 
to  be  a  very  successful  design.  Michelsen  had  obviously  shown  his  worth 
as  a  shipwright  and  in  the  following  five  years  he  received  a  spate  of 
new  orders,  each  with  an  equally  detailed  contract.  In  1615  came  an  order 
for  a  smaller  ship  with  a  keel  of  38  alen  (20.9m)4,  and  in  1616  he  was 
given  another  contract  for  an  additional  ship  to  the  same  design  as 
FidesP,  as  well  as  one  for  a  jagte  .  In  1617  a  contract  was  drawn  up  for 
a  ship  slightly  larger  than  Fides?,  which  was  subsequently  called  Sorte 
Rytter°. 
These  ships  were  followed  by  Svanen,  a  24  gun  ship  for  which  no 
contract  exists.  It  must  have  been  ordered  no  later  than  1623,  though, 
since  a  Swedish  spy  stated  that  it  had  arrived  in  Copenhagen  in  Decem- 
ber  1624.  Michelsen  was  also  in  Copenhagen  negotiating  for  his  next  con- 
tract  but  it  was  stated  that: 
-------------- 
3.  Diary  entry  25  February  1614,  Suhm  (ed.  ),  'Kong  Christian  IVdes  Skrivkalander  for  Aarene 
1614  og  16',  Nye  Samlinger,  2  Bd.,  91-114. 
4.  Contract  dated  27  November  1615,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A12,  III,  1615-30. 
5.  Contract  dated  13  December  1616.  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A145,  Ater  vedr.  skibsbyggerne  David  Bal- 
four  og  Peter  Michelsen;  and  a  copy  of  the  same  date  wrongly  filed  in  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A12,  II11611-14. 
6.  Contract  dated  13  December  1616,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A145. 
7.  Contract  dated  11  November  1617,  Rigsarkiv.  TKIA,  A145;  and  a  sketch  contract  in  Rigsarkiv. 
Danske  Kancelli,  8164.  Diverse,  IX,  lag  17,  Pk.  06.;  an  additional  copy  of  this  contract  was  issued 
on  18  September  1618,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A12,  III,  1615-30. 
8.  The  identification  as  Sorte  Rytter  is  given  in  Probst.  'Wasser-alen',  292. 
379 det  konungen  will  der  wäll  hafua  nägre  flere  schiep  bygde.  Men  de 
kunna  inthet  accordere  medh  huar  andre.  Konungen  ähr  f(pr  knapp 
medh  betalningen  och  hafuer  inthet  wäll  contenterat  be:  te  byg- 
gemestere  fqr  det,  han  alrede  giort  hafuer. 
the  king  would  like  to  have  some  more  ships  built  there  (Holstein), 
but  they  cannot  agree  with  each  other.  The  king  has  been  nig- 
gardly  with  payments  and  has  not  paid  the  aforementioned 
shipwright  for  what  he  has  already  done.  9 
Christian  IV  had  wanted  a  total  of  six  copies  of  Svanen  to  be  built'(),  but 
the  result  of  the  negotiations  was  that  Michelsen  was  issued  with  a  con- 
tract  for  just  one  ship».  When  Christian  IV  went  to  Holstein  just  a  few 
months  later,  to  prepare  for  his  campaign  in  the  Kejserkrig,  he  naturally 
looked  in  at  the  yard  to  inspect  his  new  ship,  called  Lindormen.  It  must 
have  met  with  his  satisfaction  since  no  further  comment  was  made  in  his 
diary  other  than  that  he  had  visited  the  yard'2. 
At  the  start  of  the  war  Michelsen  played  an  important  role  in 
providing  supplies  for  the  ships  based  at  Glückstadt,  as  well  as  two  small 
smacks13.  However,  in  1627  Wallenstein  invaded  Jutland,  and  with  only 
Glückstadt  holding  out  against  the  Imperial  forces,  Michelsen's  yard  at 
Itzehge  fell  into  enemy  hands.  Whether  any  ship  was  under  construction 
9.  Letter  dated  22  December  1624.  Leo  Tandrup,  Svensk  agent  ved  Sundet  (Arhus,  1971),  525-6. 
10.  Tandrup,  Svensk  agent  ved  Sundet  512. 
11.  Contract  dated  24  December  1624,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A145. 
12.  Diary  entry  31  May  1625.  R.  Nyerup,  Kong  Christian  den  Fjordes  Dagb'ger  for  Aareno  1618, 
1619,1620,1625,1635,  udgivne  efter  Originalern4  (K$benhavn,  1825),  130. 
13.  Missives  to  J4prgen  Ulfeldt,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  31  October  1625,29  April  1626,24  &  27  May 
1626. 
380 at  the  time  is  not  known,  but  it  is  unlikely,  given  that  Lindormen  was 
finished  by  1626  and  no  other  contracts  exist  from  this  date.  Certainly  no 
reference  was  made  to  any  loss  at  Itzehpe. 
-  Not  long  after  the  Peace  of  Lübeck  Michelsen  must  have  received 
another  contract,  as  in  June  1629  he  was  writing  to  say  that  the  work  on 
a  'grossen  Orloch  Schiff'  (large  warship)  would  be  'sterck  wieder  fuhrt' 
(greatly  further  progressed)14  because  of  the  possible  further  threat 
from  Wallenstein.  Despite  these  assertions  the  ship,  Tre  kroner45,  was  not 
completed  until  1634.  This  was  probably  the  last  ship  supplied  by  Michel- 
sen,  as  by  1637  he  was  dead  and  the  remaining  ship  timber  at  Itzehoe  was 
being  surveyed16.  The  ships  known  to  have  been  built  by  Michelsen  are 
shown  in  Table  10.1. 
Name  Tyke  Date  Built  Contract  Price  Ll  Breadth  Cannon 
Fides  Medium  Warship  1613-15  6,000  Rdlr.  45*  15*  30 
Not  known  Small  Warship  1615-17  7,500  38$  12$  ? 
Neldebladet  Medium  Warship  1616-18  6,3OO  45*  15*  36 
Not  known  4  1616-18  2300  3Q*  10  ? 
Sort'  Rytter  Medium  Warship  1617-19  8,800  50  IN  40 
Svanen  Medium  Warship  10-24  ?  50?  16?  24 
Lindurmen  Medium  Warship  1624-26  4,500  50  16  40 
Tre  kroner  large  Warship  1629-34  9,500  ?  ?  50 
Table  10.1.  Ships  Supplied  by  Peter  Michelsen 
sleasured  in  wasser  alen  (OQ55m),  later  ships  measured  in  Sj,  -llandske  alen  (0.62Bm) 
Sources:  Rigsarkiv,  TIQA,  A12,  n3  III;  TIQA,  A1A5;  Tandrup,  Svensk  agent  ved  Sunde4  (Arhus,  1971X 
Probst,  'Wasser-alen',  Historisk  tidssknfZ  92  (1992),  288-300. 
--------------  ---- 
14.  Letters  from  Michelsen  26  June  1629,  and  2  December  1629,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A145. 
15.  It  is  recorded  in  the  materials  accounts  as  '3  kroner  wdi  Icehow'.  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet 
f4,  r  1655,21  Bremerholmens  Materialskrivers  Regnskab,  1632  (IndtSgt). 
16.  Letter  to  Henrik  Müller,  14  December  1637,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  168. 
381 Michelsen  was  undoubtedly  a  very  competent  shipwright,  with  his 
ships  proving  to  be  so  good  that  he  was  requested  to  build  additional 
copies  of  them.  Both  Neldebladet  and  Svanen  were  described  as  being 
'lemppelige  orloffskiib'  (easy  warships),  i.  e.  seaworthy  and  easily  handled, 
and  many  of  his  ships  remained  in  active  service  for  many  years.  His 
ships  were  characterised  by  their  shallow  draught  and  the  Fides  and 
Svanen  class  of  ships  can  be  seen  as  precursors  of  Balfour's  successful 
Hummeren  design,  and  may  well  have  influenced  Balfour's  design'7. 
Whether  he  was  quite  as  good  a  shipwright  as  Balfour,  though,  is 
debatable. 
10.1.2.  Berns  &  Marselis 
The  firm  of  Berns  and  Marselis1s  was  established  when  the  young 
entrepreneur  Albert  Baltser  Berns  set  up  in  partnership  with  the  older 
well-established  international  merchant  Gabriel  Marselis,  a  Dutchman 
operating  from  Hamburg.  Berns'  family  was  part  of  the  elite  Dutch  mer- 
chant  community  in  Copenhagen  and  he  himself  had  become  a  royal  sup- 
plier  there  in  1625.  With  Berns'  royal  connections  and  Marselis'  capital 
they  made  ideal  partners,  and  they  first  joined  forces  during  the  Kej- 
serkrig  in  a  scheme  to  supply  Glückstadt  with  victuals  from  Russia. 
Although  this  venture  was  not  a  great  success  they  continued  to 
supply  the  town  with  victuals,  weapons  and  ammunition.  In  1629  Berns 
married  Marselis'  daughter  and  moved  to  Hamburg,  and  the  two  men  then 
became  the  Danish  crown's  official  factors  in  Hamburg,  supplying  all  man- 
-------------------- 
17.  See  Chapter  11. 
18.  The  Marselis  consortium  has  been  extensively  researched  by  john  T.  Lauridsen  and  the  fol- 
lowing  has  been  taken  from  his  'Skibsbyggeri  for  den  danske  krone  i  Neustadt  I  1640'rne',  Hand- 
els-  og  S4fartsmuseets  1(rbog,  (1982).  70-83;  and  Marselis  konsortiet  en  studio  over  forholdet  mel- 
lem  handelskapital  og  kongemagt  (Arhus,  1987). 
382 ner  of  goods.  With  the  escalating  financial  crisis  of  the  1630s  the  Mar- 
selis  consortium  also  became  an  increasingly  important  source  of  royal 
finance,  with  most  goods  being  purchased  on  credit. 
It  is  not  surprising  then,  with  shipbuilding  becoming  increasingly 
difficult  to  finance,  to  find  Christian  IV  contracting  Berns  and  Marselis  to 
supply  ships-  in  addition  to  the  military  supplies  they  were  also  supplying 
on  credit.  They  had  established  a  shipyard  in  Neustadt  in  1638  to  exploit 
the  extensive  timber  supplies  in  the  area,  but  whether  this  was  done  with 
the  explicit  purpose  of  supplying  warships  is  not  known.  Within  a  year, 
however,  Christian  IV  had  issued  them  their  first  contract  for  the  supply 
of  a  ship,  and  over  the  next  ten  years  they  received  many  more  con- 
tracts.  Table  10.2.  shows  all  the  ships  known  to  have  been  ordered  from 
the  Berns  and  Marselis  shipyard  in  Neustadt. 
Name  T  Y9  Date  Built  Contract  Price  lm'  Breadth  Cannon 
Not  known  ?  1639  8,000  Rer.  ?  ?  ? 
Sancte  Maria  Transport  Boyert  1639  13,500  ?  ?  ? 
Sorte  Bjorn  Medium  Warship  1640  (2t  000)$  59  15  36 
Tiefoldighed  Urge  Warship  1640-42  (53,000)  71  18  60 
Gri  U1V  Medium  Warship  1642  (38,000)  58'/4  10/4  36 
Peiicanen  Medium  Warship  1642  (,  000)  59  1014  42 
Brnen  Medium  Warship  1643-44  ?  ?  ?  40 
Not  named  ?  1644  ?  ?  ?  ? 
Victoria  Large  Warship  1616-47  52350  701  in  56 
Frederik  Urge  Warship  1647-49  ß,  000  74  20  94 
Table  10.2.  Ships  Ordered  from  Berns  &  Marselis 
Sources:  John  T  lauridsen,  Marselis  konsortiet,  (Arhus,  1967),  41. 
a  Figures  in  parenthesis  are  the  values  placed  on  the  ships  in  1653  for  the  purposes  of  the  Danish-Dutch  alliance. 
No  contracts  have  survived  for  the  building  of  these  ships  but 
Christian  IV  kept  a  close  eye  on  the  yard19  and  the  design  of  the  ships 
------------------ 
19.  He  first  visited  on  28  June  1639,  C.  F.  Bricka  (ed.  ),  'Kong  Christian  IV's  kalenderoptegnelser 
fra  Aarene  1617.1629  og  1639',  Danske  Samlinger,  V  (1869-70),  49-88. 
383 was  carefully  monitored  by  the  use  of  models.  From  1640  there  was  also 
one  of  the  navy's  mestersvende  for  tOmmermmndene  resident  at  the  yard 
to  monitor  the  work  carried  out  there. 
During  the  Torstenssonkrig,  though,  the  yard  was  captured  by  the 
Swedes  and  both  the  ship  that  was  nearing  completion  and  one  not  long 
starte  d  were  seized  and  the  yard  destroyed.  Despite  Danish  attempts  to 
blockade  the  port  the  Swedes  managed  to  get  the  completed  ship  to  sea, 
which  they  named  Ornen.  Immediately  after  the  war  the  yard  was  rebuilt 
and  a  further  two  large  ships  were  built  there. 
By  the  time  that  Frederik  was  delivered  in  1649  increasing  concern 
was  being  expressed  over  the  cost  of  the  ships  being  ordered  from  Berns 
and  Marselis.  This  alerted  Frederik  III  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt's  corruption  and 
led  to  the  establishment  of  the  commission  to  investigate  his  financial 
affairs20.  With  Berns  and  Marselis  heavily  implicated  in  this  corruption  no 
further  contracts  were  placed  with  the  Neustadt  shipyard,  and  the  yard 
was  sold  off  shortly  afterwards. 
It  was  not  just  financial  concerns  which  hastened  the  abandonment 
of  Berns  and  Marselis  as  shipbuilding  contractors,  however,  as  the 
quality  of  their  ships  was  not  all  it  could  have  been.  Christian  IV  was  at 
first  very  pleased  with  the  work  carried  out  at  the  yard  and  when  he 
inspected  Trefoldighed  in  1641  he  stated  that: 
Ieg  uar  y  disse  dage  hen  huos  dy  Skiib,  som  biggis  tyl  Nyenstad, 
och  befandt,  att  ded  stOrste  er  sa  sterck  aff  tcpmmer,  som  ieg  er 
uyss  pa,  at  magen  inted  fyndis  y  Europa. 
-------------------- 
20.  See  Chapter  3. 
384 In  these  last  days  I  was  with  the  ships  which  are  being  built  at 
Neustadt,  and  found  that  the  largest  is  so  strong  of  timber  that  I 
am  sure  that  its  match  is  not  found  in  Europe21. 
However,  when  the  ship  was  delivered  he  complained  that  'Ieg  nu  maa  for 
myne  Oiien  see,  Samme  skabelun  y  ingen  made  at  uerre  fuld'  (I  can  now 
see  with  my  own  eyes  that  the  model  has  not  been  followed  in  any  way)22 
and,  as  we  have  seen23,  the  ship  had  to  be  rebuilt  at  Bremerholm  by 
James  Robbins.  Even  then  it  was  noted  t  hat  it  'seghlar  intet  wall'  (sails 
poorly)24 
The  main  problem  seems  to  have  been  that  Berns  and  Marselis 
employed  Dutch  shipwrights,  whose  methods  did  not  particularly  suit  the 
construction  of  large  vessels.  Christian  IV  was  more  used  to  the  English 
style  capital  ships  of  Balfour  and  Sinclair,  and  there  would  therefore 
have  been  difficulties  in  transferring  the  design  criteria  from  one  method 
of  construction  to  the  other25. 
In  order  to  compare  the  relative  merits  of  the  two  methods  two 
large  ships  were  ordered  in  1647,  one,  Frederik,  from  Berns  and  Marselis, 
the  other,  Sofie  Amalie,  from  James  Robbins.  Like  Trefoldighed,  though, 
Frederik  was  found  to  be  a  poor  sailer.  When  Magnus  Durrel  made  his 
report  on  the  Danish  fleet  in  1653  he  stated  that  the  ship  was  'obequämt' 
(unserviceable)  and  that  'heela  unnerste  laghet  of  Styckarne  intet 
21.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt.  23  January  1641,  egenhrndige  Breve,  V,  10. 
22.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  listed  as  16404  but  more  likely  1642,  egenhandipe  Breve`  VII,  77. 
23.  See  Chapter  9. 
24.  Christian  Bruun,  Curt  Sivertsen  Adelaer,  (K$benhavn,  1871),  420. 
25.  See  Chapter  .  11  for  a  discussion  of  the  different  construction  methods. 
385 bruckes,  ey  Miller  wänner  Skieppet  wäll  i  stoer  hool  Si(Pe'  (the  whole 
lower  row  of  cannon  cannot  be  used,  nor  does  the  ship  sail  well  in  a 
heavy  sea)26.  The  smaller  ships  built  by  Berns  and  Marselis,  though,  ap- 
pear  to  have  been  much  better,  and  much  more  suited  to  the  Dutch  style 
of  building,  with  Gra  Ulv  in  particular  noted  for  being  a  good  sailer27. 
Despite  the  problems  with  the  larger  ships,  the  Berns  and  Marselis 
yard  was  undoubtedly  very  important  for  the  Danish  navy  in  the  1640s. 
However,  its  importance  is  overestimated  to  some  extent  by  Lauridsen, 
who  states  that  naval  shipbuilding  in  the  1640s  was  predominantly  in 
Berns  and  Marselis'  hands28. 
Because  of  the  lack  of  complete  and  accurate  records  for  the  or- 
dering  of  ships  from  Neustadt  Table  10.2.  is  probably  incomplete,  and 
several  more  ships  may  have  been  built  there.  However,  both  Johan 
Brandt  and  James  Robbins  were  also  building  large  and  medium  sized  war- 
ships  in  the  1640s  and  several  other  ships  were  purchased  from  other 
sources.  In  the  final  analysis  Berns  and  Marselis  are  known  to  have  been 
contracted  to  supply  only  eight  ships,  two  of  which  never  entered  the 
Danish  navy  and  two  of  which,  Trefoldighed  and  Frederik  were  poorly 
constructed  and,  sailed  badly.  - 
10.1.3.  The  Significance  of  Private  Contractors 
The  use  of  private  contractors  was  certainly  not  a  new  departure  for  the 
Danish  navy29  but  Christian  IV  used  them  much  more  extensively  than 
any  previous  monarch. 
------------------- 
26.  Bruun,  Curt  Sivertsen  Adelaer,  423. 
27.  H.  D.  Lind,  'Om  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Orlogsflaade,  III.  Flaadeliste'.  Tidskrift  for  S4vasen, 
(1890).  450. 
28.  Lauridsen,  Marselis  konsortief  49. 
29.  J$rgen  H.  Bartod,  Christian  Is  t7Ade6  (Kmbenhavn,  1995),  208  &  264. 
386 The  common  factor  behind  them  was  that  they  all  operated  in 
Holstein30.  There  were  a  number  of  reasons  for  this,  not  least  because 
Holstein  was  at  the  time  rich  in  shipbuilding  timber.  However,  the  main 
reason  was  most  likely  that  because  they  were  built  outside  the  kingdom 
of  Denmark-Norway,  the  rigsrAd  had  no  possible  influence  over  the  build- 
ing  of  them.  They  were  paid  for  principally  from  the  king's  own  purse, 
and  he  could  argue  that  they  had  cost  the  state  not  one  daler31. 
Although  much  of  the  capital  costs  of  ships  built  by  the  royal 
shipwrights  were  also  met  by  Christian  IV,  the  fact  that  they  were 
employed  by  the  state  meant  that  the  rigsräd  did  have  some  say  in  the 
way  they  were  used  and  the  number  of  men  employed.  By  going  outside 
the  state  system  altogether  and  using  private  contractors  Christian  IV 
was  able  to  supplement  the  ships  built  by  the  royal  shipwrights  without 
any  political  interference. 
The  private  contractors  also  built  ships  predominantly  in  the  Dutch 
style.  No  firm  conclusions,  however,  can  be  made  as  to  whether  it  was  a 
deliberate  policy  to  build  these  types  of  ships.  The  range  of  duties  per- 
formed  by  the  navy  certainly  called  for  a  mix  of  different  styles  of  ship 
and  the  Dutch-style  shallow  draught  vessels  were  ideally  suited  to  in- 
shore  coastal  and  riverine  work.  It  may,  however,  simply  have  been  a 
matter  of  availability,  with  Dutch  shipwrights  much  more  commonly  avail- 
able  on  the  continent  than  English.,  Dutch-style  ships  were  also  generally 
cheaper  than  English-style  ships  and  this  may  have  been  another  sig- 
nificant  factor,  especially  if  Christian  IV  was  paying  for  their  construc- 
tion  himself. 
------------------ 
30.  The  only  other  ship  known  to  have  been  built  by  private  contractors  was  the  small  20  gun 
ship,  Flensborg  ordered  in  1620  from  two  merchants  in  Flensburg.  J4rgen  Keelsen  and  Mattis 
Klausen.  Open  letter,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  25  February  1620. 
31.  Letter  to  rfgsrid  12  April  1633,  egenhandige  Brevet  III,  102-3. 
387 Another  thing  that  the  exclusive  use  of  private  contractors  in 
Holstein  would  suggest  is  that  there  were  no  shipwrights  or  shipyards  in 
Denmark  itself  that  were  considered  capable  of  building  warships.  No 
records  exist  for  any  Danish  commercial  shipwright  building  warships  for 
the  navy.  Even  Rasmus  Jensen  Hellekande  did  not  receive  any  warship 
orders,  despite  taking  over  Balfour's  shipyard  at  Christianshavn32.  This 
would  tend  to  further  strengthen  the  conclusions  of  Chapter  8,  that  the 
reason  for  foreign  master  shipwrights  being  employed  was  that  there 
simply  were  not  the  skills  available  in  Denmark. 
10.2.  Norwegian  Lensmmnd 
Whilst  ships  ordered  from  private  contractors  could  be  bought  on  credit 
the  cost  of  the  ships  did  eventually  have  to  be  paid.  In  the  financially 
strained  1630s  and  1640s  another  practice  was  developed  that  allowed 
ships  to  be  supplied  at  no  financial  outlay  whatsoever. 
The  lensmvnd  in  Norway  had  long  been  required  to  keep  a  certain 
number  of  ships  in  reserve  for  the  protection  of  the  Norwegian  coast.  In 
the  16th  century  these  could  be  used  by  the  Danish  navy  when  required 
but  by  the  17th  century  the  differences  between  warships  and  merchant 
ships  had  -widened  so  much  that  these  ships  were  of  little  worth  to  the 
main  fleet.  The  defensionskibe  programme  of  1630  encouraged  the  building 
of  a  larger  breed  of  armed  merchantmen,  but  these  ships  were  again  in- 
tended  mainly  to  provide  Norway  with  a  better  coastal  protection  force 
and  were  only  to  supplement  the  state  navy  in  an  emergency. 
In  the  1630s,  though,  a  system  was  developed  to  exploit  the  wealth 
of  shipbuilding  timber  in  Norway  to  construct  warships  for  the  Danish 
navy.  This  was  probably  not  an  entirely  new  arrangement  since  we  know 
that  lensmmnd  had  earlier  been  instructed  to  build  vessels  for  the  navy, 
-------------------- 
32.  Lauridsen.  Marselis  konsortie4  49. 
388 but  the  details  of  any  contractual  or  financial  arrangements  remain 
obscure.  The  royal  shipwrights  had  also  built  ships  in  Norway  before, 
using  timber  from  the  len.  However,  what  made  the  system  in  the  1630s 
different  was  that  the  lensmmnd  themselves  acted  as  shipbuilding  con- 
tractors.  Contracts  were  issued  to  them  rather  than  to  the  shipwright  but 
the  contract  also  specified  which  of  the  royal  master  shipwrights  should 
be  engaged.  The  costs  of  the  ships'  construction  were  also  specified  but 
instead  of,  being  issued  with  payments  from  the  rentekammer  they  were 
simply  to  deduct  these  costs  from  the  Yen  revenues  due  from  them. 
There  were  not  many  lensmwnd  who  had  both  the  facilities  and  the 
resources  to  undertake  these  contracts,  and  so  the  number  of  ships 
provided  in  this  way  was  not  great.  Details  have  survived  of  only  two 
lensma'nd  who  operated  in  this  way,  Christoffer  Gjpe  and  Hannibal 
Sehested,  but  there  may  well  have  been  others  who  supplied  ships  on  a 
much  smaller  scale. 
10.2.1.  Christoffer  Gj4oe 
Christoffer  Gjpe  became  the  lensmand  for  Nedenaes  len  in  1619,  and  from 
1628  -  he  also  became  lensmand  for  Mandal  and  Lister  len.  The  first 
evidence  we  have  of  his  connection  with  the  navy  comes  in  1624,  when  he 
was  ordered  to  supply  24  ship's  boats  of  the  size  prescribed  by  the 
master  shipwright  at  Bremerholm,  the  costs  of  which  were  to  be  deducted 
from  his  len  accounts33.  Over  the  next  three  years  he  supplied  at  least 
another  30  boats,  and  in  1629  he  also  supplied  five  ship-loads  of  ship- 
building  timber  to  Bremerholm34. 
----------------- 
33.  Letter  to  Christoffer  Gj$e,  30  October  1624,  Norske  Rigs-registranter.  V.  446. 
34.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  den  Fjerde  og  hans  Mand  paa  Bremerholm;  (Kipbenhavn,  1889),  377. 
389 In  1631  he  was  given  his  first  contract  to  build  a  warship.  This 
ship  was  to  be  the  same  size  as  Balfour's  Tre  Lover  and  he  was  in- 
structed  to  negotiate  with  Daniel  Sinclair  to  build  the  ship.  In  return  Gjpe 
was  granted  6700  Rdlr.  'in  specie'  for  the  ship,  which  should  be  taken 
from  the  taxes  collected  from  his  three  lerr35.  Unfortunately  this  ship 
cannot  be  identified  with  any  certainty. 
It  is  clear  from  this  contract  that  Gjge  did  not  yet  have  an  estab- 
lished  shipyard,  as  he  was  told  to  select  a  suitable  site  for  the  building 
of  the  ship  and  to  erect  a  smithy  there  where  the  ironwork  for  the  ship 
could  be  produced.  It  did  not  take  long  for  him  to  realise  the  commercial 
possibilities,  though,  as  later  in  1631  we  hear  of  a  contract  to  supply  the 
Alborg  merchant  Jens  Bang  with  a  ship3s. 
The  arrangement  with  Gjpe  must  have  proved  satisfactory  as  shortly 
after  the  first  ship  was  delivered  another  warship  was  being  built  by 
him,  but  this  time  with  Svend  Andersen  as  the  shipwright.  The  contract 
for  this  ship  does  not  exist  but  it  is  likely  that  it  was  another  copy  of 
Tre  Lover.  This  ship,  Delmenhorsi  carried  a  similar  number  of  guns,  but 
its  length  was  considerably  longer  at  701  alen  (44.3m)  between  the  posts. 
However,  Gj4e  stated  that  it  had  been  built  bigger  than  intended  and  that 
he  was  granted  an  additional  300  Rdlr.  for  it37.  By  June  1633  Andersen 
was  fitting  the  masts  and  figure-head  to  the  shipm,  but  the  following 
year  a  fore-deck  and  forecastle  had  to  be  added3g,  most  likely  because 
the  ship  was  much  longer  than  intended. 
--------------  ---  - 
35.  Contract  with  Christoffer  Gj$e,  Kancelliets  Brevbbger,  23  March  1631. 
36.  Letter  to  Palle  Rosenkrands,  7  July  1631,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VI,  329. 
37.  Letter  from  Gjq,  e,  undated  but  listed  under  c.  1639-44,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B160,  Indiag 
til  registre  og  koncepter. 
38.  Letter  to  Palle  Rosenkrands,  19  June  1633,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VI,  552. 
39.  Lind,  'Om  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Orlogsflaade',  420. 
390 Before  this  ship  was  completed  GjOe  was  given  a  contract  to  build 
another  ship,  this  time  definitely  another  copy  of  Tre  Lover.  Svend  An- 
dersen  was  again  to  be  the  shipwright  and  it  was  to  be  completed  by 
August  163440.  This  ship  was  probably  the  new  Sorte  Rytter,  which  ap- 
peared  in  the  materials  accounts  from  1635/36.  Like  Delmenhorst  it  was 
built  bigger  than  the  contract  stipulated,  and  again  Gjce  attempted  to  get 
an  additional  allowance  for  the  extra  expense41. 
In  the  summer  of  1635  Gjge  was  contracted  to  build  another  war- 
ship.  This  contract  has  not  survived  but  we  know  he  was  given  1000 
Rdlr.  to  start  the  construction  of  a  ship42  and  a  clerk  was  appointed  to 
oversee  the  shipbuilding  accounts43.  The  ship  cannot  be  identified  with 
any  certainty,  but  the  only  warship  to  enter  the  navy  between  1636  and 
1638  was  the  16  gun  Snarensvend,  and  it  is  likely  that  this  was  the  ship 
built  by  Gjme.  The  shipwright  is  also  not  known,  but  Andersen  is  the  most 
likely  as  Sinclair  was  at  that  time  in  Copenhagen  and  Johan  Brandt  had 
not  yet  been  appointed. 
Johan  Brandt,  though,  was  to  be  the  shipwright  for  a  much  larger 
ship,  identified  as  the  new  Tre  LOveru,  to  be  built  by  Gj4e  in  1638.  Gjge 
was  to  be  paid  4000  Rdlr.  from  the  Norwegian  Stadtholder,  and  a  further 
10,000  Rdlr.  was  to  be  deducted  from  the  len  revenues  due  from  him45.  It 
was  to  be  completed  by  Whitsun  1640. 
------------------ 
40.  Contract  with  Gj$e.  25  April  1633.  Norske  Rigs-registranter.  VI,  535. 
41.  Letter  from  Gj4ie,  undated  but  listed  under  c.  1639-44,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancelli,  B160 
42.  Letter  to  Christoffer  Urne,  14  July  1635,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VII.  92. 
43.  Letter  to  Palle  Rosenkrands,  18  June  1635,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VII,  62. 
44.  See  Chapter  9. 
45.  Contract  with  Gj$e,  22  August  1638,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VII,  427-8. 
391 Before  this  ship  was  completed  Gjge  was  given  another  contract,  in 
June  1639,  to  built  a  ship  the  same  size  as  Balfour's  To  LOver46.  Brandt 
was  again  to  be  the  shipwright,  but  additional  shipcarpenters  had  to  be 
recruited  so  that  the  two  ships  could  be  built  simultaneously47.  This 
second  ship,  which  has  been  tentatively  identified  as  Fenix,  was  to  be 
completed  by  Whitsun  1641. 
The  financing  of  this  last  ship  was  a  little  different  from  those 
previously  built  by  Gj4e.  This  time  he  was  to  receive  the  total  cost  of 
9000  Rdlr.  in  specie,  but  this  was  to  be  paid  in  three  instalments  from 
the  toll  revenues  of  the  neighbouring  'Affdesiden'  1ern4.  Thus  although 
Gjge  received  cash  payments  for  this  ship  the  central  administration  in 
Copenhagen  still  did  not  have  to  pay  any  money  directly  for  it.  However, 
despite  receiving  cash  for  this  ship  Gjpe  was  experiencing  financial 
difficulties50  and  this  is  the  last  ship  that  he  is  known  to  have  supplied 
to  the  Danish  navy51. 
----------------- 
48.  This  was  identical  to  the  Tre  Lover  specified  in  previous  contracts,  but  this  ship  was  lost  in 
1637,  and  to  avoid  any  confusion  with  the  new  Tre  Lover  currently  under  construction,  To  Lover 
was  specified. 
47.  Open  letter,  6  June  1639,  Norske  Rigs-registranter.  VII,  577-8. 
48.  See  Chapter  9. 
49.  Contract  with  Gj$e,  8  June  1639.  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VII,  579-80. 
50.  He  asked  Christian  IV  for  further  payments  in  1640,  which  the  king  refused  to  pay.  Letter  to 
Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  6  July  1640,  egenhandige  Breve,  IV,  365. 
51.  Johan  Brandt  built  the  Stormarn  in  Norway  in  1643/44,  which  may  have  been  built  for  Gj$e  or 
possibly  for  another  Norwegian  lensmand  See  Chapter  9. 
392 Name  Type  Date  Built  Contract  Price  L  Breadth  Cannon 
Not  known  Medium  Warship  1631-32  6,100  Rdlr,  42  13  ? 
Delmenhorst  Medium  Warship  1632-33  ?  42?  13?  34 
Sorte  Rytter  Medium  Warship  1633-34  7,000  42  13  40 
Snarensvena?  Small  Warship  1635-36  ?  ?  ?  16 
Tre  Lever  Medium  Warship  1638-40  14,000  47  15  46 
Fenix?  Medium  Warship  1642  9,000  42  13  34 
Table  10.3.  Ships  Supplied  by  Christoffer  Gjge 
Sources;  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  Kancefli,  8160;  Uarinearkivet  f$r  1655,  Bremerholmens  Materialskriver  regnskaber. 
The  fact  that  Gjge's  last  two  known  contracts  provided  him  with 
cash  payments  suggests  that  he  was  no  longer  able  to  finance  the  build- 
ing  of  ships  himself,  and  indeed  he  complained  that  he  had  been  finan- 
cially  ruined  by  the  venture52.  These  financial  difficulties  no  doubt  con- 
tributed  to  Gjge  being  dropped  as  a  shipbuilding  contractor,  especially  as 
Berns  and  Marselis  were  now  showing  themselves  capable  of  building 
ships  on  credit.  Gjpe,  however,  still  continued  to  supply  ship  timber  to 
Bremerholm.  Even  when  building  the  large  Tre  Lover  he  managed  to 
supply  large  amounts  of  ship  timber53,  and  in  1646  he  was  still  supplying 
timber  to  BremerholmM.  Like  the  ships  he  built,  the  cost  of  this  timber 
was  deducted  from  his  len  revenues,  and  therefore  was  supplied  at  no 
outlay  from  Copenhagen. 
10.2.2.  Hannibal  Sehested 
In  1642  the  king's  son-in-law  Hannibal  Sehested  was  appointed  as  Nor- 
wegian  Stadtholder  and  lensmand  in  Akershus.  Under  his  leadership  there 
grew  a  separate  Norwegian  administration,  and  during  the 
Torstenssonkrig  he  assumed  control  of  the  defensionskibe  fleet. 
-------------------- 
52.  Lind,  Kong  Kristian  og  hans  marod  378. 
53.  Open  letter,  31  May  1638,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VII,  406-7. 
54.  Letter  to  Gj$e,  3  August  1646,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VIII,  448. 
393 After  the  loss  of  the  Danish  fleet  in  this  war  he  was  instructed  to 
construct  a  large  warship  using  the  timber  that  he  had  lying  at  Chris- 
tiania.  James  Robbins  was  instructed  to  go  with  Sehested  to  Norway  to 
build  the  ship  and  Sehested  was  ordered  to  pay  for  his  wages  as  well  as 
for  the  rest  of  the  workforce  that  would  be  required. 
This  ship,  named  Hannibal  in  his  honour,  was  completed  by  1647 
and  he  was  then  given  further  instructions  to  build  another  two  large 
warships  at  Christiania,  again  with  James  Robbins  as  shipwright.  The  cost 
of  these  ships  was  to  be  met  from  Sehested's  len  revenues,  but,  unlike 
Hannibal,  for  which  he  paid  only  for  the  hull°,  it  appears  that  he  was 
also  expected  to  pay  for  the  masts  and  rigging  as  well.  Sehested  com- 
plained,  however,  that  he  had  already  paid  too  much  as  lensmand  and 
that  it  was  therefore  impossible  to  pay  for  the  outfitting  of  the  two 
ships57.  Who  eventually  paid  is  not  known  but  the  two  ships,  Sophie 
Amalie  and  Prins  Christian  were  completed  by  1650. 
These  were  to  be  the  last  ships  built  by  Sehested  as  after  the 
death  of  Christian  IV  his  position  became  precarious.  The  ordinary 
rigsrad  members  turned  against  the  sons-in-law  faction  to  which  Sehested 
belonged  and  an  investigation  into  his  financial  administration  was  or- 
dered.  By  1651  Sehested  had  had  to  resign  his  position  as  Norwegian 
Stadtholder  and  was,  for  the  time  being,  politically  and  financially 
ruined. 
-------------------- 
55.  Letter  to  Sehested,  11  May  1645,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VIII,  365. 
56.  Letter  to  Sehested,  30  July  1647,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  VIII,  552. 
57.  Thyra  Sehested,  Hannibal  Sehested  (K4)enhavn,  1886),  II,  366.  Strangely  both  this  book  and 
Bmggild-Andersen's  more  comprehensive  study  mention  Hannibal  Sehested's  shipbuilding  activity 
only  in  passing,  in  relation  to  the  enquiry  into  his  financial  administration.  C.  O.  B*ggild  Ander- 
sen,  Hannibal  Sehested:  En  dansk  statsmand  I,  (Kotbenhavn,  1946),  119  &  133. 
58.  Steffen  Heiberg,  'Hannibal  Sehested',  Dansk  biografisk  leksikon,  13.320-6. 
394 10.2.3.  The  Effectiveness  of  the  System 
The  use  of  len  revenues  at  source  to  provide  warships  for  the  navy  was 
clearly  very  attractive  to  Christian  IV,  and  as  a  method  of  acquiring 
ships  it  proved  to  be  very  effective.  In  total  the  navy  gained  at  least 
nine  ships  between  1632  and  1650  at  little  cost  other  than  their  masting 
and  rigging.  As  the  costs  of  the  ships'  construction  were  deducted  from 
the  len  revenues  at  source  it  meant  that  no  real  account  was  made  of  the 
cost  of  supplying  these  ships.  The  lensmmnd  simply  deducted  the  cost  of 
the  ships  from  the  len  revenues  due  from  them  and,  although  the  rente- 
kammer  included  these  deductions  in  the  len  accounts,  no  reference  was 
made  of  the  expense  of  the  ships  to  the  navy.  The  ships  therefore  effec- 
tively  resulted  in  a  loss  of  revenue  rather  than  being  an  expense  in 
themselves. 
These  somewhat  deceitful  arrangements  enabled  Christian  IV  to  fur- 
ther  his  case  for  a  reform  of  the  len  system.  He  could  argue  that  the 
Norwegian  len  revenues  were  falling,  whilst  covering  himself  against  ac- 
cusations  of  spending  too  much-on  the  navy,  as  the  true  cost  of  building 
these'  ships  was  disguised. 
This  system  could  only  work,  however,  if  the  lensmmnd  had  suffi- 
cient  revenue  in  the  first  place,  as  well  as  the  necessary  timber  supplies 
and  a  suitable  shipbuilding  site.  Both  Gjge  and  Sehested  felt  the  effects 
of  the  great  expense  of  building  warships  and  experienced  serious  finan- 
cial  difficulties  as  a  result.  The  Norwegian  timber  supplies  were  too  valu- 
able  not  to  exploited,  though,  and  the  practice  of  sending  the  royal 
shipwrights  to  Norway  to  build  warships  at  the  expense  of  the  local  ad- 
ministration  was  continued  well  after  the  reign  of  Christian  IV59. 
-------------------- 
59.  Jurgen  H.  Barfod,  'Bygningen  of  orlogskibe  i  Norge  i  slutning  of  1600-tallet',  Maritime  Kontakt, 
13  (1989),  5-15. 
395 Also,  in  addition  to  those  ships  that  were  specifically  ordered  from 
the  lensmmnd,  there  is  also  at  least  one  instance  where  a  lensmand, 
Gunde  Lange,  died  owing  money,  and  his  own  private  ship  was  requisi- 
tioned  in  lieu  of  his  outstanding  len  revenues60. 
10.3.  Other  Methods  of  Procuring  Ships 
So  far  we  have  looked  only  at  ships  that  were  ordered  directly  for  the 
navy  to  a  specified  design.  However,  because  of  the  great  expense  of 
warship  building  not  all  of  the  ships  of  the  navy  could  be  acquired  in 
this  way.  To  supplement  these  ships  the  navy  could  also  obtain  ready- 
built  ships  by  a  variety  of  other  means.  Some  were  given  as  gifts,  some 
were  taken  as  prizes  while  others  were  simply  purchased  from  merchants. 
These  ships  generally  tended  to  be  much  smaller  than  those  ordered 
specifically  for  the  navy,  and  of  lesser  importance. 
10.3.1.  Gifts 
Gifts  were  the  least  significant  means  of  acquiring  ships.  In  1604  some 
farmers  in  Bergen  gave  the  king  a  gift  of  five  small  skerry  boats,  and 
the  merchant  Peter  Nielsen  had  an  armed  merchantman  built  in  France. 
This  he  found  too  large  for  his  own  ends  and  so  gave  it  to  Christian 
IVet. 
Included  among  the  smaller  vessels  of  the  navy  are  some  named 
after  people,  such  as  Peder  Boringholms  krejer  and  Laurids  Christensens 
skib,  which  may  well  have  given  over  to  the  navy  by  them  as  gifts. 
However,  the  provenance  of  these  ships  is  not  at  all  clear.  They  were 
certainly  not  all  gifts  as,  for  example,  Gunde  Langes  Jagt  was  seized  as 
compensation  for  a  shortfall  in  his  Yen  accounts. 
--- 
60. 
------- 
Victor 
---------- 
Jensen,  'Om  Kong  Kristian  den  Fjerdes  Orlogsskibe',  Under  Dannebrog.  (1941),  59. 
61.  Lind,  'Om  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Orlogsflaade',  331-2. 
396 10.3.2.  Prizes 
Prize  ships  could  either  be  those  captured  in  war  or  else  those  confis- 
cated  from  merchants  who  were  attempting  to  evade  tolls  in  Danish 
sovereign  waters. 
In  Frederik  II's  time  and  in  the  early  years  of  Christian  IV's  reign 
many  English  ships  were  taken  as  prizes  for  infringing  toll  regulations. 
Moryson  noted  that  one  of  the  navy's  ships  was  English  'lately  taken  by 
the  Danes  in  the  more  Northern  parts  beyond  Norway  for  some  offence  in 
ffishing'62  and  another  traveller  in  1600  stated,  83  that: 
I  Havnen  ligge  en  haly  snees  Skibe,  hvoraf  nogle  for  rum  tid  siden 
ere  tagne  fra  Engellaenderne  i  Nordsgen 
0 
In  the  harbour  lie  about  10  ships,  of  which  some  were  taken  from 
the  English  in  the  North  Sea,  some  time  ago. 
Many  Dutch  ships  were  also  taken  as  prizes  for  evading  tolls  as  we 
can  see  from  their"  name  such  as  Hollands  Priis  Boiert  and  Forbrudte  Hol- 
lander  (Confiscated  Hollander).  In  the  1630s  we  can  also  see  a  dramatic 
increase  in  the  number  of  Hamburg  ships  taken  as  prizes  after  the  dis- 
pute  over  tolls  on  the  Elbe. 
As  well  as  those  ships  caught  evading  tolls,  merchant  ships  supply- 
ing  the  enemy  with  war  goods  could  also  legitimately  be  taken  as  prizes. 
This  was  particularly  true  during  the  Kejserkrig  when  many  of  the  prize 
ships  appear  to  have  come  from  the  Hanse  ports. 
-------------------- 
62.  Fynes  Moryson,  The  fourth  Part  of  an  Itinerary.  Of  the  Comonwealth  of  Denmarke4  Booke  II, 
Chap.  II.,  Library  of  Corpus  Christi  College,  Oxford,  MS.  C.  C.  C.  94.  f.  242-3. 
63.  Suhm  (ed.  ),  'Udtog  of  en  Reise  til  Danmark  Aar  1600',  Nye  samlinger  til  den  danske  historie,  3 
bd.,  (Kobenhavn,  1794),  99. 
397 These  merchant  ships  were  not  very  large  and  those  that  were 
taken  into  the  Danish  navy  therefore  tended  to  serve  mainly  as  transport 
ships,  although  some  of  the  larger  armed  merchantmen  were  able  to  serve 
as  small  warships.  Most  of  these  ships  had  also  naturally  been  well  used 
before  being  seized  and  it  was  exceptional  for  prize  ships  to  serve  in  the 
navy  for  more  than  a  few  years. 
Although  Denmark  managed  to  gain  a  significant  number  of  small 
ships  in  this  way,  when  it  came  to  the  capture  of  enemy  warships  in 
times  of  war  she  was  not  so  fortunate.  During  the  Kalmar  War  the  Danish 
fleet  managed  to  capture  several  Swedish  ships,  but  the  ships  captured, 
apart  from  one  or  two  exceptions,  were  all  fairly  small.  Again  during  the 
Torstenssonkrig  only  a  handful'  of  small  Swedish  transport  ships  were 
captured,  while  Sweden  on  the  other  hand  managed  to  take  half  the 
Danish,  main  fleet  as  prize. 
10.3.3.  Purchases 
Ships  were  purchased  from  many  different  sources.  Some  were  purchased 
from  foreign  powers,  such  as  the  Scottish  Gilliflower  that  was  purchased 
in  1605  from  James  I/VI,  who  stated  that: 
Although  we  do  not  gladly  allow  ships  of  that  type,  whose  struc- 
tures  are  rather  distinctive  and  most  pleasing  to  us  and  to  any 
other  prince,  to  be  distributed,  nevertheless  we  have  very  willingly 
yielded  that  to  Your  Serene  Highness64. 
------------------- 
64.  James  I  to  Christian  IV,  29  May  1605,  Ronald  L.  Meldrum  (ed.  ),  The  Letters  of  King  James  I  to 
King  Christian  IV  1603-1624  (Hassocks,  1976). 
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carried  16  guns.  The  smaller  Markatten  was  also  bought  from  England  in 
the  same  year  and  several  years  later  there  was  also  talk  of  a  ship  being 
built  for  the  Danish  navy  by  Phineas  Pett: 
The  King  of  Denmark  having  obtained  from  the  state  that  Mr  Pett 
may  build  him  a  ship  here,  desires  the  Company  would  lend  him 
their  dock  at  Deptford;  to  which  the  court  readily  condescended65. 
However,  it  seems  that  no  such  ship  was  built,  and  this  may  simply  have 
been  a  reference  to  the  rebuilding  of  Tre  kroner  which  was  being  dis- 
cussed  at  the  time66. 
Several  ships  were  also  bought  from  the  Net  herlands,  such  as  two 
unidentified  ships  bought  in  1625  and  the  Hollands  Fregat  in  1640.  Chris- 
tian  IV  was  not  always  successful  in  obtaining  the  ship  he  wanted, 
though,  as  the  following  a  ccount  testifies: 
The  King  of  Denmark  found  a  difficulty  in  purchasing  a  ship  of 
about  1,000  tons  in  North  Holland  for  which  he  pays  50,000  Florins, 
unless  he  would  give  caution  to  the  value  of  100,000  Florins  that 
the  ship  should  not  be  employed  in  the  East  Indies.  This  was  rep- 
resented  to  the  States  as  an  unreasonable  condition  and  unfit  for  a 
friendly  Prince,  and  is  laid  aside87. 
-----  -  ----------  -- 
65.  Court  Minutes  of  the  East  India  Co.,  22  September  1624,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  (Colonial, 
East  Indies),  1622-24,411. 
66.  A  Draught  contract  was  drawn  up  for  its  repair  sometime  around  1624,  egenhandige  Breve,  I, 
398-9. 
67.  Letter  Dudley  Carleton  to  Sec.  Nauton,  17  February  1620,  Calendar  of  State  Papers,  (Colonial, 
East  Indies),  1617-21,351. 
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Norwegian  merchants.  A  ship  was  bought  from  the  Oslo  merchant  Erik  Ol- 
sen  in  1603  for  4,000  Dlr.,  and  another  was  bought  from  Willem  Macker  in 
Marstrand  for  1,500  Dlr68.  In  1608  Christian  IV  paid  2,350  Dlr.  for  another 
ship  from  Norway69.  Frederik  B4yesen  sold  the  small  FOlgesvend  to  the 
navy  in  16347°,  which  he  had  built  at  his  shipyard  in  Christiania.  From 
the  sums  involved,  though,  these  ships  must  have  been  fairly  small. 
Some  larger  ships  were  also  purchased,  such  as  the  20  gun  For- 
lorne  Son  which  was  sold  to  the  navy  in  1642  by  Jacob  Madtzen,  a  mer- 
chant  from  Christianshavn».  This  ship,  however,  was  originally  an 
English  ship  which  sank  in  the  Sound  and  was  subsequently  recovered 
and  repairedM. 
The  greatest  number  of  ships  purchased,  though,  seems  to  have 
been  during  the  Torstenssonkrig,  when  many  of  the  Norwegian  defen- 
sionskibe  and  the  Copenhagen  borgerskibe  were  requisitioned  into  the 
main  fleet  and  subsequently  purchased  from  their  original  owners. 
Some  ships  were  also  hired  from  merchants  and  contractors  in  time 
of  crisis,  particularly  in  the  Torstenssonkrig,  but  these  vessels  served 
only  for  a  limited  time  and  could  not  be  considered  as  belonging  to  the 
permanent  Danish  navy. 
--- 
68. 
------- 
Letter 
---- 
to 
------ 
Steen  Maltesson,  8  July  1603,  Norske  Rigs-registranter,  III,  23. 
69.  Lind,  'Om  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  Orlogsflaade',  330-1. 
70.  Letter  to  Sten  Villumsen,  4  October  1634,  Norske  Rigs-registranter.  VI,  896. 
71.  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber,  1642/43. 
72.  Bruun,  Curt  Sivertsen  Adelaer,  421. 
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The  increasing  use  of  private  contractors  and  lensmwnd  to  build  the 
navy's  ships  must  be  seen  in  the  light  of  Christian  IV's  domestic  politics 
and  his  power  struggle  with  the  rigsräd.  The  origins  of  this  policy, 
though,  probably  owe  a  lot  to  chance,  since  it  is  more  than  likely  that 
Peter  Michelsen  was  used  initially  only  as  an  interim  measure  after  the 
imprisonment  of  David  Balfour.  However,  having  seen  that  it  was  possible 
to  successfully  build  warships  outside  the  state  system  it  allowed  Chris- 
tian  IV  much  greater  independence  in  the  development  of  the  navy  away 
from  the  interference  of  the  rigsräd. 
The  decision  to  build  ships  in  Schleswig  and  Holstein,  however,  had 
been  taken  much  earlier,  with  Petersen  and  Balfour  both  building  ships 
in  the  duchies.  The  king  knew  that  this  would  provide  him  with  a  vir- 
tually  unassailable  position  over  who  owned  and  controlled  the  navy,  and 
the  decision  to  use  private  contractors  can  be  seen  as  a  way  of  gaining 
even  greater  autonomy.  In  the  period  before  the  Kejserkrig  this  was 
definitely  a  policy  driven  by  considerations  of  political  power  and  foreign 
policy  ambitions.  Later  he  used  the  fact  that  he  built  so  many  warships 
in  the  duchies  as  a  lever  against  the  rigsrrd  in  his  attempt  to  gain  fur- 
ther  financial  support  for  the  navy. 
In  the  period  after  the  Kejserkrig  financial  considerations  played  a 
much  more  important  role  in  the  use  of  private  contractors.  The  growing 
financial  crisis  also  precipitated  the  use  of  Norwegian  lensmmnd  as  ship- 
building  contractors.  However,  finance  was  not  the  only  motive  behind  the 
adoption  of  this  policy,  and  Christian  IV's  political  manoeuvring  to  force  a 
reform  of  the  len  system  certainly  played  a  part. 
Table  10.4.  shows  the  means  by  which  large  and  medium  warships 
were  acquired  during  Christian  IV's  reign.  Because  the  origin  of  so  many 
of  the  smaller  vessels  remains  unknown  these  have  been  omitted  from  the 
table. 
401 Royal  Private  Norwegian  Prizes  d 
Shipwrights  Contractors  Lensmand  Purchases  Not  Known 
1596-1610  5  0  0  0  4 
1611-1620  2  3  0  2  2 
1621-1630  9  3  0  0  4 
1631-1640  1  1  4  2  1 
1641-1650  0  7  5  8  2 
Table  10.4.  Method  of  Acquisition  of  Large  and  Medium  Warships 
The  most  striking  thing  that  this  table  shows  is  the  dramatic 
change  in  the  role  of  the  royal  master  shipwrights.  In  the  early  part  of 
the  reign  they  built  the  majority  of  new  warships,  but  after  the  Kej- 
serkrig  their  role  changed  significantly.  The  ships  they  built  thereafter 
were  almost  exclusively  built  for  the  Norwegian  lensmwnd,  and  the 
remainder  of  the  warships  were  built  by  private  contractors  on  credit. 
In  the  1642  budget  estimate  there  was  a  provision  of  18,000  Rdlr, 
for  the  construction  of  two  warships  annually,  but  in  fact  after  around 
1640  the  building  of  larger  warships  directly  financed  by  the  rente- 
kammer  came  to  a  complete  standstill.  Even  after  half  the  fleet  was  cap- 
tured  in  the  Torstenssonkrig  the  replacement  ships  were  financed  by  the 
lensm&nd  or  by  private  contractors'  credit. 
The  sudden  rise  of  purchases  at  the  end  of  the  reign  can  be  ex- 
plained  by  the  fact  that  many  of  the  defensionskibe  and  borgerskibe 
were  purchased  as  short  term  replacements  for  those  lost  in  the 
Torstenssonkrig,  but  whether  their  owners  ever  received  full  payment 
must  remain  doubtful. 
We  cannot  draw  such  firm  conclusions  about  the  provision  of  the 
smaller  ships  and  galleys  of  the  navy  since  the  origin  of  the  majority  of 
them  remains  unknown.  However,  from  the  information  that  we  do  have  we 
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number  of  these  vessels  throughout  the  reign,  while  private  contractors 
and  lensmxnd  built  only  a  handful  of  these  smaller  vessels. 
This  can  be  explained  in  a  number  of  ways.  The  royal  shipwrights 
were  paid  an  annual  wage  and  if  they  were  at  some  stage  not  building  a 
large  warship  it  was  logical  to  keep  them  occupied  with  the  construction 
of  smaller  vessels,  using  the  timber  supplies  that  were  readily  to  hand. 
Also,  if  private  contractors  were  to  be  used,  either  because  of  financial 
or  political  reasons,  it  made  sense  for  Christian  IV  to  use  them  to  build 
as  large  ships  as  possible.  In  this  way  both  the  benefits  of  using  credit 
and  the  political  weight  of  owning  large  warships  were  maximised.  It  was 
hardly  worth  negotiating  with  private  contractors  to  build  small  ships  if 
the  royal  shipwrights  could  build  them  in  their  slack  periods  or  else 
simply  be  purchased  ready-built  from  other  sources. 
The  purchase  of  ships,  though,  appears  to  have  become  much  less 
significant  in  Christian  IV's  time.  During  Christian  III's  and  the  early 
years  of  Frederik  II's  reign  probably  the  majority  of  the  navy's  ships 
were  purchased73.  After  the  Northern  Seven  Years  War,  though,  it  became 
clear  that  the  ships  of  the  navy  had  to  be  of  a  much  larger  construction 
and  these  ships  could  only  be  built  to  order,  not  acquired  randomly  from 
merchants.  By  Christian  IV's  time  it  was  only  the  smaller  vessels  of  the 
navy  that  could  be  purchased  ready-built. 
In  summary  then  we  have  seen  that  at  the  start  of  Christian  IV's 
reign  foreign  master  shipwrights  were  employed  by  the  state  to  build  the 
large  warships  that  were  needed  both  for  the  purposes  of  warfare  and 
royal  prestige.  In  the  1630s  the  financing  of  state  shipbuilding  became 
increasingly  difficult  and  new  ways  had  to  be  sought  of  financing  the 
construction  of  warships.  Private  contractors  were  used  to  build  ships  on 
-------------------- 
73.  Barfod,  Christian  3.  s  t1Ade. 
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The  role  of  the  royal  master  shipwrights  therefore  changed  from  their 
previous  position  at  the  centre  of  naval  construction  to  a  much  less  sig- 
nificant  position  where  they  were  used  as  'consultant'  shipwrights  to  the 
Norwegian  lensmmnd  and  as  builders  of  small  vessels  at  Bremerholm. 
In  Sweden  the  trend  was  also  away  from  Crown  shipwrights 
towards  the  use  of  private  contractors,  but  here  the  contract  was  placed 
with  a  master  shipwright  who  then  worked  at  the  royal  dockyard  and 
used  the  dockyard's  workforce.  Sweden  also  continued  to  purchase  a 
large  number  of  her  warships74. 
In  England  it  became  common  practice  for  the  Crown  shipwrights  to 
also  run  their  own  private  yards  and  naval  vessels  were  built  both  at 
the  royal  dockyards  and  at  the  private  yards.  A  similar  situation  also  oc- 
curred  in  Denmark  with  Balfour's  private  shipyard  at  Christianshavn,  but 
this  lasted  only  for  a  period  of  around  10  years. 
Denmark  was  therefore  not  alone  in  changing  the  method  by  which 
warships  were  built,  but  in  terms  of  later  developments  in  Denmark, 
Christian  IV's  trend  towards  diversification  of  the  means  of  warship  con- 
struction  turned  out  to  be  a  bit  of  a  false  turn.  After  the  introduction  of 
absolutism  in  1660  Bremerholm  once  again  became  the  main  centre  for 
warship  building  and  the  royal  master  shipwrights  regained  their  position 
at  the  centre  of  the  navy.  This  trend  back  to  centralised  naval  construc- 
tion  was  so  strong  that  by  the  end  of  the  17th  century  Bremerholm  was 
no  longer  sufficient  as  the  main  naval  shipbuilding  yard  and  a  new  dock- 
yard,  called  Nyholm,  was  built  when  the  coastal  defences  around 
Copenhagen  were  improved.  However,  Christian  IV  was  not  to  know  this 
and  the  financial  and  political  crises  of  his  own  day  forced  him  to  take 
the  measures  he  did. 
------------------- 
74.  Michael  Roberts,  Gustavus  Adolphus:  A  History  of  Sweden  1611-1632  II,  (London,  1958),  288-9. 
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officials  were  not  used  by  later  regimes  to  construct  warships,  but  the 
need  for  them  was  drastically  reduced  after  the  removal  of  the  rigsrdd 
and  the  reform  of  the  len  system.  The  navy  then  belonged  unequivocally 
to  the  king  and  there  was  no  constitutional  argument  over  who  paid  for 
it  or  how  it  was  used.  Christian  IV's  difficulties  with  the  rigsrid  con- 
cerning  the  number  and  types  of  warships  that  he  wished  to  build  had 
forced  him  to  diversify  into  other  methods  of  warship  construction.  When 
absolutism  was  introduced  this  problem  no  longer  existed  and  warship 
building  returned  to  Bremerholm  on  a  large  scale. 
Christian  IV  was  also  by  no  means  the  only  European  monarch  to 
experience  political  difficulties  over  , 
financing  the  construction  of  new 
warships.  In  England  Charles  I  raised  the  'ship  money'  to  get  around  the 
problem  of  an  unsupportive  parliament.  In  many  respects  by  by-passing 
parliament  to  raise  additional  finance  for  his  navy  Charles  I  was  emulat- 
ing  what  Christian  IV  had  done  with  the  Sound  tolls.  However,  by  the 
1630s  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  Christian  IV  to  increase  his  income  in 
order  to  finance  the  navy  and  to  get  around  the  political  differences  with 
the  rigsräd  he  was  forced  instead  to  seek  alternative  ways  of  financing 
the  construction  of  ships. 
405 11.  The  Design  of  Danish  Warships 
Some  elements  of  the  process  of  designing  and  building  ships  have  been 
hinted  at  in  previous  chapters.  It  is  now  time  to  look  in  more  detail  at 
how  the  ships  of  the  Danish  navy  were  designed,  how  these  designs  were 
transferred  into  actual  ships,  and  how  successful  the  end  results  were. 
11.1.  The  Design  Process 
The  process  of  designing  a  ship  in  the  early  17th  century  depended  very 
much  on  the  nationality  of  the  shipwright.  Two  distinct  schools  developed 
in  Northern  Europe,  one  in  England  and  one  in  the  Netherlands.  The 
English  method  was  adapted  from  Venetian  practice  and  was  based  on  the 
use  of  plans  to  represent  the  desired  form  of  the  ship  in  miniature'. 
Dutch  Shipwrights  on  the  other  hand  did  not  use  detailed  plans  but  in- 
stead  relied  on  rule-of-thumb  methods  that  enabled  them  to  calculate  the 
proportions  of  a  ship  simply  from  the  desired  length  of  keel2.  Dutch 
ships  were  therefore  built  much  more  by  eye  than  English  ships,  and 
Dutch  shipwrights  were  more  able  to  manipulate  the  form  of  a  ship  during 
the  building  process. 
-------------------- 
1*  The  Venetians  did  not  actually  use  plans  but  used  geometrical  rules  to  define  the  hull  shape. 
Mathew  Baker,  who  visited  Venice  in  1550.  was  the  first  shipwright  to  transfer  these  rules  into  a 
graphical  representation  of  a  ship:  Sergio  Bellabarba,  'The  Ancient  Method  of  Designing  Hulls', 
Mariner's  Mirror,  79  (1993),  274-92. 
2.  The  two  classic  descriptions  of  17th-century  Dutch  shipbuilding  (Nicolaes  Witsen,  Aeloude  en 
Hedendaegse  Scheepsbouw  en  Bestier,  (Amsterdam,  1671)  and  Cornelis  van  Yk,  De  Nederlandse 
Scheepsbouwkonst  opengesteld,  (Amsterdam,  1697)),  make  no  reference  to  plans  at  all,  but 
Rembrandt's  painting  of  The  Shipbuilder  and  his  Wife  (1633)  clearly  shows  a  shipwright  with  a 
rough  sketch  plan  of  a  ship's  keel  and  two  sections  of  the  ship.  Rudimentary  plans  must  there- 
fore  have  been  in  use  in  the  Netherlands,  but  they  were  obviously  not  as  integral  to  the  design 
process  as  in  England.  The  painting  is  illustrated  in  J.  H.  Plumb  3  Huw  Weldon,  Royal  Heritage: 
The  Story  of  Britain's  Royal  Builders  and  Collectors,  (London,  1977).  236. 
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English  method  of  construction  was  to  first  erect  the  frames  of  the  ship 
and  then  apply  the  outer  skin.  Two  separate  methods  were  in  practice  in 
the  Netherlands.  In  the  northern  part  of  the  country  the  hull  planking 
was  built  up  from  the  keel  and  stem  and  stern  posts  and  the  constituent 
timbers  of  the  internal  frames  were  inserted  as  construction  progressed 
upwards.  In  the  south  four  frames  were  erected  on  the  keel,  two  at  mid- 
ships,  and  one  each  at  the  stem  and  stern.  To  these  frames  were  then  at- 
tached  ribbands  that  defined  the  hull  form.  The  remaining  frames  were 
then  fashioned  to  fit  this  form  and  then  the  ribbands  were  successively 
replaced  by  the  final  outer  planking3. 
By  the  17th  century  both  English  and  Dutch  shipwrights  were 
building  using  the  'carvel'  technique.  This  differed  from  the  earlier 
'clinker'  construction  in  that  the  outer  planks  were  laid  edge  to  edge 
rather  than  overlapping.  This  meant  that  much  larger  timbers  could  be 
used  for  the  outer  shell,  making  the  ships  far  stronger.  In  contrast 
Danish  native  shipbuilding  was  still  heavily  influenced  by  the  viking 
tradition  of  clinker  construction.  This  helps  to  explain  why  Danish  mer- 
chant  ships  were  so  small  and  why  foreign  shipwrights  were  called  in  to 
build  the  larger  ships  needed  by  the  navy. 
11.1.1.  Models  &  Plans 
Having  seen  in  previous  chapters  how  much  Christian  IV  was  obsessed  by 
the  details  of  his  various  projects  and  hated  delegation,  it  comes  as  no 
surprise  to  find  that  the  design  of  all  warships  were  subject  to  his  ap- 
------------  -  ------ 
3.  Olof  Hasslof,  'Carve]  Construction  Technique:  Nature  and  Origin'.  Folk-Liv,  21-22  (1657-58), 
49-60;  R.  W.  Unger,  'Dutch  Design  Specialization  and  Building  Methods  in  the  Seventeenth 
Century',  in  C.  O.  Cederlund  (ed.  ),  Postmedieval  Boat  and  Ship  Archaeology,  (Oxford,  1985),  153-64; 
A.  J.  Hoving,  'Dutch  17th-century  Shipbuilding',  Model  Shipwright  58  (1986),  28-36;  Jeremy  Green, 
'The  Planking-First  Construction  of  the  VOC  Ship  Batavia',  in  Reinder  Reinders  and  Kees  Paul 
(eds.  ),  Carvel  Construction  Technique,,  (Oxford,  1991),  70-1;  A.  J.  Hoving,  'A  17th-Century  42-Feet 
Long  Dutch  Pleasure  Vessel:  A  research  into  original  building  techniques',  in  Reinders  and  Paul 
(eds.  ),  Carvel  Construction  Technique,  77-80. 
407 proval.  He  had  a  strong  working  knowledge  of  ship  plans  and  is  known 
to  have  designed  some  vessels  himself.  However,  as  both  English  and 
Dutch  construction  methods  were  used  for  Danish  warships,  plans  could 
not  be  the  sole  means  by  which  the  design  of  vessels  was  judged,  and 
three  dimensional  models  were  also  used  in  the  design  process. 
The  term  skabelon  (model)  is  used  to  describe  both  a  three  dimen- 
sional  model  and  a  two  dimensional  model,  i.  e.  a  plan.  The  same  term  has 
also  been  used  to  describe  construction  templates  used  to  define  specific 
frames4.  Some  confusion  is  therefore  inherent  in  any  discussion  of  the 
use  of  plans  and  models  and  any  differentiation  must  involve  some  ele- 
ment  of  guesswork. 
Three  dimensional  models  were  certainly  used  for  design  approval 
before  two  dimensional  plans.  The  first  use  of  the  term  skabelon  in 
Danish  shipbuilding  comes  in  1555  when  Christian  III  ordered  that  'en 
skabelon  of  trm,  hvorefter  barken  skal  bygges'  (a  wooden  model,  after 
which  the  bark  shall  be  built)5  be  sent  to  him.  Frederik  II  also  used  ship 
models  and  ordered  a  ship  model  2  alen  (1.25m)  to  be  built  to  the  same 
design  as  Fortuna.  This  model,  however,  was  built  after  the  ship  had 
been  completed  and  could  only  have  been  used  for  reference  or  decora- 
tive  purposes6. 
Christian  IV  continued  this  model  building  tradition  and  in  Balfour's 
contract  for  the  Tre  kroner  it  was  stated  that  the  ship  was  to  be  built 
'effter  thed  Skabelun  hand  konng:  Ma:  der  aff  vnderdannigst  haffuer  Of- 
fuerantwordett'  (after  the  model  he  has  humbly  delivered  to  H.  M.  )7.  This 
may  have  been  the  same  model  for  which  he  was  issued  timber  to  'giOre 
-------------------- 
4.  Preben  Holck,  Cart  Adeler,  (K$)enhavn,  1934),  107. 
5.  .  l*rgen  H.  Barfod,  Christian  IILs  f)Ade,  (K4benhavn,  1995).  108. 
6.  Barfod,  Christian  Ill.  s  flAde,  152. 
7.  Contract  with  Balfour,  March  1602,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber  1601/02,  f.  602-5. 
408 schabelon  Vdaff'  (make  a  model  from)  at  the  end  of  16018. 
The  most  detailed  account  of  the  use  of  models  in  the  design  of 
ships,  though,  is  given  in  the  Koldinghus  len  accounts  for  1610/11.  In 
these  accounts  there  is  a  heading  that  reads  as  follows: 
Udgivet  og  bekostet  pA  1  skibsskabelon,  som  kgl.  maj.  sely  har 
afridset  og  udkastet  pä  den  lange  sal  her  pä  slottet,  og  straks  udi 
hans  maj.  egen  overvwrelse  den  har  ladet  hugge,  h4vle  og 
forfaerdige  udaf  fyrredeller,  fyrrelaegter  og  fyrrespir,  sä  og  andet 
jerntgj,  spiger  og  sqm  med  efterskrevne  hAndvaerksmcmnd,  han  dertil 
har  brugt,  som  hans  maj.  med  dem  har  i  hans  maj.  naervaerelse 
ladet  rejse  og  opsaette  nedenfor  slottet  udi  staldgärden,  hvorefter 
hans  maj.  nAdigst  ville  lade  opsaette  og  bygge  1  skib  her  for  Kol- 
dinghus  udaf  hans  maj.  skove  her  pä  lenet. 
Issued  and  paid  for  öne  ship's  model,  which  H.  M.  has  himself  traced 
out  and  sketched  in  the  long  room  here  in  the  castle,  and  which  he 
in  his  own  immediate  presence  has  had  carved,  planed  and  finished 
from  fir  deals,  laths  and  spars,  and  for  the  ironwork,  spikes  and 
nails,  along  with  the  undernamed  craftsmen  used  on  it,  which  H.  M. 
has,  in  his  own  presence,  let  erect  and  set  up  outside  the  castle  in 
the  stableyard,  after  which  H.  M.  will  have  set  up  and  built  here  at 
Koldinghus  one  ship  using  H.  M.  's  woods  here  in  the  len. 
The  subsequent  entries  show  that  a  total  of  18  local  shipwrights, 
joiners,  carpenters  and  sawyers  worked  on  the  model  for  a  total  of  84 
man-days,  costing  a  total  of  531  Dlr.  1  Mk  141  sk.  The  model  used  16 
-------------------- 
8.  Entries  dated  November  and  December  1601,  Rigsarkiv,  Marinearkivet  for  1655,28.  Bremerholms 
T*mmerregnskaber,  1601/02. 
409 tylvt.  (dozen)  timbers  plus  64  alen  (40m)  of  mast  spars,  4000  iron  spikes 
and  nails  and  90  iron  screws,  and  24  fathoms  (60m  approx.  )  of  hemp 
cable9. 
This  was  obviously  a  very  large  and  sophisticated  model  that, 
judging  from  the  materials  used,  must  have  been  built  as  a  complete  min- 
iature  ship  including  all  the  framing,  planking,  masting  and  rigging,  and 
not  just  a  simple  carved  construction  designed  to  show  the  basic  form  of 
the  vessel.  The  model  was  then  able  to  be  used  to  estimate  the  timber 
required  for  the  actual  ship  and  the  shipwright  and  his  sawyers  were 
subsequently  instructed  to  fell  a  total  of  5785  alen  (3633m)  of  timber  from 
the  local  woods. 
The  local  shipwright  who  was  employed  to  build  the  model  was  not 
used  to  build  the  full  sized  ship,  and  instead  Claus  Jansen  was  brought 
over  from  Copenhagen.  This  provides  us  with  an  important  clue  in  the 
use  of  models  by  Christian  IV.  Clearly  they  were  not  simply  built  by  the 
Crown  shipwrights  in  order  to  gain  approval  from  the  king,  and  models 
were  not  specific  to  the  shipwrights  that  built  them.  The  king  could  also 
design  his  own  models  and  then  pass  on  the  design  to  his  shipwrights  to 
construct  the  desired  ship.  However,  this  process  could  not  be  said  to 
have  been  an  unmitigated  success  as,  as  we  have  already  seen'O,  the  ves- 
sel  in  question  capsized  on  launching.  Whether  this  was  a  fault  of  the 
design  or  in  the  construction  or  interpretation  of  the  design  by  Jansen 
will  never  be  known  but  it  does  highlight  the  difficulties  involved  in  the 
whole  design  process. 
The  greatest  difficulty  appears  to  have  been  experienced  when 
models  designed  by  Christian  IV  were  issued  to  shipwrights.  Apart  from 
the  case  of  the  Kolding  galley  we  can  follow  the  consequences  of  this 
-------------------- 
9.  Birgitte  Dedenroth-Schou,  Koldinghus  lens  regnskaber  1610-11,  (Km)enhavn,  1984),  254-57. 
10.  See  Chapter  9. 
410 method  in  the  construction  of  Trefoldighed.  Christian  IV  stated  that  the 
ship  was  to  be  built  'Epther  den  Skabelun,  ieg  derpa  giiordt  haffde' 
(after  the  model  I  have  made  of  it)",  but  when  the  ship  was  delivered  it 
was  found  that  the  shipwright  had  not  followed  his  design  and  the  ship 
had  to  be  rebuilt  by  Robbins12.  Part  of  the  problem  undoubtedly  was 
that  the  Dutch  shipwright  was  expected,  using  his  own  rule-of-thumb 
methods,  to  replicate  Christian  IV's  design  which  was  most  likely  first 
produced  as  a  plan  using  English  methods. 
As  the  Koldinghus  accounts  show,  Christian  IV  was  experienced,  if 
not  exactly  skilled,  in  the  art  of  ship  draughting.  His  design  for  two 
identical  barges  built  in  1640  is  still  extant13  and  although  the  vessel 
depicted  is  fairly  rudimentary  it  does  show  that  he  understood  the  basics 
of  ship  design.  In  this  instance  the  plan  was  used  in  the  same  way  as 
the  models  discussed  above,  to  specify  a  design  for  a  ship  that  was  then 
passed  on  to  a  shipwright  to  construct. 
Christian  IV  could  not  possibly  have  designed  all  of  his  ships  and 
from  the  surviving  evidence  we  would  need  to  conclude  that  plans  were 
more  normally  drawn  up  by  the  shipwrights  themselves.  Several  of 
Balfour's  plans  have  survived14  and  in  1618  Sinclair  was  issued  with 
paper  to  'bruge  till  at  Affridtze  schabeluner  paa  till  Hans  May:  skiibe' 
(use  to  trace  out  plans  of  H.  M.  ships  on),  and  in  1631  he  also  received 
two  sheets  of  paper  on  which  to  draw  the  plans  of  Norske  LOve15. 
However,  the  king  still  had  the  final  say  in  the  design  and  all  plans  or 
------------------- 
11.  Letter  to  Corfitz  Ulfeldt,  listed  as  1640?  but  more  likely  1842,  C.  F.  Bricks  &  J.  A.  Fredericia 
(eds.  ),  Kong  Christian  den  Fjerdes  egenhaindige  Brevß  VII,  77. 
12.  See  Chapters  9  and  10. 
13.  See  Appendix  A. 
14.  See  Appendix  A. 
15.  Payments  to  book-binders,  5  September  1618  &  25  May  1631,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber 
1618/19,  p.  800;  1631/32,  f.  204. 
411 models  had  to  be  approved  by  him  before  any  ship  was  built. 
11.1.2.  The  Shipbuilding  Contract 
After  a  design  was  approved  a  formal  contract  was  drawn  up  with  the 
shipwright.  There  was  no  consistency  in  who  actually  issued  the  contract, 
the  Rentekammer,  Danske  kancelli  and  the  Tyske  kancelli  all  issued  con- 
tracts.  Contracts  were  also  only  issued  for  those  ships  that  were  built 
either  by  private  contractors  or  by  the  Crown  shipwrights  when  they 
operated  as  contractors.  There  must  also  have  been  some  agreement  with 
the  shipwrights  building  ships  as  state  employees  but  no  details  of  any 
such  agreement  have  survived. 
At  first  the  contracts  were  vague  and  imprecise.  They  stipulated 
simply  the  keel  length  or  tonnage  and  perhaps  the  arrangement  of  decks 
and  masts16.  Even  for  a  ship  the  size  of  Tre  kroner  the  contract  simply 
stated  that  it  was  to  be  built  in  a  similar  way  to  Argo,  or  a  little  smaller, 
as  per  the  agreed  model17.  No  specific  dimensions  or  proportions  were 
given. 
This  changed  in  1613  when  Peter  Michelsen  was  given  his  first  con- 
tract.  The  background  to  this  change  was  most  likely  that  because 
Michelsen  was  Dutch  and  did  not  use  plans  in  the  way  that  Balfour  did, 
Christian  IV  had  to  stipulate  far  more  clearly  the  form  and  structure  of 
the  vessel  in  the  actual  contract.  The  fact  that  Christian  IV  was  also  or- 
dering  a  ship  from  completely  outwith  the  state  system  for  probably  the 
first  time  would  also  have  had  some  influence  on  the  style  of  contract. 
Much  thought  went  into  the  wording  of  the  contract  and  the  details 
------------------- 
16.  Details  of  contracts  with  Balfour,  Rigsarkiv,  Rentemesterregnskaber  1597/98,  f.  444-6;  and 
1601/02,  f.  602-5;  Kancelliets  Brevbbger,  20  December  1604. 
17.  See  Chapter  B. 
412 which  it  specified.  Christian  IV  himself  drew  up  the  first  draft  on  14 
December  1613,  this  was  reworked  on  20  December  and  the  third  and  final 
version  was  issued  on  28  December18. 
The  final  contract  specified  the  keel  length,  breadth  and  depth  of 
the  vessel,  the  rakes  of  the  stem  and  stern  posts  and  the  width  of  the 
transom19.  The  arrangement  of  decks,  cabins,  masts,  rudder  and  gun 
ports  were  also  specified  and  the  scantlings  of  the  ships  structure  were 
all  minutely  detailed.  For  some  reason  the  details  of  the  sails  and  rigging 
which  Christian  IV  specified  in  his  original  draft  did  not  make  it  into  the 
final  contract. 
Preben  Holck  states  that  Christian  IV  consulted  Balfour  on  the  final 
form  of  the  contract20,  but  as  Balfour  was  in  prison  at  this  time  this 
would  seem  unlikely.  It  is  difficult  to  believe,  however,  that  the  king  did 
not  consult  an  experienced  shipwright  before  issuing  the  contract  and 
perhaps  Jansen  was  involved  in  the  process.  The  fact  that  the  initial 
draft  is  in  the  king's  hand,  though,  and  that  the  final  version  contained 
only  minor  changes  to  his  own  dimensions,  clearly  shows  that  Christian  IV 
fully  understood  the  process  and  technicalities  of  shipbuilding  and 
design. 
From  this  time  on  the  contracts  issued  to  the  Crown  shipwrights 
also  became  much  more  detailed.  To  begin  with  they  were  not  quite  as 
sophisticated  or  as  precise  as  the  contracts  with  Michelsen,  but  they 
gradually  increased  in  complexity  until  they  were  comparable  to  the  1613 
contract.  With  Balfour's  contract  for  Hummeren  in  1623  there  came  another 
------------------- 
18.  Contract  with  Michelson,  14  December  1613;  an  additional  rough  copy  20  December  and  the 
final  contract  of  28  December  1613,  Rigsarkiv,  TKIA,  A12,  Registrerede  koncepter  til  Patenter  II, 
1611-14.  The  contract  of  14  December  is  published  in  egenhandige  Breve,  1,77-81;  and  the  con- 
tracts  of  14  and  28  December  are  published  in  English  translation  in  P.  Holck.  'Danish  Shipbuild- 
ing  in  1813',  Mariner's  Mirror,  XVIII  (1932),  81-6. 
19.  The  transverse  timber  immediately  above  the  stern  post 
20.  Holck.  'Danish  Shipbuilding  in  1613',  84. 
413 significant  change  in  that  the  contract  specified  the  draught  of  the  com- 
pleted  ship.  This  was  a  notoriously  difficult  measurement  to  predict  and 
along  with  a  vessel's  tonnage,  was  surrounded  by  a  certain  element  of 
mystery  and  mystique.  An  outline  draft  of  the  contract  exists,  which  may 
be  in  Balfour's  own  hand21,  and  if  this  is  so  it  shows  that  he  must  have 
had  an  almost  unheard  of  faith  in  his  abilities.  A  shipwright  would  not 
have  introduced  such  an  onerous  condition  into  a  contract  of  his  own 
volition  unless  he  was  absolutely  sure  of  what  he  was  doing. 
It  has  been  widely  assumed  that  Anthony  Deane  in  England  was  the 
first  shipwright  to  devise  a  method  of  predicting  the  draught  of  a  vessel 
before  launching.  In  fact  the  method  may  have  been  in  existence  for  some 
time  before  Deane  first  described  it  in  his  Doctrine  of  Naval  Architecture 
of  1670.  Deane's  method  was  actually  very  simple.  An  approximate  area 
was  calculated  for  every  third  frame  using  either  an  average  radius  or  a 
network  of  triangles.  These  were  multiplied  by  the  distance  between  three 
frames  to  give  a  volume.  The  sum  of  these  volumes  along  the  length  of 
the  ship  then  provided  the  total  volume  of  displacement,  which  when  mul- 
tiplied  by  the  density  of  water  gave  the  tonnage  displacementn.  By  cal- 
culating  the  weight  of  the  ship  the  draught  could  then  be  calculated. 
Whether  this  was  the  method  used  by  Balfour  will  never  be  known,  but 
given  his  knowledge  of  mathematics  the  computation  of  areas  and  volumes 
would  have  presented  him  with  little  difficulty. 
21.  Balfour's  handwriting  cannot  be  identified  with  certainty  but  one  sentence  is  written  in  the 
first  person.  However,  elsewhere  'M:  Dauidt'  is  referred  to  in  the  third  person.  The  contract 
price  and  delivery  date  have  been  added  by  another  hand  at  the  end  of  the  contract,  and  on 
the  reverse,  in  yet  another  hand,  is  written  'Steen  Willomsens  fortegnelse  paa  it  schib  som  schalt 
byge'  (Sten  Villomsen's  outline  of  a  ship  which  shall  be  built).  An  explanation  may  be  that  Bal- 
four  wrote  the  contract,  passed  it  on  to  the  Holmens  admiral,  who  then  passed  it  on  to  the 
Danske  kancelli  for  official  sanction.  The  final  contract  contained  exactly  the  same  information 
but  in  a  slightly  different  word  order,  and  written  entirely  in  the  third  person.  Rigsarkiv. 
Danske  kancelli,  6164,  IX,  pk.  06,  lg  17. 
22.  Brian  Lavery.  Deane's  Doctrine  of  Naval  Architecture,  (London,  1981),  22-5  &  71-3. 
414 The  Hummeren  contract  therefore  represents  a  highly  significant 
moment  in  shipbuilding  history,  being  the  earliest  evidence  that  a  cal- 
culation  for  displacement  was  in  existence  long  before  Deane.  As  it  is  also 
the  first  known  example  of  a  vessel's  draught  being  stipulated  at  the 
design  stage  it  is  worth  quoting  the  contract  in  its  entirety23: 
Skibet  skal  vaere  40  Al.  langt  i  Kmlen,  Bjmlkerne  13  Al.  lange,  Faldet 
fra  Stavnen  111  Al.,  Faldet  fra  Skudstavnen  2  Al.,  Bredden  of 
Hidsbjmlkerne  7  Al.  3  Kv.,  Skpringen  agter  4  Al.,  immellem  Overlgbet 
og  Overkanten  of  Kobryggebjmlkerne  3  Al.,  Dybden  mellem  Foringen 
og  den  nedre  Kant  paa  Overl4pbsbjmlkerne  skal  vaere  3  Al.,  Bredden 
of  Flagen  11  Al.;  Indholterne  i  Skibet  skulle  vaere  ferst  11  Tommer 
og  siden  opad  10,9,8,7,6  og  5  Tommer.  Mester  David  skal 
anordne  Master,  Staenger,  Raaer,  Skibsbaad  med  dens  Tilbehpr  samt 
K4pjer  og  Kahytter,  saaledes  som  Fortingningen  kan  taale,  saa  K4jer 
og  Kahytter  blive  vel  udpanelede  med  godt  Snedkervmrk,  som  det 
sig  bqir,  med  Borde,  Baenke,  K4jer  og  andet,  som  behaves  i  Kahytter. 
Endvidere  skal  han  lave  Arkeliet,  Kabyssen,  Butteriet,  Kabelrum, 
Sejlkammer,  Krudtkammer,  Hgvedsmandskmlder  og  andre  Skillerum  og 
Kammerser,  som  et  Orlogsskib  behipver,  med  alt  andet,  som  okse,  Nav 
og  Hgvl  udkraever,  intet  undtaget  i  nogen  Maade.  Ligeledes  skal  han 
lave  Gallionen  vel  stafferet  og  udskaaret  med  Snedker-  og 
Billedskaerervaerk  og  Kongens  og  Kronens  Vaaben  bag  paa  Skibet. 
Naar  Skibet  er  fmrdigt,  skal  det  stikke  5  Wateralen.  Mester  David 
skal  sely  skaffe  sig  Folk  til  at  lQfte,  lette,  slaebe  og  baere,  medens 
Skibet  staar  paa  Baenkestokken,  og  skal  sely  skaffe  sig  de 
ngdvendige  Savskmrerarbejde,  Driften  og  Digten,  saa  det  kan  vaere 
fuldstaendig  faerdigt  til  St.  Laurits  Dag  1624.  Han  skal  herfor  have 
------------------ 
23.  Contract  with  Balfour.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  2  October  1623. 
415 3500  Dlr.  in  Specie,  Daleren  beregnet  til  6  Mk.,  at  udbetale  ham  i 
Rentekammeret  i4  Terminer,  den  fgrste  straks  paa  Haanden,  den 
anden  naar  Skibet  er  et  Barkholt  hgjt,  den  tredje,  naar  Skibet  kom- 
mer  i  Vandet,  og  den  fjerde,  naar  Skibet  er  helt  faerdigt.  Kongen 
vil  skaffe  Mester  David  Jaernvaerket,  T4mmer,  og  andet,  som  behaves 
til  Skibsbygningen.  Endvidere  har  Kongen  bevilget,  at  Mester  David 
maa  faa  Folk,  Blokker,  Tov  og  andet,  som  behaves  til  at  skyde 
Skibet  of  Baenkestokken  i  Sgen,  naar  det  er  faerdigt. 
The  ship  shall  be  40  alen  (25.1m)  long  in  the  keel,  the  beams  13 
alen  (8.2m)  long,  the  rake  forward  111  alen  (7.2m),  the  rake  aft  2 
alen  (1.3m),  the  breadth  of  the  transom  73/4  alen  (4.9m),  the  rising 
line  aft24  4  alen  (2.5m),  between  the  main  deck  and  the  beam  of  the 
half-deck25  3  alen  (1.9m),  the  depth  between  the  ceiling25  and  the 
lower  edge  of  the  main  deck  beams27  shall  be  3  alen  (1.9m),  the 
breadth  of  floor  11  alen  (6.9m)28;  the  ceiling  timbers  of  the  ship 
shall  be  first  11  tommer  (inches)  and  then  upwards  to  10,9,8,7, 
6,  and  5  tommer  (287-130mm).  Master  David  will  arrange  the  masts, 
topmasts,  yards,  ship's  boat  with  its  fittings,  as  well  as  berths  and 
cabins,  such  that  the  fore-  and  aftercastles25  require,  berths  and 
cabins  are  to  be  well  panelled  with  good  joinery  work  as  they 
-------------------- 
24.  The  height  of  deadwood  above  the  keel. 
25.  Free  deck  height 
26.  Internal  planking. 
27.  Depth  in  hold. 
28,  This  measurement  is  actually  incorrect,  and  the  plan  of  Hummeren,  shows  a  more  realistic 
width  of  floor  of  8  alen  (5m).  This  mistake,  however,  was  continued  in  all  subsequent  contracts 
based  on  the  Hummeren  design. 
29.  From  the  Dutch  vertuining.  (Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  13  March  1631,  note  4). 
416 should  be,  with  tables,  benches,  bunks  and  other  things  needed  in 
the  cabins.  In  addition  he  shall  make  the  magazine,  the  galley,  the 
cellar30,  cable  tier,  sail  room,  powder  room,  boatswain's  store  and 
other  bulkheads  and  compartments  that  a  warship  requires,  with 
everything  else  which  requires  axe,  auger  and  plane,  with  no  ex- 
ceptions.  Likewise  he  shall  make  the  figure-head  well  ornamented 
and  carved  with  joinery  and  carving  work  and  the  king's  and  the 
crown's  coats  of  arms  on  the  stern  of  the  ship.  When  the  ship  is 
completed  it  will  draw  5  wasser  alen  (2.75m).  Master  David  will  him- 
self  hire  men  to  lift,  drag  and  carry  while  the  ship  stands  on  the 
stocks,  and  shall  himself  provide  the  necessary  sawyer  work  and 
caulking,  so  that  it  can  be  completely  finished  by  St.  Lawrence  Day 
(10  August)  1624.  For  this  he  shall  have  3500  Dlr.  in  specie,  the 
Daler  reckoned  at  6  Mk.,  to  be  paid  to  him  from  the  Rentekammerin 
four  instalments,  the  first  immediately  in  hand,  the  second  when 
the  ship  is  a  wale31  high,  the  third  when  the  ship  is  launched  and 
the  fourth  when  the  ship  is  completely  finished.  The  king  will 
provide  Master  David  with  the  ironwork,  timber,  and  everything 
that  is  required  for  building  the  ship.  In  addition  the  king  has 
granted  that  Master  David  may  have  men,  blocks,  tackle  and  any- 
thing  else  required  to  push  the  ship  off  the  stocks  into  the  sea 
when  it  is  complete. 
All  subsequent  shipbuilding  contracts  issued  to  the  Crown 
shipwrights  and  Christoffer  Gjge  were  essentially  the  same  as  this  with 
minor  variations,  depending  on  the  particular  circumstances  relating  to 
who  was  to  build  the  ship,  where  it  was  to  be  built,  and  how  it  was  to 
-------------------- 
30.  The  editor  of  Kancelliets  Brevbbger  suggests  bottle  store,  from  the  Dutch  botteliet 
31.  A  longitudinal  strengthening  timber  attached  to  the  outside  of  the  frames. 
417 be  paid  for.  The  thing  that  varied  most  was  the  amount  of  materials 
provided.  Some  contracts,  such  as  the  one  above,  provided  everything 
needed  to  build  the  ship  except  the  manpower,  others  might  provide  just 
the  ironwork  and  masts,  and  some  provided  nothing  at  all,  with  the  con- 
tractor  expected  to  procure  everything  from  the  private  sector. 
From  1628  the  second  instalment  was  usually  paid,  not  when  con- 
struction  reached  the  first  wale,  but  when  'KDl,  Stavn,  Spaenderne, 
Bordstokkene  og  Kolsvinene  er  lagt  og  Plankerne  udenpaa  slaaet  paa' 
(keel,  stem  and  stern  posts,  frames,  floors  and  keelson  are  laid  and  the 
planking  fixed  to  the  outside)32.  Apart  from  one  or  two  exceptions33  ,  the 
degree  of  technical  specification  was  similar  to  that  contained  in  the  Hum- 
meren  contract,  and  all  stipulated  the  draught  of  the  vessel.  Another  in- 
novation  came  in  Sinclair's  contract  for  Norske  Love  in  1631  when  the 
draught  was  specified  both  at  amidships  and  at  the  stern.  This  is  there- 
fore  the  first  contract  '  known  to  specify  a  vessel's  trim34. 
11.1.3.  The  Finished  Ship 
Despite  all  the  care  and  attention  paid  to  drawing  up  detailed  contracts 
the  ships  that  were  built  from  them  nearly  always  varied  from  the 
specified  dimensions.  Most  were  built  larger  than  the  contract  dimensions, 
such  as  Balfour's  Tre  kroner  and  Michelsen's  Fides,  but  some  were 
also  built  smaller.  The  wide  variation  in  dimensions  can  be  seen  if  we 
look  at  the  series  of  ships  built  to  the  same  contract  as  Tre  Lover.  We 
know  the  finished  dimensions  of  four  of  these  vessels.  To  Lover  and  Sorte 
-------------------- 
32.  Contract  with  Sinclair.  Kancelliets  Brevbmger.  7  February  1628. 
33.  For  example  Balfour's  contract  for  two  copies  of  Postillionen,  Kancelliets  Brevb4ger,  25 
January  1625. 
34.  Contract  with  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  13  March  1631. 
35.  See  Chapter  S. 
36.  See  Chapter  10. 
418 be  paid  for.  The  thing  that  varied  most  was  the  amount  of  materials 
provided.  Some  contracts,  such  as  the  one  above,  provided  everything 
needed  to  build  the  ship  except  the  manpower,  others  might  provide  just 
the  ironwork  and  masts,  and  some  provided  nothing  at  all,  with  the  con- 
tractor  expected  to  procure  everything  from  the  private  sector. 
From  1628  the  second  instalment  was  usually  paid,  not  when  con- 
struction  reached  the  first  wale,  but  when  'Kql,  Stavn,  Spaenderne, 
Bordstokkene  og  Kplsvinene  er  lagt  og  Plankerne  udenpaa  slaaet  paa' 
(keel,  stem  and  stern  posts,  frames,  floors  and  keelson  are  laid  and  the 
planking  fixed  to  the  outside)32.  Apart  from  one  or  two  exceptions33  ,  the 
degree  of  technical  specification  was  similar  to  that  contained  in  the  Hum- 
meren  contract,  and  all  stipulated  the  draught  of  the  vessel.  Another  in- 
novation  came  in  Sinclair's  contract  for  Norske  Love  in  1631  when  the 
draught  was  specified  both  at  amidships  and  at  the  stern.  This  is  there- 
fore  the  first  contract  known  to  specify  a  vessel's  trims'. 
11.1.3.  The  Finished  Ship 
Despite  all  the  care  and  attention  paid  to  drawing  up  detailed  contracts 
the  ships  that  were  built  from  them  nearly  always  varied  from  the 
specified  dimensions.  Most  were  built  larger  than  the  contract  dimensions, 
such  as  Balfour's  Tre  kroner45  and  Michelsen's  Fides",  but  some  were 
also  built  smaller.  The  wide  variation  in  dimensions  can  be  seen  if  we 
look  at  the  series  of  ships  built  to  the  same  contract  as  Tre  Lover.  We 
know  the  finished  dimensions  of  four  of  these  vessels.  To  Lover  and  Sorte 
32.  Contract  with  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  7  February  1628. 
33.  For  example  Balfour's  contract  for  two  copies  of  Postillionen,  Kancelliets  Brevbmger,  25 
January  1625. 
34.  Contract  with  Daniel  Sinclair,  Kancelliets  Brevboger,  13  March  1631. 
35.  See  Chapter  8. 
36.  See  Chapter  10. 
418 Rytter  were  measured  at  Bremerholm  in  connection  with  GjOe's  application 
for  additional  payments  and  Delmenhorst  and  Fenix  were  measured  for  the 
Dutch  alliance  of  1653.  The  dimensions  are  given  in  Table  11.1. 
Contract  Length 
Shi  wriht  Date  Btwn  Posts  Breadth  Depth  in  Hold 
Contract  Dimensions  1628  551  13  3 
To  Lgver  Balfour  1628  521  12  33/4 
Delmenhorst  Andersen/Gjpe  1632  621  14  9/4 
Sorte  Rytter  Andersen/GjOe  1633  61  10/4  4; 
Fenix  Brandt/Gjoe  1639  91  143/4  53/4 
Table  11.1.  Dimensions  of  Tre  Lover  Class  Ships 
Sources  letter  fron  Gip,  c.  1639-44,  Rigsarkiv,  Danske  KancePi,  B160,  Ind18g  hi  registre  og  koncepter, 
Preben  Hoick,  'Flaadefister  omkring  Krigsaarene  1644-4',  Tidskrift  for  S,  vase4114  (1943),  560-1. 
Not  one  of  the  ships  as  built  matches  the  specified  dimensions.  The 
To  Lover  was  a  little  smaller  than  the  contract,  while  the  rest  were 
larger.  The  length  was  exceeded  by  as  much  as  12.5%,  and  the  breadth 
by  13.5%,  but  the  widest  variations  were  found  in  the  depth  in  hold, 
which  varied  by  as  much  as  90%. 
There  were  a  number  of  reasons  for  these  variations.  Each 
shipwright  would  have  his  own  idiosyncrasies  and  rules  of  thumb  that 
were  used  in  the  construction.  The  suitability  and  availability  of  timber 
may  also  have  played  a  part  but  it  was  most  likely  the  anticipation  of 
additional  payments  that  encouraged  shipwrights  to  build  their  ships 
larger. 
In  contrast  to  England,  where  contractors  were  paid  on  a  pound 
per  ton  basis,  the  Danish  contracts  stated  the  total  contract  price  at  the 
outset.  Thus  the  shipwrights  were  not  guaranteed  any  extra  money  if 
they  produced  a  larger  ship,  but  in  some  cases  additional  payments  were 
paid,  such  as  the  300  Rdlr.  awarded  to  GjQe  for  the  construction  of 
DelmenhorstW. 
37.  See  Chapter  10. 
419 Therefore  despite  Christian  IV's  efforts  to  regulate  the  design  of 
his  ships  through  the  use  of  plans,  models  and  contracts,  he  was  not 
guaranteed  to  actually  receive  a  ship  that  matched  his  expectations. 
However,  apart  from  one  or  two  instances,  this  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  too  much  of  a  problem,  so  long  as  he  received  a  seaworthy  ship  of 
roughly  the  right  size  and  proportion.  The  most  notable  exception  was 
the  Trefoldighed,  which  was  ordered  to  be  significantly  rebuilt38,  but  on 
the  whole  the  ships  were  accepted  and  the  shipwrights  paid  their  full 
contract  price,  even  if  the  ship  delivered  did  not  exactly  match  the  con- 
tract  specifications. 
11.2.  Design  Analysis 
Balfour's  plans3g,  illustrated  in  Appendix  A,  are  the  earliest  known  work- 
ing  ships  drawings  in  existence,  and  as  such  they  deserve  comparison 
with  the  theoretical  treatises  on  shipbuilding  that  began  to  appear  at  the 
end  of  the  16th  and  beginning  of  the  17th  century. 
The  first  theoretical  treatises  on  shipbuilding  came  out  of  Venice  in 
the  15th  and  16th  centuries.  These  were  far  from  clear  demonstrations  of 
the  shipwright's  art  and  were  probably  more  in  the  form  of  aide  memoires 
containing  certain  methods,  rules  and  proportions  used  in  the  Venetian 
Arsenal.  By  the  end  of  the  16th  century  Iberian  shipwrights  were  also 
beginning  to  outline  their  methods  of  construction  and  both  Italian  and 
Iberian  treatises  continued  to  appear  in  the  early  years  of  the  17th 
century40.  However,  Balfour's  plans  are  so  obviously  different  to  the 
ships  contained  in  these  treatises  that  any  comparison  would  be  pointless. 
38.  See  Chapters  9  and  10. 
39.  Rigsarkiv,  Smetatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  1-9. 
40.  R.  C.  Anderson,  'Early  Books  on  Shipbuilding  and  Rigging',  Mariner's  Mirror,  10  (1924),  53-64; 
John  E.  Dotson,  'Treatises  on  Shipbuilding  before  1650',  in  R.  W.  Unger  (ed.  ),  Cogs,  Caravels  and 
Galleons,  (London,  1994),  160-8. 
420 It  is  therefore  to  English  treatises  that  we  must  turn  for  comparison. 
A  number  of  manuscript  treatises  on  shipbuilding  were  produced  in 
England  in  the  late  16th  and  early  17th  century.  The  earliest  is  the 
manuscript  attributed  to  Mathew  Baker  and  commonly  called  Fragments  of 
Ancient  English  Shipwrightry41.  This  dates  from  the  1580s  and  consists  of 
a  number  of  drawings  and  mathematical  examples.  The  text  is  far  from 
clear  and  is  of  little  use;  the  drawings,  however,  are  of  great  value.  The 
design  drawing  of  a  ship  of  around  1000  tons  has  been  used  in  the  fol- 
lowing  comparison. 
Around  1600  another  two  treatises  appeared.  Both  were  written  by 
unknown  authors,  and  both  contain  essentially  the  same  details.  The  first, 
known  as  the  Scott  Manuscript42,  has  been  dated  to  between  1590-1605, 
and  the  second,  now  known  as  the  Newton  Manuscript43,  to  1599-1603.  In 
contrast  to  the  Baker  MS,  these  treatises  contain  no  drawings  but  instead 
give  a  series  of  general  rules  and  proportions  for  the  construction  of  a 
ship's  lines  and  the  mathematical  calculations  needed  to  draw  them. 
A  more  complex  treatise  was  written  by  the  mathematician  Thomas 
Harriot  around  1608-1044,  but  despite  taking  a  much  more  mathematical 
------------------ 
41.  The  manuscript  is  in  the  Pepysian  Library,  Magdelene  College,  Cambridge  (MS  PL  2820)  and 
has  never  been  published  in  full.  The  drawings,  though,  have  been  published  extensively,  for 
example  in:  Frank  Howard,  Sailing  Ships  of  War  1400-1860,  (London,  1979). 
42.  The  MS  is  in  the  library  of  the  Royal  Institution  of  Naval  Architects  (RINA  No.  798).  Although 
it  has  never  been  published  it  is  discussed  in:  William  A.  Baker,  'Early  Seventeenth-Century  ship 
Design',  American  Neptune,  14  (1954),  262-77:  and  J.  F.  Coates,  'The  Authorship  of  a  Manuscript  on 
Shipbuilding  c.  1600-1620',  Mariner's  Mirror,  67  (1981),  285-6.  Coates  refutes  an  earlier  claim  that 
the  author  was  George  Waymouth  and  Baker  suggests  that  it  may  in  fact  be  a  translation  of  a 
Venetian  document. 
43.  It  exists  only  as  a  copy  taken  by  Isaac  Newton  around  1700.  The  MS  is  in  Cambridge  Univer- 
sity  Library  (MSS  Add.  4005,  Part  12)  and  has  been  published  in:  Richard  Barker,  'A  Manuscript 
on  Shipbuilding,  Circa  1600,  Copied  by  Newton',  Mariner's  mirror,  80  (1994),  16-29. 
44.  Jon  V.  Pepper,  'Harriot's  Manuscript  on  Shipbuilding  and  Rigging  (ca.  1608-10)',  in  Five 
Hundred  Years  of  Nautical  Science,  (London,  1981),  204-15. 
421 approach  to  ship  design,  his  results  remain  remarkably  similar  to  the  em- 
pirical  methods  used  in  the  earlier  treatises.  A  fifth  treatise  was  written 
by  another  unknown  author  around  162045.  This  follows  the  same  basic 
method  of  the  Scott  and  Newton  MSS  in  giving  certain  basic  rules  and 
proportions  for  the  building  of  ships,  followed  by  a  step  by  step  guide  to 
creating  the  plan  for  a  ship  of  550  tons,  with  all  the  mathematical  calcula- 
tions  involved. 
All  of  these  design  methods  were  based  on  the  'whole-moulding' 
process  of  construction,  which  was  derived  from  Venetian  practice  in  the 
mid  16th  century.  By  this  method  the  midship  section  is  the  key  to  the 
form  of  the  ship  and  much  of  the  content  of  the  treatises  is  concerned 
with  its  design  using  various  arcs  of  circles.  The  frames  forward  and  aft 
are  then  created  by  using  the  same  basic  shape  but  raising  and  narrow- 
ing  it  according  to  the  rising  lines  shown  on  the  profile,  and  the  narrow- 
ing  lines,  shown  on  the  plan. 
With  these  five  treatises,  and  the  plans  derived  from  them  by  their 
commentators,  we  are  able  to  understand  the  process  of  early  17th  cen- 
tury  English  shipbuilding  in  great  detail.  Armed  with  this  information  we 
can  now  look  at  how  Balfour's  methods  compare  to  English  theoretical 
practice. 
The  first  thing  that  one  observes  is  that  Balfour's  plans  are  drawn 
almost  exactly  in  accordance  with  the  English  whole-moulding  technique. 
The  midship  sections  are  constructed  in  a  similar  manner,  starting  with  a 
flat  floor  and  then  using  four  arcs  of  circles.  Certain  stylistic  variations 
exist,  though,  such  as  showing  the  port  side  of  the  plan  elevation  rather 
------------------- 
45.  The  MS  is  in  the  Admiralty  papers  in  the  PRO  (Ms.  9:  Orders  and  Instructions  of  the  Duke  of 
York,  1660).  It  has  been  published  in:  W.  Salisbury  and  R.  C.  Anderson  (eds.  ),  A  Treatise  on 
Shipbuilding  and  a  Treatise  on  Rigging  written  about  1620-24  Society  for  Nautical  Research  Oc- 
casional  Publication  No.  6,  (London,  1958).  and  reprinted  in:  Peter  Kirsch,  The  Galleon,  (London. 
1990),  165-203.  The  author  has  been  cited  as  probably  John  Wells  the  mathematiciam  and  Clerk 
and  Storekeeper  at  Deptford:  Richard  Barker,  'Design  in  the  Dockyards  about  1600',  in  Reinders 
and  Paul  (eds.  ),  Carvel  Construction  Technique,  (Oxford,  1991),  61-69. 
422 than  the  starboard  side,  or  both  sides,  which  seemed  to  be  preferred  in 
England.  On  some  plans  the  midships  section  is  missing,  but  the  presence 
of  rising  and  narrowing  lines  show  that  they  must  have  existed  on  a 
separate  sheet. 
Although  the  same  basic  design  principles  were  used  there  are 
marked  differences  in  the  actual  forms  of  Balfour's  vessels.  This  was  not 
simply  a  stylistic  variation  on  Balfour's  part,  but  an  answer  to  a  very 
real  problem.  The  English  method  produced  ships  with  a  deep  draught, 
however,  the  Baltic  coastline  is  considerably  shallower  than  English  coas- 
tal  waters  which  meant  that  ships  of  a  shallower  draught  were  needed.  To 
complicate  matters,  the  water  in  the  Baltic  is  also  brackish,  rather  than 
the  fully  salt  water  of  the  North  Sea  or  Atlantic.  As  the  water  is  less 
dense  it  supports  a  lesser  weight,  with  the  result  that  ships  sink  deeper 
in  the  Baltic.  Therefore  the  use  of  an  unaltered  English  design  would 
have  been  doubly  inappropriate. 
Balfour  solves  this  problem  by  designing  a  much  fuller  underwater 
hull  form,  providing  a  far  greater  buoyancy  for  a  given  tonnage  than  the 
English  methods  produce.  The  differences  in  design  are  shown  in  Figure 
11.1. 
As  with  English  practice,  Balfour  uses  four  arcs  of  circles  to  create 
his  midship  sections,  but  his  designs  are  less  neat  and  geometrically  for- 
mal  than  the  English  method.  However,  there  was  no  logical  reason  to 
design  the  curves  of  a  ship  with  the  centres  and  radii  of  the  arcs  form- 
ing  a  neat  geometrical  pattern,  apart  from  theoretical  simplicity.  Balfour 
was  clearly  not  afraid  to  deviate  from  accepted  theoretical  dogma  and 
shows  a  certain  ingenuity  and  a  willingness  to  innovate.  He  does  not  have 
one  set  method  either  but  instead  adapts  his  hull  forms  for  each  in- 
dividual  ship. 
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Fig.  11.11.  a.  Theoretical  English  Midship  Section 
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Figure  11.1.  Midship  Section  Designs 
-  -, 
.. 
''-.  ' 
d 
__-ý7 
---3;  ý 
424 
Fig.  11.1.  e.  Hummeren ý_. 
If  we  look  first  at  the  small  warship  (Des.  E.  7.  )  we  see  that  this  is 
the  ship  that  nearest  resembles  the  English  method.  There  are  a  number 
of  differences,  however,  the  most  important  being  that  it  has  a  greater 
width  of  floor,  and  the  first  curve,  known  as  the  'sweep  of  the  wrong 
head'  is  much  sharper,  giving  a  much  fuller  hull. 
Tre  kroner  is  also  similar  to  the  English  designs.  Its  width  of  floor 
is  fairly  narrow,  and  the  'sweep  of  the  wrong  head'  has  a  similar  radius 
as  the  English  ships.  The  second  curve,  however,  known  as  the  'futtock 
sweep'  has  a  sharper  radius  and  so  gives  a  fuller  hull.  This  line  also 
continues  above  the  line  of  maximum  breadth  which  is  highly  unusual. 
The  third  curve,  known  as  the  'upper  sweep',  therefore  lies  above  the 
maximum  breadth  and  has  the  effect  of  curving  the  tumble  home  much 
tighter  inwards.  In  common  with  all  of  Balfour's  designs  the  fourth  curve, 
known  as  the  'hollowing  sweep',  has  the  same  radius  as  the  'upper 
sweep',  and  is  therefore  much  smaller  than  English  practice,  where  the 
radius  was  in  some  cases  as  much  as  the  full  breadth  of  the  ship. 
The  medium  sized  warship  (Des.  E.  7.  )  is  similarly  constructed  using 
four  arcs  but  has  a  fuller  section  than  either  the  small  warship  or  Tre 
kroner.  This  is  achieved  by  using  a  greater  width  of  floor  and  a  sharper 
'sweep  of  the  wrong  head',  as  well  as  bringing  the  futtock  sweep  up  to 
the  maximum  breadth.  The  'upper  sweep'  also  has  a  much  larger  radius 
than  English  practice  but  by  having  the  centre  of  the  arc  below  the  line 
of  maximum  breadth  the  tumblehome  is  significantly  increased. 
When  we  look  at  Hummeren,  however,  we  see  that  its  design  bears 
no  relation  to  English  practice  whatsoever.  There  is  no  flat  bottom.  In- 
stead  the  floor  timbers  rise  at  an  angle,  and  make  up  nearly  two  thirds 
the  width  of  the  ship.  The  curvature  is  then  made  of  just  two  arcs  of 
equal  radius.  This  is  very  much  influenced  by  Dutch  design  methods.  The 
425 precise  design  methods  used  by  the  Dutch  to  create  the  midship  section 
is  not  known,  but  we  do  know  that  their  full  hull  forms  were  created  by 
having  a  wide  floor,  frequently  also  with  a  deadrise46,  and  a  sharp  turn 
of  bilge.  What  Balfour  has  done  with  Hummeren  is  create  a  Dutch  style 
ship  using  English  design  methods,  which  gives  further  credence  to  the 
assertion  that  the  design  was  based  initially  on  Peter  Michelsen's  Fides47. 
If  we  turn  now  from  the  midship  section  to  the  general  proportions 
of  the  vessels  we  can  see  that  there  are  again  certain  similarities  with 
the  English  design  methods,  but  also  some  crucial  differences.  To  examine 
these  certain  basic  proportions  have  been  extracted  from  the  English 
treatises  and  compared  with  measurements  taken  from  Balfour's  plans.  The 
results  are  shown  in  tables  11.2.  and  11.3. 
The  treatises  frequently  use  different  rules  for  the  same  design 
feature.  For  example  some  take  a  proportion  of  the  breadth  for  a  certain 
measurement  while  others  use  the  depth.  In  order  to  make  useful  com- 
parisons,  all  these  proportions  have  been  rationalised.  Certain  ratios  and 
proportions  would  also  naturally  vary  according  to  the  size  and  function 
of  the  vessel,  and  since  the  theoretical  treatises  tended  to  base  their 
design  criteria  on  medium  to  large  sized  warships  some  caution  must  be 
exercised  when  comparing  them  with  Balfour's  smaller  ships. 
------------------- 
46.  The  angle  the  floor  timbers  rise  from  the  flat. 
47.  See  Chapter  B. 
426 Baker  Newton  Harnot  Treatise  c,  1620 
Keel  length/Breadth  2.6  2-3  2-3  2-3 
Depth  in  Hold/Breadth  0.46  0.5  -  0.33  0.38  0.5  -  0.33 
Depth  in  Hold/Keel  length  0.18  0.11-  0.25  0,13  -  0.19  0.15 
Maximum  Breadth  0.33  LK  aft  0.5  -  0.25  LK  aft  0.33  U  aft  0.33  Li  aft 
Width  of  Floor/Breadth  0.2  0.33  -  0.5  0.31  0.25-0.33 
Radius  of  Fwd  rake  0.72  B  0.58  -  1.25  B  1B  0.75  -18 
Rake  of  Stern  Post  20'  18  -  221'  221'  18  -  22' 
Breadth  of  Transom  0.28  B  0.5-0.578  -  0.53  B 
Tumblehome  0.13  B  0.168  0.24  B  0.17  B 
Table  11.2.  Proportions  of  English  Theoretical  Ships 
Medium  Ship  Small  Ship 
Tre  kroner  Argo  Hummeren  (Des.  E.  7,  (Des.  E.  7.  ) 
Keellength/Breadth  256  124  3.12  3.19  3.21 
Depth  in  Hold/Breadth  0.46  0.44  0.30  0.49  0.43 
Depth  in  Hold/Keel  length  0.18  0.14  0,10  0.15  0.14 
Maximum  Breadth  0.33  I.  i  aft  0.31  In  aft  0.33  lx  aft  ? 
Width  of  Floor/Breadth  0.31  0.45  0.3  0.42  0.44 
Forward  Rake  0.798  1B  0.9  B  0.88  B  1.35  8 
Rake  of  Stern  Post  ?  16'  14.  }'  17'  23' 
Breadth  of  Transom  ?  0.67  8  0.668  ?  ? 
Tumblehome  0.22  B  ?  0.14  8  0.35  B  0.24  B 
Table  11.3.  Proportions  of  Balfour's  Ships 
The  length  to  breadth  ratio  in  all  but  Tre  kroner  is  considerably 
larger  than  that  recommended  by  the  English  treatises.  This  was  most 
likely  to  compensate  for  the  increase  in  the  hull's  fullness,  since  a 
greater  length  to  breadth  ratio  helps  to  reduce  a  vessel's  resistance, 
while  a  fuller  hull  form  will  increase  its  resistance.  The  fuller  hull  form 
also  has  an  effect  on  the  depth  to  breadth  and  the  depth  to  length 
ratios.  If  an  English  hull  form  were  used  an  increase  in  length  to 
breadth  ratio  would  require  compensatory  changes  in  these  ratios  to 
achieve  the  same  buoyancy.  By  using  a  fuller  hull  form,  however,  the  ad- 
ditional  buoyancy  is  gained  without  altering  the  other  ratios,  which 
remain  more  or  less  within  the  limits  suggested  by  the  treatises. 
427 The  position  of  the  maximum  breadth,  at  one  third  of  the  keel 
length  aft  of  the  forefoot48,  is  also  the  same  as  English  practice.  This 
placed  the  'midship'  section  slightly  forward  of  amidships,  which  provided 
greater  buoyancy  forward  to  counteract  the  force  of  the  sails.  It  also 
provided  a  good  run  in  to  the  rudder,  which  was  needed  for  good 
manoeuvrability. 
The  forward  rake  initially  seems  the  same  as  that  stipulated  in  the 
English  treatises,  equal  to  slightly  more  or  less  than  the  vessels  breadth. 
Balfour  also  uses  the  English  style  rake,  consisting  of  a  single  arc  tan- 
gential  to  the  keel.  This  was  an  unsatisfactory  design  feature  in  that  it 
resulted  in  the  forward  end  of  the  ship  having  very  little  buoyancy.  This 
had  two  disadvantages.  Firstly  cannon  could  not  be  placed  too  far  for- 
ward,  as  there  was  nothing  to  support  their  weight,  and  secondly  it  also 
meant  that  the  ship  was  prone  to  violent  pitching  motions.  However,  in 
Balfour's  designs  the  breadth  is  proportionately  less  and  so  the  ratio  of 
rake  to  keel  length  is  lower,  which  would  help  to  alleviate  these  problems 
to  some  extent. 
The  angle  of  the  stern  post  in  Balfour's  designs  was  generally 
less  than  in  the  treatises.  The  angle  of  the  rudder  actually  had  little  ef- 
fect  on  its  efficiency  but  a  smaller  angle  had  certain  advantages  in  that 
it  was  easier  to  install  the  rudder  in  the  first  place,  it  placed  less  stress 
on  the  rudder,  fixings  once  in  place,  and  was  easier  to  operate. 
The  width  of  the  transom  on  Balfour's  ships  was  much  greater  than 
in  the  early  English  treatises.  This  had  the  advantage  of  creating  much 
more  space  at  the  stern  of  the  ship,  both  for  comfort  and  for  the 
positioning  of  cannon.  These  features  show  that  Balfour  was  anticipating 
-------------------- 
48.  The  forward  end  of  the  keel. 
428 English  developments  by  several  decades  and  it  is  interesting  that  Deane 
not  only  uses  a  similar  angle  of  stern  post  but  also  uses  the  same  tran- 
som  as  Balfour,  of  two  thirds  the  breadth. 
The  width  of  floor  to  breadth  ratio  is  approximately  double  that 
which  was  recommended  in  the  English  treatises,  but  this  is  hardly 
surprising  since  increasing  the  flat  part  of  the  hull  was  the  easiest  way 
of  increasing  the  vessel's  fullness.  Balfour  also  uses  a  slightly  larger 
tumblehome.  This  meant  that  the  structure  was  more  difficult  to  construct 
but  it  had  the  advantage  of  increasing  stability  since  the  weight  of  both 
the  structure  of  the  upperworks  and  the  cannon  were  nearer  the 
centreline.  It  also  meant  that  in  battle  the  ship  would  be  more  difficult  to 
board. 
As  we  have  already  seen  there  was  also  a  significant  Dutch  in- 
fluence  on  Balfour's  designs,  but  as  there  are  no  Dutch  treatises  on  ship 
design  from  the  early  17th  century  we  are  unable  to  make  as  detailed  a 
comparison  with  Dutch  design  methods.  However,  we  do  know  that  Dutch 
ships  were  characterised  by  having  a  fuller  hull  form,  incorporating  a 
greater  sheer49  and  a  larger  tumblehome  than  English  ships,  and  all  these 
characteristics  can  be  found  in  Balfour's  ships  to  some  extent. 
As  stated  above,  Hummeren  is  the  warship  that  most  embodies  Dutch 
design  principles,  but  the  Dutch  influence  can  also  be  seen  markedly  in 
the  defensionskib  (Des.  E.  8.  )  which,  since  it  was  primarily  a  merchantman, 
bears  little  relation  to  the  warship  designs.  With  its  bluff  bows  and 
rounded  stern,  and  a  keel  length  to  breadth  ratio  of  4:  1,  it  bears  a 
remarkable  similarity  to  the  Dutch  fluit3.  The  midship  section  is  very 
full,  providing  a  large'  cargo  space  with  a  low  centre  of  buoyancy  and 
shallow  draught.  However,  whereas  the  fluit  was  solely  a  cargo  ship,  with 
-------------------- 
49.  The  curvature  of  the  upper  deck. 
50.  R.  W.  Unger,  'Dutch  Ship  Design  in  the  15th  and  16th  Centuries',  Viator,  4  (1973),  387-411; 
429 perhaps  one  or  two  guns  mounted  on  the  upper  deck,  Balfour  adapted 
the  design  to  create  an  armed  merchantman  with  a  full  gun  deck  above 
the  cargo  hold. 
What  then  was  the  overall  effect  of  all  these  design  variations? 
English  vessels  were  built  for  the  high  seas  with  a  deep  draught 
for  keeping  the  seas,  but  this  meant  that  their  lower  gun  ports  could  be 
opened  only  in  calm  weather.  Their  slender  hulls  were  good  in  terms  of 
speed,  but  also  made  them  prone  to  crankness  and  it  was  not  uncommon 
for  English  ships  to  need  additional  timbers  added  to  the  hull  along  the 
waterline  to  increase  stability  and  seaworthiness. 
Dutch  vessels  on  the  other  hand  were  designed  for  shallow  draught 
to  enable  them  to  negotiate  their  shallow  home  waters,  which  had  the 
advantage  that  their  lower  gun  ports  were  well  out  of  the  water. 
However,  while  their  fuller  hulls  p  rovided  a  stable  gun  platform  in  calm 
weather,  heavy  seas  could  lead  to  violent  rolling51.  Their  flat  bottoms 
also  gave  them  the  tendency  to  drift  off  course  and  hampered  their 
weatherli  ness52. 
The  design  of  Balfour's  ships  would  not  only  have  benefitted  from 
the  increased  overall  stability  of  the  Dutch  designs,  gained  from  the  in- 
creased  buoyancy,  but  by  adapting  English  midship  sections  his  ships 
would  have  been  more  seaworthy  in  heavy  weather.  The  relatively  smaller 
forward  rake  and  more  vertical  sternposts  would  also  have  reduced  the 
tendency  to  pitch,  if  only  slightly.  Where  Balfour  uses  a  Dutch  style  mid- 
ship  section,  as  in  Hummeren,  he  introduces  a  considerable  deadrise 
which  was  beneficial  for  both  the  vessel's  speed  and  its  weatherliness, 
and  considerably  reduced  its  tendency  to  drift. 
-------------------- 
51.  R.  W.  Unger,  'Design  and  Construction  of  European  Warships  in  the  17th  and  18th  centuries', 
in  Martine  Acerra,  Jose  Merino  and  Jean  Meyer  (eds.  ),  Les  Marines  de  guerre  europdennes, 
XVIIe-XVIIIe  siecles,  (Paris,  1985).  21-34. 
52.  The  ability  to  sail  close  to  the  wind. 
430 If  we  look  at  the  uses  to  which  Danish  warships  were  put  this 
hybrid  form  of  ship  design  makes  complete  sense.  Great  strength  and 
seaworthiness  were  needed  in  vessels  sailing  the  treacherous  northern 
seas,  but  shallow  draught  and  manoeuvrability  were  needed  for  vessels 
sailing  the  shallow  waters  of  the  Baltic  coast  and  the  Elbe  estuary. 
Rather  than  having  two  separate  specialised  fleets  for  these  markedly 
different  roles,  Balfour  designed  ships  which  were  able  to  accomplish 
both  functions.  Judging  from  the  success  of  his  vessels,  the  result 
should  not  be  seen  as  a  compromise  but  as  an  innovative  synthesis  of 
Dutch  and  English  design  methods  which  created  ships  incorporating  the 
best  features  from  both  traditions. 
11.3.  Danish  Ship  Design  in  a  European  Context 
The  pivotal  role  that  Christian  IV  played  in  the  design  of  his  country's 
warships  was  not  unique  in  early  modern  Europe,  but  it  was  exceedingly 
rare,  with  perhaps  Henry  VIII  and  Frederik  the  Great  being  the  only 
other  monarchs  with  quite  as  much  influence.  The  system  required  a 
monarch  with  a  very  detailed  knowledge  of  ship  design  and  construction, 
and  with  Christian  IV's  love  of  ships  and  obsession  with  minor  details  he 
was  ideally  placed  to  be  the  ultimate  authority  for  approving  designs. 
However,  having  such  a  strong  willed  monarch  who  thought  he  always 
knew  best  did  not  always  produce  the  best  results,  as  we  have  seen  with 
the  Kolding  galley  and  Trefoldighed. 
In  other  countries  where  the  naval  bureaucracy  was  more  mature 
the  role  of  the  king  in  ship  design  was  minimal.  The  monarch  may  have 
had  a  personal  interest  in  certain  ships,  particularly  the  prestige  ships, 
but  in  general  the  naval  administrations  ordered  ships  to  their  own 
specifications  from  shipwrights  who  then  designed  and  built  these  ships 
431 from  this  specification.  When  the  Danish  Admiralty  College  was  established 
in  1655  it  too  took  over  the  function  of  checking  and  ratifying  designs 
for  new  ships53. 
That  Christian  IV  knew  the  fundamentals  of  ship  design  is  un- 
disputed  but  whether  he  was  really  competent  to  either  design  or  assess 
the  designs  of  the  increasingly  larger  and  more  complex  warships  is 
debatable.  From  the  one  plan  which  we  can  definitely  attribute  to  him 
(Des.  E.  1.  )  it  would  appear  that  his  design  skill  was  certainly  limited, 
even  for  small  craft.  Using  this  limited  knowledge  to  design  the  model  for 
Trefoldighed,  the  largest  ship  in  the  navy  at  the  time,  must  be  called 
into  question.  It  cost  around  50,000  Rdlr.  to  build  in  the  first  place, 
needed  substantial  rebuilding  once  delivered,  and  was  noted  for  being  a 
particularly  poor  sailer.  Christian  IV  could  of  course  simply  argue  that 
the  shipwright  had  not  carried  out  his  instructions  properly. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  naval  bureaucracy  in  Denmark  was  so 
rudimentary,  certain  developments  in  ship  design  were  very  advanced. 
Ship  models  were  used  in  Venice  and  Spain  in  the  16th  century,  but  their 
use  as  a  design  tool  in  Denmark  was  very  advanced  for  northern  Europe. 
The  first  known  use  of  a  model  in  the  design  process  in  England  is 
Phineas  Pett's  model  of  the  Prince  Royal,  which  he  presented  for  approval 
to  the  Lord  High  Admiral  in  1607,  but  their  use  did  not  become  stan- 
dard  in  England  until  the  later  half  of  the  17th  century.  The  practice  of 
the  king  himself  building  models,  which  his  shipwrights  then  turned  into 
ships,  is  certainly  unique,  but  probably  displays  Christian  IV's  own  in- 
ability  to  delegate  rather  more  than  a  real  advance  in  the  ship  design 
process. 
-------------------- 
53.  Commission  for  Admiralty  College  member  concerned  with  shipbuilding,  8  June  1656,  published 
in:  Bruun,  Cart  Adeler,  394. 
54.  Richard  Barker  originally  suggested  that  Mathew  Baker  used  models,  citing  evidence  from  his 
will,  but  he  later  revised  his  opinion  on  this  and  now  suggests  that  the  'models'  were  in  fact 
plans:  Barker,  'Design  in  the  Dockyards',  61-69. 
432 Danish  shipbuilding  contracts  were  also  relatively  advanced  for 
their  day.  From  the  scant  information  we  have  on  shipbuilding  contracts 
from  other  countries  at  this  time  we  can  see  that  the  Dutch  navy  issued 
contracts  to  private  contractors  in  the  16th  century,  but  the  earliest 
known  contract  for  an  English  naval  ship  comes  as  late  as  1649. 
In  terms  of  the  content  of  the  contracts  it  would  appear  that 
Michelsen's  contract  of  1613  was  roughly  similar  to  Dutch  practice.  A 
Dutch  contract  issued  to  a  private  contractor  in  1583  follows  the  same 
basic  format,  giving  the  basic  dimensions  of  the  ship  and  outlining  the 
internal  scantlings  in  some  detail,  although  Michelsen's  contract  contains 
even  more  detail.  The  English  contract  of  1649  strikes  a  middle  line  be- 
tween  the  specifications  given  in  Michelsen's  contracts  and  those  given  to 
the  Danish  Crown  shipwrights.  However  it  is  much  more  wordy  and  legal 
sounding  than  any  of  the  Dutch  or  Danish  contracts.  It  stipulates  the 
principal  dimensions,  the  internal  arrangement,  and  the  scantlings,  but  in 
slightly  less  detail  than  in  Michelsen's  contract.  Neither  the  Dutch  nor  the 
English  contract  specifies  the  vessel's  draught,  and  even  an  English  con- 
tract  as  late  as  1695  makes  no  mention  of  the  ship's  draught57. 
If  we  turn  now  to  the  actual  design  of  the  ships  we  can  see  that 
Danish  naval  architecture  was  also  very  advanced.  English  ship  design 
was  to  some  extent  bogged  down  in  theoretical  dogma,  seen  to  dramatic 
effect  in  the  ten  'whelps'  built  in  1627,  which  were  a  particularly  unsuc- 
cessful  attempt  to  use  large  warship  theory  to  build  small  vessels,  result- 
ing  effectively  in  miniature  warships  which  were  particularly  noted  for 
their  poor  sailing  qualities58.  In  the  Netherlands  the  craft  tradition 
-------------------- 
55.  R.  C.  Anderson,  'A  Collection  of  Shipbuilding  Contracts',  Mariner's  Mirror,  41  (1955),  47-52. 
56.  W.  Voorbeytel  Cannenburg  &  R.  C.  Anderson,  'Details  of  a  Dutch  Ship  of  1583',  Mariner's  Mir- 
ror,  13  (1927),  272-4. 
57.  Contract  for  the  Yarmouth  published  in:  Brian  Lavery,  The  Ship  of  the  Line,  (London,  1984), 
11,165-7. 
58.  Michael  Oppenheim,  A  History  of  the  Administration  of  the  Royal  Navy  1509-1660,  (1898, 
London),  254-6. 
433 produced  some  highly  innovative  merchant  ship  designs,  but  the  mercan- 
tile  base  of  Dutch  shipbuilding  meant  that  warships  were  heavily  in- 
fluenced  by  merchant  ship  designs,  and  many  of  the  Dutch  warships  were 
in  fact  simply  armed  merchantmen.  The  Dutch  craft-based  design  methods 
also  hampered  the  development  of  effective  large  warships  to  some  extent. 
This  is  shown  to  dramatic  effect  in  Sweden  where  the  large  64  gun 
Vasa,  built  by  Dutch  shipwrights  in  1628,  sank  on  its  maiden  voyage.  In 
Sweden  both  British  and  Dutch  shipwrights  were  employed  but  there  is 
no  evidence  to  suggest  that  they  adapted  their  design  methods  in  the 
way  that  Balfour  did  in  Denmark. 
Balfour  managed  to  incorporate  the  best  features  of  both  traditions 
to  build  a  navy  that  answered  the  particular  needs  of  Christian  IV  in 
maintaining  sovereignt  y  in  both  the  Baltic  and  northern  seas.  Balfour  of 
course  did  not  build  the  entire  navy,  but  he  had  a  major  influence  on 
the  other  shipwrights  and  the  large  number  of  ships  built  to  his  designs 
bears  testimony  to  his  success  as  a  ship  design  er. 
With  the  lack  of  any  concrete  evidence  we  cannot  really  assess  the 
abilities  of  Christian  IV's  other  master  shipwrights  in  any  detail59. 
Sinclair  was  certainly  very  talented  and  his  Store  Sophie  drew  particular 
praise,  and  Robbins,  as  well,  was  also  highly  skilled  in  the  construction 
of  large  vessels.  Quite  how  highly  they  rank  in  a  wider  European  context 
though  is  hard  to  judge. 
Balfour  must  certainly  rank  as  a  man  of  great  genius  and  talent 
and  deserves  to  stand  alongside  Mathew  Baker,  Phineas  Pett  and  Anthony 
Deane  as  one  of  the  foremost  shipwrights  of  his  day.  His  designs  show  a 
-------------------- 
59.  No  plans  or  models  by  the  other  shipwrights  have  survived  and  only  one  contract  survives 
for  a  ship  designed  by  Sinclair,  (Norske  Love).  None  of  Robbins'  contracts  have  survived,  and 
those  that  have  survived  for  the  other  state  shipwrights  are  for  copies  of  ships  designed  by 
Balfour.  The  use  of  contemporary  illustrations  in  assessing  ship  design  is  unsatisfactory  since 
the  underwater  hull  forms  remain  hidden  and  in  many  cases  the  ships  have  been  rebuilt  between 
the  time  they  were  built  and  when  they  were  drawn.  (Niels  Probst,  'Van  de  Velde  portratter  of 
danske  orlogsskibe'.  Marinehistorisk  Tidsskrift,  1/1981,6-15,  'Samtidige  illsutrationer  of  danske 
1600-tals  orlogsskibe:  Van  de  Velde  tegninger  W.  Marinehistorisk  Tisdsskrift  3/1984,9-29). 
434 remarkable  degree  of  ingenuity  and  foresight  and  his  ability  to  predict  a 
vessel's  draught  deserves  great  credit.  Although  both  English  and  Dutch 
shipwrights  were  employed  in  Denmark  to  build  ships  in  their  own  style 
after  his  death,  it  was  the  synthesis  of  styles,  initially  developed  by  Bal- 
four,  that  formed  the  basis  of  the  Danish  school  of  naval  architecture  in 
the  late  17th  and  early  18th  centuries80. 
Therefore,  despite  Christian  IV's  great  enthusiasm  for  ship  design 
it  was  to  the  Danish  navy's  great  advantage  that  he  did  not  design  all  of 
its  ships  and  employed  much  more  accomplished  shipwrights  to  create  the 
majority  of  a  fleet  that  was,  in  design  terms,  highly  innovative  and  suc- 
cessful. 
------------------- 
60.  Niels  Probst,  'Nordeuropaisk  spanteopslagning  i  1500-  og  1600-tallet',  Maritim  Kontakt,  16 
(1993),  7-42. 
435 Conclusions 
The  one  over-riding  factor  that  has  dominated  this  investigation  of  the 
Danish  navy  is  the  overwhelming  influence  of  the  king.  Christian  IV 
was  involved  at  all  levels  of  the  functioning  of  the  navy:  he  formulated 
the  policies  which  determined  the  uses  to  which  the  navy  was  put;  he 
dictated  the  number  of  ships  to  be  built  and  closely  monitored  their 
design  and  construction;  he  supervised  the  development  of  the  dockyard; 
he  took  overall  control  of  its  administration  and  attempted  to  do  the  same 
with  its  finances;  and  he  personally  commanded  the  ships  in  battle.  Few, 
if  any,  other  monarchs  in  the  early  modern  period  had  such  an  over- 
whelming  influence  over  their  navy. 
With  Christian  IV's  driving  ambition  there  is  little  wonder,  there- 
fore,  that  the  Danish  navy  under  his  control  grew  to  be  one  of  the 
greatest  state-owned  navies  in  Europe.  In  part  the  size  of  the  navy  was 
determined  by  geography.  The  fact  that  the  seas  to  which  Denmark- 
Norway  claimed  sovereignty  over  were  separate  meant  that  in  effect  the 
navy  had  to  be  double  the  size.  However,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
Christian  IV's  views  of  his  own  prestige  and  royal  reputation  played  a 
huge  part  in  the  development  of  the  navy. 
The  Danish  navy  played  a  significant  role  in  European  power 
politics.  Undoubtedly  its  greatest  influence  was  in  the  Baltic  and  here  it 
helped  to  prevent  Poland  and  the  Empire  from  building  any  significant 
maritime  power.  The  other  major  power  in  the  Baltic  in  the  17th  century 
was  Sweden  and  here  Christian  IV  met  his  match.  No  matter  how  hard  he 
might  try  he  simply  could  not  eclipse  the  power  of  Sweden  and  through  a 
mixture  of  bad  diplomacy,  bad  judgement  and  bad  luck  he  ultimately  lost 
most  of  Denmark's  influence  in  the  Baltic  to  his  neighbour. 
436 The  Baltic  was  not  the  Danish  navy's  only  sphere  of  influence, 
however.  By  controlling  the  Sound,  the  White  Sea  route  and,  for  much  of 
Christian  IV's  reign,  the  Elbe  as  well,  the  Danish  navy  controlled  vir- 
tually  all  imports  and  exports  to  northern  Germany,  Poland,  Sweden,  and 
Russia.  With  the  economies  of  England  and  the  Netherlands  relying  so 
heavily  on  Baltic  trade  it  was  therefore  inevitable  that  the  strength  of 
the  Danish  navy  would  play  a  significant  part  in  the  formulation  of 
English  and  Dutch  foreign  policy  in  eastern  Europe.  The  strong  naval 
presence  in  the  Danish  East  India  Company  and  other  trading  companies 
also  meant  Denmark's  influence  lay  well  beyond  the  confines  of  north- 
ern  Europe. 
The  strength  of  the  Danish  navy  also  put  Christian  IV  in  a  strong 
negotiating  position  on  the  European  stage.  In  many  respects  it  was  the 
control  of  the  Sound  rather  than  the  navy  itself  that  was  the  major  fac- 
tor,  but  by  having  such  a  strong  navy  Denmark  could  demonstrate  that 
this  control  was  inviolable.  All  the  northern  European  maritime  powers 
respected  this  control  whilst  the  Danish  navy  remained  powerful.  Only 
after  Danish  naval  strength  was  decimated  during  the  Torstenssonkrig 
did  the  Dutch  dare  to  risk  evading  toll  payments. 
Despite  this  position  of  strength  Christian  IV  was  unable  to  secure 
any  defensive  alliance  with  any  of  the  other  European  maritime  powers. 
In  part  this  was  due  to  his  own  impatience  in  negotiating  but,  more  im- 
portantly,  his  heavy  handed  Sound  toll  policies  created  more  enemies  than 
friends.  However,  during  the  English  civil  war  it  was  probably  only  the 
outbreak  of  the  Torstenssonkrig  that  prevented  Danish  ships  from  sup- 
porting  Christian  IV's  nephew,  Charles  I. 
It  is  likely  that  without  such  a  powerful  navy  Denmark  would  have 
remained  on  the  periphery  of  European  politics.  With  the  navy  Christian 
IV  could  force  other  powers  to  take  note  of  Danish  interests.  It  would  be 
437 pointless,  however,  to  argue  that  Denmark  was  one  of  the  great  powers  in 
early  modern  Europe,  but  without  his  navy  Christian  IV's  political  weight 
in  Europe  would  have  been  greatly  diminished. 
The  Danish  navy  under  Christian  IV  was  therefore  of  great 
European  significance,  but  how  good  a  navy  was  it? 
In  terms  of  hardware  and  infrastructure  the  Danish  navy  was  one 
of  the  best  in  Europe.  The  best  available  shipwrights  and  dockyard  en- 
gineers  were  brought  to  Denmark  to  create  a  navy  whose  ships  were  well 
designed  and  whose  dockyard  provided  for  their  every  need.  David  Bal- 
four  is  the  shipwright  who  had  the  greatest  influence  on  the  Danish  navy 
and  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  11  that  he  was  one  of  the  most  innovative 
and  forward  thinking  shipwrights  of  his  day.  The  other  foreign 
shipwrights  were  not  as  accomplished  as  Balfour  but  still  highly  skilled. 
The  ships  they  created  were  among  the  largest  in  Europe  and  it  is  to 
their  credit  that  the  majority  of  them  were  considered  good  sailers  and 
effective  warships. 
To  service  these  ships  Christian  IV  hired  skilled  Dutch  harbour  en- 
gineers  and  architects  to  create  one  of  the  finest  integrated  dockyards  in 
Europe  whose  match  could  only  be  found  in  the  Venetian  Arsenal.  The 
concentration  of  facilities  at  Copenhagen  made  the  construction  and  main- 
tenance  of  the  navy  highly  efficient,  in  early  modern  terms  at  least,  and 
reduced  the  need  to  duplicate  resources,  as  in  England. 
The  development  of  these  ships  and  facilities  was  no  accident  as 
this  is  where  Christian  IV's  real  strengths  lay.  His  sense  of  grandeur, 
love  of  detail  and  obsessive  nature  found  their  natural  expression  in 
building  works  that  could  be  seen  and  admired.  His  mind  was  more  at- 
tuned  to  concrete  things  that  he  could  see  and  manipulate,  and  he  took  a 
great  deal  of  pride  and  satisfaction  in  the  impressive  constructions  that 
were  produced  in  his  name.  This  can  be  seen  by  the  fact  that  he 
designed  both  buildings  and  ships  himself.  However,  he  knew  that  he 
438 could  not  produce  everything  himself  and,  partly  to  suite  his  own  vanity, 
and  partly  in  his  effort  to  impress  the  rest  of  Europe,  he  recruited  the 
best  engineers,  craftsmen  and  artists  that  he  could  find. 
Christian  IV's  love  of  detail  and  obsessiveness  also  found  its  ex- 
pression  in  the  development  of  a  detailed  administrative  structure  for  the 
lower  levels  of  the  civil  and  military  sides  of  his  navy.  The  contracts  of 
employment  and  the  regulations  governing  the  working  of  the  dockyard 
and  the  navy  at  sea  are  highly  impressive  for  an  early  modern  state  and 
pre-date  similar  arrangements  in  other  navies  by  several  decades.  In 
practise  these  arrangements  did  little  more  than  formalise  the  existing 
structure  rather  than  provide  an  innovative  new  administration,  but 
given  that  so  few  problems  seem  to  have  been  experienced  at  this  level, 
both  in  the  civil  and  military  sides  of  the  navy,  then  perhaps  this  was 
all  that  was  needed. 
Where  reform  really  was  needed  was  in  the  higher  levels  of  ad- 
ministration  and  control.  At  the  heart  of  the  problem  was  the  dyarchic 
system  of  government  where  political  control  of  the  navy  became  a  highly 
contentious  issue  between  the  two  heads  of  government.  The  rigsrad 
recognised  the  need  for  a  strong  navy  but  wanted  it  to  remain  a  purely 
defensive  force.  In  contrast  Christian  IV  saw  the  navy  not  as  a  form  of 
state  defence,  but  as-  his  own  personal  possession  which  he  could  use  as 
the  means  of  foreign  expansion  and  of  furthering  his  own  influence.  To 
maintain  control  of  the  navy  in  the  face  of  rigsräd  opposition  Christian 
IV  therefore  had  to  circumvent  the  constitution  by  ignoring  the  fact  that 
he  should  have  kept  a  rigshofinester  and  a  rigsadmiral  in  place  at  all 
times,  who  would  have  provided  the  rigsrad  with  influence  over  both  the 
civil  and  military  sides  of  the  navy. 
Christian  IV's  belief  that  the  navy  was  his  own  possession,  rather 
than  an  instrument  of  the  state,  was  reinforced  by  the  confused  nature 
of  naval  finance.  The  cost  of  construction  of  many  of  the  ships  was  met 
439 from  the  king's  own  purse.  However,  as  we  saw  in  Chapter  3,  Christian  IV 
had  engineered  the  situation  whereby  the  Sound  tolls  in  their  entirety 
were  paid  into  his  own  account,  rather  than  simply  any  surplus.  This 
placed  the  king  in  a  much  better  financial  position  than  ever  before  and 
gave  him  increased  power  over  the  rigsrdd,  whose  financial  control  was 
thereby  weakened. 
It  was  the  wrangling  over  naval  finance  that  proved  to  be  the  real 
threat  to  the  effective  running  of  the  navy.  The  problem  was  that 
naval  finance  became  an  emotive  issue  in  the  struggle  between  king  and 
rigsräd  over  the  need  to  reform  the  Danish  economy  from  a  domain  state 
to  a  tax  state.  Christian  IV  exploited  his  financial  position  to  try  and 
force  through  a  reform  of  the  len  system  but  the  rigsräd,  with  their 
privileges  seriously  threatened,  desperately  fought  to  retain  the  status 
quo.  Ironically  it  was  the  semi-feudal  nature  of  Danish  society  that  kept 
the  navy  going  in  the  years  of  deep  financial  crisis,  with  victuals,  men, 
building  materials  and  eventually  whole  ships  being  supplied  from  the  len 
at  no  financial  outlay  from  the  state. 
It  was  most  likely  the  climate  of  antagonism  and  hostility  engen- 
dered  by  this  constitutional  struggle  that  led  to  Christian  IV's  extreme 
distrust  of  delegation.  He  simply  could  not  bear  to  think  that  he  was 
losing  control  of  any  area  of  government.  In  terms  of  the  navy  this  not 
only  meant  that  the  posts  of  rigshofinester  and  rigsadmiral  remained 
vacant  for  long  periods  but  also  meant  that  there  was  no  effective  ad- 
ministration  to  run  the  dockyard.  With  the  greatly  increased  size  of  the 
navy  and  the  dockyard  the  posts  of  Holmens  admiral  and  proviantskriver 
had  become  impossible  tasks  for  just  one  man.  However,  Christian  IV 
either  could  not  see  the  need  for  administrative  reform  or  simply  ignored 
the  need.  What  was  needed  was  a  system  of  delegation  so  that  the  man  at 
the  top  could  maintain  control  while  his  junior  managers  saw  to  the  more 
mundane  aspects  of  the  job,  but  with  Christian  IV's  fear  of  delegation 
440 this  was  simply  not  possible.  He  made  his  own  position  in  the  running  of 
the  navy  indispensable  so  that  there  was  no  possibility  of  losing  any 
political  control,  but  as  a  result  he  created  a  system  that  could  not  cope 
effectively  in  his  absence. 
This  fear  of  delegation  can  also  be  seen  in  the  military  control  of 
the  navy.  Christian  IV  failed  to  appreciate  the  need  to  train  his  officers 
until  it  was  too  late,  nor  did  he  introduce  any  effective  system  of  com- 
mand  for  the  navy  when  it  went  to  sea.  It  is  not  surprising  therefore  to 
find  that  he  was  one  of  the  last  monarchs  to  personally  command  his  fleet 
at  sea.  He  simply  could  not  bear  anyone  else  to  take  control  from  his  own 
hands,  even  if  it  meant  that  in  his  absence  the  navy  proved  highly  inef- 
fective.  He,  apparently  deliberately,  appointed  men  to  the  post  of  rigsad- 
miral  who  knew  little  of  naval  matters  so  that  they  would  pose  no  threat 
to  his  own  authority. 
The  failure  to  reform  the  navy's  higher  administration  also  reflects 
Christian  IV's  failings  in  political  skill.  He  could  very  easily  put  his  ideas 
about  shipbuilding  and  dockyard  construction  into  practice  by  force,  but 
it  was  not  possible  to  push  through  contentious  political  reform  this  way. 
He  lacked  the  guile  and  diplomacy  that  were  required  to  achieve  any  form 
of  effective  administrative  reform,  added  to  which  he  also  lost  interest  if 
he  was  unable  to  achieve  his  ends  quickly.  Even  if  he  did  want  to  reform 
the  navy's  higher  administration  it  is  unlikely  that  he  would  have  had 
the  skill  or  the  patience  to  accomplish  it. 
Christian  IV  liked  to  think  of  himself  as  a  warrior  king  who  could 
personally  save  the  nation  from  any  threat.  In  practice  his  strategic  and 
tactical  thinking  was  poor,  and  the  blame  for  the  navy's  defeat  in  the 
Torstenssonkrig  can  be  placed  firmly  on  his  shoulders.  He  could  of 
course  blame  his  subordinate  officers,  but  it  was  he  who  failed  to  train 
výa3 
them  properly,  and  it  /he  who  formulated  the  strategies  that  they  were 
expected  to  follow. 
441 We  therefore  come  to  the  strange  paradox  that  Christian  IV  not 
only  built  up  the  Danish  navy  to  an  impressive  and  unprecedented 
strength  but  that  he  was  also  ultimately  responsible  for  its  humiliating 
defeat.  This  was  due  to  his  character  traits  that  meant  that  he  spent 
nearly  all  his  time  and  energy  concentrating  on  concrete  matters  that  he 
could  see,  such  as  ships  and  dockyards,  but  failed  to  take  into  con- 
sideration  any  abstract  concepts,  such  as  administration  and  command 
structures,  which  might  be  needed  to  make  these  things  work  effectively. 
He  also  devoted  too  much  time  on  the  minor  details  of  things  rather  than 
looking  at  the  bigger  picture.  He  spent  vast  amounts  of  time  considering 
the  duties  of  minor  craftsmen  and  on  things  like  the  messing  arrange- 
ments  of  ordinary  seamen  while  failing  to  address  the  fact  that  his  of- 
ficers  lacked  any  basic  knowledge  of  seamanship  or  military  training. 
If  Christian  IV  had  abided  by  his  rigsrad's  wishes  the  Danish  navy 
would  have  remained  simply  a  powerful  regional  force,  and  most  likely 
would  have  suffered  defeat  at  the  hands  of  Sweden  even  earlier.  Despite 
the  opposition  of  his  council  Christian  IV  managed  to  built  up  a  navy 
that,  in  terms  of  the  size  and  design  of  its  ships  and  dockyard  facilities, 
was  the  envy  of  Europe.  However,  there  were  serious  flaws  in  the  navy 
that  he  created.  It  was  far  larger  than  the  economy  of  Denmark-Norway 
could  sustain  and  very  nearly  bankrupted  the  state.  Its  administration 
was  inefficient  and  outmoded,  and  its  leadership  lay  in  the  hands  of  a 
monarch  who  was  politically  and  strategically  naive. 
In  conclusion  we  can  say  that  the  Danish  navy  was  Christian  IV's 
own  creation,  and  in  many  ways  it  reflected  his  own  character.  It  was 
large,  it  was  impressive,  and  it  consumed  vast  amounts  of  money,  but  ul- 
timately  it  proved  to  be  ineffectual  and  ended  in  humiliating  defeat. 
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The  Rigsarkiv  Ship  Drawing  Collection 
In  1832  a  collection  of  nine  architectural  and  ships  plans  was  discovered 
in  the  loft  of  Rosenborg  palace,  and  subsequently  placed  in  the  Danish 
state  archives'.  All  are  drawn  in  ink  on  stiff  card.  They  vary  in  quality 
from  rough  sketch  plans  to  highly  accomplished  working  drawings,  and 
because  Christian  IV's  handwriting  was  found  on  one  of  them  they  were 
all  initially  thought  to  have  been  drawn  by  the  king. 
In  the  1960s  Preben  Holck  identified,  incorrectly  as  it  turns  out, 
two  of  the  plans  as  Sinclair's  Store  Sophie  and  Robbins'  Sophie  Amalie2. 
In  the  1970s  H.  C.  Bjerg  stated  rather  vaguely  that  they  dated  from  the 
1640s  or  earlier  and  that  some  may  have  had  a  connection  with  Balfour 
and  Sinclair3.  However,  the  latest  research  by  Niels  Probst  has  shown 
that  some  were  in  fact  drawn  by  Christian  IV,  and  others  can  be  iden- 
tified  definitively  as  the  work  of  Balfour4. 
The  majority  of  these  plans  are  not  elaborate  theoretical  plans  or 
presentation  drawings  but  genuine  working  drawings  displaying  the  art  of 
shipwrightry  as  practised  by  Balfour,  and  as  attempted  by  Christian  IV. 
The  drawings  abound  with  tracing  marks,  pin  pricks  and  construction 
lines,  showing  that  they  were  used  to  take  measurements  from  during  the 
-------------------- 
1.  Rigsarkiv,  S4etatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  1-9. 
2.  P.  Holck,  'Orlogsskibet  Sancte  Sophia's  Konstructionstegning  (1624)',  Tidsskrift  for  Spvasen, 
1960,151-9;  'Skibsmodellen  Sophia  Amalia',  Tidsskrift  for  Spvasen,  1964,517-33. 
3.  H.  C.  Bjerg,  'S$etatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling:  En  proveniensoversigt',  Arkiv,  4/4  (1973),  209- 
31;  'Trek  of  skibskonstructionstegningens  historie'  Convivium,  (1977),  8-23. 
4.  Niels  Probst,  'Wasser-alen:  et  hidtil  overset  1aengdemAl  fra  Christian  IV's  tid',  Historisk 
tidsskrifi;  92  (1992),  288-300;  'Nordeurop-misk  spanteopslagning  1  1500-  og  1600-tallet',  Maritim 
Kontakt:  16  (1993),  7-42. 
443 construction  process  or  copied  to  provide  other  shipwrights  with  copies 
of  the  plans.  These  plans  are  therefore  the  earliest  known  working  ships 
drawings  in  existence. 
The  provenance  of  the  plans  is  something  of  a  mystery.  The 
shipwright's  art  was  traditionally  a  trade  secret  to  be  disclosed  only  to 
one's  peers  or  apprentices.  Ships  plans  at  this  time  were  also  considered 
to  be  the  private  property  of  the  shipwright,  regardless  of  the  clients. 
How  then  did  Balfour's  plans  end  up  in  the  hands  of  the  king? 
The  Recompens  affairs  may  provide  some  clues.  This  ship  may  have 
been  intended  as  a  copy  of  Argo,  as  Tre  kroner  was  supposed  to  have 
been.  In  the  course  of  the  enquiry  the  plans  of  these  two  ships,  and 
possibly  also  the  rudder  detail,  may  have  been  submitted  as  evidence. 
However,  this  does  not  explain  the  presence  of  any  of  the  other  later 
ships  plans.  When  Svend  Andersen  died  his  widow  apparently  offered  the 
king  the  plans  of  a  number  of  ships7  and  it  may  be  that  the  king  ac- 
quired  Balfour's  plans  in  a  similar  way. 
The  contents  of  the  collection  are  as  follows: 
-------------------- 
5.  James  Robbins  refused  to  hand  over  the  plans  of  a  ship  to  the  king  in  1664,  as  did  Francis 
Sheldon  in  1691.  Preben  Holck,  Cort  Adeler,  (K40benhavn,  1934),  108  &  125. 
6.  See  Chapter  8. 
7.  H.  D.  Lind,  Kong  Frederik  den  Tredjes  Scbmagt:  Det  dansk-norske  spvarns  historie  1646-1670. 
(K$benhavn,  1896),  38. 
444 Des.  E.  1. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  1.  ) 
A  cross  section  of  a  barge  drawn  by  Christian  IV.  It  bears  the  in- 
scription  Tenne  Skalun  Er  giordt  tiill  thuende  Pramme,  Som  y 
wynter  paa  Bremmerholmen  skall  opsettis,  Och  Er  affdelingen  der 
paa  giiordt  Epther  tommer.  Kpben:  Slott  den  23  Octo:  Anno  1640' 
(this  model  is  made  for  two  barges  which  shall  be  built  at 
Bremerholm  this  winter,  and  the  section  done  according  to  the 
timber)8. 
This  plan  is  rather  crudely  drawn  and  shows  a  very  simplis- 
tic  construction.  The  hull  cross  section  is  composed  simply  of  two 
quarter  arcs  joined  by  a  flat  bottom.  There  is  no  keel.  The  deck  is 
completely  flat  but  is  supported  by  pillars.  The  deck  house  is  of  a 
very  light  construction. 
Side  2.  (Not  illustrated) 
Detail  of  the  architectural  decorations  showing  the  motto,  C4 
monogram  and  date  for  the  Round  Tower.  This  shows  the  date  1640, 
whereas  the  actual  tower  bears  the  date  1642. 
-------------------- 
8.  Inscription  on  plan  dated  23  October  1640,  C4  Brevq  IV,  416. 
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446 Des.  E.  2. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  2.  ) 
The  forward  profile,  plan  and  midship  section  of  a  large  three- 
decked  warship.  This  has  become  separated  from  the  middle  portion 
of  the  plan  (Des.  E.  7.  ),  and  the  after  portion,  which  is  lost.  This 
ship  is  now  identified  as  Balfour's  Tre  kroner  of  1604. 
Side  2.  (Figure  A.  3.  ) 
The  aft  profile  and  plan  of  a  large  three-decked  vessel.  It  has  be- 
come  separated  from  the  forward  portion  of  the  plan  (Des.  E.  3.  ). 
This  ship  is  now  identified  as  Balfour's  Argo  of  1601. 
Des.  E.  3. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  3.  ) 
The  forward  profile  and  plan  of  Argo. 
Side  2.  (Figure  A.  4.  ) 
The  midship  section  of  a  galley.  The  section  shows  a  classic 
mediterranean-style  galley  and  may  be  connected  with  the  galleys 
built  by  Balfour  on  his  arrival  in  Denmark  in  the  late  1590s.  This 
plan  also  contains  a  faint  impression  of  another  identical  galley 
section  and  the  working  drawings  of  the  stern  frames  for  two 
ships,  which  Probst  links  to  Argo  and  Tre  kroner.  At  the  side  of 
the  stern  frame  workings  is  written  'Gud  fader  verre  loffuett  och 
hands  Kierre  Scpnn'  (Father  God  be  praised  and  his  dear  son). 
447 Figure  A.  2.  S4etatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  2. 
448 Figure  A.  3.  Spetatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  2.  &  E.  3. 
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Figure  A.  4.  S4etatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  3.  (Detail) 
450 Des  E.  4. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  5.  ) 
A  crudely  drawn  midship  section  of  a  one  decked  warship.  Certain 
features  distinguish  this  from  a  professional  shipwright's  drawing. 
Firstly  the  deck  beams  have  been  drawn  to  the  outer  edge  of  the 
ribs,  rather  than  the  conventional  inside  edge.  Secondly  there  is  a 
very  pronounced  kink  in  the  curvature  above  the  main  deck.  In  a 
number  of  places  the  author  of  the  sketch  has  obviously  had  dif- 
ficulty  in  obtaining  the  correct  curvature  and  there  is  evidence  of 
a  large  degree  of  re-drawing  of  arcs.  In  many  places  the  lines  also 
do  not  match  up.  Given  these  facts  it  is  possible  that  this  plan  was 
also  drawn  by  Christian  IV. 
This  plan  has  been  speculatively  linked  with  Michelsen's 
Fides9  and  certainly  bears  some  similarity  with  the  contract 
specification  10.  On  the  plan  are  noted  some  of  the  scantlings,  these 
are  similar,  though  not  identical,  with  those  stipulated  in  the  con- 
tract.  The  plan  may  therefore  have  been  drawn  as  part  of  the 
process  of  ordering  the  ship  from  Michelsen.  With  Balfour,  the  only 
shipwright  skilled  in  drawing  plans  in  Denmark,  in  prison  at  this 
time  it  is  not  unlikely  therefore  that  Christian  IV  would  have  tried 
his  own  hand  at  drawing  the  ship. 
Side  2.:  Blank 
------  ------------- 
9.  Personal  communication  with  Niels  Probst. 
10.  See  Chapter  10. 
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Figure  A.  5.  SOetatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  4. 
452 Des.  E.  5. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  6.  ) 
A  crudely  drawn  midship  section  of  a  two  decked  ship.  This  plan  is 
undoubtedly  by  the  same  hand  that  drew  Des.  E.  4,  and  bears  the 
same  stylistic  flaws  and  evidence  of  reworking.  It  also  contains  a 
small  geometrical  'flower'  as  if  drawn  by  someone  doodling  or  prac- 
tising  the  use  of  a  compass.  This  drawing  cannot  be  linked  to  any 
known  ship. 
Side  2.:  Blank 
Des.  E.  6. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  7.  ) 
Forward  profile  and  plan  of  a  small  one  decked  warship.  This  shows 
certain  similarities  to  the  plan  of  Hummeren  (Des.  E.  9.  )  but  is  a 
little  smaller  and  finer.  The  after  part  of  the  plan  has  been  lost. 
Side  2.  (Not  Illustrated) 
A  plan  of  a  fantasy  fortification. 
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Figure  A.  6.  S$etatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  5. 
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Figure  A.  7.  S4etatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  6. 
455 Des.  E.  7. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  8.  ) 
Profiles  and  midship  sections  of  two  ships.  The  first  is  a  full- 
bodied  one  decked  vessel.  It  contains  nine  gun  ports  on  the  main 
deck  and  two  each  in  the  forecastle  and  quarterdeck,  giving  an 
approximate  cannon  carrying  capacity  of  28-30  depending  on  the 
number  of  bow  and  stern  chasers.  It  has  a  keel  length  of  46  alen 
(28.8m)  and  a  breadth  of  14  alen  (8.8m).  The  other  ship  is  a  smaller 
one  decked  vessel  with  seven  gun  ports  on  the  main  deck  and  none 
in  its  smaller  forecastle  and  quarterdecks,  giving  a  cannon  carry- 
ing  capacity  of  around  14-16.  It  has  a  keel  of  30  alen  (18.8m)  and  a 
breadth  of  9  alen  (5.6m).  Although  Balfour  was  almost  certainly  the 
author  of  these  plans  the  ships  cannot  be  identified  and  may  well 
be  just  design  proposals,  rather  than  built  vessels. 
Side  2.  (Not  Illustrated) 
The  middle  section  of  the  plan  of  Tre  kroner,  as  discussed  above. 
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Figure  A.  8.  Soetatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  7. 
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457 Des.  E.  8. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  9.  ) 
The  design  of  a  defensionskib.  This  ship  is  a  bluff-bowed,  full- 
bodied  single  decked  vessel  with  a  large  hold  and  11  gun  ports  on 
the  main  deck.  It  may  be  connected  with  the  ordinance  for  the  es- 
tablishment  of  the  defensionskibe  fleet  of  1630  which  stated  that 
the  ships  should  'opbygges  og  forferdiges  efter  den  Model  og 
Maneer,  som  vi  sely  med  vor  egen  Skibbyggerne  ville  did  opstikke' 
(be  built  and  completed  after  the  model  and  manner  which  we  with 
our  shipwrights  will  outline)".  Alternatively  it  may  be  connected 
with  one  of  the  defensionskibe  that  Balfour  built  himself.  Beneath 
the  top  layer  of  paper  can  be  discerned  another  similar  design, 
which  was  presumably  superseded. 
Side  2.  (Not  Illustrated) 
Detail  of  a  rudder.  It  would  be  tempting  to  link  this  drawing  to 
Recompens,  the  design  of  whose  rudder  was  explicitly  mentioned 
during  the  construction  process12,  but  there  is  no  evidence  to  con- 
nect  it  to  any  particular  ship. 
Des.  E.  9. 
Side  1.  (Figure  A.  10.  ) 
The  profile,  midship  section  and  plan  of  a  medium  sized  one-decked 
warship.  This  ship  is  now  identified  as  Balfour's  Hummeren  of  1624. 
Side  2.:  Blank 
-------------------- 
11.  Ordinance,  27  March  1630,  Norske  rigsregistranter,  VI,  213-5. 
12.  See  Chapter  B. 
458 Figure  A.  9.  S4etatens  kort-  og  tegningssamling,  Des.  E.  8. 
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